Andrea Sellew v. Jacob Davis ( 2024 )

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 390ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-23-568
Opinion Delivered June 5, 2024
ANDREA SELLEW APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI,
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FOURTEENTH DIVISION
V. [NO. 60DR-15-1086]
HONORABLE SHAWN J. JOHNSON,
JACOB DAVIS JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Andrea Sellew appeals from an order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court
that granted appellee Jacob Davis’s motion for reallocation of parenting time and ordered
each party to have equal parenting time with their thirteen-year-old daughter, MC. On
appeal, Andrea argues that the circuit court erred in finding that a material change in
circumstances was not necessary for a modification of the custody and visitation provisions
in the parties’ divorce decree. Andrea argues in the alternative that the circuit court erred
in finding that it was in MC’s best interest to modify the custody and visitation awards in
the divorce decree. We affirm.
The disposition of this appeal hinges on whether the parties’ divorce decree awarded
Andrea primary custody of MC or whether it awarded the parties joint custody. Andrea
argues that the divorce decree awarded her primary custody, while Jacob argues that it
awarded joint custody. Traditionally, in determining whether a change in custody is
warranted, the burden is on the moving party to show a material change in circumstances.
See, e.g., Chaffin v. Chaffin, 2011 Ark. App. 293. However, in the watershed case Nalley v.
Adams, 2021 Ark. 191, 632 S.W.3d 297, the supreme court held that the material-change-in-
circumstances analysis is not triggered when the parties maintain joint custody and neither
party seeks an actual change of custody; in that event, the trial court may enforce its original
order through the adjustment of parenting time.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The parties divorced in Duvall County, Florida, in November 2012, at which time
MC was two years old.1 The divorce decree stated that the parties had reached an agreement
resolving all pending issues, which was incorporated therein. The divorce decree provided
that “the parties shall abide by the Parenting Plan which is attached hereto and incorporated
herein.” The divorce decree also ordered Jacob to pay child support.
At the time of the parties’ divorce, they had been living in Jacksonville, Florida, where
Jacob was stationed on active duty with the U.S. Navy. However, Jacob had recently been
reassigned to a naval base in Annapolis, Maryland, which is more than seven hundred miles
from Jacksonville, Florida. Therefore, when the parties divorced, they contemplated that
1
The divorce decree was styled “Consent Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.”
We refer to it herein as the divorce decree.
2
Jacob would be living in Annapolis, Maryland, while Andrea would remain in Jacksonville,
Florida.
The Parenting Plan that was attached to the divorce decree lists Andrea’s address in
Jacksonville, Florida, and Jacob’s address in Annapolis, Maryland. It provides, “This
Parenting Plan is submitted to the court with the agreement of both parties.”
The Parenting Plan contains the following pertinent provisions:
Shared Parental Responsibility: It is in the best interests of the child that the parties
have full shared parental rights and responsibilities to confer and make major
decisions affecting the welfare of the child. Major decisions include, but are not
limited to, decisions about the child’s education, healthcare, and other
responsibilities unique to this family. Each parent shall make decisions regarding day-
to-day care and control of the child while the child resides with or is with that parent.
It further provides, “Division of Shared Parental Responsibilities: All major decision
regarding the child shall be shared between Mother and Father.” The Parenting Plan also
states, “Both parents shall have equal and independent authority to confer with the child’s
school, day care, health care providers, and other programs with regard to the child’s
educational, emotional, and social progress.” Under the subtitle “Child’s Rights,” it states
that MC has a right to “[h]ave both parents to love without fear of anger or guilt from either
parent” and to “[d]evelop an independent and meaningful relationship with each parent and
to respect the differences of each parent and their home.” The Parenting Plan contains no
provision for either party to have final decision-making authority in the event the parties
were unable to mutually agree on major decisions affecting the child.
Under the subtitle “Scheduling,” the Parenting Plan provides:
3
Goal: It is the parties’ goal to share time with the child as equitably as possible by
accommodating their respective schedules, considering the minor child’s school
calendar, and taking into consideration the timesharing schedule as set forth below.
The parties acknowledge and agree that the schedule set forth herein may change
from time to time depending upon work schedules, school calendars, etc.
