United States v. Bean , 2005 CAAF LEXIS 1466 ( 2005 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Michael R. BEAN, Senior Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 05-0101
Crim. App. No. 35422
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 12, 2005
Decided December 22, 2005
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GIERKE,
C.J., and CRAWFORD, EFFRON, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain John N. Page III (argued); Colonel
Carlos L. McDade, Major Terry L. McElyea, Major Sandra J.
Whittington, and Captain Jennifer K. Martwick (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Carrie E. Wolf (argued); Lieutenant Colonel
Robert V. Combs and Lieutenant Colonel Gary F. Spencer (on
brief).
Military Judge: Harvey A. Kornstein
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Bean, No. 05-0101/AF
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
After a contested general court-martial before members,
Appellant was convicted of three specifications of aggravated
assault with a loaded firearm,1 aggravated assault by brandishing
a knife, simple assault, and carrying a knife under a Florida
statute,2 in violation of Articles 128 and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 928, 934 (2000). The
adjudged and approved sentence included a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for one year, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The United States
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and
sentence in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Bean, No.
ACM 35422, 2004 CCA LEXIS 223, 2004 WL 2191259 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Sept. 15, 2004). We granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE MEMBERS THAT SIMPLE ASSAULT WAS A
1
In relevant part, these specifications read as follows:
In that SENIOR AIRMAN MICHAEL R. BEAN, United States Air Force, .
. . did, at or near Tampa, Florida, on or about 24 April 2002,
commit an assault upon [each victim] by pointing at him, a
dangerous weapon likely to produce death or grievous harm, to
wit: a loaded firearm.
2
At the time of trial, Fla. Stat. § 790.10, assimilated into federal law by
18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000), read in relevant part as follows:
790.10. Improper exhibition of dangerous weapons or firearms.
If any person having or carrying any dirk, sword, sword cane,
firearm, electric weapon or device, or other weapon shall, in the
presence of one or more persons, exhibit the same in a rude,
careless, angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self-
defense, the person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
of the first degree . . . .
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United States v. Bean, No. 05-0101/AF
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WITH
A DANGEROUS WEAPON.
BACKGROUND
On April 23, 2002, Appellant went to a local bar with a
group of friends that included Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Warner,
SSgt Archer and Senior Airman Hovancik. Witnesses testified
that Appellant had a number of drinks and, at some point, his
speech became incoherent and he began stumbling and running into
people on the dance floor. After several hours, the group left
the bar around 2:00 a.m. In the parking lot, Appellant’s
friends became concerned that he was drunk and offered to drive
him home. As the attempt to persuade Appellant not to drive
continued, Appellant and Warner exchanged angry words.
Appellant then produced a knife, opened the blade and held it
down along his side. At that point, Archer and Hovancik
intervened, and the three wrestled Appellant to the ground and
took control of the knife and Appellant’s keys. When it
appeared that Appellant had calmed down, the three released him
and allowed him to stand. Appellant immediately opened his car
door, retrieved a .45 caliber handgun and assumed the “Weaver
Stance.”3 He first pointed the weapon at Hovancik, then Warner,
and then at Archer. Hovancik testified that Appellant said,
3
In the 1950s a Los Angeles County deputy sheriff named Jack Weaver developed
this two-handed shooting stance that bears his name. The Weaver Stance,
http://www.weaverstance.com (last visited Dec. 22, 2005). SSgt Warner
testified that as a member of a Security Forces unit he had been trained to
assume this stance when firing a handgun.
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United States v. Bean, No. 05-0101/AF
“[g]et out of my face or I’ll kill you.” While the weapon was
pointed at Archer, Archer grabbed it with his left hand and
struck Appellant in the face with his right hand. As the two
fell to the ground, Archer wrested the weapon from Appellant.
Archer later testified that at the time he took the weapon, the
hammer was “all the way back” and the safety was off. He
further testified that when he placed the weapon in Warner’s
trunk, he pulled the weapon’s slide to the rear to clear it and
noticed there was one round in the chamber and several in the
magazine.
At trial, Appellant admitted that the weapon was loaded but
insisted that the safety was engaged. He also stated he did not
remember some of the events because “[he] was more intoxicated
that night than [he had] ever been in [his] life.”
Based upon Appellant’s testimony regarding the safety,
defense counsel requested an instruction on the lesser included
offense of simple assault. Counsel argued that if the members
found that the safety was engaged, they might also find that the
weapon could not fire. The military judge denied the request as
follows:
MJ: It being an offer, I don’t think it matters.
It’s an offer, not an attempt. The firearm could have
been totally nonfunctional, in fact. With an offer,
it doesn’t matter. I’m not sure that there’s a
scintilla of evidence for a simple -– if there was any
evidence whatsoever I’d give an instruction. But, I
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United States v. Bean, No. 05-0101/AF
don’t see any evidence whatsoever in Specs 1 through 3
concerning a simple assault.
