Roy Moore v. State of Arkansas ( 2024 )

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 31ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISIONS I & II
No. CR-22-614
ROY MOORE
APPELLANT Opinion Delivered January 17, 2024
V. APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
STATE OF ARKANSAS [NO. 43CR-21-560]
APPELLEE HONORABLE BARBARA ELMORE,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
Appellant Roy Moore appeals the decision of a Lonoke County Circuit Court jury
finding him guilty of breaking or entering and sentencing him to a term of fifteen years in
the Arkansas Division of Correction. He makes two arguments on appeal: he challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence and the court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of criminal trespass. We affirm.
On October 20, 2021, the State filed a three-count felony criminal information
against Roy. Count I charged him with residential burglary of a home near Ward, Arkansas,
on August 12, 2021. Count II charged him with theft of items from the home. The items
included spare keys for vehicles parked on a driveway outside the home. Count III charged
him with breaking or entering into a red 2004 Hyundai Santa Fe on August 25. The vehicle
was parked on a driveway beside the home. Before trial, the State filed an amended
information charging only breaking or entering in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated
section 5-39-202(a)(1) (Repl. 2013).
Accordingly, Roy filed a motion in limine concerning the extent the State could refer
to the August 12 burglary as the source of the spare keys to the Hyundai. The motion asserted
that a home-security video from August 25 depicted Roy exiting the Hyundai with no keys
in sight. Roy argued that he would be prejudiced if the court permitted testimony and other
evidence about the August 12 burglary because it would unfairly raise suspicion that he was
involved. The trial court held that the State could present evidence that the vehicle’s spare
keys were missing, but the State could not mention the August 12 burglary.
Testimony at trial established that Colin Payne owned the Hyundai that was parked
outside his home. He testified that he had noticed that the spare sets of keys to both the
Hyundai and to a truck he parked beside it were missing. In response, he installed a home-
security-camera system and removed the batteries from the two parked, locked vehicles. He
testified it was cheaper for him to do that than to rekey the vehicles. On August 25, while at
work, Colin received alerts to his cell phone from the security system, and upon looking at
his phone, he saw Roy on his property exiting the Hyundai. Colin recognized Roy because
he had relatives in the area; Roy’s mother lived down the road from Colin, and he had seen
Roy walking down the road before.
Upon seeing the security footage on his phone, Colin called the sheriff’s office and
his brother Darryl Payne, who was cutting hay in a field just one-eighth of a mile from Colin’s
2
house. He asked his brother to go to the house to find out what was happening. Darryl
immediately drove his tractor out of the field and down the road toward his brother’s house.
He crossed paths with Roy on the way. Roy was driving his own car quickly from the direction
of Colin’s house, and he sped through a stop sign. Darryl testified he noticed Roy was
wearing the same shirt and hat that he later saw him wearing in the security videos.
Roy was arrested six days after the incident was reported. His car was impounded and
searched, and the car keys to the Hyundai were not found in the vehicle.
The security-system videos were downloaded onto thumb drives and were played for
the jury. The videos depict Roy walking up Colin’s driveway toward the vehicles, exiting the
Hyundai, and walking back down across the grass. The videos do not show images of Roy
entering the vehicle nor do they show the keys to the vehicle. Additionally, it is apparent
that there was a nontransparent sunscreen or windshield screen on the inside of the
Hyundai’s windshield. Colin testified it was to prevent the dashboard from cracking due to
sun damage. Notably, according to Colin, the sunscreen on the driver’s side had been
removed.
After the State rested, Roy moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there had not
been any evidence of purpose presented. The court denied the motion. Roy then requested
that the court instruct the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of breaking
or entering, which the court also denied. Roy presented no evidence, rested, and renewed
all his motions. The jury found him guilty of breaking or entering, and the case proceeded
to the sentencing phase. The State introduced into evidence twenty-nine prior felony
3
convictions as Roy’s criminal history, which qualified him as a habitual offender. He received
the maximum prison sentence of fifteen years. He now appeals.
Motions for directed verdict are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Clark v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 142, at 2, 457 S.W.3d 305, 307. Evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction if the trier of fact can reach a conclusion without having
to resort to speculation or conjecture and is sufficient to compel a conclusion one way or the
other. Id. It is not the appellate court’s place to try issues of fact; we simply review the record
for substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Id. When the sufficiency of the evidence
is challenged on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
consider only evidence that supports the conviction. Id.Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-202(a)(1) provides that a person commits the
offense of breaking or entering “if for the purpose of committing a theft or felony he or she
breaks or enters into any . . . ‘vehicle.’” On appeal, Roy argues that the State offered no proof
of a purposeful mental state.
Criminal intent or purpose can seldom be proved by direct evidence and must usually
be inferred from the circumstances. Davis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 234, at 2, 459 S.W.3d
821, 822. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence to support a
conviction, and the question of whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every
reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the fact-finder to decide. Id. It is only
every other reasonable hypothesis, not every hypothesis, that must be excluded by the
4
evidence. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003). The finder of fact need not
lay aside its common sense in determining criminal intent. Davis, supra.Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence reveals that Roy walked
up to and entered a car that was not his—without permission from the owner—that the owner
testified he had locked. The evidence further establishes that there was no forced entry, the
car’s spare keys had recently gone missing, and the sunshade was removed from the driver’s
side.
A reasonable inference can be drawn that Roy used the missing keys to enter the
locked car that was not his and removed the sunshade in preparing to drive off in the
Hyundai. The jury is allowed to use its common sense to infer that the vehicle would not
start because the battery had been removed. Darryl’s testimony that he saw Roy drive quickly
away and run a stop sign near the scene further bolsters that inference. See Ashley v. State, 22
Ark. App. 73, 732 S.W.2d 872 (1987) (holding that the action of fleeing from the scene of
the crime is relevant to the issue of guilt).
