Riddick v. Harris , 2016 Ark. App. LEXIS 451 ( 2016 )

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 426
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-15-859
Opinion Delivered September 21, 2016
APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI
MICHAEL RIDDICK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
APPELLANT CHICKASAWBA DISTRICT
[NO. DR-2015-32]
V. HONORABLE MELISSA RICHARDSON,
JUDGE
EMILY HARRIS (FORMERLY RIDDICK) AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL;
APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART AND
AFFIRMED IN PART ON CROSS-APPEAL
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge
Michael Riddick appeals the final order entered by the Circuit Court of Mississippi
County denying his motion to modify custody and granting Emily Harris’s motion to modify
child support. On cross-appeal, Harris argues that the trial court erred in calculating Riddick’s
income for child-support purposes; finding her in contempt of the summer visitation schedule;
modifying Riddick’s visitation; denying her request to make Riddick’s increased child-support
obligation retroactive; and denying her request for attorney’s fees. We affirm on direct appeal
and reverse in part and affirm in part on cross-appeal.
The parties’ divorce decree, entered on February 20, 2009, awarded Harris custody of
the parties’ son K.R., born May 27, 2007, subject to Riddick’s visitation rights. On April 18,
2014, Riddick filed a petition for emergency order of custody, petition to modify the divorce
decree, and petition for order to show cause and contempt. Riddick alleged that a material and
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substantial change in circumstances had occurred that justified the modification of custody,
visitation, and child support. In response, Harris filed a petition for modification of child
support.
A final hearing was held on January 21–22, 2015. On June 26, 2015, the trial court
issued its final order. Among other things, the trial court denied Riddick’s petition to modify
custody; granted his petition to modify visitation; granted Harris’s petition to modify Riddick’s
child-support obligation; granted Riddick’s petition for contempt and ordered Harris to pay
Riddick $500 in attorney’s fees; and found that the parties should bear their own attorney’s
fees. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
I. Direct Appeal
For his first point on appeal, Riddick argues that the trial court clearly erred in denying
his petition to modify custody. The facts were undisputed that since the parties’ divorce, Harris
had moved twice, had enrolled K.R. in two different school districts, had four boyfriends, had
been engaged to two men, had a child (B.G.) out of wedlock with Clayton Gentry, was served
a paternity action by Gentry and hired attorney Jim Harris to represent her in that action,
began dating Jim Harris (who is twenty-three years older than she) the following month,
married him a few months after that, and was expecting his child.
Gentry testified about an incident in the summer of 2013. Around 11:00 p.m., Harris
showed up at his apartment unannounced and became upset when she saw another woman
there. Gentry said that Harris cursed, called the other woman “bad names,” left the apartment,
and got into her vehicle, where she had left B.G. alone. Harris then pulled her vehicle up to
Gentry’s front door, honked, and continued to yell. Gentry came out to the car, and when he
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leaned his arm on the car door, which was open, Harris “hammered down on the gas and
drove [him] through [his] ditch,” until he could stop the vehicle.
Finally, there was evidence that after Riddick had filed the petition to modify custody
in April 2014, Harris engaged in a pattern of behavior calculated to limit and diminish K.R.’s
relationship with Riddick by unilaterally changing the parties’ visitation schedule.
In its letter opinion, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances had
occurred. However, the trial court disagreed that a change of custody was in K.R.’s best
interest. The court found that both Riddick and Harris were loving, involved parents, who had
strong bonds with K.R. The court found that K.R. was happy at the homes of both of his
parents. Both stepparents 1 testified that they loved K.R. and welcomed his presence in their
homes. The court also found that the parties agreed that K.R. was a happy, well-adjusted child.
K.R.’s teacher testified that he was an excellent student, who was motivated and worked hard.
The trial court also found that Harris’s behavior had stabilized upon her marriage to Jim Harris
and that they seemingly had a loving relationship. Further, the court found that there was no
evidence that Harris’s prior unstable behavior had negatively impacted K.R. Finally, the trial
court noted that K.R. had lived the past three years with his younger brother B.G. and that it
was in K.R.’s best interest to remain with his sibling.
