Rolandis Chatmon v. Dexter Payne, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction , 2023 Ark. 77 ( 2023 )

Cite as 2023 Ark. 77SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-22-599
Opinion Delivered: May 11, 2023
ROLANDIS CHATMON
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE LINCOLN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 40CV-22-55]
HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS,
DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, JUDGE
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION AFFIRMED.
APPELLEE
JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice
Appellant Rolandis Chatmon appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s denial and
dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the county where he is
incarcerated pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl. 2016). For
reversal, Chatmon argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition. We affirm.
I. Facts
In 2013, a Faulkner County Circuit Court jury found Chatmon guilty of three counts
of aggravated robbery and one count of theft of property. He was sentenced as a habitual
offender with a firearm enhancement to three life sentences, plus 360 months’
imprisonment, to be served consecutively. We affirmed in Chatmon v. State, 2015 Ark. 28,
467 S.W.3d 731.
On May 13, 2022, Chatmon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
his convictions were invalid because Michael Maggio, the circuit judge who presided over his
trial, did not legally hold the position. Chatmon argued to the circuit court that Maggio was
not authorized to act on behalf of the Twentieth Judicial District. The circuit court denied
and dismissed the habeas petition, finding that Chatmon failed to offer evidence establishing
probable cause that he was being illegally detained, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, or the
commitment order was invalid on its face.
II. Argument
A. Writ of Habeas Corpus
Chatmon reasserts his arguments on appeal and challenges the circuit court’s denial
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment
and commitment order is invalid on its face or when a trial court lacked jurisdiction over
the case. Myers v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 156, at 3. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear
and determine the subject matter in controversy. Green v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 157, at 2. When
the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and also has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the court has authority to render the judgment. Id. at 2.
A petitioner who does not allege his or her actual innocence and proceed under Act
1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction
by the trial court and make a showing, by affidavit or other evidence, of probable cause to
believe that he or she is being illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl.
2016). Proceedings for the writ are not intended to require an extensive review of the record
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of the trial proceedings, and the circuit court’s inquiry into the validity of the judgment is
limited to the face of the commitment order. Jones v. Kelley, 2020 Ark. 290, 2–3. Unless the
petitioner can show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment order
was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should
issue. Fields v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 416, at 5.
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless
it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, at 5, 434 S.W.3d 364, at 367. A
decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate
court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Green, 2022 Ark. 157, at 3.
B. Claims for Relief
Chatmon argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction because Maggio did
not lawfully hold his office. First, Chatmon contends that Maggio was not authorized to act
on behalf of the Twentieth Judicial District. Specifically, he contends that Maggio’s
admission to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that he was not an agent of the State
government clearly supports his claim that Maggio was not authorized to act on behalf of the
judicial district or in the capacity of a circuit judge. In support, Chatmon cites United States
v. Maggio, 862 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2017), in which Maggio claimed that he was not an
agent of the state government. The Eighth Circuit stated that the “claim that Maggio was
not an agent of the state government was belied by his stipulation that he ‘was an agent of
the State of Arkansas and the Twentieth Judicial District.’” Id. at 646. It reasoned that it had
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“no doubt that when a judge issues an order remitting a judgment in a case before him, he
is acting in connection with the business of his court.” Id. at 647. It further stated that “the
relevant federally funded agency was the ‘the State of Arkansas, Twentieth Judicial District,
Second Division,’ the judicial body on which Maggio sat.” Id. Here, Chatmon’s argument
that Maggio lacked authority to enter the judgment in this matter is misplaced. Outside of
Chatmon’s self-serving assertion that Maggio’s argument to the Eighth Circuit serves as proof
that Maggio lacked authority to enter the judgment in this matter, Chatmon fails to
demonstrate that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment of conviction or
that the judgment was invalid on its face.
Second, Chatmon claims that Maggio, having been appointed to the second division,
was elected to that same division in violation of amendment 29, sections 1 and 2 of the
Arkansas Constitution. We have held on two prior occasions that Maggio was appointed to
serve in the Fourth Division of the Twentieth Judicial District and that he was subsequently
elected to the Second Division of the same judicial circuit. See Chatmon v. Kelley, 2020 Ark.
155, 598 S.W.3d 34; Chatmon v. State, 2019 Ark. 112. Because Maggio did not succeed
himself in violation of the Arkansas Constitution, Chatmon’s argument is meritless.
In furtherance of his second argument, Chatmon also contends that this court’s
reliance on its 2001 administrative plan violated his Fourteenth Amendment due-process
rights. In support of his argument, Chatmon cites Administrative Order No. 19 to access
evidence from the Secretary of State. Notably, Administrative Order No. 19 applies only to
court records and does not authorize access to information gathered, maintained, or stored
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by a nonjudicial governmental agency or other entity. Chatmon implies that evidence is
stored with the Arkansas Secretary of State and claims that it is the duty of this court and
the appellee to retrieve the records at his behest because this court is “ultimately responsible
for Maggio’s actions[,]” as “this [c]ourt had the authority to remove him.” Because Chatmon
does not identify the evidence that he expects this court or the appellee to unearth regarding
his claim, his argument fails.
Last, Chatmon argues that Maggio’s duties were limited to juvenile matters. Citing
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-2803 (Supp. 2009),1 Chatmon asserts that the
second division in the Twentieth Judicial District is designated as the juvenile division and
that Maggio’s sole obligation was to preside over juvenile cases during his thirteen-year
tenure, but he instead held the “office of judge[.]” Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-
210 (Supp. 2005) provides, “Any circuit judge of this state, at any time while mentally and
physically competent and physically present in the geographical area of the judicial circuit
which he or she serves as the judge, may hear, adjudicate, or render any appropriate order
with respect to any cause or matter pending in any circuit court over which he or she
presides[.]” Notwithstanding whether Maggio could hear juvenile matters, it does not
preclude him from trying other matters because all circuit judges have equal authority and
1
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-2803(b)(1) states that “[t]he judgeship
created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of the
chancery court and shall be designated division 2[.]” Effective July 1, 2007, an additional
circuit judgeship was created that has jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile
matters. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-2803(f)(1).
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responsibility. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-2803(b)(2); Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511,
593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that Chatmon has not alleged a
cognizable claim for habeas relief and has failed to demonstrate probable cause for issuance
of the writ. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial and dismissal of his petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
Special Justice CODY KEES joins.
WOOD, J., not participating.
Rolandis Chatmon, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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