United States v. Pflueger ( 2007 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Gerald R. PFLUEGER III, Lance Corporal
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 05-0139
Crim. App. No. 200400213
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued May 1, 2007
Decided June 21, 2007
EFFRON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BAKER, ERDMANN, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Richard H. McWilliams, JAGC, USNR
(argued); Captain Jeffrey S. Stephens, USMC (on brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant David H. Lee, JAGC, USN (argued);
Commander Paul C. LeBlanc, JAGC, USN, and Captain Roger E.
Mattioli, USMC (on brief).
Military Judge: Kenneth B. Martin
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
Chief Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A special court-martial composed of a military judge sitting
alone convicted Appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of making a
false official statement, larceny from another Marine (four
specifications), and obstructing justice, in violation of
Articles 107, 121, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 907, 921, 934 (2000). The sentence
adjudged by the court-martial included a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for four months, and reduction to the lowest
enlisted grade.
The convening authority approved the findings and sentence.
In addition, the convening authority suspended two parts of the
sentence for a period of twelve months: (1) all confinement in
excess of ninety days and (2) the bad-conduct discharge. With
respect to the two suspended parts of the sentence, the
convening authority directed that “the suspended portion of the
sentence will be remitted without further action” at the end of
the twelve-month suspension period “unless sooner vacated.”
The suspended portions of the sentence, including the bad-
conduct discharge, were remitted at the end of the twelve-month
period. United States v. Pflueger, No. NMCCA 200400213, 2006
CCA LEXIS 328, at 5, 2006 WL 4571401, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Dec. 5, 2006). Subsequently, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals reviewed the case. The court noted that nearly
2
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
a year passed between the adjudication of the sentence and the
convening authority’s action, and that “[i]t then took over
three years to forward the case” for appellate review. United
States v. Pflueger, No. NMCCA 200400213, slip op. at 2 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Jul 30, 2004). The court described this
“unexplained” delay as “both unreasonable and unconscionable”
and determined that sentencing relief was appropriate. Id.(citing United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002)).
The court concluded: “Accordingly, we affirm the findings and
that portion of the sentence that extends to confinement for 4
months and reduction to pay grade E-1.” Id. As a result, the
court approved the sentence adjudged by the court-martial except
for the bad-conduct discharge. Id.On Appellant’s petition to our Court, we granted review of
the following issue:
WHETHER THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS AWARDED MEANINGFUL SENTENCE RELIEF (NOT
AFFIRMING AN AUTOMATICALLY REMITTED BAD-CONDUCT
DISCHARGE) AFTER IT FOUND SENTENCING RELIEF TO BE
APPROPRIATE UNDER UNITED STATES v. TARDIF, 57 M.J.
219 (C.A.A.F. 2002) FOR UNREASONABLE POST-TRIAL
DELAY.
60 M.J. 464 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
After receiving the briefs of the parties and conducting
oral argument, we remanded the case to the court below for
further consideration of issues related to the question of
meaningful relief. 61 M.J. 272 (C.A.A.F. 2005). The court
3
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
below affirmed its prior decision. Pflueger, 2006 CCA LEXIS
328, at *9, 2006 WL 4571404, at *3. We granted review of
Appellant’s petition regarding the adequacy of the remedy
provided by the Court of Criminal Appeals. 64 M.J. 437(C.A.A.F. 2007).
I. BACKGROUND
A. REMEDIAL ACTION FOR UNREASONABLE POST-TRIAL DELAY
In the course of conducting sentence appropriateness review
under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2000), the Courts
of Criminal Appeals have “broad discretion to grant or deny
relief for unreasonable or unexplained [post-trial] delay . . .
.” United States v. Bodkins, 60 M.J. 322, 324 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
In the present case, the lower court concluded that sentence
relief was warranted as a result of “unreasonable and
unconscionable” post-trial delay. Pflueger, No. NMCCA
200400213, slip op. at 2. Appellant contends that the lower
court’s disapproval of the adjudged bad-conduct discharge did
not constitute meaningful relief under the circumstances of this
case. Whether the action taken by the lower court provided
meaningful relief is a question of law that we consider under a
de novo standard of review.
