Edmondson v. Edmondson-Lockett , 2015 Ark. App. LEXIS 654 ( 2015 )


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  •                                Cite as 
    2015 Ark. App. 571
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION I
    No. CV-14-741
    EDWARD EDMONDSON                                 Opinion Delivered   October 21, 2015
    APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
    V.                                               COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
    SIXTEENTH DIVISION
    [NO. 60DR-88-1804]
    PENNY EDMONDSON-LOCKETT
    APPELLEE                      HONORABLE MORGAN E. WELCH,
    JUDGE
    AFFIRMED
    RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
    Edward Edmondson appeals the order from the Pulaski County Circuit Court
    directing him to pay Penny Edmondson-Lockett thirty-two percent of his pension benefits
    and finding him in contempt of court. On appeal, Edmondson argues that the circuit court
    erred in (1) awarding Lockett more of his pension than the parties’ divorce decree provides
    and (2) finding him in contempt. We affirm.
    Edmondson and Lockett divorced in December 1988. Paragraph 10 of the divorce
    decree provides that
    [o]n the date of trial, [Edmondson] had an accrued, deferred vested pension plan,
    under which benefits will be paid, to him through his employer, Southwestern Bell
    Corporation at the time of retirement. On the date of trial for final Decree of Divorce,
    [Lockett] had a calculated marital property right and interest of thirty-two percent
    (32%) of [Edmondson’s] accrued and vested deferred pension. At such time as
    [Edmondson] retires and begins drawing the pension from his pension fund account,
    [Lockett] will be paid a sum equal to thirty-two percent (32%) of the monthly pension
    Cite as 
    2015 Ark. App. 571
    amount paid to [Edmondson] through Southwestern Bell Corporation, at the time of
    his retirement.
    On June 2, 1998, Lockett petitioned the circuit court to order Edmondson to file a
    qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) so that Southwestern Bell would set aside and
    pay benefits to her when Edmondson retired. On September 4, 1998, the circuit court
    ordered that a QDRO be executed.
    On March 2, 2011, Lockett filed a petition for citation for contempt. In the petition,
    she asked the court to hold Edmondson in contempt for failing to follow the divorce decree
    in several respects. She additionally requested that a QDRO be reinstated with AT&T,
    formerly Southwestern Bell.1 On April 25, 2012, the court found that Edmondson was not
    in contempt but ordered that a QDRO be issued.
    On December 23, 2012, Lockett filed a motion for enforcement of orders and citation
    for contempt, alleging that Edmondson had retired from AT&T in December 2012 and had
    received pension payments but had failed to pay her thirty-two percent of the monthly
    payments. She asked the court to order Edmondson to pay her thirty-two percent of the
    monthly pension payments and to hold Edmondson in contempt for willfully failing to pay
    her.
    On March 27, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion. Edmondson
    testified that he had retired on August 18, 2013, and that he had received his first pension
    1
    In her petition, Lockett requested that a QDRO be “reinstated” with Southwestern
    Bell; however, it is unclear to this court whether a QDRO was ever issued prior to the filing
    of the petition. The only QDRO in the record is dated April 8, 2014.
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    2015 Ark. App. 571
    payment in September 2013. He testified that he was receiving $1500 a month in retirement
    benefits. He stated that he was unaware that the 1988 divorce decree awarded Lockett a
    percentage of his pension so he did not pay Lockett upon his retirement. He further stated
    that he had not seen a QDRO that had been submitted to the court for his signature. Lockett
    testified that she thought Edmondson had retired in December 2012. She asked the court to
    approve a QDRO so that she could send it to Fidelity Investments for allocation of the
    pension. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued oral findings. Specifically, the court
    found that paragraph 10 of the divorce decree is unambiguous and that despite Edmondson’s
    testimony, he had notice of paragraph 10 since 1988.
    On April 11, 2014, the court entered a written order directing Edmondson to pay
    Lockett $3360. The court explained that $3360 represented thirty-two percent of the monthly
    benefit amount of $1500, multiplied by the seven months that she had not been paid. The
    court further noted that Edmondson had “received, not only the amounts to which he is
    entitled, as the plan participant, but those amounts to which [Lockett] was/is entitled.” The
    court found Edmondson’s failure to pay Lockett her share of the benefits “has been willful and
    purposeful, and in violation of the orders of [the] [c]ourt” and ordered Edmondson to pay the
    costs associated with the action as well as Lockett’s attorney’s fees.
    Edmondson filed a motion for relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 59
    on April 25, 2014. On May 22, 2015, the court entered an order denying Edmondson’s
    motion for relief. Edmondson then filed this timely appeal. He raises two issues on appeal.
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    Edmondson first argues that the circuit court misinterpreted paragraph 10 of the
    divorce decree and awarded Lockett more of his pension than the decree provides.
    Specifically, Edmondson argues that Lockett is entitled only to the sum equal to thirty-two
    percent of what he actually receives, not thirty-two percent of all amounts paid by the plan
    administrator.
    When a contract is unambiguous, its construction is a question of law for the court.
    Surratt v. Surratt, 
    85 Ark. App. 267
    , 
    148 S.W.3d 761
    (2004). A contract is unambiguous and
    its construction and legal effect are questions of law when its terms are not susceptible to more
    than one equally reasonable construction. 
    Id. When contracting
    parties express their intention
    in a written instrument in clear and unambiguous language, it is the court’s duty to construe
    the writing in accordance with the plain meaning of the language employed. 
    Id. In this
    case, we agree with the circuit court that paragraph 10 of the decree is
    unambiguous. It provides that “[a]t such time as [Edmondson] retires and begins drawing the
    pension from his pension fund account, [Lockett] will be paid a sum equal to thirty-two
    percent (32%) of the monthly pension amount paid to [Edmondson] through Southwestern
    Bell Corporation, at the time of his retirement.” Edmondson testified at the March hearing
    that he receives $1500 a month in retirement benefits. He offered no other evidence that he
    receives a different amount. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in ordering him to pay
    Lockett thirty-two percent of $1500.
    Edmondson next argues that the court erred in finding him in contempt of court
    because the language of the divorce decree does not require him to personally pay Lockett.
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    He contends that the decree only requires the pension-plan administrator to pay Lockett and
    that Lockett should have ensured that a QDRO had been entered. The standard of review
    for civil contempt is whether the finding of the circuit court is clearly against the
    preponderance of the evidence. Scudder v. Ramsey, 
    2013 Ark. 115
    , 
    426 S.W.3d 427
    . The
    disobedience of any valid judgment, order, or decree of a court having jurisdiction to enter
    it may constitute contempt. Guffey v. Counts, 
    2009 Ark. 410
    ; Gatlin v. Gatlin, 
    306 Ark. 146
    ,
    
    811 S.W.2d 761
    (1991). Before one can be held in contempt for violating the court’s order,
    the order must be definite in its terms and clear as to what duties it imposes. Guffey, 
    2009 Ark. 410
    .
    In this case, the circuit court found that Edmondson had knowledge of the 1988
    decree and that Lockett had been awarded thirty-two percent of his retirement benefits.
    Nevertheless, when Edmondson retired in August 2013, he did not inform Lockett that he
    had retired, and he retained his benefits along with Lockett’s share for seven months.
    Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in finding Edmondson
    in contempt.
    Affirmed.
    HARRISON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
    Tripcony, May & Assoc., by: James L. Tripcony, for appellant.
    H. Oscar Hirby and Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellee.
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    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CV-14-741

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ark. App. 571, 473 S.W.3d 567, 2015 Ark. App. LEXIS 654

Judges: Raymond R. Abramson

Filed Date: 10/21/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024