DISCUSSION
Appellant renews his argument before this Court that the
evidence reasonably raised a question as to whether or not the
safety was engaged when he pointed his firearm. As a result,
Appellant argues, he was entitled to an instruction on the
lesser included offense of simple assault, because a reasonable
panel could have found, as a matter of law, that pointing a
loaded, operable firearm at another with the safety engaged is
not using the firearm “in a manner likely to produce death or
grievous bodily harm.”4 Appellant seeks support from this
Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 47 M.J. 484(C.A.A.F. 1998). In that case, we held that “an unloaded pistol
4
The elements for aggravated assault with a loaded firearm are:
(i) That the accused attempted to do, offered to do, or did
bodily harm to a certain person;
(ii) That the accused did so with a certain weapon, means, or
force;
(iii) That the attempt, offer, or bodily harm was done with
unlawful force or violence;
(iv) That the weapon, means, or force was used in a manner
likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm; and
(v) That the weapon was a loaded firearm.
MCM pt. IV, para. 54.b.(4)(a)(i)-(v).
The elements of simple assault are:
(i) That the accused attempted or offered to do bodily harm to
a certain person; and
(ii) That the attempt or offer was done with unlawful force or
violence.
MCM pt. IV, para. 54.b.(1)(a)-(b).
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is not a dangerous weapon under the President’s interpretation
of Article 128.” Id. at 486.
We review allegations of error involving mandatory
instructions de novo. United States v. Forbes, 61 M.J. 354, 357
(C.A.A.F. 2005); United States v. Smith, 50 M.J. 451, 455
(1999). “‘[T]he military judge has a duty to instruct sua
sponte on all lesser-included offenses reasonably raised by the
evidence.’” United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 480, 481
(C.A.A.F. 1999)(quoting United States v. Rodwell, 20 M.J. 264,
265 (C.M.A. 1985)). An accused is entitled to have a court-
martial consider all reasonable alternatives to guilt. Smith,
50 M.J. at 455 (citing United States v. Clark, 22 M.J. 576, 580
(C.M.A. 1973)). Toward this end, as long as an accused can show
“some evidence” that “reasonably raises” the applicability of a
lesser included offense, the military judge must instruct the
panel on that lesser included offense. United States v. Davis,
53 M.J. 202, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2000). Evidence “reasonably raises”
a lesser included offense if it could cause members to “attach
credit” or rely upon it if they so choose. Id. Finally, “any
doubt whether the evidence is sufficient to raise the need to
instruct on a lesser-included offense must be resolved in favor
of the accused.” Rodwell, 20 M.J. at 267.
Appellant is correct that whether he used a loaded firearm
in a manner likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm was
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United States v. Bean, No. 05-0101/AF
a question for the members to determine. Similarly, Appellant
is correct in stating that his conviction cannot stand if no
rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
he used the firearm in such a manner. United States v. Turner,
25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987). He is also correct in stating that
if a firearm were not functional a conviction for aggravated
assault could not stand.5 However, it does not necessarily
follow that as a result he was entitled to an instruction on the
lesser included offense of simple assault. That depends on
whether some evidence reasonably raised the lesser included
offense.
The evidence indicates the following. Appellant was drunk
and claimed he could not remember all the events in question.
He threatened his associates with a knife when they sought to
dissuade, and then prevent, him from driving. Appellant
obtained a .45 caliber weapon from his vehicle, assumed a
“Weaver Stance” and aimed the weapon at three servicemen.
Appellant conceded that the weapon was loaded, but testified
that the safety was on during the altercation. One witness
5
In this regard, the military judge’s statement that “the firearm could have
been totally nonfunctional” is an incorrect statement of the law. However,
any error on the military judge’s part was harmless. Appellant did not
contest that the weapon was functional and there is no evidence in the record
suggesting that it was, or might have been, nonfunctional. Further,
consistent with our case law, the military judge stated, “if there was any
evidence whatsoever [in support of the lesser included offense] I’d give an
instruction.”
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testified that when the weapon was seized from Appellant, the
safety was off and a round was chambered.
Appellant has cited no authority, nor have we identified
authority, supporting the view that engaging the safety of a
loaded, operable firearm while pointing it at another, as a
matter of law, removes or might remove its character as a
dangerous weapon. Moreover, the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States (2005 ed.)(MCM), supports a counter conclusion.
MCM pt. IV, para. 54.e.(1) sets out the maximum punishment for
simple assault and contains two parts.6 Generally for simple
assault, subsection (A) sets the maximum punishment at
confinement for three months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay
per month for three months. Subsection (B), which is specific
to a simple assault committed with an unloaded firearm, sets a
maximum punishment of confinement for three years, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. The
analysis for this provision states: “Threatening a person with
an unloaded firearm places the victim of the assault in fear of
losing his or her life. Such a traumatic experience is a far
6
(1) Simple Assault.
(A) Generally. Confinement for 3 months and forfeiture of two-
thirds pay per month for 3 months.
(B) When committed with an unloaded firearm. Dishonorable
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for 3 years.
MCM pt. IV, para. 54.e.(1).
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greater injury to the victim than that sustained in the course
of a typical simple assault.” MCM, Analysis of Punitive
Articles, app. 23 at A23-16. Common sense supports the same
conclusion in this case.
Based on the law and the facts of this case, Appellant was
not entitled to an instruction on simple assault. In sum, where
the evidence shows that an intoxicated accused pointed a loaded
firearm at others, having first threatened the others verbally
and with a knife, and having assumed a firing position, the
lesser included offense of simple assault is not reasonably
raised, whether the firearm’s safety is engaged or not.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
9