Arkansas law is well settled that the primary consideration in child-custody cases is the
welfare and best interest of the children; all other considerations are secondary. Evans v.
McKinney, 2014 Ark. App. 440, at 4, 440 S.W.3d 357, 359. Generally, courts impose more
stringent standards for modifications in custody than they do for initial determinations of
1 Riddick also remarried.
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custody. Id., 440 S.W.3d at 359. The reason for requiring more stringent standards for
modifications than for initial custody determinations is to promote stability and continuity in
the life of the child and to discourage repeated litigation of the same issues. Id., 440 S.W.3d at
359.
The party seeking modification of the custody order has the burden of showing a
material change in circumstances. Id., 440 S.W.3d at 359. In order to change custody, the trial
court must first determine that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the last
order of custody; if that threshold requirement is met, it must then determine who should
have custody with the sole consideration being the best interest of the children. Id., 440 S.W.3d
at 359. In reviewing child-custody cases, we consider the evidence de novo, but will not reverse
a trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance
of the evidence. Id., 440 S.W.3d at 359.
Riddick argues that the trial court clearly erred in determining that it was in the best
interest of K.R. to remain in his mother’s custody. In support of his argument, Riddick restates
all of the evidence of Harris’s unstable behavior, argues that she has intentionally alienated
him from his child, and points out that he and his wife can provide a stable life for K.R.
Based on a de novo review, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that it was not in K.R.’s best interest to change custody to Riddick. In an extremely detailed
letter opinion, the trial court noted that both parents love K.R. and were capable of caring for
him. However, the court found there was no reason to alter the current custodial arrangement
to which K.R. was accustomed because he is a happy, well-adjusted child, who was performing
very well in school. The court also properly considered that K.R. had formed a bond with his
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younger brother and that it was important that they continue to live together. See Sykes v.
Warren, 99 Ark. App. 210, 217, 258 S.W3d 788, 793 (2007) (recognizing that unless exceptional
circumstances are involved, young children should not be separated from each other by
dividing their custody). Finally, the court found that the questionable behavior of Harris had
not negatively impacted K.R. and that since she had remarried, her behavior had stabilized.
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, which observed the witnesses
first hand. Evans, 2014 Ark. App. 440, at 6, 440 S.W.3d at 360. There are no cases in which
the superior position, ability, and opportunity of the trial judge to observe the parties carry a
greater weight than those involving the custody of minor children, and our deference to the
trial judge in matters of credibility is correspondingly greater in such cases. Id., 440 S.W.3d at
360. Therefore, we affirm on this point.
Riddick’s second point on direct appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in
modifying his child-support obligation. As a rule, when the amount of child support is at issue,
we will not reverse the trial court absent an abuse of discretion. Browning v. Browning, 2015 Ark.
App. 104, at 6, 455 S.W.3d 863, 867.
Pursuant to the divorce decree, Riddick was ordered to pay $501 per month in child
support. Riddick’s support payments were later abated to $472.09 per month to account for
his six-week summer visitation. At the January 2015 hearing, the evidence established that
Riddick had experienced a material increase in income, which was derived from three sources:
wages from his employer Syngenta; rental income; and farm income. In its letter opinions, the
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trial court found that Riddick’s net monthly income was $8,735.36. 2 The trial court applied
this amount to the family-support chart and concluded that Riddick was obligated to pay
$1,251.36 in monthly support.
Riddick argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not deviating from the
family-support chart. He contends that the trial court failed to take into account factors
supporting a deviation, i.e., K.R.’s accustomed standard of living; other income or assets
available to Harris to support K.R.; the extraordinary time K.R. spends with Riddick; and
depreciation for his farm equipment.
The courts begin with a presumption that the chart amount is reasonable. Ceola v.
