Jones v. Miller ( 2016 )

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 317
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-15-989
Opinion Delivered June 8, 2016
THOMAS JONES AND OLLYE MAE
ROBINSON JONES APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 35DR-07-129]
KIMBERLY MILLER AND GERALD HONORABLE DONALD EUGENE
ROBINSON, SHERIFF OF JEFFERSON BISHOP, JUDGE
COUNTY, ARKANSAS
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge
Appellants Thomas Jones and Ollye Mae Robinson Jones (the Joneses) appeal the
order entered by the Jefferson County Circuit Court dismissing, with prejudice, their petition
for replevin filed against appellees Kimberly Miller and Jefferson County Sheriff Gerald
Robinson. The trial court’s order found that the petition was barred by the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel; that the Joneses lacked standing; and that the
petition failed to state a cause upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the Joneses
contend that the trial court erred in finding that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar their
claim. Because the Joneses challenge only two of the five independent grounds supporting the
trial court’s order, we summarily affirm.
Thomas and Kimberly were divorced by decree in October 2007. In March 2008, the
trial court entered a supplemental decree and final order that, among other things, awarded
Kimberly a $20,687.75 judgment against Thomas. After the sale of real property contemplated
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 317
in the supplemental decree, the judgment was reduced to $20,187.75. The Jefferson County
Circuit Clerk issued a writ of execution on October 27, 2011, directing Sheriff Robinson to
take possession of four vehicles owned by Thomas.
In November 2011, Ollye Mae1 filed a motion to intervene, claiming that she had an
ownership interest in three of the vehicles subject to the writ of execution. The court
suspended the enforcement of the writ, and two hearings were held on her motion to
intervene. Thereafter, in April 2013, the trial court entered an order denying Ollye Mae’s
motion to intervene with respect to one of the vehicles; lifting the stay of the writ of execution;
ordering the sheriff to proceed with seizing the four vehicles; and enjoining each party from
disposing of or removing from the court’s jurisdiction any of the vehicles. Ollye Mae timely
appealed from this order to our court, arguing that she was the owner of the vehicles, that her
property had been taken without adequate compensation, and that Kimberly had become
unjustly enriched. Robinson v. Miller, 2014 Ark. App. 144. Due to briefing deficiencies in the
abstract and addendum, we ordered rebriefing, warning Ollye Mae that the failure to file a
compliant brief may result in affirmance. Id. at 4.
Ollye Mae refiled her brief with our court; however, she made minimal changes and
failed to correct all the examples of deficiencies. As such, in an opinion dated October 8, 2014,
we affirmed the trial court’s order based on noncompliance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2. Robinson
v. Miller, 2014 Ark. App. 539, at 2. We denied Ollye Mae’s petition for rehearing on November
19, 2014.
1 At this time, Ollye Mae was not married to Thomas.
2
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 317
On March 25, 2015, Ollye Mae and Thomas 2 filed a petition for replevin seeking
possession of the four vehicles. They contend that the judgment Thomas owed Kimberly was
satisfied by the conveyance of real property to her; therefore, the four vehicles had been
wrongfully taken from them. On July 31, 2015, the trial court entered an order dismissing,
with prejudice, the Joneses’ replevin petition. The trial court’s order found that the petition
was barred by the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel; that the
Joneses lacked standing; and that the petition failed to state a cause upon which relief can be
granted. The Joneses timely appealed from the order dismissing their replevin petition with
prejudice.
On appeal, the Joneses address only two of the five grounds given by the trial court in
reaching its decision to dismiss the petition for replevin. They challenge the trial court’s
findings that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar their claim, but they do not challenge the
trial court’s findings that the law of the case, the lack of standing, and the failure to state a
claim also bar their claim. Where the trial court bases its decision on two or more independent
grounds and appellant challenges fewer than all of the grounds, the appellate court will affirm
without addressing either. Coleman v. Regions Bank, 364 Ark. 59, 64, 216 S.W.3d 569, 573 (2005)
(citing Pugh v. State, 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002); Pearrow v. Feagin, 300 Ark. 274, 778
S.W.2d 941 (1989)). Consequently, the Joneses’ arguments cannot be examined because they
did not challenge the other three independent grounds that the trial court relied on in making
its decision to dismiss their petition for replevin. Accordingly, we summarily affirm.
2 Ollye Mae and Thomas are now married.
3
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 317
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and HOOFMAN, JJ., agree.
Thomas T. Jones, pro se appellant.
Ollye Mae Robinson-Jones, pro se appellant.
McKissic & Associates, PLLC, by: Jackie B. Harris, for appellee Gerald Robinson, Sheriff,
Jefferson County, Arkansas.
4