Jacoby Goehler v. State of Arkansas ( 2023 )

Cite as 2023 Ark. 186SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-23-72
Opinion Delivered: December 7, 2023
JACOBY GOEHLER
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FULTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 25CR-21-35]
V.
HONORABLE TIM WEAVER, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED.
APPELLEE
CODY HILAND, Associate Justice
On October 21, 2022, a jury in the Fulton County Circuit Court found Jacoby
Goehler guilty of the first-degree murder of Davidlee Stansbury and sentenced him to life
in prison, plus fifteen years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Goehler appeals his
conviction. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Crime and Arrest
In early April 2021, Goehler walked into his living room to find his sister telling their
parents that Goehler’s best friend, Stansbury, had raped her in the previous year. Testimony
revealed the Goehler family previously moved to Salem, Arkansas, after Goehler’s brother
was sexually assaulted in Oklahoma. Additionally, not only did Goehler’s wife attempt
suicide just hours before Goehler learned about his sister and Stansbury, but also, Goehler’s
mother historically struggled with drug abuse and bipolar disorder.
After Goehler told his friend, Travis Barker, that he believed his sister’s accusation,
he traveled to Barker’s home in Jefferson City, Missouri, on April 22, 2021. While there,
Barker showed Goehler a handgun he had recently repaired. Later that night, Goehler told
Barker he wanted to kill Stansbury. Barker replied, “Let’s go.” In possession of the
aforementioned gun, the two men left Barker’s home in Goehler’s truck and drove back to
Salem, Arkansas.
Goehler called Stansbury on the road and convinced him to accompany Goehler to
a remote place to pick up a fictitious bag of drugs. Goehler dropped Barker off at Barker’s
Arkansas property where he waited while Goehler picked up Stansbury at approximately
4:00 a.m. Upon arrival, the three walked into the woods, scaled a fence, and entered a more
secluded area. As they walked, Goehler repeatedly asked Stansbury if he had raped Goehler’s
sister. Stansbury denied doing so.
Eventually the group stopped near a large boulder. Goehler asked Stansbury once
more whether he had raped Goehler’s sister, and Stansbury again said no. Goehler then took
out the pistol and shot Stansbury in the hand. Goehler then shot him again, this time in the
head. After Stansbury had fallen, Goehler stood over him and shot him a third time, again,
in the head. Goehler then directed Barker to help him look for the shell casings, but they
could not find them. They left Stansbury’s body and drove back to Barker’s Missouri home.
Goehler returned to Salem the next day where he met his wife at their home and
told her he shot Stansbury three times, killing him as revenge for the rape. While Goehler’s
parents and brother were also present, it is not clear whether they overheard the
conversation. Later that same evening, Goehler called his squad leader in the Arkansas
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National Guard and asked for a lawyer because he had killed someone. The squad leader
eventually put Goehler in touch with the commanding officer. After Goehler informed him
he had shot his best friend, the commanding officer contacted another National Guard
member employed by the Arkansas State Police, and Goehler was arrested.
While in custody, Goehler told a Fulton County jail detainee he had shot Stansbury.
After the police Mirandized Goehler, Goehler requested counsel, and law enforcement
stopped all questioning and contacted the public defender. Goehler’s counsel then told
police not to speak with Goehler anymore.
After three days passed following Goehler’s arrest, the search for Stansbury’s body
was unsuccessful. A deputy then told Fulton County Sheriff Al Roark that Goehler wanted
to speak with him. Roark approached Goehler’s jail cell, and Goehler asked if they could
talk. Roark agreed, but he told Goehler he would not ask any questions. When Goehler
heard a search helicopter fly by, he asked Roark if the police had found Stansbury’s body.
Roark said no. Goehler replied that they would not find it, then asked to call his lawyer.
Roark tried to get the public defender on the phone, but he was out of state on vacation.
Goehler then asked to call his wife. After the call ended, Goehler motioned Roark over and
said, “If you’ll let me smoke a cigarette[,] I’ll take you to the body.” When Roark told
Goehler he ought to talk to his attorney, Goehler refused, saying, “You’re not going to find
him, but I’ll take you to him.”
