Jackie Parker v. City of Little Rock ( 2024 )

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 466ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-22-647
JACKIE PARKER Opinion Delivered October 2, 2024
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH
V. DIVISION
[NO. 60CV-18-3812]
CITY OF LITTLE ROCK
APPELLEE HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Jackie Parker (“Parker”) appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order
affirming the Little Rock Civil Service Commission’s (“Commission”) decision to uphold
his termination from the Little Rock Police Department (“LRPD”) on November 6, 2017.
Parker was terminated following two incidents in which he did not appropriately respond to
information provided by dispatch and failed to make necessary arrests in both instances.
Parker appealed his termination to the Commission, which upheld the termination. He
then appealed to the Pulaski County Circuit Court, which affirmed the Commission’s
decision.
Parker argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding his due process rights
were not violated, and furthermore, the circuit court erred in affirming the Commission’s
decision upholding his termination. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Parker served as an officer with the LRPD for twenty-two years prior to his
termination. When Kenneth Buckner took over as chief of police of the LRPD in June
2014, he instituted an unwritten policy that officers found in violation of LRPD policies
after having previously been suspended for more than sixty days were automatically subject
to termination. In April 2015, Parker, as an acting supervisor, advised a subordinate officer
against arresting an individual at a gas station when the officer saw a weapon in the
individual’s car because Parker suggested the officer had no proof the individual was in
possession of the weapon. Chief Buckner demoted Parker as a result of the April 2015
incident. Parker admitted that in 2015 when he was demoted, Chief Buckner told him that
if he did anything else that led to a one-day suspension, he would be terminated. Parker
conceded that Chief Buckner informed him at that time that he had more than sixty days’
suspension. Parker acknowledged that Assistant Chief Hayward Finks was present when
Chief Buckner demoted him and warned him about being terminated for any further
infractions.
Two more infractions did occur, which ultimately led to Parker’s termination. On
May 18, 2017, Parker encountered an individual soliciting on University Avenue. Parker
obtained the individual’s driver’s license, and upon radioing in the information, learned that
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the individual was a parole violator. Alleging dispatch did not inform him that the individual
had an active warrant for his arrest, Parker issued a citation to the individual and released
him.
The second incident occurred the following day. On May 19, Parker was one of five
officers that responded to a call regarding a disturbance in which the caller’s ex-boyfriend
was refusing to leave. Parker offered to contact dispatch to run the identifying information
on the ex-boyfriend at the scene. Dispatch informed Parker that the ex-boyfriend did not
have any warrants for his arrest but that the caller did have an order of protection against
the ex-boyfriend, which should have resulted in an arrest. Parker did not relay the
information concerning the protective order to the other officers at the scene, and the ex-
boyfriend was escorted off the property and directed not to return.
Sergeant Gregory Quiller was Parker’s acting supervisor on May 19, 2017. When the
call came in on May 19, Sergeant Quiller ran the subject’s name to determine how many
officers to send to the scene. Later that day, Sergeant Quiller reviewed the incident report
and discovered that the subject left the scene without further incident. Sergeant Quiller
asked Officer Rena Evans, the primary officer on the scene, why she did not arrest the
subject, and she told him that she did not know the caller had an order of protection against
the subject. Officer Evans stated that Parker “conducted a warrants check on [the ex-
boyfriend] and relayed to her that [he] did not have any active warrants, therefore [he] was
allowed to leave the scene.” Sergeant Quiller commanded Officer Evans to go back and take
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the subject into custody for violating the protective order. Sergeant Quiller directed the
officers who were on the scene to submit letters about the May 19 incident.
Sergeant Quiller then initiated an investigation of Parker in relation to the May 19
incident. Sergeant Quiller questioned Parker about why he did not arrest the ex-boyfriend.
Parker reported that he did not hear dispatch mention the order of protection because he
did not hear the “code 10-35.” Sergeant Quiller was not aware of the May 18 incident when
he questioned Parker about the May 19 incident.