Burnham, 84 Ark. App. 269, 273, 139 S.W.3d 150, 153 (2003). Reference to the chart is required,
and the chart establishes a rebuttable presumption of the appropriate amount that can only be
modified on the basis of written findings stating why the chart amount is unjust or
inappropriate. Id., 139 S.W.3d at 153. Because the child-support guidelines are remedial in
nature, they must be broadly construed so as to effectuate the purpose sought to be
accomplished by their drafters. Id., 139 S.W.3d at 153. The court may grant more or less
support if the evidence shows that the needs of the children require a different level of support.
Id., 139 S.W.3d at 153 (citing In Re: Admin. Order No. 10, Ark. Child Support Guidelines, 346 Ark.
Appx. 1064 (2002)). Administrative Order Number 10 § V sets forth the factors to be
considered when deviating from the amount set by the chart.
2 The trial court found that Riddick’s monthly income from Syngenta was $5,808.07,
that he had no rental income, and that his monthly farm income was $2,927.67.
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The record shows that Riddick never asked the trial court to deviate from the family-
support chart. There are no pleadings filed below seeking a deviation. At the hearing, Riddick
merely offered testimony about his income. There was no argument to the trial court
requesting a deviation. Accordingly, there are no findings in the trial court’s letter opinions or
final order addressing a request for a deviation or explaining why the trial court did not deviate
from the chart.
This court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and an
appellant must obtain a ruling from the trial court on an issue in order to preserve an argument
for appeal. Troutman v. Troutman, 2016 Ark. App. 70, at 9, 482 S.W.3d 365, 370 (citations
omitted). Because the trial court did not rule on the point, this court has nothing to review.
Id., 482 S.W.3d at 370. It was Riddick’s burden to raise the issue of a deviation from the family-
support chart and to obtain a specific ruling on it. His failure to do so precludes this court
from considering the merits of his argument.
II. Cross-Appeal
Harris raises five points on cross-appeal. Her first argument is that the trial court
abused its discretion in calculating Riddick’s income for child-support purposes. Based on her
calculations, Riddick owed $2,559.70 in monthly support.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-14-201(4)(A) (Repl. 2015) defines the term
“income” as “any periodic form of payment due to an individual, regardless of the source,
including wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, workers’ compensation, disability, payments
pursuant to a pension or retirement program, and interest.” Subsection (4)(B) permits the
expansion of the definition from time to time in Supreme Court Administrative Order
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Number 10—Arkansas Child Support Guidelines. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-201(4)(B). See also
Admin. Order No. 10(II) (providing the same definition of income). Our supreme court has
said that the definition of income included in the administrative order “is intentionally broad
and designed to encompass the widest range of sources for the support of minor children.”
McWhorter v. McWhorter, 346 Ark. 475, 481, 58 S.W.3d 840, 844 (2001).
It is undisputed that bonus income is income for child-support purposes under the
definition of income contained in Administrative Order Number 10. Kelly v. Kelly, 341 Ark.
596, 600, 19 S.W.3d 1, 4 (2000). See also Admin. Order. No. 10 (II)(b). Also, in Ford v. Ford,
347 Ark. 485, 495, 65 S.W.3d 432, 439 (2002), we affirmed the trial court’s finding that a one-
time retirement payment received by the appellant fell within the broad range of her income
for child-support purposes.
Relying on Riddick’s 2014 earning statement, Harris argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to include “SIP” of $11,977.90 and “Other Benefits” 3 of $26,257.60 in
Riddick’s income. “SIP” is not defined on this record; however, it is listed on Riddick’s
earnings statement under his salary, and he testified that he received a bonus twice a year.
“Other Benefits” received by Riddick include retirement income, and Riddick testified that his
employer contributed to his 401(k) plan. The trial court did not make findings as to whether
“SIP” or “Other Benefits” were income or explain why it did not include these amounts.
Considering that the definition of income is intentionally broad and designed to encompass
the widest range of sources for the support of minor children, we conclude that the trial court
Items listed as “Other Benefits” in the earnings statement include: “Medical
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Employer,” “Dental Employer,” “401K Employer,” “Basic Life Employer,” “Basic AD&D
Employer,” “LTD Employer,” and “EE GTLI Taxable.”
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abused its discretion in failing to either include these amounts in Riddick’s income calculation
or explain why these amounts should not be included. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
on this point.
