United States v. Clayton ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Robert B. CLAYTON, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 08-0417
Crim. App. No. 20040903
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 16, 2008
Decided March 26, 2009
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and ERDMANN and RYAN, JJ., joined. STUCKY, J., filed a
separate opinion concurring in part and in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Jennifer A. Parker (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Matthew M. Miller, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci,
and Major Grace M. Gallagher (on brief); Colonel Christopher J.
O’Brien, Lieutenant Colonel Steven C. Henricks, Major Bradley M.
Voorhees, Major Sean F. Mangan, and Captain Kathleena R.
Scarpato.
For Appellee: Major Christopher R. Clements (argued); Colonel
Denise R. Lind, Lieutenant Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, and Major
Lisa L. Gumbs (on brief); Major Dana E. Leavitt.
Military Judge: R. L. Hall
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Clayton, No. 08-0417/AR
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial with members convicted Appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of use of marijuana, possession of
marijuana, two specifications of obstruction of justice,
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, reckless
driving, assault on a law enforcement officer, and fleeing
apprehension in violation of Articles 111, 112a, 128, and 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 911, 912a,
928, 934 (2000). Appellant was sentenced to a dishonorable
discharge, confinement for five years, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to grade E-1. The convening authority
approved the sentence as adjudged, as well as thirty-three days
of confinement credit for time served and post-trial delay. The
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
findings of guilty and the sentence. United States v. Clayton,
No. ARMY 20040903 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2008) (per
curiam).
We granted Appellant’s petition for grant of review and
specified two issues that relate to the admission of a German
civilian police report.1 We hold that the police report
1
We specified review of the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE CIVILIAN POLICE DRUG SEIZURE REPORT IN THIS
CASE IS A REPORT SETTING FORTH “MATTERS OBSERVED BY POLICE
OFFICERS . . . ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY,” AND,
IF SO, WHETHER IT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER M.R.E. 803(6)
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constitutes testimonial hearsay and the military judge committed
constitutional error by admitting it as evidence at Appellant’s
court-martial. We further hold that the error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.2
BACKGROUND
Although only the specification under Charge IV of
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute is at
issue in this appeal, several of Appellant’s charges relate to
the events of March 16, 2004, in Ansbach, Germany.3 On that day,
(BUSINESS RECORD EXCEPTION), WHEN IT WOULD NOT BE
ADMISSIBLE UNDER M.R.E. 803(8) (PUBLIC RECORDS EXCEPTION).
COMPARE, e.g., UNITED STATES v. OATES, 560 F.2d 45, 77-78
(2d Cir. 1977) (HOLDING THAT POLICE RECORDS THAT WOULD BE
INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE PUBLIC RECORDS EXCEPTION AGAINST THE
ACCUSED WOULD ALSO BE INADMISSIBLE UNDER ANY OTHER
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE) WITH UNITED STATES v. HAYES,
861 F.2d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1988) (HOLDING THAT THERE IS
NO LIMITATION TO THE BUSINESS RECORD EXCEPTION IF THE
AUTHOR OF THE PROFFERED DOCUMENT TESTIFIES AT TRIAL).
II. IF THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN
ADMITTING THE POLICE DRUG SEIZURE REPORT, WHETHER THE ERROR
MATERIALLY PREJUDICED APPELLANT’S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS?
67 M.J. 42 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
2
In light of our conclusion that the report was inadmissible
testimonial hearsay, we need not reach the specified issues.
This report would not qualify as either a business record or a
public record. See United States v. Rankin, 64 M.J. 348, 353
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (concluding that the documents were
nontestimonial under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
before proceeding to determine whether the documents were
otherwise admissible).
3
The panel found Appellant guilty of five offenses related to
the events of March 16, 2004, in Ansbach, Germany:
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the German civilian police (Polizei) organized a drug sting
operation. Private Tyler Swafford agreed to work with the
CHARGE IV: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 112A
SPECIFICATION: In that Sergeant Robert B. Clayton, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Ansbach, Germany, on or about 16 March 2004,
wrongfully possess some amount of marijuana with intent to
distribute the said controlled substance.
CHARGE V: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 111
SPECIFICATION: In that Sergeant Robert B. Clayton, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Ansbach, Germany, on or about 16 March 2004, at
or near the intersection of Feuchtwanger Strasse and the turn-
off lane of Hohenzollern Ring, operate a vehicle, to wit: a
passenger car, in a wanton and reckless manner by driving the
vehicle back and forth several times in a hectic manner and did
thereby cause said vehicle to injure Jurgen Brenner.