It also provides:
It is acknowledged that the child has a right to spend substantial time with both
parents. Both parents are expected to provide access to the child at unscheduled
times if requested and if to do so does not unreasonably disrupt prior planned
activities of the child or the parent with whom the child is timesharing.
Under the subtitle “Timesharing as to the Child,” the Parenting Plan states that
“[m]other shall have the majority timesharing with the minor child.” The Parenting Plan
then provides that, until MC enters kindergarten, Jacob shall have seven consecutive days
every month with MC and that
[u]pon the child entering kindergarten, the parties shall timeshare the minor child as
more particularly set forth below. Father shall be entitled to and shall have the
following minimum timesharing rights with the child and Mother shall have
timesharing with the minor child at all other times.
(Emphasis in original.) This subsection then provides that Jacob may exercise timesharing
on alternate weekends in the vicinity of Andrea’s residence and that this would include any
three-day weekend of any given month. With respect to holidays and summers—applicable
both before and after MC entered kindergarten—Jacob was awarded timesharing during
Christmas and Thanksgiving breaks every other year; spring break every year; and the entire
summer, subject to Andrea’s timesharing on alternate weekends in the vicinity of Jacob’s
residence.
The Parenting Plan also contained the following provision:
4
DESIGNATION FOR OTHER LEGAL PURPOSES: The child named in this
Parenting Plan is scheduled to reside the majority of the time with Mother. This
parent is designated as the custodian of the child solely for purposes of all other state
and federal statutes which require a designation or determination of custody. This
designation does not affect either parent’s rights and responsibilities under this
Parenting Plan.
We observe that the terms “primary custody” or “primary caretaker” appear nowhere
in the Parenting Plan, and the Parenting Plan never uses the term visitation but repeatedly
references timesharing with MC. We also observe that the Parenting Plan does not use the
term “joint custody.”
In August 2014, the Florida court issued a “Consent Judgment Modifying Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.” This judgment provided that Andrea shall be
permitted to permanently relocate with MC to Little Rock, Arkansas, which relocation had
already transpired. The judgment further provided:
This Court shall relinquish jurisdiction and further subject matter jurisdiction to
enforce or modify the provisions of the Final Judgement is relinquished to the State
of Arkansas regarding all post-dissolution matters, including those concerning the
minor child. Arkansas is the new home state of the minor child pursuant to the
provision of the UCCJEA. Each party specifically subjects themselves to the personal
jurisdiction over each, respectively, in the State of Arkansas, and any further
proceedings for enforcement or modifications shall occur in the State of Arkansas.
Consistent with the provisions of this judgment, Andrea relocated to Pulaski County,
Arkansas, where she continues to reside.
In March 2015, Andrea filed in Pulaski County Circuit Court a petition to register
foreign decree, asking that both the “Consent Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage”
and the “Consent Judgment Modifying Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage” entered in
5
Florida be registered in Arkansas. In her petition to register foreign decree, Andrea stated
that “[t]he divorce awarded the parties joint legal custody of the minor child with Petitioner
having the majority timesharing with the minor child.” (Emphasis added.) In August 2016,
Andrea filed an amended petition to register foreign decree wherein she again made the
above-quoted statement. In her amended petition, as she had previously alleged in her
original petition, Andrea also stated that “she is the custodial parent under the orders and
is the party seeking registration” and that “Jacob is the non-custodial parent under the
orders.” In Jacob’s response to Andrea’s amended petition to register foreign decree, he
admitted Andrea’s allegation that the divorce decree awarded the parties joint legal custody
of MC with Andrea having the majority timesharing with MC. Jacob stated further:
In response to paragraph 7, he denies that Petitioner is the custodial parent and that
he is the non-custodial parent. Instead, he states that the parties share joint custody
of their minor child, that they have shared parental responsibilities, and that they
have a time sharing plan. Although Petitioner has majority timesharing, he has
extensive minimum timesharing as provided in the plan.
(Emphasis in original.) Jacob did not object to Andrea’s request to register the Florida orders
in Arkansas. In November 2015, the Pulaski County Circuit Court entered an “Agreed
Order of Registration of Foreign Decree” finding that the Florida orders should be given full
faith and credit by the State of Arkansas and that they are registered in Pulaski County for
all enforcement and modification purposes that may be necessary.
