Tandi Speer v. State of Arkansas ( 2024 )


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  •                                    Cite as 
    2024 Ark. App. 473
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION IV
    No. CR-23-536
    TANDI SPEER                                      Opinion Delivered October 2, 2024
    APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
    COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    V.                                               [NO. 17CR-22-529]
    STATE OF ARKANSAS                           HONORABLE CANDICE A. SETTLE,
    APPELLEE JUDGE
    AFFIRMED
    WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
    A Crawford County jury convicted appellant Tandi Speer of breaking or entering and
    first-degree criminal mischief.1 She was sentenced to an aggregate term of four years’
    imprisonment. She argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her
    convictions. We affirm.
    Appellant’s jury trial took place on May 5, 2023. The evidence shows that appellant
    and James Dukes entered property belonging to James Richesin, Jr., located at 2927 Westville
    Road in Van Buren, Arkansas, on June 2, 2022. The property is a defunct go-kart track that
    housed cars and equipment. After noticing property missing, Richesin put up a game camera
    to see who was taking items from the property. He received a notification on his phone on
    1
    Appellant was acquitted of an aggravated-assault charge.
    June 2 from the game camera showing a red Chevrolet Lumina near a building where
    Richesin housed a lot of his things. He headed to the property after receiving the notification
    and arrived approximately seven minutes later. Once there, Richesin noticed the Lumina as
    well as a black truck at the property. The door to the building was shut, and Richesin called
    out for anyone inside the building to come out. At that point, appellant and Dukes exited
    the building. Richesin attempted to hold the two at gunpoint until police arrived, but they
    subsequently went to their vehicles to leave the property. Richesin went to his vehicle and
    attempted to back down the driveway so that he could block the gate; however, by this time,
    appellant had driven her car around the black truck and was in front of Richesin’s car. As
    Richesin was backing up, appellant hit his car and pushed it into a sixteen-foot utility trailer.
    Appellant backed up and Richesin pulled forward. Appellant then hit the driver-side back
    door of Richesin’s car and drove away. Richesin testified that appellant hit his vehicle a total
    of three times. Richesin said that his car, a Honda Accord, was totaled and that he valued
    it at $2,500, the price he would expect to pay for that make and year. He also stated that
    appellant’s family had returned some of the items that had been taken from a building on
    the property, including some die-cast cars and a “fire chief globe that sits on top of a gas
    pump.”
    Deputy Allison Testerman of the Crawford County Sheriff’s Office testified that she
    answered Richesin’s call about trespassers on his property. She said that when she got there,
    she noticed that Richesin’s vehicle had been damaged by another vehicle. She also noticed
    that “some stuff sat outside, [and] some stuff [was] moved inside the building.” She
    2
    subsequently contacted appellant at her apartment, and appellant informed Deputy
    Testerman that she had been to the property in question the night prior and on that day to
    have sex with her boyfriend. Deputy Testerman testified that damage to appellant’s car
    matched Richesin’s statement concerning the events of June 2. She testified that she
    subsequently arrested appellant. She stated that she had worked approximately two hundred
    vehicle accidents and that she estimated the damage to Richesin’s car to be $6,000.
    James Dukes testified that he and appellant were “intimate friends” on the date in
    question. He stated that he followed appellant to the property and that they were at the
    property for “unlawful reasons”: they went to the property to steal things, and appellant was
    going to get vehicle registrations. He stated that appellant thought he would be interested
    in some tools that were on the property. He said that appellant brought black case that was
    on top of a welding machine he wanted outside to him, but she threw the case down when
    he said he did not want it. He testified that once someone showed up at the property, he
    and appellant decided that they would tell the person they were there to have sex. He said
    that appellant admitted to him that she had rammed Richesin’s car. He testified that he had
    seen a plastic globe gasoline-pump topper and some matchbox cars at appellant’s apartment.
    Dukes was currently incarcerated after pleading guilty to charges stemming from this case.
    He admitted that he was ordered to pay restitution, jointly and severally, with appellant in
    the amount of $5,000 due to “the damage done [to Richesin’s vehicle] and articles taken
    [from Richesin’s property].”
    3
    Deputy Keith Smith of the Crawford County Sheriff’s Office testified that he
    interviewed appellant, and the video from that interview was played for the jury. In the
    interview, appellant denied taking anything from Richesin’s property. Appellant said that
    she had been on the property many times to watch the sunset and sunrise and that she had
    never seen any trespassing signs or purple markings. Appellant also said that she went to the
    property on June 2 to have sex in a public place, which was on her bucket list. However, she
    said that they went into the building because they did not want to be seen. Appellant claimed
    that the gate and building were open and that she never broke into anything.
    At the conclusion of the State’s case, appellant unsuccessfully moved for a directed
    verdict, arguing,
    On the charge of breaking or entering, the State has failed to meet its burden beyond
    a reasonable doubt, that [appellant] entered or broke into a building or structure, and
    that she did so with the purpose of committing a theft. There’s been no testimony as
    far as the purpose -- no credible testimony as far as the purpose of what she went in
    there for, even if she did enter. . . . Defense would move for a directed verdict on the
    charge of criminal mischief in the first degree, in that the State has alleged that she
    purposefully and without legal justification caused damage to the property of another
    person, and the value of the damage was more than $1,000.00 but $5,000.00 or less.
    The State’s failed to present evidence any other than through the testimony of their
    alleged victim as to the value of any of the damage that may have been caused, and
    therefore, we would move for a directed verdict on that[.]
    Appellant rested her case without putting on any testimony. The directed-verdict motions
    were unsuccessfully renewed at the close of all the evidence. The jury found appellant guilty
    of breaking or entering and first-degree criminal mischief. Appellant was sentence to four
    years’ imprisonment. She filed a timely notice of appeal.
    4
    Motions for directed verdict are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the
    evidence.2 Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if the trier of fact can reach a
    conclusion without having to resort to speculation or conjecture and is sufficient to compel
    a conclusion one way or the other.3 It is not the appellate court’s place to try issues of fact;
    we simply review the record for substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.4 When
    the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we view the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the State and consider only evidence that supports the conviction. 5
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-202(a)(1)6 provides that a person commits the
    offense of breaking or entering if for the purpose of committing a theft or felony he or she
    breaks or enters into any building, structure, or vehicle. Breaking or entering is a Class D
    felony.7 On appeal, appellant initially seems to challenge the portion of the statute regarding
    the element of entering. However, in her motion for directed verdict, she recited the statute
    and argued that even if she did enter the building, there was no credible evidence that she
    did so with the purpose to commit a theft. She did not challenge or develop her argument
    2
    Clark v. State, 
    2015 Ark. App. 142
    , 
    457 S.W.3d 305
    .
    3
    