CHARGE VI: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 128
SPECIFICATION: In that Sergeant Robert B. Clayton, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Ansbach, Germany, on or about 16 March 2004,
assault Jurgen Brenner, who then was and was then known by the
accused to be a person then having and in the executive of
civilian law enforcement duties, by striking him on the leg with
a vehicle, to wit: a passenger car.
CHARGE VII: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134
SPECIFICATION 1: In that Sergeant Robert B. Clayton, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Ansbach, Germany, on or about 16 March 2004,
wrongfully endeavor to impede an investigation in the case of
United States v. Clayton, by disposing of evidence.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that Sergeant Robert B. Clayton, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Ansbach, Germany, on or about 16 March 2004,
flee apprehension by Ansbach Criminal Police, armed policemen,
persons authorized to apprehend the accused, which conduct was
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.
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German police to apprehend Ms. Monica McLemore, his drug dealer
whom the German police had been investigating since November
2003. Private Swafford arranged a time and place to meet Ms.
McLemore to purchase “[o]ne thousand pills of ecstasy for 7,500
Euro.” Appellant drove the car with Ms. McLemore to the
designated location on March 16, 2004. When Ms. McLemore
indicated that she had the drugs with her, Private Swafford
popped the trunk of his car to “signal the bust” to the German
police. However, the German police failed to respond to the
signal, so Private Swafford “told [Ms. McLemore] that [they]
were going to a different location.”
En route to the second location, the German police tried to
stop Appellant and Ms. McLemore at a traffic light. Private
Swafford testified about what happened next:
A Polizei car, marked Polizei car, came to the
intersection. It was about three cars in front of me,
stopped, had its lights on. A Polizei got out and
started walking on the left side of the traffic up
towards my car, and I looked back and I saw one of the
German investigators running towards their car behind
me. He had his gun out. He put his gun to the
window, tried to open the door, and the door was
locked.
. . . .
There was a gunshot fired after -- when -- well when
the Polizei came up to the window of the car, he had
his gun to the window and the car took off around
mine.
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A chase ensued, and the German police lost sight of the car for
about two minutes before finding it stopped and empty with the
doors open. Ms. McLemore was apprehended immediately and
Appellant fled on foot, only to be apprehended approximately
twenty-five minutes later.
The German police then collected drugs from the car driven
by Appellant and along the route of the chase. The lead German
investigator, Mr. Wolfgang Held, “personally picked up . . .
three packages” of psilocybin mushrooms at the scene. Another
German police officer recovered a “rucksack” containing an array
of drugs “in the foot area of the passenger seat” of the car
driven by Appellant. Other German police officers collected
drugs from along the route of the chase, some of which were
brought to their attention by pedestrians who said that the
drugs were discarded from a car “driving at a high rate of speed
. . . and after that vehicle was a police car.” Of the police
officers who collected the drugs, including the marijuana at
issue in Charge IV and its specification, only Mr. Held and one
other officer testified at Appellant’s court-martial. None of
the pedestrians testified about how and where they found the
drugs. No witness testified about how the drugs came to be
located where they were found along the chase route or that they
actually saw Appellant or Ms. McLemore discard the drugs.
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At Appellant’s court-martial, the military judge admitted
into evidence, over defense counsel’s objections, a report from
the German police pursuant to the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 803(6).
The report in question listed the drug evidence collected from
the car and the chase route, including “where the narcotics were
found, the time when it was found, and the police officer who
found it or who took it over from a pedestrian.” Mr. Held
verified that he prepared the report as part of the “regular
course of [his] business” and such documents are “always
prepared when evidence is received.” Mr. Held also testified
that, although he counted and recorded the drugs in the report,
he personally seized only three items and none of the marijuana
listed in the report, saw the rucksack in the car but did not
personally seize it from the car, and did not see anything
thrown from the car.
In addition, the original report, about which Mr. Held
testified, was in German, and the military judge submitted to
the panel a “redacted American version” of the report translated
into English. Although defense counsel only objected to the
admission of the German version, the English version merely
translated the content of the German version into a language
spoken by the members of the panel. However, the German version
of the document is dated March 24, 2004, eight days after
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Appellant’s arrest. The translation is dated September 1, 2004,
which was during Appellant’s court-martial. The German document
contains seven paragraphs, and the translation contains four
paragraphs because certain drugs later seized from Ms.
McLemore’s quarters that were listed in the German version were
not included in the translation.
