Fletcher v. State , 2014 Ark. App. 50 ( 2014 )

Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 50
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-13-415
Opinion Delivered January 22, 2014
RODNEY STEVEN FLETCHER APPEAL FROM THE FULTON
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-10-77]
V.
HONORABLE TIM WEAVER,
STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
Rodney Steven Fletcher, a habitual offender, was charged criminally on multiple
counts in connection with a 2010 break-in that occurred at a pharmacy in Salem,
Arkansas. A Fulton County jury found him guilty of commercial burglary, theft of
property, and fraud. The jury acquitted Fletcher of eighteen counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver regarding the same incident. The court
sentenced Fletcher to thirty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction on the
commercial-burglary conviction, forty years on the theft-of-property conviction, and
thirty years on the fraud conviction. The fines totaled $35,000. The court ordered that
Fletcher’s prison sentences run consecutively. We affirm Fletcher’s convictions.
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I.
The evidence at trial showed that Salem Drug Company, a local pharmacy, was
broken into just before 6:00 a.m. on 8 October 2010. Video cameras at the pharmacy
recorded the break-in. The video footage showed a masked man with a limp taking
several thousand pills from the pharmacy. Store records revealed that $10,200 in cash—
and $1300 in customer checks held in a Ziploc baggy—were also missing. At least 3000
hydrocodone tablets were among the missing pills; the total purchase value of the
controlled substances taken from the pharmacy was around $11,869. The pharmacist who
discovered the break-in, Darla York, said that she did not know who broke into the store.
Salem’s police chief, Al Roark, told the jury that Fletcher came to mind when he
watched the video footage of the break-in. Roark said that he had known Fletcher for all
of his adult life because Fletcher had been married to his niece; Fletcher also lived close to
the burglarized pharmacy, according to Chief Roark. Based on Chief Roark’s
information, the Arkansas State Police made Fletcher a person of interest. Police officers
ultimately found Fletcher at Glen Jackson’s house, a place where he was known to stay.
Members of the Jackson family testified during Fletcher’s trial. Glen Jackson’s son,
David Jackson, said that Fletcher had stayed on their couch, left the house around 2:00
a.m. the morning the break-in occurred, and returned before daylight the same day. Glen
Jackson also testified that Fletcher stayed with them the night before the burglary. Glen
said that he had taken hydrocodone, Zanax, and drank three or four beers the night before
the break-in; that he had slept all night; and that Fletcher woke him up around 8:00 a.m.
(the morning the burglary happened) because Fletcher wanted to buy some tennis shoes at
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Walmart. Glen also told the jury that he owned a camouflage-hunting mask and that the
police took his hunting mask and pistol when they searched his house.
The search of the Jackson home produced these items: a Ziploc baggy containing
twenty four checks made out to Salem Drug Store, a mask, wet pants, an oversized purse
with many bottles of prescription pills inside, injectable narcotics, a .45-caliber handgun,
and boots. Patrolman Johnny Byler testified that when Fletcher turned up at the Jackson
home after the police had started investigating, Fletcher held a “wad of cash” and was
argumentative. Police officers found $6,350.71 on Fletcher’s person; Fletcher told the
police it was an inheritance. State Police lead investigator Todd Shaw said that he saw
Fletcher walking at the Jackson home with “a limp consistent with the person in the video
camera,” and that the camouflage-hunting mask and boots the police found in the Jackson
home were consistent with the mask and boots the burglar had worn.
Arkansas State Crime Lab chemist Gary Dallas told the jury that the numerous pills
the police recovered from the home where Fletcher was staying included hydrocodone
and other controlled prescription drugs. Forensic DNA examiner Jennifer Beaty testified
that the camouflage-hunting mask the police found contained a “very, very, very tiny
amount of DNA,” and that she was only able to get a partial profile of the DNA from it.
Although Beaty could not say with all scientific certainty that the DNA profile from the
mask matched Rodney Fletcher, she told the jury that “you might find one out of 67
million of the Caucasian population have those same areas.”
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Fletcher moved for directed verdicts at trial, arguing each time that there was
insufficient DNA evidence to convict him and that the State failed to prove that he was
the person who committed the crimes. Fletcher raises these same points here.