On May 9, 2022, Jacob filed in Pulaski County Circuit Court a “Motion for
Reallocation and Modification.” In his motion, Jacob stated that pursuant to the Parenting
Plan incorporated into the parties’ divorce decree, the parties are to have “full shared
6
parental rights and responsibilities to confer and make major decisions affecting the welfare
of the child,” and “it is the parties’ goal to share time with the child as equitably as possible.”
Jacob asserted that until 2021, the parties resided in different states but that Jacob and his
family now reside in Pulaski County, Arkansas. Jacob alleged that “[d]ue to the age of the
minor child and the closeness in proximity of [Jacob] and the child’s siblings to the child, it
is in the best interest of the minor child to reallocate the shared parenting time to each party
receiving equal parenting time with the child.” Jacob requested a reallocation of parenting
time to equal parenting time and for a modification of his child-support obligation.
On May 24, 2022, Andrea responded to Jacob’s motion for reallocation and
modification, asking that it be denied. In a pretrial brief filed on January 3, 2023, Andrea
alleged that “[t]here has been no substantial change of circumstances and it is not in the best
interest of the child to reallocate the time.”
On January 10, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on Jacob’s motion for
reallocation and modification. The parties argued whether the divorce decree granted
primary custody to Andrea or whether it granted the parties joint custody, in which case
Jacob would not be required to prove a material change in circumstances under the supreme
court’s precedent in Nalley, 2021 Ark. 191, 632 S.W.3d 297. The circuit court found at the
hearing that the language in the Parenting Plan, which was incorporated into the divorce
decree, awarded the parties joint custody.
Jacob testified that it was his understanding that under the Parenting Plan the parties
shared custody but had a specific timesharing plan because of their schedules and his service
7
in the Navy. Jacob testified that he was on active duty in the Navy until May 2020 and that
he remained in Annapolis, Maryland and entered the Navy Reserve. Jacob remained in the
Navy Reserve until November 2021.
Jacob stated that in 2019, while he was still in the Navy, he started a business with a
partner in the Annapolis area. He stated that it took time to establish the business and that
he was eventually able to relocate his portion of the business to Arkansas. Jacob testified
that he moved to Pulaski County around June 2021.
Jacob testified that he had remarried about eight years ago and that he and his wife
have three sons. He stated that MC has a good relationship with her younger brothers and
that MC is very close with Jacob’s wife.
Jacob testified that after he moved to Arkansas, he reached out to Andrea and
requested equal parenting time with MC. He stated that Andrea agreed to allow him three-
day weekends with MC during his alternate weekend timesharing. They continued this
arrangement for almost a year, but Jacob wanted equal timesharing. He stated that when
Andrea became uncooperative, he filed his motion for reallocation asking for equal
parenting time.
Andrea testified that she is a labor and delivery nurse at UAMS. Andrea has
remarried and she and her husband have two daughters. Andrea stated that MC has a strong
bond with Andrea’s husband and with MC’s younger sisters.
Andrea stated that, before Jacob moved to Arkansas, Jacob would exercise his summer
and holiday visits with MC but that Jacob’s parents—who live in Arkansas— exercised his
8
alternating weekend visits with MC. Andrea acknowledged that after Jacob relocated to
Arkansas, she allowed him to have MC for three-day weekends on alternating weeks but
stated that she retracted the schedule to regular alternating weekends after he filed his
motion for reallocation of parenting time. Andrea stated that she objects to equal parenting
time and sees no reason to change MC’s environment where she has been thriving.
At the end of the hearing, the circuit court announced from the bench that the parties
have joint custody according to the terms of the divorce decree and that Nalley “seems to be
very applicable here” and “very analogous.” The circuit court announced that under the
joint-custody arrangement it would award equal parenting time on an alternating-week basis,
which it found to be “best for your child.”