Sergeant Quiller decided to investigate whether Parker had any similar instances of
conduct and discovered the failure to arrest on May 18. Parker was directed to provide a
letter to Sergeant Quiller that contained his statement regarding each incident. Parker
explained that he did not arrest the individual on May 18 because he again didn’t hear the
phrase “10-35 traffic.” Parker learned shortly thereafter that LRPD Internal Affairs had
opened an investigation concerning the two incidents.
When questioned about the incidents by LRPD Internal Affairs, Parker denied that
he intentionally ignored or chose not to serve a warrant or a protection order. In an August
2017 LRPD Internal Affairs memorandum concerning Parker, the inspector reviewed
multiple reports concerning Parker and noted that he could not locate any reports in his file,
indicating that he had ignored or failed to respond in prior encounters. However, Parker’s
Internal Affairs file contained the evaluations of Parker’s chain of command, Sergeant
Quiller and Lieutenant Troy Ellison, who both recommended remedial training and a
twenty-five- or thirty-day suspension. Captain Michael Davis reviewed Quiller’s and Ellison’s
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evaluations and proposed that Parker be terminated because he had seventeen sustained
disciplinary charges resulting in sixty days of suspension and one demotion. Captain Davis
opined that another suspension would not correct Parker’s negative behavior.
Two months later, Parker was informed by Chief Buckner that disciplinary action was
being considered against him in relation to the incidents, and Parker declined an
administrative hearing concerning the disciplinary action. Parker was terminated from the
LRPD on November 6, 2017. In requesting a hearing before the Commission, Parker argued
that his letter of termination mentioned only the two incidents in May but did not include
any mention of his disciplinary history or Chief Buckner’s sixty-day suspension policy.
At the hearing before the Commission, Sergeant Quiller testified that Parker’s failure
to arrest in both instances—because he did not hear the code 10-35—was not a valid reason
to refrain from arresting the subjects. Sergeant Quiller noted that the code 10-35 had no
bearing on whether the officers should arrest the subject. Sergeant Quiller concluded that
Parker should have inquired further in both instances about whether the subjects should
have been arrested.
Assistant Chief Hayward Finks testified that the LRPD had a policy of detaining all
parole violators and contacting the Arkansas Department of Correction to determine
whether the subject should be arrested. Assistant Chief Finks testified that he was present
at the meeting with Chief Buckner and Parker wherein Chief Buckner informed Parker of
the sixty-day suspension policy and that any further discipline for reckless or negligent
behavior would lead to termination. Assistant Chief Finks stated that all of Parker’s past
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disciplinary history was “in the vein of dereliction of duty or failure to take action,” so he
believed termination was appropriate. He stated that he would have recommended Parker’s
termination even absent Chief Buckner’s sixty-day suspension policy because of Parker’s
history and the May 18 and 19 incidents.
Chief Buckner testified that Parker’s failure to arrest the subjects on May 18 and 19
constituted both neglect of duty and dereliction of duty. Chief Buckner stated that he
reviewed Parker’s disciplinary history—which he described as extensive—and noted Parker
was regularly cited for “dereliction of duty, conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty,” and
failure to “remain alert and observant.” He maintained that Parker’s disciplinary history
reflected that Parker was unable to effectively perform his job. Chief Buckner testified that
Parker was the second individual terminated as a result of this policy.
Chief Buckner confirmed that he informed Parker of his sixty-day suspension policy
and indicated Parker understood. Chief Buckner agreed that his termination letter to Parker
did not include any discussion of Parker’s disciplinary history or days of suspension. Chief
Buckner stated that he terminated Parker as the result of the totality of Parker’s disciplinary
history as well as the May 18 and 19 offenses because he considered Parker to be a habitual
offender. Chief Buckner testified that every officer’s disciplinary history is contemplated
when determining the appropriate discipline for that officer’s infraction. He also did not
believe Parker’s disciplinary issues could have been remedied with training.
Multiple LRPD officers testified about the proper procedures when hearing the
information relayed by dispatch to Parker on May 18 and 19 and confirmed that, in both
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instances, Parker should have requested additional information or effected an arrest of both
individuals. The officers all further agreed that the information relayed to Parker should
have resulted in the subject’s arrest on May 19.