We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Hunt v. State, 354 Ark. 682, 128 S.W.3d 820 (2003). When reviewing this
challenge we determine whether substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supports
the verdict. Lockhart v. State, 2010 Ark. 278, 367 S.W.3d 530. Substantial evidence is
evidence of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or another
and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id.
Circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a guilty verdict, but it must exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Id. The credibility of witnesses is
an issue for the jury and not for us. Id. Here, the jury was free to believe all or part of the
witnesses’ testimony and to resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent
evidence. Id.
II.
According to Fletcher, “the only possible evidence” that he was the perpetrator
was the inconclusive testimony of DNA expert Jennifer Beaty. The heart of Fletcher’s
argument is that the jury had to guess to convict him because Beaty could not say with
scientific certainty that the DNA profile found on the mask came from him. And the
remainder of the evidence, in Fletcher’s view, is insufficient to support the convictions
because Chief Roark did not identify him as the burglar, the large amount of cash the
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police found on him did not connect him to the break-in, and the Jacksons were either
under the influence or asleep. We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying
Fletcher’s motions for directed verdict and that substantial evidence supports his
convictions.
In every criminal case the State must of course present enough evidence for a jury
to conclude that the defendant committed the crime. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105,
113, 161 S.W.3d 815, 818 (2004). The State did so in this case. Investigator Shaw
testified that Fletcher had a limp consistent with the person in the security video. Shaw
also told the jury that the camouflage-hunting mask, and the boots the police found where
Fletcher had been staying when the break-in occurred, were consistent with the mask and
boots seen in the pharmacy’s security video. Although the State’s forensic expert could
not say with all scientific certainty that the DNA profile from the mask matched Fletcher,
she did identify Fletcher as a contributor to the DNA found on the mask. The 1 in 67
million chance that another Caucasian person’s DNA would be a match on the hunting
mask is something the jury could consider and weigh for or against the State’s case. Prater
v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991). The DNA evidence, in any event, was
just some of the circumstantial evidence the State presented in the case.
This brings us to the checks. Darla York said that the checks made payable to the
pharmacy were in a plastic Ziploc baggy inside the store. The police later found—in the
home where Fletcher had arguably stayed the night of the break-in—twenty-four checks
in a Ziploc baggy made payable to Salem Drug Store. As for Fletcher’s explanation that
the approximately $6,000 of cash the police found on him was his inheritance, the jury
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was permitted to consider it as evidence of his guilt. Burley v. State, 348 Ark. 422, 73
S.W.3d 600 (2002). That some of the pills recovered from the home Fletcher was staying
in matched some of those that were stolen from the pharmacy was also evidence the jury
could weigh when deciding whether Fletcher was guilty. Prince v. State, 304 Ark. 692,
805 S.W.2d 46 (1991). The jury also heard about Chief Roark’s educated suspicion that
Fletcher was the one in the pharmacy that morning based on his long and close
acquaintance with Fletcher and Fletcher’s proximity to the pharmacy. Davenport v. State,
373 Ark. 71, 281 S.W.3d 268 (2008). Finally, it was up to the jury to credit or discredit
Glen and David Jackson’s testimony about where Fletcher was at what time of day. Id.
Evidence of guilt is not less because it is circumstantial. Coggin v. State, 356 Ark.
424, 436, 156 S.W.3d 712, 720 (2004). Whether the circumstantial evidence excluded
every hypothesis consistent with innocence was for the jury to decide. Ross v. State, 346
Ark. 225, 230, 57 S.W.3d 152, 156 (2001). We ask only whether the jury resorted to
speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95
S.W.3d 789 (2003). Here, we have concluded that the State placed before the jury
substantial evidence that Fletcher was the one who committed the crimes and that the jury
did not resort to speculation and conjecture in reaching its guilty verdict.
Fletcher also argues that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent because the jury
acquitted him of eighteen controlled-substance charges but convicted him of commercial
burglary, theft of property, and fraud. This argument was not made to the circuit court
after the jury returned its verdict or in Fletcher’s motion for a new trial. He cannot raise
it for the first time in this appeal. Eastin v. State, 370 Ark. 10, 257 S.W.3d 58 (2007).
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Affirmed.
WYNNE and GLOVER, JJ., agree.
Ogles Law Firm, P.A., by: John Ogles, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Pamela A. Rumpz, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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