Stacy Anthony Mitchell v. State of Arkansas , 2022 Ark. App. 424 ( 2022 )

Cite as 2022 Ark. App. 424ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-22-21
Opinion Delivered October 26, 2022
STACY ANTHONY MITCHELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 04CR-19-368]
V.
HONORABLE BRADLEY LEWIS
KARREN, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Appellant Stacy Mitchell was convicted by a Benton County jury of one count of first-
degree battery1 and sentenced to a total of twenty-one years in the Arkansas Department of
Correction as a habitual offender. On appeal, Mitchell argues that the circuit court erred
when it denied his motion for substitution of counsel. In addition, he argues that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree battery. We affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Although Mitchell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in his second point on
appeal, double-jeopardy considerations require this court to consider it first. See Keys v. State,
1
Mitchell was also charged with one count of second-degree battery and one count of
failure to appear. The jury convicted him on the failure-to-appear charge but acquitted him
of second-degree battery.
2021 Ark. App. 469, at 6, 636 S.W.3d 835, 839 (citing Taffner v. State, 2018 Ark. 99, 541
S.W.3d 430). When we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider only the evidence supporting
it. Adkins v. State, 371 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.3d 523 (2007). We will affirm if the finding of guilt
is supported by substantial evidence. King v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 339. Substantial evidence
is evidence of such sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty,
compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture.
Fernandez v. State, 2010 Ark. 148, 362 S.W.3d 905. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.
Turner v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 476, at 5, 588 S.W.3d 375, 378. It is the jury’s role as the
finder of fact to resolve questions of inconsistent evidence and conflicting testimony, and
the jury is free to believe the State’s version of the facts over the defendant’s account. Id.Mitchell was convicted of first-degree battery. A person commits first-degree battery
if, with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, the person causes
serious physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon or causes serious physical
injury to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201(a)(1) & (3) (Supp. 2019). A “deadly weapon”
includes “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death
or serious physical injury.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(4)(B) (Repl. 2013). “Serious physical
injury” means “physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted
disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the
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function of any bodily member or organ.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(21). We now turn our
attention to the facts introduced at trial, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to
the State.
On the evening of February 2, 2019, Chelsea Roberts and some friends, including
Lauren Patanus, Kent Fisher, and Christian McKinnis, were socializing on the back patio of
JJ’s Bar and Grill in Rogers. They were approached by appellant Mitchell, who started
making vulgar comments to Roberts. Fisher intervened and asked Mitchell to stop, which
led to an exchange of words between Fisher and Mitchell, and the exchange of words led to
a fight between them. A JJ’s employee removed Mitchell from the patio and escorted him
out through the front of the building.
After Mitchell had been escorted through the front of the building, Roberts and her
friends decided to exit through a side door to avoid him. This was unsuccessful. Outside the
building, Mitchell once again approached them. Fisher saw Mitchell pull a knife out of his
pocket, flip it open, and “[take] off at a dead sprint” toward the group. Fisher alerted the
others and told them to run. They attempted to reenter the building but could not because
the door would not open from the outside.
Mark McCoy, another JJ’s patron, heard Fisher and McKinnis screaming at him to
open the patio gate. He opened the door, and McKinnis held the door open while Fisher
ran inside and told the bouncer to call 911. As he was holding the door, McKinnis attempted
to calm Mitchell down, and McCoy went outside to assist. McCoy tried to calm Mitchell
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down and asked him to leave. During this exchange, Mitchell cut McCoy’s wrist with the
knife.2
Concerning the nature and extent of McCoy’s injury, the jury heard evidence that
the cut on McCoy’s arm wrapped around his left wrist from the middle to the right and
caused a “significant amount” of bleeding. He was taken to the emergency room for
treatment, where Tyler McGinty, a physician’s assistant, treated McCoy for a four-centimeter-
long laceration to his skin and another laceration to the underlying fascia. McGinty put two
sutures into the fascia and a separate row of sutures into his skin. McCoy did not sustain any
long-term indication of nerve or vascular injury, but he did complain of numbness and joint
pain in the area. As a result of the wound, McCoy has scarring on his left arm. He testified
that as a golf professional, he had to relearn the feel of his grip. He experienced numbness
in his pinky, which impacted everything from typing on a keyboard to getting dressed.
On appeal, Mitchell argues that this evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction for first-degree battery. He first notes that McCoy did not testify what sort of
object hit him. The jury, however, heard evidence that Mitchell pulled a knife from his
pocket and flipped it open. Moreover, McCoy testified that he felt himself “bumped from
the back, [and] my arm gets just nailed, just hit by an object.”
