Kroger Ltd. Partnership I v. Fee , 2014 Ark. App. LEXIS 876 ( 2014 )

Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-13-1129
Opinion Delivered October 29, 2014
KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP I
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION [NO. G008938]
V.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART ON DIRECT
JOSEPH L. FEE APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS-
APPELLEE APPEAL
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from an order of the Arkansas Workers’
Compensation Commission. Appellee, Joseph Fee, was employed by appellant, Kroger,
when he sustained an admittedly compensable injury. After a hearing on appellee’s claim for
benefits, the Commission issued a decision finding that all treatment received by appellee
through November 15, 2012, was reasonably necessary; that replacement therapy for low
testosterone was reasonably necessary to counteract side effects of medicine prescribed for
appellee’s compensable injury; that appellee proved entitlement to additional temporary-total-
disability through December 27, 2011; and that appellee proved that he had sustained a
compensable mental injury pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113 (Repl. 2012).
Appellant Kroger argues that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings
that appellee’s treatment through November 15, 2012, was reasonably necessary; that the need
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
for testosterone therapy resulted from the compensable injury; or that appellee had sustained
a compensable mental injury. On cross-appeal, appellee argues that there is no substantial
evidence to support the Commission’s findings that he was not entitled to additional medical
treatment after November 15, 2012, or to additional temporary-total-disability benefits after
December 27, 2011. We affirm in part and reverse in part on direct appeal, and we affirm on
cross-appeal.
In reviewing workers’ compensation decisions, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s
findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Loar v. Cooper Tire
& Rubber Co., 2014 Ark. App. 240. Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328
Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). We will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we
are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have
reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. White v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 339
Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999). The determination of the credibility and weight to be given
a witness’s testimony is within the sole province of the Commission; the Commission is not
required to believe the testimony of any witness but may accept and translate into findings of
fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Farmers Cooperative v.
Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.3d 899 (2002). The Commission has the duty of weighing
medical evidence as it does any other evidence, and its resolution of the medical evidence has
2 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
the force and effect of a jury verdict. Continental Express v. Harris, 61 Ark. App. 198, 965
S.W.2d 811 (1998).
Appellee, who was forty-two years old at the time of the Commission’s 2013 decision,
was employed by appellant as a meat cutter in February 2000, and continued in that
employment through October 7, 2010. It was stipulated that, on that date in 2010, appellee
tripped and fell while unloading a truck, resulting in injury to many body parts, including his
neck and back. Initial radiology testing of his neck and spine by x-ray and CT scans revealed
no fractures or gross abnormalities. Suffering from low back pain and neck pain with
numbness in his right hand, he was initially diagnosed by Dr. Bernard Crowell with cervical
and lumbar strain and radiculopathy into the right upper extremity.
Dr. Crowell took appellee off work and ordered physical therapy on October 19,
2010. After several physical-therapy sessions and pain treatment with hydrocodone, Flexeril,
and naproxen, a follow-up visit on November 2, 2010, led Dr. Crowell to conclude that
appellee’s symptoms remained unchanged and that his pain cycle was unbroken. Dr. Crowell
renewed appellee’s prescriptions, kept him off work, and ordered an MRI of his spine. The
MRI was performed on December 2, 2010, by Dr. David Harshfield, Jr., who reported
various abnormalities of appellee’s cervical and lumbar spine, the most significant being broad-
based posterior-disc protrusion of the cervical spine.
Appellee returned to Dr. Crowell for a follow-up examination on January 13, 2011.
Noting that, despite continued physical therapy, appellee was still complaining of neck pain
with pain radiating into both arms, with pain, numbness, and tingling into the small finger of
3 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
the right hand, Dr. Crowell recorded his impression as “[f]all with lumbar strain, along with
broad-based disc herniations at C5–C6 and C6–C7.” Dr. Crowell noted that he was
attempting to obtain approval for an epidural steroid injection to appellee’s cervical spine at
C5-C6 and returned appellee to light-duty work with restrictions to begin January 17, 2011.
Appellee returned to light-duty work for approximately six weeks but ultimately was
sent home by his supervisor after he complained of numbness and shoulder pain. On January
25, 2011, appellee returned to Dr. Crowell, who gave him a seven-day supply of Ambien,
scheduled an epidural steroid injection at C5-C6, and referred him to Dr. Christopher
Mocek. On February 15, 2011, Dr. Mocek noted cervical spine pain, low back pain, cervical
radiculopathy, lumbar spondylosis, and positive indications for sexual difficulty. Dr. Mocek’s
treatment plan included administration of HCD, Skelaxin, and Pennsaid, and part-time work
with a new weight restriction of ten pounds.