Roark again Mirandized Goehler, after which Goehler rode along to guide the police
to Stansbury’s body. He showed the officers where they should be able to find spent shell
casings, of which they found two, both from the same 9mm handgun. They did not recover
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the murder weapon. After they returned to the jail, law enforcement filed the criminal
information and officially charged Goehler with murder in the first degree.
B. Circuit Court Proceedings
On May 13, 2021, Goehler’s defense attorney filed a motion with the Circuit Court
of Fulton County to suppress statements Goehler made while in police custody without his
attorney present. The court did not hold a suppression hearing and made no rulings
regarding those statements.
Over a year later, the defense moved to change venue, claiming that public interest
in the case was significant and so adverse to Goehler that his trial would be unfair. The
pretrial process continued, including routine voir dire of the jury. On October 19, 2022,
the first day of trial, the court denied Goehler’s motion for change of venue.
The State called Goehler’s wife as a witness, and Goehler claimed that spousal
privilege allowed him to prevent her from testifying. The court allowed her to testify,
though it sustained a hearsay objection Goehler later raised regarding Stansbury’s last words.
On the second day of trial, the State introduced an autopsy photograph of Stansbury’s
face and the uppermost portion of his torso. The court admitted the photograph over
Goehler’s objection that it was substantially more prejudicial than probative.
At the end of trial, Goehler requested that the court give jury instructions regarding
the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and second-degree murder. The court denied
this request as well, and on October 21, 2022, Goehler was convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to life in prison plus fifteen years for using a firearm.
II. Points on Appeal
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A. Goehler’s Incriminating Statements
Goehler maintains that the trial court erred in admitting incriminating statements he
made in police custody without counsel present as well as statements made after he requested
counsel and after counsel directed police to no longer speak with Goehler.
This court generally will not hear issues of error that were not preserved below.
Goehler did not object to this evidence at trial. But he asserts that this court can nevertheless
address this issue for the first time on appeal through an exception outlined in Marshall v.
State, 316 Ark. 753, 760, 875 S.W.2d 814, 819 (1994). He then argues we should weigh
the totality of the circumstances and find that the trial court’s admission of Goehler’s
statements into evidence violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights according to Bussard
v. State, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71 (1988).
1. The Wicks exception
In four circumstances, this court may review an issue of error not presented to the
trial court. See Marshall, 316 Ark. at 760, 875 S.W.2d at 819. Goehler’s proffered exception
arises “when evidentiary errors affect a defendant’s substantial rights although they were not
brought to the court’s attention.” Id. We first recognized this exception in Wicks v. State,
considering it arguably possible based on language in Uniform Evidence Rule 103(d) that
we reasoned could apply “at most . . . only to a ruling to admit or exclude evidence.” 270
Ark. 781, 787, 606 S.W.2d 366, 370 (1980).
Here, the trial court made no such ruling. While the record shows that the defense
filed a motion to suppress, among other things, “[a]ny statement or statements made by
[Goehler],” it contains no transcript of a suppression hearing for this court to review. Absent
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a ruling, and given this exception’s restricted scope, we decline to extend it to the facts of
this case; thus, we affirm the trial court on this point. We need not analyze this case under
Bussard because no exception shields Goehler from the general rule that this court does not
address issues of error not preserved below. See Bussard, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71.
B. Goehler’s Motion for Change of Venue
This court reviews a denial of a motion to change venue for abuse of discretion.
Porter v. State, 359 Ark. 323, 324, 197 S.W.3d 445, 446 (2004). A trial court properly grants
change of venue if it is clear the defendant could not likely receive a fair trial in the county.
Id. The law does not entitle a defendant to jurors who are ignorant of his case, but only to
those jurors who can set aside any impressions they might have and make decisions based
on the evidence alone. Id. at 324, 197 S.W.3d at 446–47.
Because voir dire sufficiently protects a defendant against publicity before trial, the
court does not err in denying a motion for change of venue when the transcript shows that
the court selected an impartial jury. Tucker v. State, 2011 Ark. 144, at 17, 381 S.W.3d 1, 11.
Here, the record reveals a robust voir dire involving fifty-four potential jurors and a 113-
page transcript. The parties made their allotted strikes from the panel to their satisfaction.