Harris also argues that the trial court clearly erred in failing to add rental depreciation
to Riddick’s rental income. This argument was not raised below; therefore, it is not preserved
for appeal. Troutman, 2016 Ark. App. 70, at 9, 482 S.W.3d at 370.
Harris’s final argument under this point is that the trial court abused its discretion in
considering Riddick’s 2012 tax returns to determine his farm income. She contends that the
2012 tax returns should not have been considered because Riddick did not start the farm until
the fall of that year; therefore, all he had were losses.
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 10, to determine support for self-employed
payors, the trial court should first consider the payor’s last two years’ federal and state income
tax returns and the quarterly estimates for the current year. Admin. Order No. 10, § III(c).
Here, the trial court complied with Administrative Order No. 10 when it based its
determination of Riddick’s farm income on his 2012 and 2013 federal and state income tax
returns. At the time of the hearing, January 2015, Riddick had not filed his 2014 returns, and
he did not introduce 2014 quarterly estimates. As such, the trial court used the only tax records
presented. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in considering
Riddick’s 2012 tax returns to determine his farm income.
Harris’s second point on cross-appeal is that the trial court erred in finding her in
contempt of the summer-visitation schedule. When the parties divorced, the decree awarded
Riddick standard visitation with additional overnight visitation each Wednesday night until
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K.R. reached kindergarten. The facts demonstrated that from 2010 until 2014, Harris and
Riddick worked well together regarding visitation and had even expanded visitation beyond
that stated in the decree and standard schedule. 4
After Riddick filed for custody, the cooperation ended. The evidence demonstrated
that Harris restricted visitation to standard visitation. With regard to summer visitation, the
facts established that on May 11, 2014, Riddick requested, in writing, summer-visitation dates
to start June 12, 2014. Harris agreed that she received the letter on May 12, 2014; however,
she refused to allow Riddick visitation as requested claiming that he failed to provide timely
notice as per the standard visitation schedule. She contended that Riddick was required to give
thirty days’ notice prior to the first Friday in June. She also stated that she did not like the
schedule that Riddick proposed and that she wanted K.R. to have the same summer-visitation
schedule as his brother had with his father. As such, she limited Riddick’s summer visitation
to multiple two- or three-week visits instead of their traditional one six-week visit.
The trial court found that Harris’s behavior was a willful violation of the decree’s
summer-visitation schedule. The trial court found that Harris’s interpretation of the visitation
schedule was “unusual”; that she had not interpreted the visitation schedule in that fashion in
the years prior to 2014; that Riddick had provided timely notice as per the schedule; and that
Harris did not premise her violation on the advice of counsel because she admitted she wanted
the default visitation schedule so that she could coordinate her children’s visitation, and she
4 Harris allowed Riddick to have overnight visitation on Wednesdays, extended
weekend visitation, extended summer visitation, and time with K.R. the morning of his first
days of kindergarten and first grade.
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did not want to accommodate Riddick after he had sued her for custody. Based on her
contempt, the trial court ordered her to pay Riddick attorney’s fees of $500.
The disobedience of any valid judgment, order, or decree of a court having jurisdiction
to enter it may constitute contempt. Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, at 12, 426 S.W.3d 427,
435. However, before one can be held in contempt for violating the court’s order, the order
must be definite in its terms and clear as to what duties it imposes. Id., 426 S.W.3d at 435. Civil
contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to
suits and to compel obedience to orders made for the benefit of those parties. Id., 426 S.W.3d
at 435. The contempt in this case was civil because the award of attorney’s fees and costs was
for the benefit of Riddick and was thus remedial in nature. Id., 426 S.W.3d at 435. The standard
of review for civil contempt is whether the finding of the circuit court is clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. Id., 426 S.W.3d at 435.
