Murphey v. Fuller , 2017 Ark. App. 164 ( 2017 )

Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 164
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-16-727
SANDRA MURPHEY Opinion Delivered: March 15, 2017
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
WESTERN DISTRICT
[NO. 16JDR-15-832]
DONALD FULLER
APPELLEE HONORABLE MELISSA BRISTOW
RICHARDSON, JUDGE
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
RITA W. GRUBER, Chief Judge
Appellant Sandra Murphey appeals from an order of the Craighead County Circuit
Court entered April 28, 2016, establishing paternity over her then seventeen-year-old
daughter.1 The court also ordered the child’s father, appellee Donald Fuller, to pay biweekly
child support in the amount of $420.17 until the child graduated from high school in May
2016; awarded judgment for retroactive child support in the amount of $106,434.88; ordered
the retroactive child support to be payable at a rate of 20 percent of the “current child support
amount due and owing”; and ordered payment on the arrearage to continue after May 2016
at the rate of $500 per month until paid in full. Appellant does not challenge the amount of
the court’s judgment for the child-support arrearage. Appellant’s sole point on appeal is that
the trial court erred in prohibiting her from collecting the judgment for the child-support
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The child was born on May 4, 1998.
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 164
arrearage in the same manner as provided for the collection of other judgments. We dismiss
the appeal because appellant’s point is not ripe for our review.
Appellant filed the paternity action on October 14, 2015; appellee filed an answer
admitting paternity; and the trial court held a bench trial on February 19, 2016 regarding
amounts of child support and retroactive child support due. Appellant argues that the court
erred in restricting the manner in which she may collect the judgment and in refusing to
adopt her proposed precedent, which included the following provision: “[T]he judgment
shall otherwise be collectable and accrue interest in accordance with applicable law.” In
support of her argument, she cites Arkansas Code Annotated sections 9-14-202, 9-14-
218(a)(1)(B), and 9-14-235 (Repl. 2015) and Hill v. Hill, 84 Ark. App 132, 134 S.W.3d 6
(2003). She argues that those statutes, and this court’s interpretation of those statutes,
essentially provide that child support becomes a judgment when due and is subject to
execution and that, while the trial court has some discretion in setting a payment schedule,
a parent who is owed a child-support arrearage may utilize other enforcement methods to
collect the arrearage. See Hill, 84 Ark. App. at 140, 134 S.W.3d at 11; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-
14-202; § 9-14-218; § 9-14-235(a), (b).
We hold that appellant’s argument is not ripe for our review. There was neither
testimony nor argument before the trial court regarding the method or manner of payment
and collection of any child-support arrearage. All evidence and argument surrounded the
amount of child support due. The trial was held on February 19, 2016, and the court filed
a letter opinion on March 7, 2016. The court explained in detail its findings, including
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Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 164
payment of the arrearage at a rate of $500 per month after the current child-support
obligation ceased in May 2016. It appears that counsel for both parties then presented
separate proposed precedents, identical except for the added provision in appellant’s counsel’s
order which provided that the judgment “shall otherwise be collectable and accrue interest
in accordance with applicable Arkansas law.”
While it may be true that appellant is entitled under the law to pursue other
enforcement methods to collect the arrearage, she has not used the judicial process in an
attempt to do so here. Unlike Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978)
(reversing trial court’s order holding execution in abeyance), or Stewart v. Norment, 328 Ark.
133, 941 S.W.2d 419 (1997) (reversing trial court’s order finding periodic payments was the
exclusive method of collecting arrearage), the court’s order here does not appear to
specifically prohibit appellant from pursuing other enforcement methods. Further, the scope
of the evidence, law, and judicial discretion involved in such an attempt is not before us.
Thus, the issue raised on appeal is not sufficiently developed to permit judicial review.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Dismissed without prejudice.
VIRDEN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.
Ford & Cook, PLC, by: Paul N. Ford, for appellant.
Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellee.
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