On May 11, 2023, the circuit court entered an order making these findings:
The parties have joint custody of the minor child. Joint custody means that before a
decision is made, the parties are charged with consulting one another on the issue,
taking into consideration as to what is in the best interest of the child and not what
is best for either party. In the event that the parties are unable to reach a mutual
agreement, then Mother shall have final decision-making authority. Each party will
make the day-to-day decisions regarding the child while she is in that party’s physical
care.
The circuit court awarded the parties parenting time of alternating weeks, to continue
through the summer months, and alternating holidays.2 This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
2
The circuit court also modified Jacob’s child-support obligation due to the new
parenting schedule and ordered him to pay child-support arrears that had accrued after Jacob
was discharged from active duty in the Navy and while he was developing his business.
However, no issue regarding child support is raised by either party in this appeal.
9
In reviewing domestic-relations cases, we consider the evidence de novo but will not
reverse a circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Sanchez v. Weeks, 2023
Ark. App. 531, 678 S.W.3d 907. A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court,
on the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Stehle v. Zimmerman, 375 Ark. 446, 291 S.W.3d 573 (2009). When the question of
whether the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous turns largely on the credibility of
the witnesses, we give special deference to the superior position of the circuit court to
evaluate the witnesses, their testimony, and the child’s best interest. Brown v. Brown, 2012
Ark. 89, 387 S.W.3d 159.
III. Andrea’s Points on Appeal
On appeal from the circuit court’s order that awarded equal parenting time, Andrea
raises the following two arguments. Andrea argues that the circuit court erred in finding
that a material change in circumstances was not required to modify the divorce decree in
this regard, and she argues in the alternative that the circuit court erred in finding that the
modification was in MC’s best interest.
A. Material Change in Circumstances
For her first argument, Andrea argues that the circuit court erred in not requiring
Jacob to prove a material change in circumstances in order to modify the custody
arrangement in the divorce decree. Andrea contends that the divorce decree and
incorporated Parenting Plan did not award joint custody and that the language therein
“resembles an award of physical custody to [Andrea] subject to the visitation rights of
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[Jacob].” Andrea notes that pursuant to the Parenting Plan she had the “majority
timesharing” with MC, and she asserts that for ten years following the divorce, she was MC’s
primary caretaker. Therefore, Andrea argues, Nalley is not applicable, and it was Jacob’s
burden to prove a material change in circumstances. See, e.g., Hoover v. Hoover, 2016 Ark.
App. 322, 498 S.W.3d 297 (holding that for a circuit court to change custody of children, it
must first determine that a material change in circumstances has transpired from the time
of the divorce decree).3
To address this point on appeal, a careful review of the supreme court’s decision in
Nalley is necessary. In Nalley, the unmarried parties had a child together and lived together
in Jonesboro. They separated, and the mother moved to Little Rock. The mother moved
for a paternity adjudication and child support and asked that she remain the primary
caretaker of the child. The parties later stipulated, as reflected in the circuit court’s order,
that they would have joint legal custody with the mother serving as the primary caregiver.
Due to the two-hour driving distance between the parties, the circuit court in Nalley found
in its order that “it was difficult to fashion a schedule so that both parties will have adequate
time with the minor child.” The circuit court set a schedule that awarded the majority of
3
Andrea also appears to argue in a separate part of her brief that Florida law should
apply to Jacob’s motion for reallocation of parenting time. However, because Andrea failed
to raise this argument below and, in fact, acquiesced to the application of Arkansas law, this
argument is not preserved. At the hearing on Jacob’s motion, Andrea’s counsel specifically
argued, “I think the law is in my client’s favor on the issue of reallocation. If the court wants
a brief, I’d be happy to brief the issue, but I believe that there has to have been under Arkansas
law some change in circumstances to seek the modification that’s required.” (Emphasis
added.)
11
the parenting time to the mother but stated in the order that “[t]he parties are encouraged
to offer flexibility to the other party as much as possible.” 2021 Ark. 191, at 3, 632 S.W.3d
at 299.