Harris contends that the standard schedule is ambiguous, her interpretation of it was
not unreasonable, and her interpretation was based on the advice of counsel. 5 The standard
summer visitation schedule is not ambiguous. It provides,
Written notice as to the time and manner of visitation will be provided by the non-
custodial parent to the custodial parent at least 30 days in advance of the exercise of
visitation. In the event that no notice is given, the default summer visitation schedule
shall be as follows: Begin at 6:00 p.m. on the first Friday in June and continue for two
weeks. After a one-week break, begin again for two weeks. After a one-week break
begin again for the final two-week period.
5 Harris also argues that she cannot be held in contempt for violating the standard
visitation schedule because it was not attached to the decree and is not part of the case file.
However, we note that she is also arguing that Riddick should have been forced to adhere to
the notice provisions of the standard schedule. She cannot rely on the standard schedule when
it works to her advantage and ignore it when it works to her disadvantage. We further note
that the standard visitation schedule is included in the record and addendum. Therefore, we
reject these arguments.
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The plain language of the provision states that notice by the noncustodial parent should
be given thirty days before the day that parent wants to exercise visitation. Riddick complied
with this provision. Harris’s interpretation is unreasonable, and the parties had not interpreted
the summer schedule in this fashion in any of the summers leading up to 2014. Finally, Harris
testified that she restricted Riddick’s summer visitation because she did not like the schedule
he proposed, she wanted K.R. and her other son to have the same visitation schedule, she was
angry with Riddick for filing the petition for custody, and she did not want to accommodate
him any further. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s finding that Harris was in contempt
of the summer-visitation provision of the standard schedule was not clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence.
Harris’s next point on cross-appeal is that the trial court clearly erred in increasing
Riddick’s visitation. She contends the finding was improper because he did not ask for
increased visitation and it was made to punish her.
The same standard of review applicable to the modification of custody applies to the
modification of visitation. We consider the evidence de novo. Baber v. Baber, 2011 Ark. 40, at
9, 378 S.W.3d 699, 705. We will not reverse the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. Id., 378 S.W.3d at 705. When the question of whether the trial court’s findings are
clearly erroneous turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses, we give special deference to
the superior position of the circuit court to evaluate the witnesses, their testimony, and the
child’s best interest. Id., 378 S.W.3d at 705.
A trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction over visitation and may modify or vacate
those orders at any time when it becomes aware of a change in circumstances or facts not
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known to it at the time of the initial order. Id., 378 S.W.3d at 705. Although visitation is always
modifiable, to promote stability and continuity for the children and to discourage repeated
litigation of the same issues, courts require more rigid standards for modification than for
initial determinations. Id., 378 S.W.3d at 705. Thus, the party seeking a change in visitation has
the burden to demonstrate a material change in circumstances that warrants such a change.
Id., 378 S.W.3d at 705.
The primary consideration regarding visitation is the best interest of the child. Id., 378
S.W.3d at 705. Important factors the court considers in determining reasonable visitation are
the wishes of the child, the capacity of the party desiring visitation to supervise and care for
the child, problems of transportation and prior conduct in abusing visitation, the work
schedule or stability of the parties, and the relationship with siblings and other relatives. Id. at
10, 378 S.W.3d at 705. Fixing visitation rights is a matter that lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court. Id., 378 S.W.3d at 705.
The trial court did not sua sponte increase Riddick’s visitation. Riddick, in his petition
for emergency order of custody, petition to modify, and petition for order to show cause and
contempt, alleged that a “material and substantial change in circumstances has occurred which
justifies this Court entering an Emergency order of custody, and modifying the previous orders
of this Court with regard to custody, visitation, and child support.” Therefore, the issue was
properly raised by Riddick below.
Upon review of the trial court’s findings, we are not persuaded by Harris’s assertion
that the trial court modified visitation for the sole purpose of punishing her. Without restating
each of the examples of Harris’s unstable behavior, it is clear that there is more than sufficient
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evidence on this record to support the trial court’s finding that there had been a material
change in circumstances since the entry of the divorce decree. And while the trial court did
voice its displeasure with Harris’s efforts to curtail and control Riddick’s visitation, it is clear
that the increase in visitation awarded to Riddick was based on the trial court’s finding that
the modification was in K.R.’s best interest. The trial court stated in its letter opinion that the
“modification reflects the reality of what [Harris] and [Riddick] had independently assessed to
be in [K.R.’s] best interests in the years prior to the instant action.” We therefore hold that the
trial court did not clearly err when it increased Riddick’s visitation.
