2014-10

Booth v. State ( 2014 )

Menu:

                                Cite as

2014 Ark. App. 572

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-13-978
DERRICK LAMONT BOOTH                           Opinion Delivered   October 22, 2014
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
V.                                             COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIFTH DIVISION
STATE OF ARKANSAS                              [NO. 60CR-12-3455]
APPELLEE
HONORABLE WENDELL L.
GRIFFEN, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
On October 5, 2012, at around 4:20 p.m., Little Rock firemen were dispatched to
3 Althea Circle, the address of a house owned by Jacqueline Booth-Clark, appellant’s wife.
When the firemen arrived at the house, light smoke was coming from a bedroom on the
right side of the residence. The house’s doors were locked and the windows were closed.
The firemen entered the house by breaking down the front door, and extinguished a fire
they found inside a bedroom. The door to this bedroom had been shut.
A jury trial was held on July 9–10, 2013. At trial, appellant moved for a directed
verdict at the close of the State’s case alleging that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that he set a fire at his wife’s home. 1 His motion was denied. At the close of all
1
While appellant and his wife, who was the owner of the home, were married, they
were separated at the time of the fire. At the time of the fire, appellant’s wife was living
with her mother and appellant was living in the home.
Cite as

2014 Ark. App. 572

the evidence, appellant renewed his motion. The court again denied his motion. The jury
found appellant guilty of Class A felony arson. In the sentencing phase, the jury could not
reach a sentencing verdict. In lieu of the jury sentencing appellant, the circuit court judge
sentenced him, as a habitual offender, to serve twelve years’ imprisonment. A sentencing
order reflecting the same was entered on July 24, 2013. It is from this order that appellant
timely appeals.
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred by not directing a verdict in his favor
on the arson charge. The State argues that the circuit court correctly denied the appellant’s
directed-verdict motion because there was sufficient evidence to convict him of arson.
A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 2 In a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State and considers only the evidence that supports the conviction. 3
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. 4 Evidence is
substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a
conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. 5 We affirm a conviction if
2
Washington v. State,

2010 Ark. App. 596

, at 6,

377 S.W.3d 518

, 522 (citing Tryon
v. State,

371 Ark. 25

263 S.W.3d 475

(2007)).
3
King v. State,

2014 Ark. App. 81

, at 2,

432 S.W.3d 127

, 129 (citing Daniels v.
State,

2012 Ark. App. 9

, at 1–2).
4
Laswell v. State,

2012 Ark. 201

, at 4,

404 S.W.3d 818

, 823 (citing Smoak v. State,

2011 Ark. 529

385 S.W.3d 257

.).
5

King, supra

(citing Heydenrich v. State,

2010 Ark. App. 615

379 S.W.3d 507

).
2
Cite as

2014 Ark. App. 572

substantial evidence exists to support it. 6 The trier of fact resolves the questions of
conflicting testimony, inconsistent evidence, and credibility. 7 We will disturb the jury’s
determination only if the evidence did not meet the required standards, thereby leaving
the jury to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. 8
For circumstantial evidence to be relied on, it must exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, or it does not amount to substantial
evidence. 9 The question of whether circumstantial evidence excludes every other
reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the fact-finder to decide. 10 On
review, this court must determine whether the fact-finder resorted to speculation and
conjecture in reaching the verdict. 11
Appellant was charged with arson. A person commits arson if he or she starts a fire
with the purpose of destroying or otherwise damaging an occupiable structure that is the
property of another person. 12 Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying
6
Harris v. State,

2014 Ark. App. 448

, at 2, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (citing Ali v. State,

2011 Ark. App. 758

).
7

King, supra

(citing Daniels,

2012 Ark. App. 9

).
8

Laswell, supra

2012 Ark. 201

, at

4, 404 S.W.3d at 822

(citing Ellis v. State,

2012 Ark. 65

386 S.W.3d 485

).
9
Brawner v. State,

2013 Ark. App. 413

, at 6,

428 S.W.3d 600

, 605 (citing Lowry v.
State,

364 Ark. 6

216 S.W.3d 101

(2005)).
10

Id. 11 Id.

