Jeffery C. Frazier v. Jana Bland and Paige Bland , 2024 Ark. App. 495 ( 2024 )

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 495ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
NO. CV-23-319
Opinion Delivered October 9, 2024
JEFFERY C. FRAZIER APPEAL FROM THE WHITE
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 73DR-16-361]
V.
HONORABLE DANIEL C. BROCK,
JUDGE
JANA BLAND AND PAIGE BLAND
APPELLEES REVERSED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Jeffery C. Frazier appeals from an order that awarded $17,203.65 in
attorney’s fees to appellee Jana Bland and $7,556.65 in attorney’s fees to appellee Paige
Bland. These attorney’s fees arose from a companion case, Frazier v. Bland, 2024 Ark. App.
494, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Frazier II), which our court is also handing down today. For the
reasons explained herein, we reverse the trial court’s order awarding both attorney’s fees.
This is a paternity and child-support case with a lengthy procedural history (See Frazier
I1 and Frazier II for additional facts and procedural history). Jana Bland is Paige’s mother.
As Paige was approaching graduation from high school, Jana became concerned with her
ability to fund Paige’s college education. As such, Jana assigned her rights to retroactive
child support against Jeffery to the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE). On May
1
Frazier v. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, 2021 Ark. App. 65, 618 S.W.3d 415.
19, 2016, OCSE filed a paternity complaint and retroactive child-support claim against
Jeffery alleging Jeffery is Paige’s father.2 When the complaint was filed, Paige was seventeen
years and eight months old, and OCSE sought nearly eighteen years in retroactive child
support. The subsequent record revealed that Jana had not communicated with Jeffery since
Paige was three months old when she filed an unrelated debt claim in small claims court
against him. Both Jana and Paige were later joined as party plaintiffs to the case.
In the initial round of litigation resulting in Frazier I, the trial court entered a
summary-judgment order finding Jeffery to be Paige’s father and ordering him to pay
$179,080.54 in retroactive child support “to the plaintiffs.” Jeffery appealed from the order
of summary judgment. In Frazier I, we held that material fact questions remained pertaining
to Jeffery’s affirmative defenses to the claim for retroactive child support, and we reversed
and remanded for trial.
On remand, after a bench trial, the trial court entered an order on June 28, 2022,
finding in pertinent part that Jeffery is Paige’s biological father and establishing paternity.
The trial court then found that Jeffery owed $181,739.903 in retroactive child support based
on Jeffery’s admitted wages as applied to the child-support guidelines then in place for each
year calculated. The trial court found that Jeffery proved the affirmative defense of laches as
2
DNA testing confirmed Jeffery is Paige’s father, and Jeffery has since stipulated that
he is Paige’s father.
3
The initial award was $179,080.54 and the current award is $181,739.90. The
difference is apparently a correction in the calculation made by OSCE. However, this
difference is not relevant to this appeal.
2
to Jana’s claim for retroactive child support, stating that Jana had the necessary information
to locate Jeffery to establish paternity and child support at all times but that she simply chose
not to do so until Paige was almost an adult. However, the trial court found that Jeffery did
not prove any of his affirmative defenses as to Paige’s claim for retroactive child support. In
a somewhat obscure June 28, 2022, order, the trial court awarded Jana $18,138.44 in
retroactive child support and awarded Paige $163,601.46 in retroactive child support for a
combined total of $181,739.90.
In the June 28, 2022, judgment, the trial court acknowledged that Jana’s previous
summary judgment against Jeffery for retroactive child support in the amount of
$179,080.54 was “void ab initio” when the summary judgment was reversed by the court of
appeals in Frazier I. As is typical in domestic-relations cases where child-support awards are
appealed, Jeffery began making periodic payments on the $179,080.54 award that was
ultimately voided. The record reveals that during the pendency of Frazier I, Jeffery had made
payments on the retroactive summary-judgment award in the amount of $39,388.44. In the
June 28, 2022 order, the trial court stated,
On remand, this Court ordered Jana Bland to begin paying back the sums previously
collected because the order previously awarding judgment was void ab initio. By the
time of the trial, Jana Bland still owed the sum of $18,138.44 to Jeffery Frazier. Jeffery
Frazier is therefore credited with the amount still held by Jana Bland, thereby leaving
the remaining amount to be paid to Jana Bland on the judgment established in this
Order to be $0.00.