2
McKinnis’s jacket and shirt were also cut during the altercation, and he sustained a
“nick” to his stomach. This injury was the crux of the State’s second-degree-battery charge
against Mitchell; however, as noted above, the jury acquitted him on this count.
4
Next, Mitchell argues that McCoy did not sustain a “serious physical injury” as
defined by section 5-13-201. Citing the medical evidence, Mitchell points out that the injury
was a four-centimeter-long laceration that “only needed sutures to repair.” He contends that
McCoy did not testify about the type of medical treatment he received, did not testify that
he sustained any injury to any part of his body other than his wrist, and complained only of
pain and numbness around the wound.
Mitchell’s argument is not well taken. Whether a victim has sustained serious physical
injury as well as the question of temporary or protracted impairment are issues for the jury
to decide. Bangs v. State, 338 Ark 515, 998 S.W.2d 738 (1999). In determining whether a
physical injury exists, a jury may consider the severity of the attack and may rely on its
common knowledge, experiences, and observations in life to make this determination.
Chambers v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 54, 595 S.W.3d 371; Linn v. State, 84 Ark. App. 141, 133
S.W.3d 407 (2003). It is not necessary that the impairment be permanent, but only
protracted, Bell v. State, 99 Ark. App. 300, 259 S.W.3d 472 (2007), and the fact that the
victim ultimately recovers has no bearing on whether the injury sustained is serious. Brown
v. State, 347 Ark. 308, 65 S.W.3d 394 (2001). Moreover, expert medical testimony is not
required to prove serious physical injury. Johnson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 71, 510 S.W.3d
298.
Here, the jury heard evidence as set forth above that supports its finding that Mitchell
committed the offense of first-degree battery. McCoy suffered a cutting wound to his arm
deep enough to require multiple sutures to close and that resulted in a scar and caused
5
McCoy to continue to experience numbness in the area two years later. In Bangs, supra, the
supreme court affirmed a first-degree-battery conviction when the victim sustained five-
centimeter lacerations to her skull that required staples to close. In Huggins v. State, 2021
Ark. App. 74, 618 S.W.3d 187, this court affirmed a first-degree-battery conviction when the
defendant hit the victim with a glass bottle that shattered; the victim required multiple
stitches to close the wound, and was left with a scar that ran from her elbow down her
forearm. The jury, sitting as trier of fact and using its common knowledge, was able to see
McCoy’s injuries and determined that he sustained a serious physical injury when Mitchell
cut his wrist with a knife. We therefore hold that there was substantial evidence of serious
physical injury and affirm Mitchell’s conviction for first-degree battery.
II. Motion for Substitution of Counsel
In what is actually his first point on appeal, Mitchell argues that it was erroneous for
the circuit court to deny his motion for substitution of counsel. A circuit court’s ruling on a
defendant’s request for substitution of counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., Conic v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 185, 624 S.W.3d 322. Abuse of discretion is a high
threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision but requires that
the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Hopkins v.
State, 2017 Ark. App. 273, 522 S.W.3d 142. In addressing this argument, we will make a
careful examination of the proceedings and hearings that occurred before Mitchell’s jury
trial.
6
Shortly after the incident involving McCoy, Mitchell was arrested but released from
custody. He appeared pro se in the Benton County Circuit Court on March 11, 2019, and
asked if there was any way he could get a public defender. The court agreed and directed him
to have either a private attorney or a public defender at his next hearing as a condition of
release. On July 8,3 Mitchell was arraigned and filled out an affidavit of indigency. The court
found him to be partially indigent and appointed a public defender, Sam Hall. Mitchell then
pled not guilty, and the court set an omnibus hearing for August 12. Hall represented
Mitchell at the August 12 omnibus hearing and at numerous other pretrial status hearings.
Eventually, the court set a May 4, 2021,4 trial date with a pretrial hearing on April 15.
Throughout the entire pretrial process, the court frequently directed Mitchell to keep in
touch with his attorney, and Mitchell never expressed any concerns about Hall’s
representation of him.
On March 18, 2021, before the April 15 pretrial hearing, Alex Morphis of the James
Law Firm filed a motion for discovery and disclosure on Mitchell’s behalf. Bill James then
filed a motion for substitution of counsel on March 24, asking the court to authorize the
withdrawal of Sam Hall and substitute James as Mitchell’s attorney of record.5
3
Mitchell failed to appear at arraignments scheduled for April 22 and June 10.
4
Primarily because of scheduling complications brought on by the coronavirus
pandemic, the court postponed and rescheduled jury-trial settings multiple times.
5
James filed multiple other motions with the court throughout April, although the
court had not yet acted on the motion for substitution of counsel.