Parker testified regarding the May 19 incident that he heard dispatch say the subject
did not have any warrants but did not hear that the caller had an order of protection against
the subject. Parker asserted that if he had heard dispatch report that the caller had an order
of protection against the subject, he would have made the arrest. Parker admitted that he
told the subject on May 18 that dispatch reported the subject was a parole violator. Parker
testified that his failure to follow up on the information that the subject was a parole violator
was due to dispatch’s failure to inform him of any warrants.
The Commission unanimously voted to uphold the LRPD’s determination that
Parker violated the orders and regulations set forth in his termination letter. The
Commission voted 3–2 to uphold Parker’s termination, which, pursuant to the
Commission’s rules, sustained Parker’s termination.
Parker filed his notice of appeal of the Commission’s findings and complaint against
the City of Little Rock (the “City”) on June 7, 2018, alleging claims for violation of due
process and equal protection pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and wrongful discharge. The
City filed a notice of removal on July 11, noting that Parker was a resident of Florida and
had asserted federal claims. In the federal litigation, Parker alleged that “[t]here are many
instances of similar conduct by white LRPD officers who were either not disciplined or
disciplined more [sic] less harshly.”
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During the federal litigation, the City moved for summary judgment against Parker,
which was granted in part and denied in part. The Eastern District of Arkansas granted
summary judgment in favor of the City on Parker’s claims for race discrimination, age
discrimination, retaliation, and the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act but denied summary
judgment to the City on Parker’s due-process claim, concluding that a material dispute
existed regarding whether Parker was sufficiently notified of the sixty-day suspension policy
prior to his termination. On a joint motion by the parties, the Eastern District of Arkansas
remanded Parker’s due-process claims to the Pulaski County Circuit Court.
The parties submitted a supplemental record to the circuit court. The parties also
submitted the exhibits presented to the Commission and the transcript of the civil-service
hearing. At the hearing before the circuit court, the court afforded the parties the
opportunity to present any additional testimony, and the parties agreed that because of the
voluminous proceedings, no additional testimony was necessary. On June 20, 2022, the
circuit court affirmed the findings of the Commission, concluding that Parker failed to meet
his burden of proof on his due-process claims. It is from this order that Parker instituted
the present appeal.
II. Standard of Review
The circuit court reviews decisions of the Civil Service Commission de novo and has
jurisdiction to modify the punishment fixed by the Commission even if the court agrees that
the officer violated department rules and regulations. City of Little Rock v. Muncy, 2017 Ark.
App. 412, at 7–8, 526 S.W.3d 877, 881. This court then reviews the findings of the circuit
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court to determine whether they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 8, 536 S.W.3d at 881. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id. at 8, 526 S.W.3d at 881–82. The circuit court does not merely review the
commission’s decision for error but instead conducts a de novo hearing on the record made
before the commission and hears any additional competent testimony required by either
party. Little Rock Police Dep’t v. Starks, 2021 Ark. App. 323, at 4.
III. Discussion
First, Parker contends that his rights to due process were violated because the City
failed to provide notice of the charges against him or the proposed action that the City
intended to take based on the charges. Parker further claims he was subsequently terminated
without a fair opportunity to “defend, enforce, and protect his right to continued
employment.”
Arkansas law requires that “[n]o civil service employee shall be discharged, reduced
in rank or compensation, or suspended for three (3) or more days without being notified in
writing of the discharge, reduction in rank or compensation, or the suspension for three (3)
or more days and its cause.” Ark. Code Ann. § 14-51-308(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). Section 14-51-
308(b) provides for the right to a trial before the Commission “[w]ithin ten (10) days after
the notice in writing is served upon the officer . . . the person may request a trial before the
board of civil service commissioners on the charges alleged as the grounds for discharge . . .
.” Ark. Code Ann. § 14-51-308(b)(1). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
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“minimal due process procedures for termination of employment of governmental
employees was held to include notice of and a copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing
a response, an opportunity for an oral appearance, and an evidentiary hearing.” Parks v. Goff,
483 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)).
