Myron Anderson v. Dexter Payne, Director, Arkansas Division of Correction ( 2024 )

Cite as 2024 Ark. 129SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-23-845
Opinion Delivered: September 19, 2024
MYRON ANDERSON
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT
V.
[NO. 35CV-23-693]
DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, HONORABLE JODI RAINES
ARKANSAS DIVISION OF DENNIS, JUDGE
CORRECTION
APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice
In 2007, Myron Anderson was found guilty of five counts of committing a terroristic
act and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury imposed an aggregate
sentence of 1320 months’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. 1
Anderson now appeals the denial and dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed
in the county of his incarceration pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-
101 to -123 (Repl. 2016). Anderson’s habeas petition asserted claims that his conviction
was invalid because he was convicted under an incorrect version of Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-3-310(a)(2) (Repl. 2006). Specifically, he claims the trial court and the
prosecutor lacked the authority and jurisdiction to modify the 2005 hard-copy version of
the terroristic-act statute by removing the language “at an occupiable structure” from
1
Anderson v. State, CR-08-458 (Ark. App. Jan. 28, 2009) (unpublished) (original
docket no. CACR 08-458).
subdivision (a)(2). The circuit court found that Anderson failed to show that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment order is invalid on its face. We agree.
I. Writ of Habeas Corpus
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is invalid
on its face or when a trial court lacks jurisdiction over the cause.2 Jurisdiction is the power
of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy.3 When the trial court
has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and the subject matter of the case, the court has
authority to render the judgment.4 A trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and
determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes and has personal jurisdiction over
offenses committed within the county over which it presides.5
Under the statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his or her actual
innocence must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction and make a showing, by affidavit or other evidence, of probable cause that he
or she is being illegally detained.6 Proceedings for the writ do not require an extensive
review of the record of the trial proceedings, and the circuit court’s inquiry into the validity
2
Hutcherson v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 127, 644 S.W.3d 415.
3
Id.4
Id.5
Fuller/Akbar v. Payne, 2021 Ark. 155, 628 S.W.3d 366.
6
Id. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016)).
2
of the judgment is limited to the face of the commitment order. 7 Unless the petitioner can
show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment order was invalid on
its face, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. 8 In habeas
proceedings, an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. 9
II. Standard of Review
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless
it is clearly erroneous.10 A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence
to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.11
III. Claims for Relief
On appeal, as he did below, Anderson argues that removing the language “at an
occupiable structure” from Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-310(a)(2) changed the
meaning of the terroristic-act statute.12 Specifically, Anderson claims the prosecutor
7
Id.8
Id.9
See Hobbs v. Turner, 2014 Ark. 19, 431 S.W.3d 283.
10
Lowery v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 85, 665 S.W.3d 223.
11
Id.12
Anderson has previously argued that section 5-13-310 is inconsistent and that he
was not made aware that the offense be committed against an occupant of an occupiable
structure. See Anderson v. State, 2017 Ark. 357, 533 S.W.3d 64 (per curiam). A similar
claim was raised and rejected in a proceeding brought by Anderson’s brother and
codefendant, Michael. See Anderson v. State, 2013 Ark. 332 (per curiam). Anderson had
3
changed the jury instructions given at trial by removing the language “at an occupiable
structure” when that language was not removed from the statute, rendering his conviction
invalid.13 Assertions of error concerning jury instructions are allegations of trial error that
are not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.14 If there were errors at trial, those errors could,
and should, have been raised at trial and on the record on direct appeal and are thus not
within the purview of the remedy because the writ will not be issued to correct errors or
irregularities that occurred at trial.15
Moreover, to the extent Anderson attempts to couch his claim for habeas relief as
one involving statutory interpretation, his argument is nothing more than a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Anderson argues that the court should have interpreted
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-310(a)(2), the statute under which he and his
brother were charged and convicted, instead of erring in its interpretation of subdivision
raised a related “statutory” argument in a prior, unrelated appeal. See Anderson v. State, 2017
Ark. 44, 510 S.W.3d 755 (per curiam).
13
Anderson’s brother raised a similar claim in a Rule 37.1 appeal in which he argued
that counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to challenge jury instructions on the basis
that the instructions did not follow the electronic version of section 5-13-310, thereby
depriving him of a jury trial as to each element of a terroristic act. See Anderson, 2013 Ark.
332. This court determined that the instructions tracked the elements of a terroristic act as
set out in the hard-copy version of section 5-13-310 in effect when Anderson’s brother
committed the crimes. See id.14
Garrison v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 8, 534 S.W.3d 136.
15
Stephenson v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 143, 544 S.W.3d 44.
4
(a)(1) in his brother’s case.16 Claims for habeas relief that are conclusory in nature do not
demonstrate a basis for the writ to issue.17 Anderson’s claim is conclusory and vague and, if
nothing else, references Michael’s Rule 37.1 appeal as the basis for his claim of trial error.
Yet habeas corpus will not be issued to correct errors or irregularities that occurred at trial.18
Likewise, habeas action does not afford a petitioner the opportunity to retry his or her case,
much less another petitioner’s case.19
Affirmed.
Myron Anderson, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
16
Although Anderson’s argument on appeal references the Arkansas Court of Appeals,
his citation is to Anderson, 2013 Ark. 332, his brother’s Rule 37.1 appeal, which was decided
by this court.
17
Jones v. State, 2019 Ark. 12, 565 S.W.3d 100.
18
Stephenson, 2018 Ark. 143, 544 S.W.3d 44.
19
See Hill v. Kelley, 2022 Ark. 3.
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