Apparently, instead of requiring Jana to repay the $18,138.44 balance on the voided
judgment, the court allowed Jana to retain those funds and awarded her a self-satisfying
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judgment in the amount of $18,138.44 while giving Jeffery a corresponding credit against
retroactive child support owed to Paige.
Jeffery appealed and Jana cross-appealed from the trial court’s June 28, 2022 order.
In that appeal, which is Frazier II, Jeffery did not contest the $18,138.44 self-satisfying
judgment awarded to Jana, but he argued that the $163,601.46 awarded to Paige should be
reversed based on his laches defense that was applied against her mother’s, Jana’s, claim for
retroactive support. On cross-appeal, Jana argued that laches should not have been applied
to her claim. In Frazier II, which we also hand down today, we reversed on direct appeal,
and we affirmed on cross-appeal.4
We now turn to the instant appeal involving attorney’s fees. In the trial court’s June
28, 2022 order that awarded retroactive child support, the trial court stated that Jana and
Paige’s attorneys may submit requests for attorney’s fees in compliance with Rule 54(e) of
the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 5, 2022, Jana filed a petition requesting $21,218.65 in attorney’s fees,
asserting that the “fees are awardable in accordance with A.C.A. § 9-14-233(b) as well as the
Court’s powers to enforce such provisions of the Court’s orders.” On July 7, 2022, Paige
filed a petition requesting $7,806.65 in attorney’s fees and cited Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-14-233
as the statute authorizing the fees. Both Jana and Paige attached to their petitions an
itemized list of the attorney’s fees billed in the case.
4
We will discuss the specifics of our decision in Frazier II as becomes necessary later
in this opinion.
4
On July 22 and July 25, 2022, Jeffery filed separate responses to the petitions for
attorney’s fees. In each response, Jeffery alleged that neither petition was in compliance with
Rule 54(e) because that rule requires the moving party to specify the statute or rule entitling
the moving party to the attorney’s-fee award, and in their petitions, both Jana and Paige had
cited an inapplicable statute. Specifically, Jeffery asserted that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233(b)
allows for attorney’s fees for only the enforcement of an existing child-support order, and this
was an action for the establishment of an original child-support obligation.5 Jeffery also
asserted that he had prevailed in his defense of Jana’s claim for retroactive child support on
the basis of laches, and that it would be inequitable to require him to reimburse either Jana
or Paige for their attorney’s fees under the circumstances presented.
On October 28, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Jana’s and Paige’s petitions
for attorney’s fees. At the hearing, Jeffery argued, as he had done in his written responses to
the petitions, that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233(b) does not authorize attorney’s fees in the
instant matter. Jeffery also argued in the alternative that it would be inequitable to award
any attorney’s fees against him under the circumstances of the case. Paige argued that,
regardless of whether the statute cited in their written petitions was applicable, attorney’s
fees in this paternity action were authorized by Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-10-109(a) and 9-27-
342(d), and Jana asserted further that the trial court has the inherent power to award
5
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-14-233(b) provides, “The circuit court shall
award a minimum of ten percent (10%) of the support amount due or any reasonable fee,
including a contingency fee approved by the circuit court, as attorney’s fees in actions for the
enforcement of payment of support provided for in the order.”
5
attorney’s fees in domestic-relations proceedings. The trial court ruled from the bench that
the statutes cited by Paige authorized an award of attorney’s fees and that it would award the
attorney’s fees requested by both Jana and Paige except for those fees that were related to the
appellate work in the Frazier I summary-judgment appeal.
On December 15, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting attorney’s fees and
making the following findings:
2. The Court find that there are statutes that apply authorizing the payment of
attorney’s fees and finds that part of the reason for the case being drawn out is because
of the actions of Defendant Jeffrey C. Frazier. Particularly, he alleged that he did not
know the child was his, but during his testimony he testified that he was told that she
was his child and it appears to the Court that some of the other defenses were
apparently fabricated by Mr. Frazier.