Dr. Crowell took appellee off work on March 10, 2011, and released him to light duty
on March 29, 2011, restricted to sitting for four hours per day and occasional lifting up to ten
pounds. On April 4, 2011, Kroger notified appellee that duty modifications had been
arranged and that he was to return to work in his regular position. Appellee saw an internal
medicine specialist, Dr. Daniel Cartaya, for depression on April 7, 2011. Dr. Cartaya
diagnosed appellee’s condition as a recurrent episode of major depressive disorder with
moderate but constant depressive symptoms, secondary to his on-the-job injury and
exacerbated by his relationship with his wife. A licensed clinical social worker, David
Hendrix, Jr., saw appellee on April 21, 2011, noting that appellee was depressed because he
4 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
was being sent back to work, because of money problems related to his injury, and because
of demands placed upon him by his wife. Mr. Hendrix diagnosed depressive disorder and
recommended regular talk therapy and a psychiatric evaluation for possible medication
management.
On April 26, 2011, appellee followed up with Dr. Crowell, who noted that appellee
was despondent, had obtained no relief from the epidural steroid injection, and complained
of low back pain with pain radiating into the right leg. His impression was cervical
radiculopathy and herniated nucleus pulposus of the cervical spine and low back pain.
However, electrodiagnostic testing performed on May 4, 2011, revealed no neuropathic or
myopathic abnormalities of the upper extremities. Dr. Crowell took appellee off work again
on May 24, 2011, noting that he could offer appellee no services other than operative
intervention and stating his intention to refer appellee back to Dr. Mocek for a comprehensive
plan of care rather than continued injections.
A psychiatric evaluation was performed by Dr. Robin Hickerson on July 13, 2011,
who diagnosed “Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood and Generalized Anxiety
Disorder.” Dr. Hickerson noted that appellee had been prescribed Effexor for depression and
was suffering sexual side effects from that drug, and she recorded that appellee was unable to
work, was in chronic pain, and was very angry with Kroger for perceived unfair treatment.
On July 19, 2011, appellee was examined by Dr. James Adametz, who opined that
appellee’s MRI scans of the cervical and lumbar spine were essentially normal, that the x-rays
of his thoracic spine were normal, and that his nerve-conduction studies were normal. He
5 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
stated that, although appellee appears to have “had this take over his life and been
incapacitated by it,” he did not believe that appellee had sustained a serious injury or required
surgery. He recommended a functional capacity evaluation, although he predicted that it
would be inconsistent, and opined that it would be reasonable to provide pain management
and up to two more epidural steroid injections.
In response to correspondence from Kroger, Dr. Crowell stated his diagnosis as disc
herniation at C5–C6 with radiculopathy in the upper extremity with numbness and tingling,
along with low back pain. In addition, Dr. Crowell opined that appellee had reached
maximum medical improvement on May 24, 2011. Kroger paid temporary-total-disability
benefits until August 24, 2011; appellee has not since attempted to return to gainful
employment.
Appellee was seen by Dr. Gary Frankowski for a repeat cervical-epidural steroid
injection at C5-C6 on September 13, 2011. Dr. Frankowski’s notes indicate that appellee had
a beneficial response to his last such injection. However, after seeing appellee on October 4,
2011, Dr. Crowell recorded that appellee obtained no relief at all from the second injection.
Dr. Crowell wrote Kroger on October 18, 2011, and stated that his office erred in his
earlier opinion that appellee had reached maximum medical improvement, that appellee
remained under his care, and that he would notify Kroger when appellee reached maximum
medical improvement. On November 11, 2011, appellee participated in a functional capacity
evaluation; the report stated that, although appellee demonstrated that he was at least capable
6 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
of sedentary work, his true functional level could not be determined because he gave
unreliable effort during the evaluation.
On November 17, 2011, Dr. Crowell noted that, because appellant was not a surgical
candidate, he was being referred to Dr. Columbus Brown for pain management. In a letter
to Kroger dated December 6, 2011, Dr. Crowell stated that, although appellee had probably
reached maximum medical improvement, he would like Kroger to refer appellee to a
comprehensive pain-management physician before stating categorically that appellee had in
fact reached maximum medical improvement. After seeing appellee on December 15,
however, Dr. Crowell noted that, because appellee was still complaining of neck and low
back pain despite physical therapy and several epidural steroid injections, he intended to
schedule surgery in the near future to perform an anterior-cervical discectomy with interbody
fusion at C5-C6.