When potential jurors expressed concerns about their fitness to serve, the trial court
respectively dismissed or retained them after careful questioning and deliberation with both
sides. Finally, most potential jurors’ concerns were personal and independent of public
interest, social media, or other coverage about the case. The potential jurors who said public
opinion had swayed them were excused by the court after both parties agreed.
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The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Goehler’s motion to change venue,
and Goehler has not shown that his trial was unfair because of this denial. Accordingly, we
affirm.
C. Testimony of Goehler’s Wife
When the State called Goehler’s wife as a witness, Goehler sought to exclude her
testimony pursuant to the spousal-privilege rule. Ark. R. Evid. 504. Rule 504 allows a
criminal defendant to prevent his or her spouse from testifying about anything the two
communicated in confidence exclusively to one another. At trial, Goehler argued that what
he had told his wife, he had told no one else, and intended to keep the communication
between the two of them. The State disagreed, characterizing the testimony as little more
than repeating what Goehler had already told others, and therefore, it was unprivileged.
The trial court permitted Goehler’s wife to testify.
On appeal, Goehler maintains that his wife’s testimony included confidential,
privileged matters. The State responds that Goehler waived his privilege concerning
anything significant that he disclosed to third parties under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 510.
In admitting the testimony of Goehler’s wife, the trial court made an evidentiary
ruling this court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bragg v. State, 2023
Ark. 66, at 7, 663 S.W.3d 375, 380. Abuse of discretion requires thoughtlessness,
improvidence, or lack of due consideration on the trial court’s part—not merely error. Id.
at 7, 663 S.W.3d at 381.
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 504(b) extends the spousal privilege to “confidential
communication between the accused and the spouse,” and Rule 504(a) defines
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“confidential” as what is private and meant to remain that way. Rule 510 negates that
privilege once the defendant chooses to share with a nonspouse “any significant part of the
privileged matter.”
Yet waiver need not pertain to this case. The parties stipulated that Goehler told his
wife and others that he had killed Stansbury. That fact, then, was never privileged under
Rule 504. Goehler contests the admission of his wife’s testimony about how many times he
shot Stansbury, but Goehler’s friend and accomplice, Travis Barker, also testified that he
saw Goehler shoot Stansbury three times. So this fact likewise enjoyed no Rule 504
privilege. Even if it had been privileged when Goehler’s wife presented it, Barker’s identical
testimony would have come before the jury.
All that remains at issue is the testimony of Goehler’s wife revealing Stansbury’s last
words, which the trial court excluded by sustaining Goehler’s hearsay objection. Though it
was too late to “unring” the bell, the jury simply hearing this testimony did not prejudice
Goehler. Goehler could have requested a limiting instruction but did not do so. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm on this point.
D. The Photograph of the Victim
On the second day of trial, the State offered into evidence a photograph of Stansbury.
Goehler objected and argued that the “grotesque” photograph, which depicts Stansbury’s
partially decomposed face and the tops of his shoulders but does not show the wounds that
caused his death, was substantially more prejudicial than probative. The State asserted the
evidence tended to show that Goehler purposely killed Stansbury. The court admitted the
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photograph over Goehler’s objection, reasoning that the image showed the jury “the
consequence of what the State is saying is purposeful conduct.”
We reverse a trial court’s admission of photographs only if that admission abused the
court’s discretion. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 461, at 9, 385 S.W.3d 214, 220–21.
Generally, photographs clarifying testimony are admissible; a trial court need not exclude
such a photograph merely because it is inflammatory or cumulative. Robertson v. State, 2011
Ark. 196, at 4. Even a “gruesome” photograph may come in if it can assist the jury in any
of several ways, including “showing the condition of the victim’s body.” Id.The record contains a bench discussion over the photograph. Both parties had
sufficient opportunity to argue their perspectives on its relevance and potential prejudicial
effect. Before admitting the photograph, the court conceded it was “difficult to look at,”
but went on to explain that to see the condition of Stansbury’s body would help the jury
better understand the result of Goehler’s actions and decide whether his conduct was
purposeful; an element of the first-degree murder charge. These were proper, adequately
reasoned grounds to admit the photograph despite its graphic nature.
The trial court was neither thoughtless nor improvident, nor did it fail to duly
consider the matter. We affirm.
