Burris v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 126 ( 2015 )

Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 126
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-13-491
NICHOLAS BURRIS Opinion Delivered February 25, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE UNION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-12-395]
V.
HONORABLE HAMILTON H.
SINGLETON, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
APPELLEE WITHDRAW GRANTED
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Appellant Nicholas Burris was convicted by a Union County jury of one count of
rape and one count of residential burglary. He was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years’
imprisonment for the two convictions. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
and Rule 4-3(k) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, Burris’s
attorney has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on the ground that the appeal is wholly
without merit. The motion is accompanied by an abstract, brief, and addendum purporting
to list all adverse rulings and to explain why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground
for reversal. Burris was provided a copy of counsel’s brief and notified of his right to file a
list of points within thirty days; he opted to file pro se points, and the State filed a responsive
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 126
brief.1 From our review of the record and the briefs presented, we find compliance with
Rule 4-3(k). The appeal is without merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the
trial court is affirmed.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
As noted above, Burris was convicted of one count of rape. A person commits the
offense of rape if he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another
person by forcible compulsion. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006). “Forcible
compulsion” is “physical force or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to
or kidnapping of any person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(2) (Supp. 2009). “Physical force”
is “any bodily impact, restraint or confinement, or the threat thereof.” Freeman v. State, 331
Ark. 130, 132, 959 S.W.2d 400, 401 (1998). Force is present if “the act is against the will of
the party upon whom the act was committed.” Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 675, 386
S.W.3d 609. Counsel provides a full discussion of the evidence in his brief and correctly
concludes that any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence would be without merit.2
1
We have twice ordered rebriefing in this case. The first time, the record did not
contain a transcript of the voir dire. Burris v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 37. The second time was
because the addendum failed to include a CD that was played in open court, and the
statement on that CD was not abstracted. Burris v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 522. Counsel has
cured these deficiencies, and his brief is now in compliance with the requirements of Rule
4-3(k).
2
Burris moved for directed verdict at the close of the State’s case and then rested
without presenting any evidence. Although he did not renew his motion for directed verdict
at that time, the supreme court has held that, if a defendant presents no evidence after a
directed verdict motion is made, further reliance on that motion is not waived. Huggins v.
State, 321 Ark. 289, 902 S.W.2d 212 (1995); Robinson v. State, 317 Ark. 17, 875 S.W.2d 837
(1994).
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Here, the evidence of rape was overwhelming. The victim testified that Burris
inserted his penis into her vagina against her will. See Richey v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 382 (A
rape victim’s testimony, standing alone, is sufficient to support a conviction if it establishes
the elements of the offense.). The victim identified Burris in open court and described how
he injured her face during the assault. The DNA evidence identified the perpetrator as Burris
(the crime lab DNA analyst testified that the odds of the DNA belonging to anyone else
were one in sixtillion). As such, counsel correctly asserts that there would be no merit to any
argument pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence on the rape count.
Additionally, Burris was convicted of residential burglary. A person commits that
offense if he enters or remains unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure of another
person with the purpose of committing in the residential occupiable structure any offense
punishable by imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2006). The statute
requires entry with the “purpose” to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment.
Purpose can be established by circumstantial evidence, and often this is the only type of
evidence available to show intent. Whitfield v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 380, 438 S.W.3d 289
(citing Washington v. State, 268 Ark. 1117, 599 S.W.2d 408 (Ark. App. 1980)). The
circumstances established by the evidence must be such that the requisite purpose of the
accused can reasonably be inferred, and the evidence must be consistent with the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Id. There was substantial
evidence supporting Burris’s conviction for residential burglary.
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Here, the evidence showed that Burris showed up at the victim’s house and said that
he had $50 worth of crack. The victim testified that she said to him, “I told you about
coming into my house and I don’t want to fool with you.” Burris came back later, kicked
in the door, and said “I come here to take it.” Burris then grabbed the victim by the arm,
began “tussling” with her, and raped her. From this evidence, the jury could have inferred
that Burris intended either to rob or rape the victim, either of which is a crime punishable
by imprisonment. Counsel therefore again correctly concludes that there would be no
meritorious argument on this issue.
II. Other Adverse Rulings
A. Rejection of Proffered Jury Instruction
As mentioned, Burris was charged with rape. At the conclusion of the State’s case,
Burris proffered a jury instruction on second-degree sexual assault3 and the lesser-included
introductory and transitional instructions for rape. The State responded that, because Burris’s
defense was absolute innocence, it would be inappropriate for the jury to be able to consider
a lesser-included offense. The State also objected that the legislature has not created a lesser-
3
Both charges—rape and second-degree sexual assault—require that the actor use
forcible compulsion against the victim. The distinction between the offenses is the action
taken. Rape requires the acts of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity. Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(1). Sexual assault in the second degree requires the act of sexual contact.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(1).