On December 27, 2011, Dr. Adametz opined that appellee had reached maximum
medical improvement and qualified for a six-percent permanent-partial impairment to the
body as a whole. On February 2, 2012, Dr. Crowell signed a note stating that appellee was
still under his care until further notice. On March 7, 2012, appellee was seen in Dr. Cartaya’s
office complaining of panic attacks.
On April 3, 2012, the Commission approved a change of physician from Dr. Crowell
to Dr. Mocek, who assessed appellee as suffering from cervical-spine pain, right upper-
extremity radiculitis, and low back pain. Dr. Mocek recommended additional diagnostic
testing. On May 17, 2012, Dr. Mocek reported that appellee complained that his pain
7 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
medication was interfering with his sex life. On June 12, 2012, Dr. Mocek noted that
appellee had benefitted from a change in medication from Effexor to Wellbutrin, and had a
low testosterone level. Stating that the low testosterone was related to appellee’s taking opioid
medication for his neck, Dr. Mocek ordered monthly testosterone injections to be followed
by repeat testosterone-level checks two weeks after each injection.
A psychiatric evaluation of appellee was provided by Dr. Purushottam Thapa on July
5, 2012. She noted that appellee had been dealing with depression and anxiety since 2008,
but that appellee stated that his current problem started with the work-related injury that he
sustained on October 7, 2010. Dr. Thapa diagnosed “Major Depressive Disorder and Anxiety
Disorder,” for which she prescribed Paroxetine and Clonazepam. Noting on August 9, 2012,
that the Paroxetine was causing appellee sexual dysfunction, Dr. Thapa withdrew appellee
from that medication and increased his dosage of Wellbutrin.
Dr. Mocek performed a diagnostic cervical medial-branch nerve block (MBNB) on
September 12, 2012; he noted that he intended to repeat the procedure in one month and
that, if appellee reported eighty-percent or more relief from the injections, appellee would be
a candidate for radio-frequency ablation of the facet-joint nerves to provide prolonged pain
relief. After a follow-up appointment on October 16, 2012, Dr. Mocek noted that appellee
reported experiencing 100% relief for three to four hours after the cervical MBNB performed
on September 12. Based on this result, Dr. Mocek recommended radio-frequency ablation,
but this was not performed because appellant controverted any further medical treatment,
testing, or medication as of October 1, 2012. On November 14, 2012, Dr. Cartaya wrote
8 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
that he believed that the procedure proposed by Dr. Mocek was the correct way to proceed.
Appellee was last seen by Dr. Mocek on November 15, 2012. Dr. Mocek noted increased
cervical and lumbar pain and radiculitis; increased appellee’s hydrocodone dosage;
recommended a testosterone injection; and refilled appellee’s medications.
Appellant argues that the Commission erred in finding that the medical treatments
provided through November 15, 2012, were reasonably necessary for treatment of appellee’s
compensable injury. Although couched in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence, this
argument is premised on the assertion that the only credible medical opinion was that of Dr.
Adametz, who recommended no further treatment after the cervical-epidural steroid injection
administered by Dr. Frankowski on September 13, 2011. However, the question of the
credibility of medical opinions is within the sole province of the Commission; Arkansas
appellate courts have consistently and repeatedly held that, when the Commission chooses to
accept the opinion of one physician over that of another, the appellate court is powerless to
reverse the decision. E.g., Nettleton School District v. Adams, 2010 Ark. App. 3.
Nor do we agree that substantial evidence is lacking to support the Commission’s
finding that replacement therapy for low testosterone was reasonably necessary to counteract
side-effects of medicine prescribed for appellee’s compensable injury. Appellant argues that
Dr. Mocek’s opinion that opioid medications administered to relieve appellee’s pain from his
compensable injury caused a drop in his testosterone level was not stated to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty because it lacked the requisite degree of definiteness. See Crudup
v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000). We do not agree. Although it is
9 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
true, as appellant notes, that Dr. Mocek wrote on August 16, 2012, that it was well known
that chronic use of opioids for chronic pain “can” cause a reduction in a man’s testosterone
production, this statement is taken out of context. A fair reading of the entire medical note
shows that Dr. Mocek’s comment was directed not to the reason for the need for testosterone
therapy, but instead to his frustration with Kroger for having denied coverage for this therapy
despite the fact that the causal connection between chronic opioid use and low testosterone
was well established. In any event, Dr. Mocek definitively stated his opinion regarding
causation in his report of June 12, 2012, where he wrote, “The low testosterone is related to
taking opioid medication for his neck.”