Parker was interviewed by, and submitted written statements to, Sergeant Quiller
immediately following the May 18 and 19 events. Parker admits that he was advised of and
interviewed for the internal-affairs investigation into the same incidents. Parker further
concedes that Chief Buckner provided a notice-of-intent letter informing him that
disciplinary action against him was being considered in relation to the May 18 and 19
incidents and that the letter identified potential violations of General Order 310 Section
V.A. and Rule and Regulation Section 1/4002.00 and the bases for such violations. Parker
knowingly declined an administrative hearing to address the alleged violations, which would
have afforded him the opportunity to view the investigative files concerning the alleged
violations.
Parker confirmed during the hearing before the Commission that he was informed
by Chief Buckner in 2015, during the meeting on his demotion, that he would be terminated
if he engaged in any further conduct that could result in a one-day suspension. Parker further
admitted that Chief Buckner mentioned in that meeting that Parker had already been
disciplined with more than sixty days of suspension. Assistant Chief Finks testified before
the Commission that he was present when Chief Buckner informed Parker of the sixty-day
suspension policy. Chief Buckner explained that his sixty-day suspension policy was simply
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a tool he used when considering the appropriate discipline for any violations of LRPD
policies.
We hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Parker received sufficient
due process in relation to his termination. Parker was admittedly put on notice in 2015 that
he would be terminated if he was subject to even a one-day suspension going forward. Parker
was on notice in 2017 that an investigation had been opened concerning his conduct on
May 18 and 19. Chief Buckner provided Parker a notice-of-intent letter informing Parker
that disciplinary action was being considered against him in relation to the May 18 and 19
incidents. The letter also identified potential violations of General Order 310 Section V.A.
and Rule and Regulation Section 1/4002.00 and the bases for the violations. Parker was
provided an evidentiary hearing and offered testimony. Parker’s counsel cross-examined the
City’s witnesses and presented Parker’s witnesses, including Parker.
Second, Parker contends that the circuit court’s finding that Parker was not
wrongfully terminated was clearly erroneous and against a preponderance of the evidence.
“Disputed facts are within the province of the fact-finder, and due deference is given to the
circuit court’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
to be accorded to their testimony.” Starks, 2021 Ark. App. 323, at 4. “A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Little Rock Police Dep’t v. Phillips,
2017 Ark. App. 410, at 3, 526 S.W.3d 872, 874.
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A preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Parker was fully aware of
Chief Buckner’s sixty-day suspension policy and that his termination was not clearly
erroneous. The parties agreed on the general facts concerning the May 18 and 19 incidents.
Parker blamed the May 18 failure to arrest on the fact that dispatch informed him the subject
did not have any warrants. Parker indicated that he did not have a duty to inquire further
when he was informed that the subject was a parole violator. As to the May 19 failure to
arrest, Parker claimed that the area was very loud and that he did not hear the dispatcher tell
him that the caller had an order of protection against the subject. Parker testified that he
had no reason to inquire further on May 19 because, although he could not hear everything
the dispatcher said, it was reported that the subject had no warrants. In both instances,
Parker did not believe that he had violated any regulations because he was not given the 10-
35 code for confidential transmissions.
Several officers testified at the hearing before the Commission, and every officer,
including those called by Parker, confirmed that Parker had a duty to request additional
information from dispatch before releasing each of the subjects. The testimony further
illustrated that Parker did not follow standard procedures on May 18 and 19. Chief Buckner
and Assistant Chief Finks both testified that they did not believe further training would
alleviate Parker’s inability to follow well-known procedures. The testimony from multiple
LRPD officers regarding proper procedures confirmed Parker’s deficiencies. We conclude
that the circuit court did not clearly in concluding that Parker was not wrongfully
terminated.
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Affirmed.
VIRDEN and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Holleman & Associates, P.A., by: Timothy A. Steadman, for appellant.
Thomas M. Carpenter, Office of the City Attorney, for appellee.
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