Tijuana Webster v. Director, Division of Workforce Services ( 2023 )

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 547ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. E-22-484
TIJUANA WEBSTER Opinion Delivered November 29, 2023
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW
V. [NO. 2022-BR-00481]
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN
WORKFORCE SERVICES PART
APPELLEE
CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge
Tijuana Webster appeals to this court, challenging the Arkansas Board of Review’s
(“Board’s”) decision requiring her to repay unemployment-compensation benefits she
previously received in the amount of $2,205. We affirm in part and remand in part.
I. Background and Procedural History
The record indicates that Webester received $107 in weekly state unemployment
benefits for the weeks ending October 3, 2020, through January 9, 2021, for a total of
$1,605. In addition, Webster received $300 in weekly Federal Pandemic Unemployment
Compensation (“FPUC”) for the weeks ending January 2 through January 9, 2021, for a total
of $600. The record also contains a notice of agency determination dated December 2, 2021,
that disqualified Webster from receiving benefits beginning September 29, 2020. The
decision disqualifying Webster from unemployment benefits was ultimately upheld by the
Board in a separate appeal and affirmed by this court in Webster v. Director, E-22-483 (Ark.
App. Nov. 15, 2023) (aff’d without written opinion). That underlying disqualification is
therefore not before us. In this separate appeal, we address only the issue of repayment.
II. Standard of Review
Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.
Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In appeals of
unemployment-compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even if there is
evidence that could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board
could have reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Id.However, our function on appeal is not merely to rubber-stamp decisions arising from the
Board. Thomas v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 468, 587 S.W.3d 612; Wilson v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App.
171, 517 S.W.3d 427.
III. Analysis
This court’s recent decision in Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d
852, confirmed that, for purposes of overpayment of state unemployment benefits, the
repayment may be waived “if the director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct
result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against
equity and good conscience.” Carman, 2023 Ark. App. 51, at 7, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (quoting
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021)). Carman also holds that FPUC
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repayment may be waived if the State determines that the payment of the FPUC was without
fault on the part of the individual and that such repayment would be contrary to equity and
good conscience. Id. at 8, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).
In the present case, the Board affirmed and adopted the decision of the Tribunal
which found that the overpayment of benefits was a result of a final disqualifying Board
determination—that Webster “voluntarily left last work without good cause connected to the
work”—and not due to an error by the Division. As stated above, to avoid repayment of state
unemployment benefits, the overpayment must have been caused as a direct result of the
Division’s error, and it must be against principles of equity and good conscience to require
repayment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2). Because Webster failed to satisfy the first
prong of her state unemployment-waiver analysis that overpayment was received as a result
of an error by the Division of Workforce Services, we affirm the decision requiring Webster
to repay $1,605 in state unemployment benefits.
However, Webster also received FPUC benefits. For the repayment of federal benefits
to be waived, the Division must find that the federal payments were made without fault on
the part of the claimant and that repayment would be contrary to equity and good
conscience. See 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2). Here, neither the Tribunal nor the Board performed
the required federal-waiver analysis to determine whether the $600 in FPUC must be repaid,
and no findings were made with regard to that analysis. Whether sufficient findings of fact
have been made is a threshold question in an appeal from an administrative board. Id. If
adequate findings of fact are not made on the issue presented, we remand to the Board for
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it to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which to perform proper appellate
review. Id. Therefore, we must remand for further findings as to, first, whether Webster was
at fault and, second, whether repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience
before requiring her to repay the $600 in FPUC benefits.
In sum, we affirm the decision requiring Webster to repay the $1,605 in state benefits
and remand for further findings regarding whether Webster is required to repay the $600 in
FPUC benefits for the reasons set forth above.
Affirmed in part; remanded in part.
ABRAMSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Tijuana Webster, pro se appellant.
Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
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