The issue of relief from an adjudged bad-conduct discharge
implicates the procedures for automatic forfeitures and the
4
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
procedures for review and execution of a punitive discharge.
The following sections summarize the applicable procedures.
B. AUTOMATIC FORFEITURES IN CASES
INVOLVING A PUNITIVE SEPARATION
A court-martial sentence that includes specified
punishments, including a bad-conduct discharge, triggers
automatic forfeitures of pay and allowances under Article 58b,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 858b (2000). See United States v. Emminizer,
56 M.J. 441, 443 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (discussing the legislative
background of Article 58b).
Just as automatic forfeitures are triggered by specific
types of court-martial sentences, there is a comparable
provision for return of automatic forfeitures to the
servicemember under specified circumstances. Amounts that were
subject to automatic forfeitures “shall be paid” to the
servicemember if the sentence is: (1) “set aside”; (2)
“disapproved”; or (3) “as finally approved, does not provide
for” one of the punishments that triggers automatic forfeitures
-- death, confinement for more than six months, or confinement
for six months or less and a punitive separation. Article
58b(c), UCMJ; see Article 58b(a)(2). The statute does not
expressly identify the stage of the court-martial review process
at which a sentence is “finally approved,” or no longer
5
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
“provide[s] for a punishment” that triggers mandatory
forfeitures.
C. REVIEW AND EXECUTION OF SENTENCES
INVOLVING A PUNITIVE SEPARATION
The procedure for review and execution of sentences
involving a punitive separation provides the foundation for
considering when automatic forfeitures are returned to a
servicemember. The following summarizes the review process for
a case involving a punitive separation in which the
servicemember has not waived appellate review. See Articles 61,
and 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 861, 866 (2000).
1. Review of Sentences Involving a Punitive Separation
The initial responsibility for reviewing a court-martial
sentence rests with the convening authority, who has the
authority to modify the sentence so long as the severity of the
punishment is not increased. Article 60(c)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 860(c)(1) (2000); Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1107(d).
In acting on a sentence, the convening authority “may approve,
disapprove, commute, or suspend the sentence in whole or in
part.” Article 60(c)(2), UCMJ. The convening authority also
may remit all or part of any unexecuted part of a sentence,
except for death. Article 74, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 874 (2000).
When the convening authority suspends execution of all or part
of the sentence, successful completion of a period of suspension
6
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
results in automatic remission of the suspended portion of the
sentence. R.C.M. 1108.
When a punitive separation is approved by the convening
authority, the case is reviewed by the appropriate Court of
Criminal Appeals under Article 66. Thereafter, a case may be
reviewed by our Court under Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(2000). The Supreme Court may grant review upon petition of
either party. Article 67a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867a (2000).
Otherwise, after this Court has acted on a case, it is returned
either to the Court of Criminal Appeals or the convening
authority (unless there is to be action by the President or
Service Secretary) to act in accordance with this Court’s
decision. Article 67(e), UCMJ. Suspension or remission of all
or a part of a sentence does not affect appellate jurisdiction.
Steele v. Van Riper, 50 M.J. 89, 92 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
2. Execution of a Sentence to a Punitive Separation
Direct judicial review provides the “final judgment as to
the legality of the proceedings” in a case involving a punitive
separation. Article 71(c)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 871(c)(1)
(2000). The determination that a proceeding was lawful,
however, does not constitute the final action on the sentence in
a case involving a punitive separation. After legal review is
completed, a punitive separation is further reviewed as a matter
of executive discretion under Article 71. That portion of a
7
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
sentence providing for dismissal of an officer may not be
executed until “approved by the Secretary concerned.” Article
71(b), UCMJ; see R.C.M. 1113(c)(2). With respect to enlisted
personnel, a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge may be
ordered executed only by “the officer then exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction over the accused” except as otherwise
prescribed by the Secretary concerned. R.C.M. 1113(c)(1); see
Article 71(c)(1), UCMJ. That officer has the power to remit or
suspend any unexecuted portion of the sentence. Article 74,
UCMJ.