DISCUSSION
This Court reviews a military judge’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Datz, 61 M.J. 37, 42 (C.A.A.F. 2005). “We review factfinding
under the clearly-erroneous standard and conclusions of law
under the de novo standard.” United States v. Rodriguez, 60
M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). We must first determine whether the report is
constitutionally admissible as nontestimonial hearsay. Rankin,
64 M.J. at 353. Whether evidence constitutes testimonial
hearsay is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v.
Foerster, 65 M.J. 120, 123 (C.A.A.F. 2007). Because we conclude
that the report is testimonial under Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, and
its progeny, we hold that the military judge erred in admitting
the report as evidence. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813 (2006); Rankin, 64 M.J. at 348. We further hold that this
constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Error Under Crawford
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
This right applies to testimonial statements made out of court
because the declarant is a witness within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment, and thus the accused must be afforded the right
to cross-examine that witness. Foerster, 65 M.J. at 123 (citing
Davis, 547 U.S. at 821). Although Mr. Held and one other
officer who discovered some of the drugs testified, two other
officers listed in the report, as well as the pedestrians who
provided the drugs to the officers, did not testify at
Appellant’s court-martial. Further, only one of the officers
who found part of the marijuana at issue in Charge IV and its
specification testified, and he discovered it with the help of
pedestrians. Appellant did not have the opportunity to cross-
examine these potential witnesses. The question becomes whether
their statements in the report are testimonial, and thus whether
the report’s admission as evidence violated Appellant’s right to
confront witnesses against him.
Although the Supreme Court has not defined testimonial
hearsay precisely, it has said that the distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay aims to guard against
“abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed,” like
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“use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 68. Most pertinent to this case, the
Supreme Court has identified “‘statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial’” as an example of “core” testimonial hearsay.
Rankin, 64 M.J. at 351 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). In
turn, this Court has established “a number of questions . . .
relevant in distinguishing between testimonial and
nontestimonial hearsay made under circumstances that would cause
an objective witness to reasonably believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 352.
First, was the statement at issue elicited by or made
in response to law enforcement or prosecutorial
inquiry? Second, did the statement involve more than
a routine and objective cataloging of unambiguous
factual matters? Finally, was the primary purpose for
making, or eliciting, the statements the production of
evidence with an eye toward trial?
Id.; see also United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154, 158
(C.A.A.F. 2008); Foerster, 65 M.J. at 123. We answer all three
of these questions in the affirmative. Thus, the report is
testimonial.
First, the report was prepared in the course of an
investigation. Mr. Held, a German police officer, prepared the
original report after a drug sting operation that resulted in
Appellant’s arrest for suspected drug possession. See Harcrow,
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66 M.J. at 159 (finding that a state police laboratory report
from analysis conducted after the accused had become a suspect
and that identified him as a suspect was testimonial hearsay).
The report also incorporated the statements of other officers
regarding where they, or the pedestrians, found the drugs, which
they provided in furtherance of the investigation as part of
their law enforcement duties. Furthermore, the German version
of the report was not translated into English until Appellant’s
court-martial in response to a prosecutorial request.
Second, the report “involve[d] more than a routine and
objective cataloging of unambiguous factual matters.” Rankin,
64 M.J. at 352. Although Mr. Held testified that such reports
are routinely created, there is an important distinction between
a routine police report, such as a log, and an investigative
report that describes criminal events. Mr. Held prepared this
report eight days after March 16, 2004, to describe the drugs
found in the car and along the chase route, who found them, and
where they found them. Moreover, Mr. Held testified based on
the German version of the document, but the military judge
admitted the English version into evidence. Although the
English version translates the information from the German
version, Mr. Held did not personally create the English version
and it was facially different from the German version.
Therefore, whatever arguments might be made about the initial
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German report, the English version certainly was not a routine
report of the German police.
Further, the report does more than objectively inventory
the marijuana or record the chain of custody; it links the
marijuana listed therein to the scene and to Appellant by
extension. The information included in the report is subject to
debate, such as how the marijuana was found and traced to
Appellant, as well as why one of the items listed was
“(supposedly) marihuana.”4 Accordingly, the circumstances in
which the report was created imply that the report contained
more than objective, unambiguous facts, which the report itself
confirms.
Third, the report and its English translation were created
“with an eye toward trial.” Rankin, 64 M.J. at 352. Mr. Held
took eight days to create the report and included in it
information about who found the drugs and where. The lapse of
time and content imply that the report is more than a police log
and was intended to serve as an exhibit in Appellant’s future
prosecution. The date of the English translation of the report
and the discussion about it during the Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10
4
Although the original German version of the report also
includes “(vermutl.) marihuana,” which translates as
“(supposedly) marihuana,” no explanation was provided regarding
why or how it was only “(supposedly) marihuana.” If it was only
“(supposedly) marihuana,” the question arises as to why it was
included in the report at all and whether or not it was tested
to verify that it was marijuana.
