Stephanie Morgan v. Director, Division of Workforce Services ( 2024 )

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 89ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. E-22-586
Opinion Delivered February 7, 2024
STEPHANIE MORGAN
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW
V.
[NO. 2022-BR-01030]
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES
APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
In this unbriefed employment-security case, Stephanie Morgan appeals the Board of
Review’s determination that she is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits under
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-507(3)(A) (Supp. 2023) beginning November 28,
2021, and continuing. The Board adopted the decision of the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal,
which found that Morgan was not able to perform suitable work. We reverse and remand.
The Employment Security Department denied benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code
Annotated section 11-10-507(3)(A), which requires that a person be unemployed, physically
and mentally able to perform suitable work, available for such work, and doing things that a
reasonably prudent individual would be expected to do to secure work before being entitled
to employment security benefits.
At the telephone conference before the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, Morgan testified
that she was taking care of her disabled grandson, and while she could not begin working on
June 2, 2021, because she was getting him situated, by the date of the hearing, he was in
school from about 7:30 a.m. until about 3:30 p.m., and she was looking for work that would
let her work during those hours.
The Tribunal reasoned that because the grandson is completely disabled, and Morgan
was providing care for him, that she was not able to perform suitable work. The inference
from the evidence is unreasonable.
We affirm the decision of the Board of Review if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Billings v. Dir., 84 Ark. App. 79, 133 S.W.3d 399 (2003). Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Id. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light of
the Board’s findings. Id. Like a jury, an administrative body is free to accept or reject the
testimony of witnesses. Gunter v. Dir., 82 Ark. App. 346, 107 S.W.3d 902 (2003). Even if the
evidence could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board could
have reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Billings, supra.
The Board’s finding that Morgan was unavailable for work was based on her status as
a caretaker for her grandson but ignores entirely that the grandson was in school eight hours
a day. However, just because Morgan was unable to work for her previous employer (who
required employees to work in eleven-hour shifts) does not mean that she was unavailable
for any work at all.
Our case law supports the general principle that a reduction in the amount of work
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available to a claimant is insufficient reason to find that the claimant is unavailable to work.
Buchanan v. Dir. 91 Ark. App. 35, 37, 207 S.W.3d 567, 569 (2005). In Hefton v. Daniels, 270
Ark. 857, 606 S.W.2d 379 (Ark. App. 1980), we reversed the Board of Review and held that
a claimant—who was not highly skilled, lived in an area where work available for her was
sparse, and had transportation but could not relocate unless the job paid at least four dollars
an hour—was not unavailable to work. And in Buchanan, 91 Ark. App. at 37, 207 S.W.3d at568–69, we held that a lack of a driver’s license does not, standing alone, constitute
unavailability. Similarly, just because Morgan is limited to the roughly eight hours a day her
grandson is in school does not mean that she is unavailable to work under employment
security law.
As we explained in Buchanan, there might be times that claimants are in positions
“where the amount of employment available to them is severely limited due to some general
inability,” but as long as there exists employment that can reasonably fit within the scope of
that limitation, those claimants are available to work. See generally id.Reversed and remanded.
BARRETT and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree.
Stephanie Morgan, pro se appellant.
Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
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