Next, Harris argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to
make Riddick’s increased child-support obligation retroactive. The trial court ordered Riddick
to begin making increased child-support payments in January 2015, the month of the final
hearing. Harris argues that this was error based on Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-14-
107(d) (Repl. 2015), which provides that any modification of a child-support order that is
based on a change in gross income of the noncustodial parent shall be effective as of the date
of filing a motion for increase or decrease in child support unless otherwise ordered by the
court. She contends that under this statute, the trial court should have ordered Riddick make
support payments retroactive from the date she filed her petition to modify child support in
May 2014 and that there was no reason to not comply with the statute.
This issue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tucker v. Tucker, 96 Ark. App. 194,
199, 239 S.W.3d 532, 536 (2006) (citing Heflin v. Bell, 52 Ark. App. 201, 916 S.W.2d 769 (1996)).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not applying the increased child support
retroactively. Section 9-14-107(d) provides for retroactive application unless otherwise ordered by
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the court. Here, the trial court found that Harris and her husband both testified that K.R. was
well supported in their home during the eight months after she had filed the petition to modify
child support. The court further found that there was no evidence that K.R. was negatively
impacted by Riddick’s payment of the lower amount of child support during that time period.
Based on these findings, the court concluded,
[H]aving carefully considered all factors pertaining to the best interests of the child, as
well as being mindful of the Court’s discretion as to whether to order retroactive
imposition of child support, the Court hereby specifically rules that the modified
support amount . . . shall not be retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition to
modify. Instead, the first such increased payment shall be due for the month of January
2015 and each month thereafter.
Contrary to Harris’s argument, the trial court gave reasons for not applying the
increased child support retroactively. Because the court specifically ordered that the increase
not be retroactive, and gave reasons for doing so, we conclude that it did not abuse its
discretion and affirm on this point.
Harris’s fifth and final point on cross-appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying her request for attorney’s fees. She argues that Riddick has the financial means to
pay her fees and she does not. 6
In domestic-relations proceedings, the trial court has the inherent power to award
attorney’s fees, and the decision to award fees and the amount of those fees are matters within
the discretion of the trial court. James v. Walchli, 2015 Ark. App. 562, at 6–7, 472 S.W.3d 504,
6 Harris’s argument heading also asserts that reversal is warranted because she was the
prevailing party. However, the body of her argument does not discuss this argument. If an
argument heading raises an issue but the body of the argument does not address the issue, we
will not reach it on appeal. Adams v. Howard, 2014 Ark. App. 328, at 7 n.3, 436 S.W.3d 473,
478 (citing Jones v. McLemore, 2014 Ark. App. 147, 432 S.W.3d 668).
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508 (citations omitted). Absent an abuse of that discretion, an award of fees will not be
disturbed on appeal. Id. at 7, 472 S.W.3d at 508 (citations omitted).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’s request for attorney’s
fees. First, the trial court was in a better position to analyze the request in light of the pleadings,
motions, orders, conferences, and hearings filed or conducted in this matter. Scroggins v.
Scroggins, 302 Ark. 362, 368, 790 S.W.2d 157, 161 (1990). Second, Harris focuses only on the
disparity of the parties’ respective incomes when arguing she is entitled to fees. This factor,
while relevant, cannot alone justify an award of attorney’s fees. Id., 790 S.W.2d at 161. Third,
we note that each party raised multiple issues in this case. In addition to defending the claim
for modification of custody, she was pursuing a child-support increase, retroactive support,
and contempt against Riddick. She did not prevail in all of these matters. Therefore, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’s request for attorney’s fees.
Affirmed on direct appeal; reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part on cross-
appeal.
HIXSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Martin E. Lilly, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Law Office of Wendell L. Hoskins II, by: Wendell L. Hoskins II, for appellee/cross-appellant.
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