Alley v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 31 ( 2015 )

Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 31
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-14-389
MICHAEL DALE ALLEY Opinion Delivered January 28, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-12-880]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBIN F. GREEN,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Michael Dale Alley appeals his conviction of second-offense driving while intoxicated
(drugs) from the Benton County Circuit Court. Alley was sentenced to thirty days in the
Benton County jail with twenty-three days suspended, ordered to pay $300 in court costs and
a $20 booking fee, and fined $750. On appeal, Alley asserts that the circuit court erred when
it denied his motion to suppress, overruled his Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 objections, and
denied his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
On October 28, 2011, Benton County Deputy Sheriff Jason Wood stopped Alley’s
vehicle on suspicion that Alley was driving while intoxicated. After performing a traffic stop
and administering three field-sobriety tests, Deputy Wood arrested Alley.
Alley was later convicted in the Rogers District Court of second-offense DWI. He
appealed his conviction to the Benton County Circuit Court. In the Benton County Circuit
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Court, Alley filed a motion to suppress the results of the field-sobriety tests. A suppression
hearing was held, and the circuit court denied Alley’s motion.
On January 8, 2014, a bench trial was held. Deputy Wood testified for the State. He
stated that on October 28, 2011, he saw Alley in the parking lot of a restaurant known to
serve alcohol and observed him having difficulty exiting the lot in his vehicle. He then saw
Alley driving erratically on the road. Deputy Wood explained that after seeing Alley’s erratic
driving, he stopped Alley’s vehicle and asked Alley for his license and registration. He testified
that Alley located the documents but looked at them for several minutes before passing them
over. Deputy Wood testified that Alley then admitted that he had been drinking and had
taken a Klonopin tablet earlier in the evening. Deputy Wood also noted that, during their
conversation, Alley exhibited slurred speech.
Deputy Wood administered a breathalyzer on Alley, and the test showed less than .08%
breath alcohol. Deputy Wood then directed Alley to perform three field-sobriety tests.
Specifically, Alley performed the one-leg-stand, walk-and-turn, and horizontal gaze
nystagmus tests. Deputy Wood testified that Alley failed all three tests, and a video shown at
trial depicts Alley having difficulty with his balance. After administering the tests, Deputy
Wood arrested Alley. Following his arrest, Alley gave a urine sample, which was sent to the
Arkansas State Crime Lab.
The State introduced the urine-sample reports into evidence, and Danny Sanders, the
chemist who completed the urine-sample reports, testified about the sample. Sanders stated
that the sample tested positive for tramadol, promethazine, codeine, dihydrocodeine, and
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alprazolam. However, he stated that he did not test the urine to see how much of each drug
was contained in the sample. Sanders further testified that he could not determine from the
sample when Alley ingested the drugs but that it could have been as long as two or three days
prior to his arrest. Alley objected to the introduction of the urine-sample reports, arguing that
the reports violated Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403. Alley made this objection four times, and
the circuit court overruled each of Alley’s objections.
At the conclusion of the State’s case, Alley moved for a directed verdict, and the circuit
court denied it.1 The court then convicted Alley of second-offense DWI under Arkansas
Code Annotated section 5-65-103(a) (Repl. 2005). Alley now appeals his conviction, asserting
that the trial court erred when it (1) denied his motion to suppress the field-sobriety tests; (2)
overruled his Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 objections; and (3) denied his motion for a
directed verdict for insufficient evidence.
I. Motion for Directed Verdict
A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which
we consider before any other points on appeal. Graham v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 90, at 5, 389
S.W.3d 33, 36. Alley contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish his
intoxication by drugs in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-65-103(a). The test
for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by
substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient
force and character that will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the
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Alley did not call any witnesses.
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other without resort to speculation or conjecture. Id. In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, this court views the evidence, including any that may have been
erroneously admitted, in the light most favorable to the State and considers only the evidence
that supports the conviction. Id.
Under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-56-103(a), it is unlawful for any person
who is intoxicated to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.
“Intoxicated” means influenced or affected by the ingestion of alcohol, a controlled substance,
any intoxicant, or any combination of alcohol, a controlled substance, or an intoxicant, to
such a degree that the driver’s reactions, motor skills, and judgment are substantially altered
and the driver, therefore, constitutes a clear and substantial danger of physical injury to himself
and other motorists or pedestrians. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-102(2) (Repl. 2005).
In this case, Alley argues that the State presented insufficient evidence of intoxication
because the State performed only a qualitative analysis on the urine sample and did not
complete a quantitative test on it. Alley also notes that Sanders, the chemist who completed
the analysis, could not link the urine-test results to intoxication. Alley’s argument is
unpersuasive. Without the results of the urine sample, the State offered other substantial
evidence that Alley was intoxicated. Deputy Wood testified that he observed Alley having
difficulty exiting the parking lot and saw him driving erratically on the road. Deputy Wood
further testified that Alley admitted to having taken Klonopin that night and exhibited slurred
speech. Deputy Wood also reported that Alley had difficulty identifying his license and
registration. Moreover, Deputy Wood testified that he administered three field-sobriety tests
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on Alley and he failed all three tests, and a video shown at trial clearly shows Alley having
difficulty with his balance. Deputy Wood’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence to
support the fact-finder’s conclusion that Alley was intoxicated. Accordingly, the circuit court
properly denied Alley’s motion for a directed verdict.
II. Motion to Suppress
Alley argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion to suppress the field-
sobriety tests because Deputy Wood commanded Alley to perform the tests. In other words,
Alley argues that the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to receive consent
before directing an individual to take a field-sobriety test. In reviewing a circuit court’s denial
of a motion to suppress evidence, this court conducts a de novo review based on the totality
of the circumstances, reversing only if the circuit court’s ruling is clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. Stokes v. State, 375 Ark. 394, 291 S.W.3d 155 (2009).
This court has held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurs when an officer
commands a defendant to perform a field-sobriety test if the officer had reasonable suspicion
that a defendant had committed the offense of DWI. Tiller v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 431, at
5, 439 S.W.3d 705, 708; Fisher v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 301, at 4, 427 S.W.3d 743, 746. In
this case, Alley does not challenge whether Deputy Wood had reasonable suspicion. Alley
argues only that the test should have been suppressed because he never consented. According
to the holdings in Tiller and Fisher, the Fourth Amendment did not require Deputy Wood to
receive consent when he had reasonable suspicion that Alley had committed the offense of
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DWI. Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Alley’s motion to suppress the field-
sobriety tests.
III. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 Objections
Finally, Alley claims that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the
urine-sample reports because the reports violate Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403. Our standard
of review for evidentiary rulings is that circuit courts have broad discretion, and a circuit
court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 392, at 4, 384 S.W.3d 515, 519. Arkansas Rule of
Evidence 403 provides that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” In this case, Alley merely asserts that the reports unfairly prejudiced him because
“no testimony from any state witness linked the urine drug results to any level of
intoxication.” We hold that the admission of the urine-sample reports did not unfairly
prejudice Alley. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
the reports into evidence.
Affirmed.
HARRISON and GLOVER, JJ., agree.
Norwood & Norwood, P.A., by: Doug Norwood and Alison Lee, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Kent Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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