E. The Jury Instructions on Lesser-Included Offenses
At the close of evidence, Goehler sought to introduce jury instructions on
manslaughter, which means to cause someone’s death under otherwise murderous
circumstances while experiencing “extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable excuse.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). The trial court ruled
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there was no rational basis for a manslaughter instruction. Goehler then sought instruction
on second-degree murder, which can involve a knowing killing “under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-
103(a)(1). The trial court likewise found no rational basis for this instruction, reasoning that
there was no doubt Goehler purposely killed Stansbury.
We review a trial court’s rulings concerning jury instructions for abuse of discretion.
Marshall v. State, 2021 Ark. 158, at 3, 627 S.W.3d 810, 811. If even the slightest evidence
supports giving an instruction, a trial court commits reversible error by refusing to give it.
Id. But a trial court need not give instructions on a lesser-included offense unless there is a
rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the charged crime and instead convicting him
of the lesser. Id., at 3, 627 S.W.3d at 812; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(c).
1. Manslaughter
Goehler would have this court consider several facts: (1) Goehler’s sister said that
Stansbury had raped her; (2) Goehler’s wife attempted suicide; (3) Goehler’s family suffered
other sexual abuses; and (4) Goehler’s accomplice, Travis Barker, encouraged Goehler to
act. Goehler argues these facts support a manslaughter instruction because they are at least
slight evidence he killed Stansbury in the heat of reasonably excusable passion.
With the exception of Travis Barker, none of the other events occurred in the
timeframe immediately preceding the murder of Stansbury. We have repeatedly held that a
killing meriting a manslaughter instruction must occur “in the moment following some kind
of provocation” like a fight or threat. See Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. 433, at 4 (per curiam).
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Goehler waited nearly three weeks before visiting Barker, discovering Barker had a
gun, and devising a plan to lure Stansbury to a remote location in the woods under a false
premise of finding drugs. As he, Stansbury, and Barker walked through the woods, Goehler
repeatedly asked Stansbury if he had raped Goehler’s sister, which Stansbury denied each
time. There is no evidence that either of these men ever threatened one another along the
way, and Goehler was the only one armed. When the group eventually stopped near a
boulder, Goehler shot Stansbury––not during a struggle––but while standing some feet
away. The first bullet passed through Stansbury’s hand, and before Stansbury could do more
than express confusion and surprise, Goehler shot him in the head at closer range. Then,
after standing over Stansbury’s body for some moments, Goehler shot him again in the head.
These circumstances do not lend themselves to a manslaughter instruction because
they do not demonstrate Stansbury (or anyone or anything else) provoked Goehler by
threatening or fighting with him just before he fired the shots. Instead, they reveal calculated
action. The trial court did not err when it found no rational basis for acquitting Goehler of
his charged crime, first-degree murder, and instead convicting him of manslaughter. And it
did not err in refusing to give such instructions to the jury.
2. Second-degree murder
Goehler argues that the following evidence supports an instruction for second-degree
murder: (1) Goehler shot Stansbury first in the hand; (2) the two men were several feet
apart; and (3) they were deep in the woods at night. His position is that these facts could
lead a jury to believe that Goehler killed Stansbury under circumstances showing his extreme
indifference to the value of human life. The State responds that the law does not require
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second-degree-murder instructions when fatal gunshot wounds are not point-blank; it was
not too dark for the men to scale a fence to reach the place where Goehler stopped them
or for Goehler to shoot Stansbury in the head twice; and the location’s remoteness highlights
that Goehler’s actions were purposeful.
We agree with the State that Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001),
controls the outcome here. In Britt, we affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury
on second-degree murder where all the evidence revealed a purposeful, execution-style
killing, and there was no evidence that the defendant had acted with any mental state other
than with the purpose of killing the victims. Id. at 23, 38 S.W.3d at 370. Reincorporating
the facts mentioned above, there was no evidence that Goehler acted only knowingly and
with extreme indifference. On the contrary, the evidence shows that he formed and then
realized a plan for the purpose of taking Stansbury’s life.
III. Rule 4-3(a) Review
Because Goehler received a life sentence, the record has been examined for all
objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to him
in compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a) (2021), and no prejudicial error
has been found.
Affirmed.
Digby Law Firm, by: Mathew R. Ingle, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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