Angela Rice v. Director, Division of Workforce Services And Thrifty Car Sales of Fort Smith ( 2024 )


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  •                                 Cite as 
    2024 Ark. App. 97
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION II
    No. E-22-608
    Opinion Delivered   February 14, 2024
    ANGELA RICE
    APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
    BOARD OF REVIEW
    V.                                      [NO. 2022-BR-01248]
    DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
    WORKFORCE SERVICES; AND
    THRIFTY CAR SALES OF FORT SMITH REVERSED AND REMANDED
    APPELLEES
    N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge
    Angela Rice appeals from the decision of the Arkansas Board of Review denying her
    claim for unemployment benefits upon finding that she voluntarily left her last work without
    good cause connected with the work. We hold that substantial evidence does not support
    this finding; accordingly, we reverse and remand.
    Beginning in October 2019, Rice worked as a sales representative for Thrifty Car Sales
    of Fort Smith selling portable buildings. Rice worked part time and was paid an hourly wage
    unless her commissions for the month exceeded her hourly earnings; in that event, she was
    paid only her commissions. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, Rice
    was allowed to work from home in order to be home with her minor child. Under this
    arrangement, Rice earned commissions only. This arrangement continued until Rice’s
    employment ended. The Division of Workforce Services determined that Rice was entitled
    to benefits because she was discharged for reasons other than misconduct connected with
    the work. The employer appealed to the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, which reversed the
    Division’s determination and found that Rice was disqualified from receiving benefits
    because she voluntarily left work without good cause connected with the work. Rice then
    appealed to the Board, which adopted the Tribunal’s decision.
    Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.
    Dir., 
    2019 Ark. App. 205
    , 
    575 S.W.3d 186
    . Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
    that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
    Id.
     We view the
    evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
    Board’s findings. 
    Id.
     Even if the evidence could support a different decision, our review is
    limited to whether the Board could have reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the
    evidence presented. 
    Id.
     However, our function on appeal is not merely to rubber stamp
    Board decisions. 
    Id.
    Rice alleged in a discharge form that she was discharged pursuant to a letter dated
    January 8, 2021. She stated in the form that due to her working arrangements, her hours
    were set by her, and she had never received any warnings regarding her work hours. She
    stated that she had communicated with the employer about a customer on December 22,
    2020, and when she sent another message regarding a customer in January 2021, she received
    no response. The employer completed a discharge form, stating that Rice’s employment
    ended when she “abandoned her position” on October 8, 2020; however, the employer also
    wrote that Rice’s last day of work was September 12, 2020.
    2
    At the hearing before the Tribunal, the employer was represented by its president,
    Gregg Lawler, and Melissa Lawler, its secretary-treasurer, participated as a witness. Gregg
    testified that Rice could do almost all of her work remotely, but she could also come in any
    time she wanted since she had an alarm code and gate key. Melissa testified that Rice had
    not been coming in much, had not earned any commissions since October 2020, had not
    performed work on the employer’s premises since November 16, 2020, and had not set up
    any appointments with customers since then. The Lawlers testified that Rice could have
    returned to work at the premises during business hours and earned hourly pay again, and
    they disputed Rice’s testimony that she had offered to do this. Gregg testified that when
    they got to the first of the year and the situation with Rice had not improved, they decided
    to send a letter requesting that Rice return her keys due to her “self-abandonment” of her
    position.
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a)(1) (Supp. 2023) provides that an
    individual shall be disqualified for benefits if she voluntarily and without good cause
    connected with the work left her last work. The Board found that Rice was disqualified
    under this provision upon finding that she had declining sales and little contact with the
    Lawlers and that she could have started working on the premises again to show that she
    intended to stay employed. However, the Board also found that Rice “was not told she had
    to keep certain hours or to make regular contacts.” Furthermore, there is no evidence that
    the employer ever asked or directed Rice to begin working on the premises again. While the
    evidence suggests that the employer was displeased with the amount or results of Rice’s work
    3
    since implementing her work-from-home arrangement, the employer did not implement any
    changes to the arrangement, and it continued until the employer decided to end Rice’s
    employment. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not support the finding that
    Rice quit; instead, it demonstrates that she was discharged. Accordingly, we reverse and
    remand for the Board to determine whether the circumstances of Rice’s discharge entitle her
    to benefits in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514 (Supp. 2023).
    Reversed and remanded.
    BARRETT and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
    Angela Marie Rice, pro se appellant.
    Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
    4
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 2/14/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/14/2024