7
The court conducted the pretrial status hearing on April 15. At this hearing, Hall, as
the court-appointed public defender, appeared and represented Mitchell. Morphis also
appeared and asserted that he was representing Mitchell. Cognizant of the looming jury trial
scheduled for May 4, the following colloquy then ensued between the court and both
counsel:
HALL: Your Honor, I would be––I would be ready for that [the May 4 trial
date]. However, [Mitchell] has hired the Bill James Law Firm and
they’ve filed––
COURT: Well, that’s fine.
HALL: ––several motions.
COURT: He can hire––he can hire whoever he wants. I don’t see an order in the
file anywhere that granted the motion to substitute counsel. Am I
mistaken, Mr. Hall?
HALL: There was no order, Your Honor, filed.
COURT: Thank you. He can file a motion asking the Court to change counsel.
The problem is I have a jury trial set for May the fourth and I’m not
going to change counsel at this late in the game. So defense motion––
HALL: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: Defense motion to substitute counsel is denied.
At this point, Morphis addressed the court about the May 4 trial date as follows:
MORPHIS: Your Honor, we can be prepared to move forward on May 4.
COURT: No, sir. Here’s the problem with that. . . . If I change counsel right now
and there’s some issue, it’s an automatic Rule 37 problem. So I’m not
changing counsel. We’ve got . . . a jury set for May the fourth. Motion
to substitute counsel is denied.
8
Hall asked whether the James Law Firm would be considered “on board as . . . co-
counsel on the trial date,” as that might “build in some issues with appeal.” The court agreed
there might be issues, but no one had moved to serve as co-counsel. Hall then asked the
court to have Mitchell contact him and let him know what he wanted to do and represented
that he was prepared to go forward with the trial on May 4.
On the morning of May 4, Hall appeared to represent Mitchell at the scheduled jury
trial, which was once more postponed. Although the trial did not occur, the court re-
addressed the substitution-of-counsel issue in the following exchange:
COURT: Now, Mr. Hall, last time I believe Bill James’s office had filed a motion
to substitute counsel, which I denied because we were too close to the
jury trial date. I did not prohibit––and I want it to be clear––I did not
prohibit either Bill James’s firm or another firm if they want to be as
co-counsel. If they want to file their motion, I certainly will entertain
that. But I just want to make clear on the record I wasn’t prohibiting
co-counsel, what I didn’t want to do is change counsel this close to trial
and create an issue.
HALL: Yes, Your Honor. And so I know there was subsequent conversations
with the James Law Firm. I did speak with Mr. Morphis at the James
Law Firm and he indicated to me that they weren’t going to be co-
counsel.
COURT: All right, Mr. Mitchell, I’m confident you heard that but what Mr. Hall
had stated to the Court was that he had talked to Mr. Morphis with the
James Law Firm and the James Law Firm is not wanting to be co-counsel
or even take over the case. But I do want you to understand I’m not
prohibiting you, Mr. Mitchell, if you want co-counsel or you either want
a change of counsel, I’ll consider it, but the problem was at that late
date I didn’t want to change counsel so close to the trial date. So if you
still want to do that, I just want to make sure you understand I’m not
prohibiting that. If you want that done, then please contact additional
counsel to find out what you want to do. Okay?
9
MITCHELL: Yes, sir, I will.
The court then scheduled another pretrial status hearing for May 10 and set a new jury-trial
date of May 18.
At the May 10 status hearing, Hall once again appeared for the defense. After some
evidentiary issues were discussed, Mitchell asked to address the court. He explained that his
wife had talked to Hall on several occasions, and she believed he was “not the attorney for”
him. Mitchell asked the court to reconsider the matter, and the court replied as follows:
COURT: Well, Mr. Mitchell, there’s been no motion filed by any other law firm
asking to join as co-counsel or substitution of counsel. We’ve got trial
here in eight days. So I’m not going to change––I’m not going to
change counsel at this point, Mr. Mitchell. I’m not going to do that.
Mr. Hall has been in this court for years, eight years if I’m not mistaken.
He’s tried several jury trials in this court. He’s conducted himself very
competent.
MITCHELL: I have [unintelligible simultaneous speech]––
HALL: Mr. Mitchell––
MITCHELL: I’m sorry, I don’t mean to cut you off, Your Honor. I do understand
where you’re coming from. I truly do. But in conversation me and Mr.
Hall had with me and my family is that I’m going to lose this jury trial.
He’s one hundred percent sure of that. So he’s going in there with
doubt in his mind. I can have my wife to testify to that. He told her
that.
COURT: All right. Well, there’s no motion––
MITCHELL: So if he’s going in there with doubt in his mind, why would I even have
an attorney to defend me? There’s no one to defend me.
COURT: There’s no motion pending, Mr. Mitchell. I’m going to go ahead and
keep this trial on May the 18th. Mr. Hall is going to be your attorney
of record on the case.