We agree, however, with appellant’s argument that substantial evidence is lacking to
support the Commission’s finding of a compensable mental injury. The Commission based
its award of compensation for psychological and psychiatric costs on Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-
113 (Repl. 2012), which requires proof that the mental injury was caused by physical injury
to the body. In Amlease, Inc. v. Kuligowski, 59 Ark. App. 261, 957 S.W.2d 715 (1997), the
issue was whether the claimant’s post-traumatic stress disorder was properly found to have
been caused by physical injuries that he sustained in a compensable vehicular accident. We
held that it was not caused by claimant’s physical injuries because the claimant admitted that
his mental anguish stemmed not from his own injuries but instead from the death of the other
driver involved in the accident. In Terrell v. Arkansas Trucking Service, Inc., 60 Ark. App. 93,
959 S.W.2d 70 (1998), the claimant was involved in an accident in which his truck
overturned on a bridge embankment, and he subsequently suffered mental distress and was
10 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
afraid to drive his truck again. The issue was whether the Commission erred in denying his
request for a psychological examination. We held that it did so err because such an exam was
necessary for him to prove his claim of mental injury:
There is no question that appellant sustained physical injuries in the
compensable accident. Whether the physical injuries have caused appellant’s mental
distress must be answered by psychological evaluation by a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist. The results of the evaluation should make it clear whether appellant’s
distress is the result of his physical injuries or the accident itself. For appellant’s mental
injury to be compensable it must have a causal connection to his physical injuries. As
the statute is written, mental injury or illness under this section is not compensable
unless it is caused by the physical injuries.
Terrell, 60 Ark. App. at 96, 959 S.W.2d at 72.
Here, there was no medical opinion offered to show that appellee’s mental condition
was caused by his physical injury. Although medical evidence on the issue of causation is not
required in every case, see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d
522 (1999); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Strickland, 2011 Ark. App. 585; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Leach, 74 Ark. App. 231, 48 S.W.3d 540 (2001), we think that such evidence was necessary
in this case because appellant’s depressive and anxiety disorders were recurrences of conditions
that dated to at least 2008, two years prior to his compensable injury. In the absence of any
medical opinion regarding the cause of appellee’s mental distress, or evidence to show that the
distress he experienced after his injury was different in degree than that experienced before
the injury, we hold that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding
of a compensable mental injury under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113. We express no opinion
as to whether appellee’s psychiatric treatment could have been found to be compensable
under § 11-9-508.
11 CV-13-1129
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 577
On cross-appeal, appellee argues that the Commission erred in finding that he was not
entitled to additional medical treatment after November 15, 2012. We find no error.
Medical opinion differed widely over the utility of further medical treatment, and the
Commission chose to believe the opinion of Dr. Adametz on this point; this is a question of
the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. See Nettleton School District v. Adams, supra.
Appellee also argues that the Commission erred in finding that he proved entitlement
to temporary-total disability only to December 27, 2011. Temporary-total disability is that
period within the healing period in which an employee suffers a total incapacity to earn
wages; the healing period continues until the employee is as far restored as the permanent
character of his injury will permit, and it ends when the underlying condition causing the
disability has become stable and nothing in the way of treatment will improve that condition.
Carroll General Hospital v. Green, 54 Ark. App. 102, 923 S.W.2d 878 (1996). Determining
when the healing period ends is a fact question for the Commission. Id. Although there was
opinion offered to the contrary, here the Commission’s finding as to the end of the healing
period was based on Dr. Adametz’s express opinion that appellee had reached maximum
medical improvement as of that date. This, too, is a matter of credibility into which we may
not intrude. See id.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part on direct appeal; affirmed on cross-appeal.
GLADWIN, C.J., and WYNNE, J., agree.
Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Gail Ponder Gaines, for appellant.
The McNeely Law Firm, PLLC, by: Steven R. McNeely, for appellee.
12 CV-13-1129