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U.S.C. § 839a (2000), session at Appellant’s court-martial
reflect that it was created specifically for Appellant’s court-
martial. The English translation of the report also tailored
the original German report to Appellant’s court-martial by
excluding drugs recovered from Ms. McLemore’s quarters, which
had not been linked to Appellant.
For these reasons, we conclude that the German police
report and its English translation are testimonial hearsay. The
military judge thus committed constitutional error by admitting
testimonial hearsay infringing on Appellant’s Sixth Amendment
right to confront the officer and pedestrian witnesses against
him.
Prejudice
“The Government bears the burden of establishing that a
constitutional error has no causal effect upon the findings.”
United States v. Othuru, 65 M.J. 375, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2007). To
carry its burden, the Government must demonstrate that there is
no reasonable possibility that the testimonial German police
report contributed to the contested finding of guilty to
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Id.
To say that an error did not “contribute” to the
ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the
jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial
later held to have been erroneous. . . .
To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict
is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation
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to everything else the jury considered on the issue in
question, as revealed in the record.
Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled
on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 63, 72 n.4
(1991)). The Government has not carried its burden in this
case.
On the one hand, the Government presented a strong case
against Appellant and independently established much of the
information contained in the report. Among other things,
multiple witnesses testified to the events that took place,
including the dramatic car chase, and the Government entered
photographs of the seized marijuana into evidence.
On the other hand, the report effectively relieved the
Government of its burden to present direct testimony regarding
where the marijuana was recovered, how it was traced to
Appellant, and other necessary elements to prove that Appellant
possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute. Rather than
forcing the members to hear and weigh testimony from the
officers listed in the report and draw their own conclusions
about the truth of their stories, the report allowed the members
to rely on seemingly objective facts contained in the document.
Further, the report offered members a straightforward, written
accounting of the evidence, which, for some members, might well
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have carried more weight than their recollections of witness
testimony.
Additionally, the report contained a detailed catalogue of
drugs other than marijuana in amounts clearly not intended for
personal consumption.5 The military judge correctly instructed
the members that they could rely on circumstantial evidence,
such as the packaging and amount of drugs, to conclude that
Appellant possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute.
However, with those instructions in mind and looking at the list
of drugs and amounts in the report, a reasonable member would
have been hard pressed not to conclude that Appellant possessed
the marijuana with the intent to distribute.
In light of these factors, we are unable to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute. Consequently, the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is set aside with respect to Charge IV and the
specification thereunder and with respect to the sentence. The
remaining findings are affirmed. The record of trial is
5
Among other things, the report indicated that the drugs seized
included 62 grams of marijuana, 79.5 pills of ecstasy of six
different varieties, and 75.6 grams of psilocybin mushrooms.
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returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to
that court for reassessment of the sentence or, in the
alternative, that court may remand for a rehearing on the
affected charge and specification.
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STUCKY, Judge (concurring in part and in the result):
I concur with the majority that the German polizei (police)
report: (1) is not a business or public record under Military
Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 803(6) or M.R.E. 803(8); (2) is
testimonial; (3) should not have been admitted into evidence at
Appellant’s court-martial; and (4) that the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the majority
opinion implies that there are Confrontation Clause issues that
are specific to the English translation and are independent from
the Confrontation Clause issues with the original German police
report. I disagree.
The opinion suggests that there is some Confrontation
Clause significance to the facts that the English translation
was prepared months after the incident and after the preparation
of the original report; was prepared at the request of the
prosecution in anticipation of trial; and was not prepared by
the person who prepared the original. Those facts might be
relevant to the admissibility of the original report, but are
not relevant to that of the translation. When a party attempts
to introduce both a translation and the document translated into
evidence, if the translation is accurate -- and Appellant made
no objection to the accuracy of the translation in this case --
the admissibility of the translation is wholly dependent upon
United States v. Clayton, No. 08-0417/AR
the admissibility of the underlying document. Since the
original report was not admissible, neither was the translation.
The majority opinion also suggests that there is some
significance to the fact that the translation was redacted. It
appears that the redactions were made to delete evidence of
drugs that the German police were unable to link to Appellant.
Absent an objection from Appellant on the ground of
completeness, M.R.E. 106, this fact has no significance as to
the admissibility of a translation.
I concur in the result.
2