3. The Court does find that the appellate work submitted in the Plaintiffs’ attorneys’
billings should not apply. In applying the factors set forth in Chrisco v. Sun Industries,
304 Ark. 227, the Court find that all the other fees submitted are reasonable and the
Court awards attorney’s fees to [Jana] in the amount of $17,203.65 and to [Paige] in
the amount of $7,556.65.
Jeffery timely appealed from the order awarding attorney’s fees, which is the subject of the
present appeal.
Before discussing Jeffery’s appeal on the attorney’s-fees issue, we find it necessary to
briefly summarize our disposition in the companion case, Frazier II, which is also being
delivered today. In Frazier II, Jeffery did not contest the $18,138.44 self-satisfying judgment
awarded to Jana, but he argued that the $163,601.46 awarded to Paige should be reversed
based on his laches defense that was applied against Jana’s claim for retroactive child support.
On cross-appeal, Jana argued that laches should not have been applied to her claim. In
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Frazier II, we affirmed on Jana’s cross-appeal based on our holding that the trial court did
not clearly err in finding that Jana’s near eighteen-year delay in bringing the action, along
with the absence of any reasonable explanation for the delay, created an inequity and that
injustice would be done by granting the relief requested and that the trial court did not err
by applying the equitable defense of laches. We reversed on Jeffery’s direct appeal, holding
that the trial court clearly erred in not finding that because laches applied to Jana’s claim for
retroactive child support, which resulted in the denial of the claim, such application barred
Paige’s claim under the single-obligation principle as explained in the opinion. Accordingly,
in Frazier II, we vacated the $163,601.46 in retroactive child support awarded to Paige.
In this appeal from the award of attorney’s fees in the same paternity and child-
support case discussed above, Jefferey raises two arguments. First, Jeffery argues that the trial
court erred in awarding attorney’s fees because the written petitions for the fees failed to
comply with Rule 54(e). Next, he argues in the alternative that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Jana and Paige. Although we disagree with Jeffery’s
first argument, we agree with his second argument that the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding attorney’s fees.
Jeffery’s first argument is that neither Jana’s nor Paige’s written petition for attorney’s
fees was in compliance with Rule 54(e), which provides in relevant part:
(1) Claims for attorneys’ fees and related nontaxable expenses shall be made by
motion unless the substantive law governing the action provides for the recovery of
such fees as an element of damages to be proved at trial.
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(2) Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, the motion must be
filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of judgment; must specify the
judgment and the statute or rule entitling the moving party to the award; and must state
the amount or provide a fair estimate of the amount sought.
(Emphasis added.) Jeffery states that the only statute cited in Jana’s and Paige’s written
petitions was Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233, which he asserts is inapplicable because that statute
applies to only enforcement of an existing child-support order and not an action for the
establishment of a child-support obligation. Jeffery thus posits that attorney’s fees should
have been denied because neither petition specified a statute or rule entitling the moving
party to the award as required by the rule.
We do not agree with Jeffery’s first argument because—even assuming the statute cited
in the written petitions does not authorize attorney’s fees—at the hearing on attorney’s fees,
Paige correctly identified statutory authority for awarding attorney’s fees in a paternity action,
and Jana correctly noted that the trial court has inherent power to award attorney’s fees in
domestic-relations cases. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-109(a)(1)(A), cited by Paige
at the hearing, provides in relevant part:
[S]ubsequent to a finding by the court that the putative father in a paternity action is
the father of the child, the court shall follow the same guidelines, procedures, and
requirements as set forth in the laws of this state applicable to child support orders
and judgments entered by the circuit court as if it were a case involving a child born
of a marriage in awarding custody, visitation, setting amounts of support, costs, and
attorney’s fees.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-342(d), also cited by Paige at the hearing, provides:
Upon an adjudication by the court that the putative father is the father of the juvenile,
the court shall follow the same guidelines, procedures, and requirements as
8
established by the laws of this state applicable to child support orders and judgments
entered upon divorce. The court may award court costs and attorney’s fees.
