In re Adoption of I.C. , 2014 Ark. App. 513 ( 2014 )

2014 Ark. App. 513
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-13-1159
IN RE ADOPTION OF I.C. Opinion Delivered October 1, 2014
KEVIN SCOTT CLARK AND APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
JUNIORETTE MARIE CLARK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLANTS [NO. PR-2013-300-3]
V. HONORABLE TOM SMITH, JUDGE
MADISON ELAINE HALL AFFIRMED
APPELLEE
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
Juniorette and Kevin Clark appeal the circuit court’s denial of their petition for
adoption. They argue that the court erred in (1) allowing the birth mother, Madison
Hall, to withdraw her relinquishment of her parental rights outside the five days allowed
by statute, and (2) not approving Hall’s relinquishment under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-
220(b) (Repl. 2009). We cannot address the arguments on appeal, and affirm the court’s
denial, because the Clarks did not also appeal the court’s decision that it was not in the
child’s best interest to be adopted.
On 5 June 2013, the Clarks filed a petition for adoption in the Benton County
Circuit Court. The petition explained that the child to be adopted was born on June 1
and that the mother of the child, Hall, had signed a relinquishment of her parental rights
and consent to adoption, which was attached to the petition. In this document, Hall
relinquished all rights and obligations to her child, consented to adoption by the Clarks
and stated that adoption was in her child’s best interest, waived her right to revoke the
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relinquishment within ten days after the child’s birth, and acknowledged that she had five
days after the birth of the baby to revoke her relinquishment by filing a notarized affidavit
of withdrawal with the Benton County Clerk. Hall signed this document on 10 January
2013.
On 6 June 2013, the Clarks filed a motion to gain custody of the child or, in the
alternative, to require Hall to appear in court with the child. The motion explained that
Hall had failed to communicate with the Clarks and had taken the child from the hospital.
The Clarks expressed concern for the child’s safety and questioned Hall’s stability and
parenting skills. The court ordered Hall to appear with the child on 11 June 2013. On
that date, Hall appeared and informed the court that she was withdrawing her consent to
the adoption. The Clarks’ counsel argued that Hall’s attempted withdrawal was outside
the five-day period allowed by statute and requested a formal adoption hearing so that
proof could be offered on whether Hall’s relinquishment was valid.
After another preliminary hearing and trial briefs filed by the parties, the court held
a final hearing on 16 August 2013. Hall testified that at the end of 2012, when she was
approximately four months pregnant, her friend Mariah introduced her to Tabitha Easley,
who could help her find someone to adopt the baby. Hall felt that adoption was the best
option because she was homeless and did not have any support or help to care for the
baby. Along with providing food and transportation, Easley located several families
interested in adopting the baby, and from those families, Hall chose the Clarks. On 10
January 2013, Hall met with the Clarks, reviewed the relinquishment-and-adoption
agreement, and signed the agreement in the presence of a notary.
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Hall acknowledged during the hearing that she understood when she signed the
form that she had until five days after the birth to change her mind. About three or four
months before the baby was born, however, Hall began to have doubts about the
adoption. She did not communicate those doubts to Easley or to the Clarks, but she did
speak to family and friends about it. After the baby was born, Hall told several nurses that
she had changed her mind about the adoption. She claimed to have spoken to
approximately fifteen attorneys in the five days after the baby was born “to see how I’m
supposed to do it. I didn’t know how I was supposed to.” She said that she had never
filed any revocation with the probate clerk and was not given a copy of the consent that
she signed in January.
Tabitha Easley, who connected Hall with the Clarks, testified that she does not
work for any adoption agency or group but “just help[s] people in the community that
have a heart for adoption.” Easley stated that Hall and the Clarks met at her home on
January 10 and that she (Easley) explained the consent form and specifically the five-day
waiver to Hall. According to Easley, Hall did not question the consent form.
Easley stated that she continued to communicate with Hall for the next several
months, mostly through text messaging, but that Hall stopped communicating on April
20. On that date, Hall was admitted to the hospital and her friend Mariah told Easley that
Hall was in labor. Easley then informed the Clarks and they were headed to the hospital
when Hall sent Easley a text message that it was just food poisoning, that she was not in
labor, and that she did not want the Clarks there until she was in labor. After that date,
Hall did not respond. Easley speculated that Hall cut off contact because “the Clarks
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showed up at the hospital, and we were informed that it was because of drug use, that
[Hall] was fearful of being in trouble for drugs.”
Juniorette Clark testified that she knew Easley because they had gone to church
together for several years and that Easley knew that the Clarks were interested in adopting
a child. Among other things, she said that on January 10 she asked Hall if she was sure
about her decision and if she understood what to do if she changed her mind, and Hall
said, “Yes, but I’m not going to.” According to Juniorette, Hall signed two copies of the
consent agreement, and she and the Clarks each received a copy. Kevin Clark also
testified that Hall signed two copies and received one.
