Anthony Brown v. Director, Division of Workforce Services ( 2023 )

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 389ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. E-22-362
ANTHONY BROWN Opinion Delivered September 20, 2023
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW
V. [NO. 2021-BR-05612]
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES
APPELLEE AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN
PART
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
Anthony Brown (“Brown”) appeals to this court, challenging the Arkansas Board of
Review’s (“Board’s”) decision requiring him to repay unemployment-compensation benefits
he previously received in the amount of $3,324. We affirm in part and remand in part.
I. Background and Procedural History
The record indicates that Brown received $231 in weekly state unemployment
benefits from July 4 through July 25, 2020, which amounts to a total of $924. In addition,
Brown received $600 in weekly Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (“FPUC”)
from July 4 through July 25, 2020, for a total of $2,400. The record also contains a notice
of agency determination dated November 20, 2020, that disqualified Brown from receiving
benefits beginning June 28, 2020. The Board decision in this matter notes that Brown’s
disqualification for unemployment benefits was ultimately upheld by the Board in a separate
appeal. That underlying disqualification is not before us because the Board’s decision on
the matter was not appealed further. We address only the issue of repayment.
II. Standard of Review
Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.
Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In appeals of
unemployment-compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even if there is
evidence that could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board
could have reasonably reached its decision as a result of the evidence presented. Id. However,
our function on appeal is not merely to rubber-stamp decisions arising from the Board.
Thomas v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 468, 587 S.W.3d 612; Wilson v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 171,
517 S.W.3d 427.
III. Analysis
This court’s recent decision in Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d
852, confirmed that, for purposes of overpayment of state unemployment benefits, the
repayment may be waived “if the director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct
result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against
equity and good conscience.” Carman, 2023 Ark. App. 51, at 7, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (quoting
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021)). Carman also holds that FPUC
repayment may be waived if the State determines that the payment of the FPUC was without
2
fault on the part of the individual and that such repayment would be contrary to equity and
good conscience. Id. at 8, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).
In the present case, the Board found that the overpayment of benefits was a result of
a final disqualifying Board determination finding that Brown was not able and available to
work during the weeks in question, not due to agency error. We hold that there is substantial
evidence to support the Board’s findings. The record indicates, and Brown admits, that he
was unable to work due to illness and/or quarantine. Because Brown fails to satisfy the first
prong of his state unemployment-waiver analysis, we affirm the decision requiring Brown to
repay $924 in state unemployment benefits.
However, the Board also found that Brown was not at fault in causing the
overpayment. This meets the first prong of the FPUC-waiver analysis. The Board failed to
make findings regarding the second prong of the FPUC analysis, i.e., whether repayment
would be contrary to equity and good conscience. If adequate findings of fact are not made
on the issue presented, we remand to the Board for findings of fact and conclusions of law
upon which to perform proper appellate review. Pillow v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 341, at 4.
We therefore remand to the Board for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
whether repayment of the $2,400 in FPUC benefits would be contrary to equity and good
conscience.
Affirmed in part; remanded in part.
ABRAMSON, J., agrees.
HIXSON, J., concurs.
3
Anthony Brown, pro se appellant.
Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
4