Sampley v. Sampley , 2014 Ark. App. 134 ( 2014 )


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  •                                Cite as 
    2014 Ark. App. 134
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION IV
    No.CV-13-660
    Opinion Delivered   February 19, 2014
    GINGER LYNN SAMPLEY, now                     APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
    BLACKWELL                                    COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    [NO. DR-2002-291]
    APPELLANT
    V.                                           HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK,
    JUDGE
    JAMIE RAY SAMPLEY
    APPELLEE AFFIRMED
    RHONDA K. WOOD, Judge
    Appellant Ginger Sampley Blackwell and appellee Jamie Sampley divorced. Since
    2008, Jamie has had custody of the parties’ now twelve-year-old daughter.             Ginger
    challenges the circuit court’s April 13, 2013 order denying her motion to modify visitation
    and motion to modify custody and support. We affirm the circuit court.
    In 2010, Ginger filed several motions seeking, among other things, to modify
    visitation, custody, and child support. On July 10, 2012, the circuit court entered an
    agreed order that left custody with Jamie and modified Ginger’s visitation schedule. The
    following month, Ginger filed another motion to modify child custody, citing
    circumstances occurring before the July 10, 2012 order that she alleged amounted to a
    material change in circumstance warranting a change in custody to her.
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    2014 Ark. App. 134
    A hearing was held on Ginger’s motion on April 1, 2013. At the beginning of the
    hearing, Jamie’s attorney made an oral motion to restrict testimony to evidence that had
    occurred since the July 2012 order. Ginger did not object, and the circuit court granted
    the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found Ginger failed to
    present proof of a material change of circumstances. The court also stated that the parties
    should have litigated the evidence presented at the hearing back in July 2012 when
    instead, the parties indicated to the court they reached an agreement which resulted in the
    agreed order. The court denied Ginger’s motion for change of custody and awarded
    attorney’s fees to Jamie.
    We review child-custody cases de novo, but we will not reverse a circuit court’s
    findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Taylor v. Taylor, 
    353 Ark. 69
    , 
    110 S.W.3d 731
    (2003). Because the question of whether the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous
    turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses, we give special deference to the superior
    position of the trial judge to evaluate the witnesses, their testimony, and the child’s best
    interest. Sharp v. Keeler, 
    99 Ark. App. 42
    , 
    256 S.W.3d 528
    (2007).
    First, Ginger contends on appeal that the circuit court erred by failing to find a
    material change in circumstances. The record reflects that the judge heard testimony from
    both parties as well as their witnesses. Ginger’s alleged change of circumstances included a
    purported strained relationship between the minor child and her step-mother and the fact
    that the minor child, age twelve, was sometimes left at home alone after school for short
    periods of time. Our court has repeatedly held that in order to make changes to custody or
    visitation, the party seeking modification must first demonstrate that a material change in
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    2014 Ark. App. 134
    circumstances affecting the best interest of the child has occurred. Byrd v. Vanderpool, 
    104 Ark. App. 239
    , 
    290 S.W.3d 610
    (2009). Following evidence on these issues, the court
    found that a material change had not occurred. The court admittedly was frustrated that
    the appellant filed her motion only one month after entry of the agreed order. Based on
    the court being in the best position to assess credibility and weigh the evidence, we hold
    that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
    Next, Ginger contends that the circuit court erroneously failed to consider relevant
    evidence supporting a modification in custody. The court limited testimony to incidents
    occurring after the previous hearing and agreed order. In its ruling from the bench, the
    circuit court stated that all of Ginger’s allegations against Jamie could have been litigated at
    the July 2012 hearing and that her proof did not rise to the level of a material change in
    circumstance. Our supreme court has held that when circumstances affecting the best
    interests of the child were not presented to the trial judge at the time the original custody
    order was entered, they can be considered in determining whether a material change of
    circumstances has occurred. Hamilton v. Barrett, 
    337 Ark. 460
    , 
    989 S.W.2d 520
    (1999).
    This is not the case, however, when the parties were aware of the circumstances and
    entered into an agreement that is approved by the court. Orantes v. Orantes, 
    2011 Ark. 159
    , 
    381 S.W.3d 758
    . Here, as evidenced by her pleadings, Ginger knew of the incidents
    prior to the July 2012 agreed order. It thus was not an error for the court to exclude this
    evidence.
    Finally, the court awarded attorney’s fees to Jamie following the May 2013 hearing,
    and Ginger contends on appeal that if we reverse the circuit court’s other ruling, we
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    2014 Ark. App. 134
    should also reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Jamie. Because we are affirming the
    circuit court on all other points, we also affirm the award of fees.
    Affirmed.
    HARRISON and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.
    Milligan Law Offices, by: Phillip J. Milligan, for appellant.
    Shannon Foster, for appellee.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CV-13-660

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ark. App. 134

Judges: Rhonda K. Wood

Filed Date: 2/19/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021