In Davis v. Williamson, 359 Ark. 33, 194 S.W.3d 197 (2004), the supreme court held that
both of these statutes permit the trial court, in its discretion, to award attorney’s fees in a
paternity action such as this one. Moreover, in Hargis v. Hargis, 2019 Ark. 321, 587 S.W.3d
208, the supreme court stated that it is well settled that the trial court has the inherent power
to award attorney’s fees in domestic-relations proceedings. Therefore, the trial court clearly
had the authority to consider the attorney’s-fees petitions in this case and to exercise its
discretion in whether to award any fees. And the fact that the statutory authority for the
attorney’s fees was cited orally at the hearing instead of in the written petitions does not
change this result. See State Auto Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swaim, 338 Ark. 49, 991 S.W.2d
555 (1999) (holding that an oral motion for attorney’s fees was acceptable because, in part,
Rule 54(e)(2) authorizes a court to modify its procedure for requesting attorney’s fees).
Nevertheless, even though there was statutory and inherent authority on which to
award attorney’s fees in this paternity and child-support case, we agree with Jeffery’s second
argument that under the particular circumstances presented, the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Jana and Paige.
It is well settled that the trial court has the inherent power to award attorney’s fees in
domestic-relations proceedings. Hargis, supra. Our supreme court has held that we are to
generally recognize the trial court’s superior perspective in determining whether to award
attorney’s fees due to its intimate acquaintance with the record and the quality of services
9
rendered. Id. There is no fixed formula for determining what constitutes a reasonable
amount of attorney’s fees, and pertinent considerations can include the attorney’s judgment,
learning, ability, skill, experience, and professional standing; the relationship between the
parties and the importance of the subject matter of the case; the nature, extent, and difficulty
of services; and the research, anticipation of defenses, and means of meeting them. Goodson
v. Bennett, 2018 Ark. App. 444, 562 S.W.3d 847. Additionally, the relative financial ability
of each party is a consideration, but it is not determinative. Id. The decision to award
attorney’s fees is accordingly a matter within the trial court’s discretion. Baber v. Baber, 2011
Ark. 40, 378 S.W.3d 699. We will not disturb a trial court’s decision regarding attorney’s
fees absent an abuse of discretion. Vice v. Vice, 2016 Ark. App. 504, 505 S.W.3d 719.
Discretion is abused when it is exercised improvidently, thoughtlessly, and without due
consideration. Hargis, supra.
The proceedings in this case were complex and lengthy. In its order awarding
attorney’s fees, the trial court found that the case was drawn out as a result of Jeffery’s actions,
but we do not agree with this assessment. The reason the case was reversed and remanded
in Frazier I for further proceedings in the trial court was not due to Jeffery’s actions but
because the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment when there were material
issues of fact to be tried with respect to Jeffery’s affirmative defenses, including laches, upon
which Jeffery ultimately prevailed. Although not dispositive, the determination of the
prevailing party is a relevant consideration in deciding the issue of attorney’s fees. See Folkers
v. Buchy, 2019 Ark. App. 30, 570 S.W.3d 496. Jeffery prevailed in Frazier I when we reversed
10
the summary judgment, and after a trial on remand, he prevailed against Jana based on his
claim that laches applied to her claim for retroactive child support. Although the trial court
did fashion an equitable remedy that resulted in a self-satisfying judgment of $18,138.44,
which represented the balance of what Jana had been previously paid in child support based
on the voided summary-judgment order, this amount was less than ten percent of the total
amount ($181,739.90) that Jana had requested. And, as explained previously, Jeffery has
now prevailed against Paige’s claim because in Frazier II we reversed the $163,601.46 in
retroactive child support that had been awarded to her. Jeffery also notes that some of the
attorney’s fees claimed by both Jana and Paige were for services performed on motions and
hearings wherein Jeffery ultimately prevailed. Finally, little information was presented with
respect to the relative financial abilities of the parties. Taking all of this into consideration,
we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees; accordingly, the
order awarding the fees is reversed.
Reversed.
BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.
James & Streit, by: Jonathan R. Streit and Elizabeth James, for appellant.
Robert Hudgins and Robert M. Abney, for appellees.
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