McNeely v. State , 2017 Ark. App. LEXIS 558 ( 2017 )


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  •                                 Cite as 
    2017 Ark. App. 483
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION I
    No. CR-17-29
    Opinion Delivered   September 27, 2017
    CHRISTOPHER JORDAN MCNEELY
    APPELLANT                     APPEAL FROM THE VAN BUREN
    COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    V.                                              [NO. 71CR-15-98]
    STATE OF ARKANSAS                               HONORABLE H.G. FOSTER, JUDGE
    APPELLEE
    AFFIRMED
    N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge
    Following a bench trial in the Van Buren County Circuit Court, Christopher Jordan
    McNeely was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced as a habitual
    offender to ten years’ imprisonment. On appeal, McNeely challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence that supported his conviction and argues that the sentencing phase of the trial and
    resulting sentence were “illegal and unfair.” We affirm.
    Officers James Burroughs and Jay Murdock of the Clinton Police Department testified
    about responding to the residence of Michael and Cindy Fritts for a report of gunfire on the
    night of September 4, 2015. Burroughs said that it was not against the law to shoot guns in
    that location, and they were just going to tell them to “knock it off.” Burroughs said that
    as he pulled up, he saw McNeely standing next to the passenger window of a Chevrolet
    pickup truck. Burroughs said that when McNeely saw Burroughs’s patrol car, McNeely
    turned and made a tossing motion toward the car, and Burroughs saw something come out
    Cite as 
    2017 Ark. App. 483
    of his hand. McNeely started to walk away, and Burroughs got out of his car and yelled for
    him to come back. At that point, Burroughs saw a 9 mm pistol on the ground in front of
    his car. There were gouge marks where it had hit the ground, and there was dirt in the
    muzzle and in the ejection port. The gun was loaded. Burroughs said that no one else
    besides McNeely was in the area when he drove up.
    Video from the body camera Burroughs was wearing was played at trial and showed
    the officers’ conversations with McNeely and Michael, who had walked up from the other
    side of the residence after the officers had arrived. The officers determined that McNeely
    was on parole and asked him what he was doing around firearms. McNeely claimed that he
    did not know the gun was there. Burroughs testified that McNeely appeared to be under
    the influence and that he denied throwing the gun. Michael told the officers that there were
    two guns in the area that he had been shooting—a .22 revolver that he had dropped in the
    yard and a 9 mm pistol he had left in the passenger side of McNeely’s truck. Officer
    Murdock recovered the .22 about 75 to 100 yards south of the residence close to the
    highway. McNeely’s truck was parked near the residence, and 9 mm bullets were found in
    the passenger seat. Burroughs asked Cindy if she saw McNeely throw the gun, but she said
    she was inside at the time.
    Michael testified at trial that he had been siting in McNeely’s truck to load his 9 mm
    and then went down to the road and shot it. He said that it kept jamming so he threw it
    down in the yard with his .22 and then fired his .357 before the police arrived. Michael said
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    that he was firing the guns about 10 to 30 feet from the highway and 40 to 75 feet from
    McNeely’s truck. He did not remember telling the officers that the 9 mm was in the
    passenger side of the truck when the officers were at the house because he thought he had
    tossed it on the ground where he had been shooting. He said that he never saw McNeely
    with the 9 mm or any of the guns.
    The circuit court denied McNeely’s motions for dismissal and found him guilty of
    being a felon in possession of a firearm. McNeely testified during the sentencing phase of
    the trial that he was currently serving a prison term after having his parole revoked. He said
    that he had received a lot of his convictions when he was still a teenager, that he had obeyed
    the conditions of release, and that he had never owned a gun and did not know how to
    work one. His attorney asked that he be sentenced to less than the normal range because he
    could still be rehabilitated, and fifteen years was not appropriate. After reviewing his prior
    offenses, the circuit court sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment to run consecutive to
    the sentence he was already serving.
    McNeely first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that supported his conviction.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only
    the evidence that supports the verdict. White v. State, 
    2014 Ark. App. 587
    , 
    446 S.W.3d 193
    .
    The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported
    by substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial. 
    Id. Evidence is
    substantial if it is of
    sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass
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    2017 Ark. App. 483
    beyond suspicion and conjecture. 
    Id. For circumstantial
    evidence to be substantial, the
    evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the
    accused. 
    Id. The question
    whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every hypothesis
    consistent with innocence is a decision for the fact-finder, whose determination will not be
    disturbed unless it reached its verdict using speculation and conjecture. 
    Id. Arkansas Code
    Annotated section 5-73-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016) provides that no person