At the hearing’s conclusion, the court denied the petition for adoption. It found
that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-220, the relinquishment of parental rights was subject
to court approval and that it did not approve because (1) Hall did not receive a copy of
the consent agreement, and “without a copy . . . being given to the mother, you can’t
make informed consent and waiver,” and (2) the Clarks were put on notice as of April 20
that Hall had possibly changed her mind. The court found that no external duress or
intimidation from the Clarks occurred, but that
the circumstances of an unwed mother who’s being kicked out of her
house, is homeless, is foodless, is having everybody telling her this is the
right thing to do, and then when you combine that with the fact that after
we signed the document, without any attorney, or legal consent done to
understand what it means what we’re signing. I do find that there is some
duress and intimidation factors that existed that we got that far, would set
this aside.
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The court also concluded that it was not in the child’s best interest to allow the adoption
“at this time” given that the child had been with her mother for three months. A written
order memorializing these findings was entered, which the Clarks appealed.
This court recently explained the standard of review for adoption proceedings:
In adoption proceedings, we review the record de novo, but we will
not reverse the lower court’s decision unless it is clearly erroneous or against
a preponderance of the evidence, after giving due regard to its superior
opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses. We have said that
in cases involving minor children a heavier burden is cast upon the court to
utilize to the fullest extent all its power of perception in evaluating the
witnesses, their testimony, and the children’s best interest; that the appellate
court has no such opportunity; and that we know of no case in which the
superior position, ability, and opportunity of the trial court to observe the
parties carry as great a weight as one involving minor children. . . .
Adoption proceedings are in derogation of the natural rights of parents, and
statutes permitting such are to be construed in a light favoring continuation
of the rights of natural parents.
Ducharme v. Gregory, 2014 Ark. App. 268, at 6, 435 S.W.3d 14, 18 (citations omitted).
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-220 (Repl. 2009) provides in part:
(a) With the exception of the duty to pay child support, the rights of
a parent with reference to a child, including parental right to control the
child or to withhold consent to an adoption, may be relinquished and the
relationship of parent and child terminated in or prior to an adoption
proceeding as provided in this section.
....
(b) All rights of a parent with reference to a child, including the right
to receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption, may be
relinquished and the relationship of parent and child terminated by a
writing, signed by an adult parent, subject to the court’s approval. . . . The
signing shall occur in the presence of a representative of an agency taking
custody of the child, or in the presence of a notary public, whether the
agency is within or without the state, or in the presence and with the
approval of a judge of a court of record of this state or any other state in
which the minor was present at the time it was signed. The relinquishment
shall be executed in the same manner as for a consent to adopt under § 9-9-
208.
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(1)(A) The relinquishment may be withdrawn within ten (10)
calendar days, or, if a waiver of the ten-day period is elected under § 9-9-
220(b)(3), five (5) calendar days after it is signed or the child is born,
whichever is later.
(i) Notice of withdrawal shall be given by filing an affidavit with the
probate division clerk of the circuit court in the county designated by the
writing as the county in which the guardianship petition will be filed if there
is a guardianship, or where the petition for adoption will be filed, if there is
no guardianship. If the ten-day period, or, if a waiver of the ten-day period
is elected under subdivision (b)(3) of this section, the five-day period ends
on a weekend or legal holiday, the person may file the affidavit the next
working day.
The Clarks argue here that the circuit court clearly erred in allowing the revocation
beyond the five-day period allowed by statute because Hall never filed an affidavit with
the Benton County Probate Clerk within the five-day time frame (or thereafter), which
means that her revocation was invalid under the plain language of the statute. In the
Clarks’ view, the circuit court had no discretion to reject the withdrawal of
relinquishment given that Hall undisputedly signed it and understood it. The Clarks also
argue that the court’s decision was clearly erroneous because Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-220
does not require that a copy of the relinquishment of rights be given to the birth mother,
and the “internal duress” the court found cannot support an untimely withdrawal.
We cannot decide the merits of what appears to be a novel case because the Clarks
failed to challenge the court’s finding that the adoption was not in the child’s best interest.
Even if a biological parent has validly consented to the adoption of a child, the circuit
court may still deny the adoption petition if it finds that the adoption is not in the child’s
best interest. See In re Adoption of J.P., 2011 Ark. 535, 385 S.W.3d 266 (affirming the
denial of a stepmother’s adoption of her stepson despite biological father’s consent based
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on the circuit court’s best-interest determination). So even if we expressed a concern
about the circuit court’s decision to reject the relinquishment for the reasons stated, we
still have an unchallenged basis for affirming the denial of the adoption petition.
We acknowledge that the Clarks’ reply brief states, in a heading and without
further development, that the “trial court erred in its determination that maintaining the
natural relation between appellee and her child was in the best interest of the child.” Even
if we could grant that the quoted sentence was an argument, it came too late. See Kassees
v. Satterfield, 2009 Ark. 91, 303 S.W.3d 42 (noting that appellate courts will not consider
an argument raised for the first time in the reply brief). What is clear to us is that the
principal brief was solely about the revocation/withdrawal issue, which means the separate
and independent best-interest finding was not timely discussed and challenged.
Affirmed.
WYNNE and GLOVER, JJ., agree.
H. Keith Morrison, for appellants.
Tina Adcock-Thomas, for appellee.
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