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included offense of rape. The circuit court agreed on both points and rejected Burris’s
proffered instruction.4
An instruction on a lesser-included offense is appropriate when it is supported by even
the slightest evidence. Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413; Cole v. State, 2013 Ark.
App. 492. Once an offense is determined to be a lesser-included offense, the circuit court is
obligated to instruct the jury on that offense only if there is a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the lesser-included
offense. Green, supra. A circuit court’s ruling on whether to submit a jury instruction will not
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Here, there was no rational basis for acquitting
Burris of the offense charged and convicting him of the lesser-included offense; we therefore
agree with counsel that there would be no meritorious argument that the circuit court abused
its discretion in refusing to give the lesser-included instruction.
4
In light of a recent opinion from this court, the circuit court was incorrect in finding
that second-degree sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of rape. In X.O.P. v. State,
2014 Ark. App. 424, 439 S.W.3d 711, this court held that second-degree sexual assault by
forcible compulsion, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(1), is a lesser-included offense of rape
by forcible compulsion. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(1). The court reasoned that
forcible compulsion is an element of both rape and second-degree sexual assault, and that
both sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity (elements of the rape statute) necessarily
involved “sexual contact,” which is an element of the sexual-assault offense. X.O.P., 2014
Ark. App. 424, at 3–4, 439 S.W.3d at 713.
The court’s mistake on this point, however, does not constitute reversible error
because, as discussed herein, there was still no rational basis for instructing the jury on the
lesser-included offense.
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B. Evidentiary Objections
Burris’s counsel points to three other objections and adverse rulings that occurred
during the trial. The first came during Burris’s cross-examination of the victim concerning
the nature of the assault and the duration of time over which it occurred. The State objected
that the line of questioning was argumentative and had already been asked and answered.
The court agreed. Counsel correctly notes that any error in this ruling would be harmless,
as the length of time of the assault would not be relevant to whether a rape occurred.
The next adverse ruling occurred during Burris’s cross-examination of Agent Seletia
Smith. The witness was questioned concerning the victim’s activities and whereabouts prior
to the officer’s arrival. The State objected that the question called for an answer beyond the
witness’s personal knowledge. The court agreed. Again, we find no error in this ruling
because, as with the first objection, where the victim may or may not have been prior to the
rape was irrelevant as to whether a rape occurred.
Finally, Burris objected when the State moved to introduce a CD containing
Detective Shorter’s interview with Burris and a typed transcript of that interview. Burris
asserted that he generally had no problem with the transcript being distributed to the jury for
the purpose of following along with the playing of the CD; however, Burris complained that,
if the State intended for the transcript to be introduced into evidence and taken back into
the jury room, the transcript had not been certified. The State responded that there was
nothing to indicate that anything in the transcript was erroneous; in addition, the State
agreed that it would start playing the recording past the point where it made a reference to
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potentially prejudicial material. The court allowed the State to introduce both the CD and
the transcript into evidence.
On appeal, counsel contends that the court’s ruling allowing the transcript into
evidence was not reversible error because it was not necessarily prejudicial. He notes that,
while the recording contained incriminating information, the transcript contained no such
material. Thus, he concludes that introducing the transcript and allowing the jury to take it
into deliberations did not constitute reversible error. We agree.
III. Pro Se Points
Finally, Burris has filed pro se points in which he challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, noting inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and claiming that she only
invented a story of rape because he did not pay her for the sex he admits that he had with
her.5 As discussed above, however, the evidence supporting Burris’s rape conviction was
overwhelming. Moreover, Burris’s directed-verdict motion did not challenge the victim’s
credibility. Arguments not raised at trial will not be addressed for the first time on appeal, and
parties cannot change the grounds for an objection on appeal, but are bound by the scope
and nature of the objections and arguments presented at trial. Rounsaville v. State, 372 Ark.
252, 273 S.W.3d 486 (2008); Savage v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 133. At trial, Burris argued that
the State failed to prove that he engaged in sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion. He
5
This pro se argument on appeal is inconsistent with Burris’s defense of absolute denial
of sexual involvement at the trial.
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did not make any arguments concerning the victim’s credibility. Thus, he has waived these
arguments on appeal. See Savage, supra.
Burris also briefly challenges his trial attorney’s performance, saying that he believes
he “should get a retrial because [of] lack of help from my lawyer.” This amounts to a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is appropriate
on direct appeal only when it is raised before the circuit court and the facts and circumstances
surrounding the claim have been fully developed at the trial level. Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark.
145, 427 S.W.3d 5; Guevara v. State, 2012 Ark. 351. Here, no such claim was raised below
and, therefore, it cannot be addressed on direct appeal.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
HARRISON and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
N. Mark Klappenbach, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Rachel H. Kemp, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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