Arkansas Insurance Department v. Henley ( 2016 )

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 60
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-14-1007
ARKANSAS INSURANCE Opinion Delivered: JANUARY 27, 2016
DEPARTMENT
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 17CV-12-523]
RACHEAL HENLEY HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK,
APPELLEE JUDGE
APPEAL DISMISSED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
The Crawford County Circuit Court remanded an order of the Arkansas Insurance
Department (Department) for further proceedings after the Department revoked the title-
insurance license of appellee Racheal Henley. The Department appeals the circuit court’s
ruling, but we must dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order.
In 2011 and 2012, the Department conducted an investigation of Henley’s
employer, Edwards Title, LLC. The investigation stemmed from the theft of escrow funds
by an Edwards closing agent. Henley was not implicated in the theft, but the evidence
uncovered during the course of the investigation convinced the Department that both
Henley, who was the title agency’s manager, and Charles Dyer, the agency’s owner, had
committed violations of Arkansas Insurance Department regulations and the Arkansas
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 60
Insurance Code. The Department held hearings to determine whether Dyer’s and
Henley’s title-insurance licenses should be revoked. 1
Following a hearing, the Department issued an order in October 2012 revoking
Henley’s license. The order relied in part on Henley’s conduct as Edwards’s operations
manager in the years prior to March 2011, which was when Henley actually received her
title-agent license. Henley appealed to the Crawford County Circuit Court, pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act. 2 She argued primarily that the Department erred in
basing her revocation on activities that occurred before her March 2011 licensure. She also
argued that the Department’s sanction of revocation was too harsh.
The circuit court agreed that “the issues and complaints that arose before [Henley]
was licensed were given too much weight” and that “a review of the Department’s
sanctions in previous hearings does not yield a consistent view of what sanction is
appropriate under similar circumstances.” The court therefore struck some of the findings
in the Department’s revocation order, although other findings were allowed to stand. The
court then remanded the case back to the Department for “further proceedings.” The
Department filed an appeal in our court following the circuit court’s order of remand.
A circuit court’s order of remand to an administrative agency for further
proceedings is not a final, appealable order. 3 This is true even where, as here, the circuit
1
We affirmed the Department’s revocation of Dyer’s license in Dyer v. Arkansas
Insurance Department, 2015 Ark. App. 446, 468 S.W.3d 303.
2
See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212 (Repl. 2014).
3
See generally Floyd v. Ark. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 248 Ark. 459, 451 S.W.2d 874
(1970); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. J.N., 96 Ark. App. 319, 241 S.W.3d 293 (2006);
2
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 60
court has affirmed the agency’s findings in part. 4 Because the order is not final, we lack
jurisdiction to hear the present appeal.
The Department contends, however, that the circuit court’s decision is final
pursuant Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-15-212(i). 5 That statute provides that an
agency order that is affirmed or affirmed in part by a court “shall be a final judgment
subject to writ of garnishment or execution to the extent it is affirmed.” We disagree that
section 25-15-212(i) confers finality for purposes of appeal in this case. The statute is
clearly concerned with finality for purposes of garnishment and execution, which are not
at issue here. Further, the statute does not resolve the question of whether a court’s ruling
is final with regard to an appeal, nor does it address the question of finality when a case is
remanded to the administrative agency. We therefore rely on our case law, cited
previously, to hold that the appeal in this instance does not come from a final order of the
circuit court.
The appeal is dismissed without prejudice, subject to re-filing upon entry of a final
order.
Dismissed without prejudice.
GLADWIN, C.J., and ABRAMSON, J., agree.
Amanda J. Andrews, Assoc. Counsel, Ark. Ins. Dep’t, for appellant.
Joseph C. Self, for appellee.
Hargrett v. Dir., 44 Ark. App. 111, 866 S.W.2d 432 (1993) (per curiam); Baldor Elec. Co. v.
Jones, 29 Ark. App. 80, 777 S.W.2d 586 (1989).
4
Oldenberg v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 2013 Ark. App. 599.
5
(Repl. 2014).
3