Roy compares his case to Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 609 S.W.2d 1 (1980). In
Norton, the accused was seen coming out the front door of an office building that had been
securely locked for the night. Entry had been gained by breaking out a window. The owner
testified that although the appellant’s entry had been unlawful, nothing was taken from the
5
office. The appellant was convicted of burglary.1 The supreme court reversed the conviction,
however, observing that the State proved only that the appellant was seen standing inside
the doorway of an office that he had illegally entered. The court stated that the burden was
on the State to prove each essential element of the crime of burglary and that a specific
criminal intent cannot be presumed from a mere showing of illegal entry into an occupiable
structure.
Norton is distinguishable. In cases that distinguish Norton, the State has proved
“presence” plus other facts and circumstances from which the trial court could infer that
appellant had the requisite intent. See, e.g., Jimenez v. State, 12 Ark. App. 315, 318, 675
S.W.2d 853, 855 (1984).
Here, the State presented sufficient evidence of intent and not merely that Roy broke
into the vehicle. With the removal of the sunshade, the jury could reasonably infer that Roy
was preparing to steal the car. This, coupled with Colin’s testimony that all the doors of the
car were locked and that the car would not have started because he removed the battery
supports the verdict. Additionally, Darryl’s testimony that he saw Roy drive through a stop
sign near the scene of the incident constitutes circumstantial evidence from which the jury
could conclude that Roy entered the vehicle with the intent of committing a theft. Further,
1
Both the offense of burglary and breaking or entering require a similar purposeful
intent. Burglary requires the intent to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment, and
breaking or entering requires an intent to commit theft or a felony. See Arkansas Code
Annotated sections 5-39-201 & -204.
6
given the lack of tools or evidence that the car had been ransacked, one can infer that Roy’s
focus was on stealing the car itself.
Overall, presented with this evidence, the jury did not have to resort to speculation
and conjecture to conclude that Roy intended to steal the Hyundai. While we might conjure
up hypotheticals to offer alternate, innocent theories, it is the responsibility of the jury to
weigh the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence. Pruitt v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 754.
Roy next argues that the court abused its discretion by refusing to include a jury
instruction for the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. However, Roy did not proffer
the jury instruction he proposed to the circuit court, and the record does not contain the
proposed instruction; therefore, we cannot address his argument on appeal. See Gray v. State,
2018 Ark. App. 544, at 4–5, 564 S.W.3d 289, 291.
Affirmed.
VIRDEN, GRUBER, and BROWN, JJ., agree.
GLADWIN and THYER, JJ., dissent.
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge, dissenting. The difference between speculation and
conjecture and a reasonable inference when weighing circumstantial evidence is the question
presented in this case. While I agree with the majority that Roy did not preserve his objection
to the circuit court’s refusal to give the jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of
criminal trespass, I must respectfully dissent to affirming on the sufficiency-of-the-evidence
question.
7
The majority opinion adequately sets out the scant evidence presented at trial and the
proper standard of review. The evidence presented shows that Roy entered a car without
permission, moved a sunshade, and then exited the vehicle. A finding beyond a reasonable
doubt, on these facts, that Roy committed the offense of breaking and entering, in my mind,
is based on speculation and conjecture.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-202(a)(1) (Repl. 2013) provides that a person
commits the offense of breaking or entering “if for the purpose of committing a theft or
felony he or she breaks or enters into any . . . vehicle.” On the evidence presented, the jury
was left to speculate as to Roy’s purpose for entering the vehicle. The majority opinion
emphasizes that the missing keys are an inference of purpose of committing a theft. It is
conjecture that Roy even possessed the keys. The keys were never found in or around the car
or in Roy’s possession, yet the majority holds that this is evidence that a theft or felony was
going to occur. Further, Roy’s moving the sunshade is not indicative of a theft or felony.
There is no evidence that Roy rummaged through the vehicle or attempted to start it.
The majority attempts to distinguish Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 609 S.W.2d 1(1980), without explaining the difference between that case and this case. I submit that
Norton is on point. In both cases, the evidence indicates that the defendant was in a place he
was not authorized to be, yet no property was taken in either case. The only distinguishing
fact between the two cases is that in Norton, there was a forced entry, while in the present
case, there was no evidence of forced entry. As the Arkansas Supreme Court held in Norton,
8
specific criminal intent cannot be presumed from the mere showing of illegal entry into an
occupiable structure. The same should hold true for the illegal entry of a vehicle.
The majority also claims that a witness’s testimony that he saw Roy “driving through”
a stop sign is evidence that Roy had an intent to commit a felony or theft. This analysis is
misplaced. The witness testified that he saw Roy exiting one road “quickly” and turning right
without stopping at the four-way stop sign. It is well settled that the flight of an accused to
avoid arrest is evidence of his felonious intent. See Atkins v. State, 63 Ark. App. 203, 206, 979
S.W.2d 903, 905 (1998) (considering fleeing in conjunction with other evidence when the
accused immediately ran and attempted to evade capture upon being discovered at the crime
scene). Here, there is no evidence that Roy was fleeing to avoid arrest.
Finally, even if one takes the majority’s entire premise as fact, it still does not support
a conviction on the charge of breaking or entering. Assuming that Roy did have the keys,
started the vehicle, and knowingly operated or exercised control of the vehicle without the
owner’s consent, that would be a violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-36-108,
the unauthorized use of a vehicle—a Class A misdemeanor.
Because the evidence presented fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Roy
intended to commit a theft or other felony, I submit his conviction is based on speculation
and conjecture rather than a reasonable inference. Accordingly, I must dissent.
THYER, J., joins.
Omar F. Greene, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Clayton P. Orr, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
9