Approximately seven months after the stipulated order was entered, the father filed a
motion for modification stating that he was relocating to Little Rock and had a favorable
work schedule. Because the circuit court’s previous order awarded joint custody, the father
asserted that he was entitled to equal time with the child. After a hearing on the matter, the
circuit court found that the parties shared, and would continue to share, joint custody; that
the “only reason in the initial Order that the parties did not share equal time with the child
was that the Defendant lived in Jonesboro, Arkansas and the Plaintiff lived in Little Rock,
Arkansas”; and that because the father had moved to Little Rock, “there is no discernible
reason why each party could not share equal time with the parties’ three-year-old child.” Id.
at 5, 632 S.W.3d at 300. The circuit court noted that, normally, the material-change-of-
circumstances analysis has to do with the opposing party, but in this case, the mother’s
circumstances had not changed. The circuit court ordered a physical-custody schedule of
alternating weeks.
On appeal, the mother in Nalley argued that the circuit court erred in finding that
the father’s change in employment and move to Little Rock constituted a material change in
circumstances to warrant a change in custody to grant the father equal time with the child
because the noncustodial parent cannot use the circumstances he created as grounds to
12
modify custody. The supreme court in Nalley disagreed with the mother’s argument, and
wrote:
We agree with the circuit court’s disposition for the following reasons. While
we recognize the parties’ respective positions regarding a material change in
circumstances, our review of the record leads us to conclude that a material-change-
in-circumstances analysis is not triggered in this case as neither party sought an actual
change of custody. Further, we note that the case before us does not present an issue
of visitation because the parties maintain joint custody.[4] Stated differently, based on
the specific facts of this case, the narrow issue before us is an adjustment of parenting
time previously ordered by the circuit court. In its July 17, 2019 original order, the
circuit court awarded joint custody to Nalley and Adams. The circuit court
recognized that because Adams lived in Jonesboro, it was impossible at that point to
split time equally between the parents. Seven months later, through his amended
motion for contempt and modification, Adams notified the circuit court that he was
relocating to Little Rock and sought to exercise equal time with M.A. Because Adams
had relocated to Little Rock and based on its previous award of joint custody in the
original order, the circuit court ordered that the parties share equal time with M.A.
Although the circuit court used the phrase “modification of the custody and visitation
schedule,” a careful review of the record demonstrates that the circuit court simply
adjusted the parenting time schedules of the respective parties because Adams had
moved to Little Rock, enforcing its July 2019 order. Specifically, in its original order
awarding joint custody, the circuit court found that
both parties are suitable to provide the care, love and nurture for the minor
child. Both are medical professionals, well-educated and capable of making
good decisions for their daughter. It is a compliment to both parties that they
understood and agreed that there should be joint custody of the child
recognizing that the shortfalls of either party were insufficient to prevent a
joint custodial relationship. To say it another way, both parties recognize that
the other party is, and can be, a proper parent for the child.
However, because of Adam’s location in Jonesboro, the circuit court
recognized that at the time of the 2019 order, shared time was impossible. Once
Adams relocated to Little Rock, in its July 8, 2020 order, the circuit court reiterated
its July 2019 order of equal time and found:
4
Joint custody means the approximate and reasonable equal division of time with the
child by both parents individually as agreed to by the parents or as ordered by the court.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(5) (Supp. 2021).
13
[T]he Court has already ordered, and the parties agreed, that they shall have
joint legal custody of the child. The only reason in the initial Order that the
parties did not share equal time with the child was that the Defendant lived
in Jonesboro, Arkansas and the Plaintiff and child lived in Little Rock,
Arkansas. Since the Defendant has moved to Little Rock, there is no
discernable reason why each party could not share equal time with the parties’
three-year-old child. The law is clear in Arkansas that joint custody with equal
time is favored.
Accordingly, given our standard of review and the specific facts in this case, we
cannot say that the circuit court erred in enforcing its original order through the
adjustment of parenting time.
Nalley, 2021 Ark. 191, at 6–8, 632 S.W.3d at 301–02.