    who has been convicted of a felony shall possess or own a firearm. A showing of
    constructive possession, which is the control or right to control the contraband, is sufficient
    to prove possession of a firearm. 
    White, supra
    . Constructive possession can be inferred where
    the contraband was found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused
    and subject to his control. 
    Id. McNeely argues
    that the evidence did not exclude every hypothesis consistent with
    his innocence due to Michael’s testimony that the gun had been in his possession and he had
    thrown it on the ground. He claims that this testimony distinguishes his case from Kimble
    v. State, 
    2016 Ark. App. 99
    , 
    483 S.W.3d 832
    , in which an officer observed the defendant
    walk away from him and drop a black object, later determined to be a missing gun. We
    disagree. Neither of Michael’s two explanations for where he left the gun accounts for it
    being found on the ground in front of Burroughs’s patrol car after McNeely made a tossing
    motion in that direction. The evidence showed that Michael was not in the area when
    Burroughs drove up and observed McNeely tossing something, and the area where Michael
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    claimed to have thrown the gun down was a considerable distance from where the gun was
    found. Nor do we agree with McNeely’s assertion that the officers’ statements on the video
    indicated that they were not confident that McNeely had possessed the gun. Burroughs
    stated more than once on the video that he had seen McNeely throw something, that he had
    found the gun on the ground in that area, and that the condition of the gun indicated that
    it had been thrown on the ground. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    State, we hold that substantial evidence supports the conviction.
    McNeely next argues that a combination of factors resulted in an unfair sentencing
    hearing. He raises two issues with regard to the amended felony information, which added
    the notification that he was charged as a habitual offender with four or more felonies.
    McNeely first notes that he waived his right to a jury trial before the filing of the amended
    felony information, which increased his exposure from six years’ to fifteen years’
    imprisonment. However, because McNeely never attempted to withdraw his jury-trial
    waiver or object to the legality of the amended information, any argument regarding the
    timing of the habitual-offender notification was not preserved. See Plessy v. State, 2012 Ark.
    App. 74, 
    388 S.W.3d 509
    . McNeely also claims that the amended felony information was
    defective because it failed to conclude the habitual-offender statement with the contra pacem
    clause, “against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas.” We will not address this
    allegation because, as McNeely concedes, the inclusion of a contra pacem clause goes to the
    sufficiency of the charging instrument and must be raised before trial to be preserved for
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    appellate review. McNeese v. State, 
    334 Ark. 445
    , 
    976 S.W.2d 373
    (1998) (citing Wetherington
    v. State, 
    319 Ark. 37
    , 
    889 S.W.2d 34
    (1994)).
    McNeely also argues that the packet of his prior convictions reviewed by the circuit
    court erroneously contained conviction records of another defendant that could have
    prejudiced the circuit court. While the record on appeal does contain a sentencing order for
    another defendant, it does not appear that this order was ever before the circuit court. The
    erroneously included sentencing order is marked as “State’s Exhibit 1” and was certified by
    the county clerk to be a true and correct copy on July 19, 2016. McNeely’s trial concluded
    on July 18, 2016, and his sentencing order was entered that same date. Furthermore, the
    packet of his prior convictions was admitted as “State’s Exhibit 4.”
    Lastly, McNeely contends that the legislature did not intend for general
    habitual-offender statutes to be coupled with most nonviolent felonies or with “the
    additional enhancement practice of consecutive sentencing.” McNeely fails to provide any
    convincing argument or authority for this assertion. His sentence is within the statutory
    range of punishment for a Class D felony committed by a defendant previously convicted of
    four or more felonies, and the circuit court’s decision to run the sentence consecutive to
    McNeely’s other sentence was within the court’s discretion.1           See Ark. Code Ann. §
    1
    Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-607(e)(1), the State contends that the
    circuit court was required by law to run McNeely’s sentence consecutive to the sentence he
    was serving for his parole revocation. That statute, however, applies only when a defendant
    has committed a Class Y, A, or B felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-607(a). McNeely was
    convicted of Class D felon in possession of a firearm; thus, the statute is inapplicable. See
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    5-4-501(b) (Supp. 2015); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-403(b) (Repl. 2013). We affirm McNeely’s
    conviction and sentence.
    Affirmed.
    GLADWIN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.
    Satterfield Law Firm, by: G. Randolph Satterfield, for appellant.
    Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    Campea v. State, 
    87 Ark. App. 225
    , 
    189 S.W.3d 459
    (2004).
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CR-17-29

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ark. App. 483, 530 S.W.3d 876, 2017 Ark. App. LEXIS 558

Judges: N. Mark Klappenbach

Filed Date: 9/27/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024