Ronald Matthew Robinson v. State of Arkansas ( 2024 )

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 401ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-23-670
RONALD MATTHEW ROBINSON Opinion Delivered September 4, 2024
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE POPE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 58CR-21-764]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Ronald Matthew Robinson (“Robinson”) appeals his conviction in the
Pope County Circuit Court for two counts of second-degree battery, criminal trespass,
resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct and argues that the circuit court abused its discretion
in denying his motion to exclude Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) testimony. We affirm.
I. Background Facts
On June 29, 2021, Russellville police officers arrested Robinson for criminal trespass
after he ignored repeated requests to leave Orr Auto Mall. Robinson had asked the
dealership to repair damages to his wrecked automobile—at no cost—that he alleged occurred
because of the vehicle’s defective hood latch. When the dealership told Robinson that it
would not cover the cost of the repairs, he refused to leave. Before the responding officers
arrived, the dispatcher informed them “that the suspect that was identified on the scene
[Robinson] had a violent history and had been known to fight officers.” When officers
attempted to take Robinson into custody, he showed “no willingness to get up” from the
chair.
Officers Trent Pursifull and Alex Shipley ultimately had to force Robinson to stand
up, and Robinson began a push-and-pull struggle that carried the officers across the room
until they hit the wall and fell into a stack of boxes. The officers recalled that Robinson did
“everything he possibly could to get away from” them, including kicking manically, jerking,
and striking the officers with his legs and feet. Officer Chance Jackson was kicked backward
by Robinson while he attempted to secure Robinson’s legs. Eventually, the officers secured
Robinson’s arms behind his back and handcuffed him. However, as the officers placed
Robinson in the patrol car, he hooked his right leg underneath the vehicle and prevented
the officers from securing him inside. According to Officer Shipley, he was eventually able
to guide Robinson’s leg inside the car, but once he did, Robinson slammed his knee into
the seatbelt buckle and crushed Shipley’s fingers.
The State charged Robinson with one count each of disorderly conduct, resisting
arrest, and criminal trespass and two counts of second-degree battery. Prior to trial, the State
notified Robinson that it intended to introduce evidence that, two weeks before the incident,
Robinson injured two Dover deputy marshals when they attempted to take him into custody.
On June 15, 2021, Deputy Marshal Titsworth arrested Robinson, and during the arrest,
Robinson resisted, punched Titsworth in his throat, and injured his knees. Robinson was
found guilty of two counts of battery against the deputies as a result of the incident.
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Robinson’s counsel argued that the deputies’ testimony regarding the prior incident
should be excluded at trial because the probative value of the testimony was substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. However, after hearing the arguments of counsel,
the circuit court determined that the prior acts “were temporally very close in time,” and the
evidence was admissible to show Robinson’s intent and the absence of mistake or accident
pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b). The circuit court further found that the
evidence was not unduly prejudicial because of the similarity between the prior bad acts and
the charged offenses.
At the close of all the evidence, the jury found Robinson guilty of disorderly conduct,
resisting arrest, criminal trespass, and two counts of second-degree battery for the incident
at Orr Auto Mall. The circuit court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years’
imprisonment and $10,000 in fines. Robinson filed a timely notice of appeal, and this
appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
On review, “the admission or rejection of evidence under Rule 404(b) is committed
to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and this court will not reverse absent a showing
of manifest abuse of discretion.” Dimas-Martinez v. State, 2011 Ark. 515, at 23, 385 S.W.3d
238, 252. Likewise, the balancing mandated by Rule 403 is also a matter left to a circuit
court’s sound discretion, and an appellate court will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling
absent a showing of manifest abuse. Croy v. State, 2011 Ark. 284, 383 S.W.3d 367. Abuse of
discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision
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but requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due
consideration. Craigg v. State, 2012 Ark. 387, 424 S.W.3d 264.
III. Discussion
For his sole argument on appeal, Robinson maintains that pursuant to Rules 404(b)
and 403, the circuit court erred by allowing the admission of evidence that he previously
attacked police officers while resisting arrest. Specifically, Robinson argues that his prior
battery conviction against Officer Titsworth was not independently relevant—its probative
value minimal, and the risk of unfair prejudice was immense. We disagree.
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) (2023) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Our supreme court has explained that the first sentence provides the general rule excluding
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts, while the second sentence provides an exemplary,
but not exhaustive, list of exceptions to that rule. Craigg, 2012 Ark. 387, 424 S.W.3d 264.
Evidence is not admissible under Rule 404(b) simply to establish that the defendant is a bad
person who does bad things. Id. Rule 404(b) permits the introduction of evidence of prior
bad acts if the evidence is independently relevant to make the existence of any fact or
consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See, e.g., Vance v.
State, 2011 Ark. 243, 383 S.W.3d 325.
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Additionally, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 403 (2023). Thus, a circuit court may refuse to admit evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, even if it might be relevant. Lockhart v. State, 2010
Ark. 278, 367 S.W.3d 530. The supreme court has noted that evidence offered by the State
is likely to be prejudicial to the accused; however, the evidence should not be excluded unless
the accused can show that it lacks probative value in view of the risk of unfair prejudice.
Chunestudy v. State, 2012 Ark. 222, 408 S.W.3d 55. Finally, circuit courts have broad
discretion in deciding evidentiary issues, including the admissibility of evidence under Rule
404(b), and those decisions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Barnes v. State,
346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001). “The degree of similarity between the circumstances of
prior crimes and the present crime required for admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is
a determination that affords considerable leeway to the trial judge, and may vary with the
purpose for which the evidence is admitted.” Sasser v. State, 321 Ark. 438, 447, 902 S.W.2d
773, 778 (1995).
Here, the circuit court held that the State’s Rule 404(b) evidence was admissible for
several reasons. First, the court held that Robinson’s prior conviction for conduct that
occurred just two weeks before the current charges was “temporally very close in time.” Next,
the court found that the prior conviction and the circumstances of those related events “were
admissible for the purpose of showing the mental state of the defendant, including what his
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intent was . . . in the conduct alleged . . . lack of a mistake or misunderstanding or an accident
on his part and his knowledge of his obligations at the time of the events described.” Further,
the court noted that because one of the charges was for resisting arrest, Robinson’s awareness
and comprehension of the prior incident was independently relevant. Finally, the court held
that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because the June 15 incident involved
intentional conduct for which Robinson was convicted.
Given the similarities between the evidence of Robinson’s resisting arrest and second-
degree battery against officers on June 15 and Robinson’s resisting arrest and injuring two
other police officers just two weeks later on June 29, we find no abuse of discretion in the
circuit court’s admitting Officer Titsworth’s testimony as independently relevant evidence of
Robinson’s intent, motive, or plan. Furthermore, Robinson’s argument that Officer
Titsworth’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial “given that the prior conviction, like the
pending offense, involved law enforcement officers” lacks merit. It is well established that
the fact that evidence is harmful, or prejudicial, to one side does not make it inadmissible.
See Boyle v. State, 363 Ark. 356, 214 S.W.3d 250 (2005). In this case, the evidence’s high
probative value is the very reason Robinson is claiming it is prejudicial. The proper inquiry,
however, is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of “unfair” prejudice. See id. Because the circuit court fully and thoughtfully
considered the issue prior to trial—and held that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial—
we affirm Robinson’s convictions.
IV. Conclusion
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For the above-stated reasons, we affirm Robinson’s convictions.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
James Law Firm, by: William O. “Bill” James, Jr., and Drew Curtis, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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