We find the case at bar analogous to Nalley. Although the Parenting Plan
incorporated into the divorce decree did not use the terms “primary custody” or “joint
custody,” it provided that the “parties’ goal” was to “share time with the child as equitable
as possible” and that “the child has a right to spend substantial time with both parents.” The
Parenting Plan specifically provided for “shared parental responsibility,” and stated, “It is in
the best interest of the child that the parties have full shared parental rights and
responsibilities to confer and make major decisions affecting the welfare of the child.” The
Parenting Plan speaks in terms of timesharing as opposed to visitation, and although it gave
Andrea more timesharing with MC, it was at that time impossible to split the time equally
due to the considerable distance between the parties. Finally, the Parenting Plan provided:
The child named in this Parenting Plan is scheduled to reside the majority of the time
with Mother. This parent is designated as the custodian of the child solely for purposes of all
other state and federal statues which require a designation or determination of custody. This
designation does not affect either parent’s rights and responsibilities under this Parenting Plan.
14
(Emphasis added.) Our statutes do not require a designation of one party or the other as
custodian, and, in fact, our statutes provide that joint custody is favored in Arkansas. See
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iii). The foregoing provisions in the Parenting Plan
incorporated into the divorce decree make it clear that the parties intended to share joint
custody, but as in Nalley, equal parenting time was logistically impossible.5
Here, as in Nalley, Jacob did not seek a change in custody. He instead filed a motion
for reallocation of parenting time to equal parenting time. And, as in Nalley, this case does
not present an issue of visitation because the parties maintain joint custody. Therefore,
pursuant to our supreme court’s holding in Nalley, we hold under these circumstances that
the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that a material change in circumstances was
not required before adjusting the parties’ parenting time.
B. Best Interest
Andrea’s remaining argument is that the circuit court erred in finding that a
modification of custody or visitation was in MC’s best interest. In support of this argument,
Andrea asserts that she has been MC’s primary caretaker since the parties’ divorce, that Jacob
5
We observe that Andrea acknowledged the joint-custody nature of the divorce decree
when she petitioned to register the decree in Arkansas in March 2015 and stated, “The
divorce decree awarded the parties joint legal custody of the minor child with Petitioner having
the majority timesharing with the minor child.” (Emphasis added.) Andrea’s
characterization of the divorce decree is similar to the language of the divorce decree in
Nalley.
15
does not understand MC’s needs and desires, that MC is a well-adjusted straight-A student,
and that there is no issue with the existing custody arrangement or visitation schedule.
Giving due deference to the superior position of the circuit court in evaluating the
witnesses, their testimony, and the best interest of the child, we cannot say that the circuit
court clearly erred in finding that equal timesharing with each parent was in MC’s best
interest The testimony showed that MC is bonded with Andrea and her family and is
bonded with Jacob and his family, and awarding equal parenting time is consistent with the
parties’ expressed desires in the Parenting Plan that their goal was to share time with MC as
equitably as possible and that MC has a right to spend substantial time with both parents.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold under the particular facts of this case that the circuit court did
not clearly err in finding that a material-change-in-circumstances analysis was not triggered
or in reallocating the parties’ parenting time. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN, J., agrees.
VIRDEN, J., concurs.
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge, concurring. I concur with the result of our decision today.
For the reasons stated in my concurrence in Cooper v. Kalkwarf,1 my dissent in Nalley v.
1
2017 Ark. App. 405, at 16, 525 S.W.3d 508, 516, vacated, 2017 Ark. 331, 532
S.W.3d 58.
16
Adams,2 and my recent concurrence in Heileman v. Cahoon,3 I once again implore the
legislature or our supreme court to provide some meaningful guidance for the benefit of trial
courts, attorneys, and litigants. Are we to look to the plain language of a decree to determine
if the parties share joint custody? See Nalley, supra. Or, are we to look to the actual practice
of the parties to determine traditional custody/visitation despite the language in a decree?
See Cooper, supra.
And, despite possibly tilting at windmills, I will again say that if the best interest of
children is the polestar in every child-custody case, Self v. Dittmer, 2021 Ark. App. 85, 619
S.W.3d 43, that is where the analysis should start and end. Nothing is served by continuing
to play word games with the ever-shifting terminology.
Richard E. Worsham, for appellant.
LaCerra, Dickson, Hoover & Rogers, PLLC, by: Traci LaCerra, for appellee.
2
2021 Ark. App. 167, at 34, 625 S.W.3d 336, 355, vacated, 2021 Ark. 191, 632
S.W.3d 297.
3
2024 Ark. App. 72, at 12, 685 S.W.3d 256, 263.
17