       12
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-301(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2013).
3
Cite as

2014 Ark. App. 572

his motion for directed verdict. He argues that while the State proved that appellant had
opportunity and motive, it failed to provide additional evidence that would allow the jury
to reasonably infer that appellant set the fire.
At trial, Captain Naim Salaam of the Little Rock Fire Department (LRFD) testified
that he and his crew were the first to arrive on the scene of the fire. He saw light smoke
coming from one of the bedroom windows. The home was secured; the front and back
doors were locked. While he did not participate in extinguishing the fire, he did enter the
home thereafter. While inside, he saw “a lot of damage in the kitchen[,]” including
broken glass that appeared to be from a dining room table. A bunch of clothing on the
floor was “definitely where the fire started[,]” but he was unable to ascertain an ignition
source—something electrical or flammable in nature—for the fire. Because, he testified, a
fire like the one in this case could smolder for a period of time before smoke would be
visible, he estimated that the fire may have been burning for “probably up to an hour or
so” before smoke was visible. There was not a lot of actual burning damage because there
was not enough oxygen in the room for the fire to grow due to the door and window to
the room being closed. He noted that there were “a lot” of household items on the floor
of other rooms, yet none of those rooms had a fire going.
Captain Kevin Murphy of the LRFD and a member of the crew that entered the
home and extinguished the fire, also testified. He corroborated Salaam’s testimony that the
door to the room containing the smoldering fire was closed. He also testified that the
house looked like it had been “ransacked.” He had not moved anything in the home,
beyond opening the back sliding glass door for ventilation purposes.
4
Cite as

2014 Ark. App. 572

Fire Marshall Ryan Baker, also with the LRFD, testified. His job was to determine
the origin and cause of a fire. The doorknob to the front door was locked, but not the
deadbolt. 13 He testified that the interior of the home was “in disarray” with things, such as
chairs and tables, “thrown around[,]” and a trash can in the dining room, which was
uncommon. He found a garden tool in the home and later found a television with gouges
in it that appeared to be consistent with use of the previously-found garden tool.
Fire Marshall Baker testified that the fire was an incendiary fire—“a human act set
fire” that would not have occurred but for human involvement, “period.” “[N]o ignitable
liquids” were detected as having been used to start the fire; however, accelerants were not
necessary to have an incendiary fire. Paper had been used to start this fire. He ruled out all
other potential causes for the fire. He estimated damage to the structure at about
$15,000.00. After determining that the fire was incendiary, he spoke with Jacqueline, who
showed him a number of negative and threatening text messages she had received from
appellant between 1:28 p.m. and 2:45 p.m. 14 These text messages helped Baker identify
appellant as a suspect for setting the fire.
Jacqueline Booth-Clark testified that she was living with her mother on the date of
the fire, as she had moved out of her home on October 2, 2012. While her niece had
lived at her house “off and on” in September 2012, she was not living there in October.
Only appellant was living in the house between October 3 and October 5, 2012. 15 Only
13
Firefighters had kicked in the door to gain access to the fire.
14
None of the messages had threats that appellant would burn her house down.
15
He had been in jail directly prior to these dates.
5
Cite as

2014 Ark. App. 572

Jacqueline, appellant, and her niece had keys to the home. She testified that when she
arrived at her home a with police escort to obtain some things from her home on the day
prior to the day of the fire, the house was not in disarray as it was after the fire; there had
been no damage to the home. Specifically, among other things, the trash can containing
pieces of her glass dining room table had not been in the dining room area where it was
after the fire, but in the driveway; and the garden tool had not been in the home.
There was testimony from appellant’s mother, Geraldine McCarther, that on the
day of the fire, appellant was with her all day up until 2:40 p.m. She stated that she
returned to pick him up at 3:00 p.m.; however, appellant testified that he was at the home
all day by himself.
Appellant testified that he sent “a lot of angry text messages,” but denied that he set
the fire at the home. He asserted that his anger was with the “nasty” way Jacqueline kept
the house as he was very neat; however, he admitted to being responsible for at least one
section in the home that was “very messy,” including empty beer cans and dirty dishes
with food still on them. He stated that the door to the “storage” room where the fire
began was closed while he was in the home. He admitted to a criminal conviction history
including terroristic threatening and multiple counts of battery.
A great deal of this case hinges on testimony, whether that of Fire Marshall Baker,
appellant, or any of the other witnesses. While appellant’s testimony contradicts that of
other witnesses, the jury is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and
6
Cite as

2014 Ark. App. 572

resolves questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. 16 Reconciling
conflicts in the testimony and weighing the evidence are matters within the exclusive
province of the jury. 17 In assessing the weight of the evidence, a jury may consider and
give weight to any false and improbable statements made by an accused in explaining
suspicious circumstances. 18 We hold that there was substantial evidence to overcome a
motion for directed verdict because there was evidence that appellant had opportunity and
motive; had displayed anger towards Jacqueline via text messages; and had acted on that
anger by destroying items in the home that were owned by Jacqueline.
Affirmed.
WHITEAKER and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Laura Shue, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
16
Woodson v. State,

2009 Ark. App. 602