10
Just before the hearing concluded, the State noted that it would object to “further
interference by other attorneys,” asserting that Hall knew the case well and had been
“extremely diligent in his participation.” The court thanked the State and advised Mitchell
that he would need to appear in person on May 18. Mitchell said that he would and then
added, “I’ll go hire me an attorney.” He did not, however, hire another attorney, and the
jury trial proceeded with Hall representing him.
On appeal, Mitchell argues that when the circuit court denied his motion for
substitution of counsel, he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice.
Mitchell has a right to counsel of choice grounded in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and guaranteed by article 2, section 10 of the Arkansas Constitution.
While constitutionally guaranteed, however, Mitchell does not have an absolute right to
counsel of his choosing and may not exercise his right to frustrate the inherent power of the
court to command an orderly, efficient, and effective administration of justice. Bullock v.
State, 353 Ark. 577, 111 S.W.3d 380 (2003). The purpose of the right is to “guarantee an
effective advocate for each criminal defendant, rather than to ensure that a defendant will
inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159 (1988). Once competent counsel is obtained, any request for a change in counsel
must be considered in the context of the public’s interest in the prompt dispensation of
justice. Thomas v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 492, 441 S.W.3d 918.
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In support of his argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
Mitchell relies solely on Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, 428 S.W.3d 464. Citing Arroyo,
Mitchell argues that the circuit court summarily denied his motion to substitute counsel
without allowing him an opportunity to be heard on the matter. He thus contends that the
court abused its discretion by failing to engage in the proper balancing of his constitutional
right to counsel of his choice against any countervailing governmental interest. We disagree.
In Arroyo, the defendant and his wife were charged with multiple drug offenses and
were both represented by the same private counsel, Hensley. At a pretrial hearing, a new
attorney, Adcock, entered a conditional appearance and asserted he had been retained by
Mr. Arroyo, but his representation was contingent on his being able to obtain a continuance
because he could not be ready for the jury trial that was set to begin the next day. The court
denied the continuance and proceeded to trial with the original attorney the next day.
Arroyo was convicted at a jury trial, and we affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.
Arroyo subsequently petitioned for postconviction relief, which the circuit court also
denied, finding that the outcome of Arroyo’s trial would not have been any different if the
motion for substitution of counsel had been granted. Arroyo then appealed the denial of his
postconviction relief to the supreme court.
The supreme court reversed the denial of postconviction relief because the circuit
court “applied the wrong test to Appellant’s choice-of-counsel argument when it determined
that Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief because he had failed to demonstrate
that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his new attorney acted as trial
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counsel and a continuance had been granted.” Id. at 4, 428 S.W.3d at 468. This was so
because when the “right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is
unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth
Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148
(2006)). Instead, the circuit court should have engaged in a balancing test, considering the
defendant’s “right to choice of counsel against the needs of fairness and the demands of [the
court’s] calendar. Id. at 7, 428 S.W.3d at 470. The court reasoned that
[a] circuit court “certainly may consider how last minute continuances . . . tread upon
the rights of parties and the demands of a court’s calendar.” [United States v. Sellers,
645 F.3d 830, 838 (7th Cir. 2011).] The key, however, is that these legitimate
considerations must be balanced against the reasons in support of the motion for a
continuance to accommodate new counsel.” Id. at 838–39.
Id. at 9, 428 S.W.3d at 470.
Mitchell puts the entire focus of his argument solely on the April 15 hearing at which
the circuit court refused to allow him to change counsel. Admittedly, if we were to view this
hearing in a vacuum, we might agree that the court refused to substitute counsel without
balancing Mitchell’s desire for different counsel against the “needs of fairness and the
demands of the court’s calendar.” See King v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 531, at 5, 589 S.W.3d
420, 423. The April 15 hearing, however, was not an isolated incident nor the only
proceeding at which the matter was addressed.
When considering the context of the entire pretrial proceedings, it is apparent that
the circuit court did more than summarily decide the motion. As demonstrated by the
colloquies set forth above, the court was gravely concerned with the fact that the case had
13
been pending on its docket for over two years. The trial had been continued multiple times
(largely because of the COVID pandemic but also frequently at Mitchell’s request). The court
repeatedly stated that it was amenable to considering the option of having the James Law
Firm work as co-counsel with the public defender (an offer James rejected). Stated another
way, there was no “unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of
a justifiable request for delay’” that violated Mitchell’s right to assistance of counsel. Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983). On the whole, we are unable to conclude that the circuit
court abused its considerable discretion in denying Mitchell’s motion for substitution of
counsel.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
James Law Firm, by: William O. “Bill” James, Jr., and Scott J. Kadien, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zanzari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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