    Id.
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    Id.
    6
    (Repl. 2013).
    7
    
    Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-202
    (c).
    5
    concerning the enter element of the crime as she now attempts to do. Thus, her argument
    on that element of the crime is not preserved. Additionally, her attorney conceded during
    closing argument that the enter element of the crime was not being contested. Specifically,
    he said that it was “obvious she was in that building.”
    Appellant also argues that Dukes’s testimony concerning their purpose for entering
    the building on June 2 is not enough to support her conviction for breaking or entering
    because Dukes is an accomplice, and his testimony needs to be corroborated. 8 The State
    maintains that appellant’s accomplice-corroboration challenge is barred. The State is correct.
    In order to preserve an accomplice-corroboration challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
    for appellate review, a defendant must either have the trial court declare a witness to be an
    accomplice as a matter of law or submit the issue to the jury for determination.9 Because
    appellant failed to do either of these, her challenge to the conviction based on
    uncorroborated accomplice testimony is not preserved for our review. 10
    8
    It should also be noted that appellant has changed her argument from that made at
    trial. At trial, she challenged the evidence based on witness credibility, which is left to the
    jury to decide. A party is bound by the nature and scope of the objections and arguments
    made at trial and may not enlarge or change those grounds on appeal. Merchant v. State,
    
    2017 Ark. App. 576
    , 
    532 S.W.3d 136
    .
    9
    Barron v. State, 
    2009 Ark. App. 117
    .
    10
    Johnson v. State, 
    358 Ark. 460
    , 
    193 S.W.3d 260
     (2004). Appellant’s counsel
    concedes that the issue in not preserved but asks this court to take judicial notice.
    6
    Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for
    first-degree criminal mischief. A person commits criminal mischief in the first degree if he
    or she purposely and without legal justification destroys or causes damage to any property of
    another person.11 This offense is a Class D felony if the amount of actual damage is more
    than $1,000 but less than $5,000.12 Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that she
    was justified in her actions. However, that argument is not preserved for our review. She
    also argues that the evidence does not support the statutory amount of damages to Richesin’s
    car. However, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that the damage to the car was over
    $1,000 but less than $5,000. Richesin testified that he considered the damage to be $2,500,
    which he explained was the price he would expect to pay for the car’s make and year. Deputy
    Testerman testified that based on her experience, the car received damages totaling $6,000.
    And Dukes admitted that he was to pay $5,000, jointly and severally, with appellant for the
    damage to Richesin’s car and the items taken from Richesin’s property. Photos of the
    damage to the car were also introduced as evidence. By all accounts, the damage to
    Richesin’s vehicle exceeded $1,000, and the jury found as much based on their verdict. In
    determining the extent of the loss, the jury had a right to take into the jury box with them
    their common sense and experience in the everyday affairs of life. 13 Thus, the jury could
    11
    
    Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203
    (a)(1) (Supp. 2023).
    12
    
    Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203
    (b)(2).
    13
    McMahen v. State, 
    2024 Ark. App. 101
    , 
    684 S.W.3d 332
    .
    7
    consider the testimony and other evidence before it to determine that the damage to
    Richesin’s car met the statutory minimum to support the charge against appellant.14
    Affirmed.
    ABRAMSON and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree.
    Tim Cullen, for appellant.
    Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: David Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    14
    See 
    id.
    8
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 10/2/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/2/2024