II. DISCUSSION
The granted issue asks whether the lower court provided
Appellant with meaningful sentence relief under Tardif. We
examine this question by comparing Appellant’s case to the
situation he would have faced had the lower court found no
Tardif error. In both cases, the executed sentence would not
include a bad-conduct discharge. According to the lower court,
this result flows from its decision to not affirm the bad-
conduct discharge. 2006 CCA LEXIS 328, at *8-9, 2006 WL
4571401, at *3. If the lower court had found no Tardif error,
however, the same result would occur because the convening
authority had remitted the bad-conduct discharge. Thus, with
8
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
respect to the bad-conduct discharge itself, the decision of the
lower court did not provide Appellant with meaningful relief.
Because the adjudged bad-conduct discharge triggered
automatic forfeitures under Article 58b(a), we also consider
whether the lower court’s action affected those forfeitures in a
manner that provided Appellant with meaningful relief under the
circumstances of the present case. The lower court noted that
the adjudged sentence included a bad-conduct discharge, and that
the convening authority’s decision to remit the discharge did
not have the effect of removing the discharge from the sentence
reviewed by the lower court. 2006 CCA LEXIS 328, at *5, 2006 WL
4571401, at *20. The court observed that the bad-conduct
discharge, having been remitted by the convening authority,
could not be executed, but found that to be of no import because
the discharge remained in the adjudged sentence. Id. On that
basis, the lower court concluded that its decision to not affirm
the bad-conduct discharge provided meaningful relief because the
court’s action served as the basis for return of automatic
forfeitures, citing the Dep’t of Defense, DoD 7000.14-R,
Financial Management Regulation, Volume 7A: Military Pay Policy
and Procedures – Active Duty and Reserve Pay, ch. 48, para.
480306.D. (Feb. 1999, incorporating changes through Dec. 2006).
2006 CCA LEXIS 328, at *7-*8, 2006 WL 4571401 at *3. The
Government contends that this action provided meaningful relief
9
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
because the bad-conduct discharge would have remained in the
sentence approved by the appellate courts absent the lower
court’s decision to not include the discharge in the approved
sentence.
The statutory requirement for return of forfeitures in
Article 58b, however, is not limited to actions by judicial
authorities or a determination that a punishment has been
“disapproved.” The statute also provides for return of
forfeitures when the sentence “as finally approved, does not
provide for” the punishment that triggered the automatic
forfeitures -- in this case, the bad-conduct discharge.
As noted in Section I.C.2, supra, judicial review
constitutes final review of the legality of the proceedings, not
final approval of a punitive separation. In the case of an
officer, a punitive separation must be expressly approved by the
Service Secretary, and, in the case of an enlisted person, a
punitive separation cannot be executed until so ordered by the
officer then exercising general court-martial convening
authority over the servicemember at the time that legal review
has been completed. Article 71(b), (c), UCMJ.
The lower court recognized that Appellant’s bad-conduct
discharge could not be executed even if the lower court did not
find Tardif error because it had been remitted by the convening
authority. 2006 CCA LEXIS 328, at *5, 2006 WL 4571401, at *2.
10
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
The lower court concluded, however, that determinations with
respect to execution of the sentence would have no impact on the
return of forfeitures under Article 58b(c). 2006 CCA LEXIS 328,
at *8-9, 2006 WL 4571404, at *3. The lower court’s
interpretation of Article 58b(c), however, did not address the
requirement for action on a bad-conduct discharge by executive
branch officials under Article 71. Article 58b(c), on its face,
does not limit the final approval language to actions taken by
judicial authorities prior to review under Article 71.
Likewise, the DoD Financial Management Regulation cited by the
lower court and by the Government do not contain such a
limitation with respect to return of automatic forfeitures.
Moreover, those regulations do not carve out an exception with
respect to return of automatic forfeitures for cases in which a
convening authority has ordered remission and the sentence, as
executed, does not include a punitive separation. Accord R.C.M.
1108(a) (“Remission cancels the unexecuted part of a sentence to
which it applies.”).
Although not addressed by the lower court or the parties,
we observe that Article 71(b) requires that the punitive
separation of an officer be “approved” by the Service Secretary
before execution, while Article 71(c) and R.C.M. 1113(c) require
the convening authority to order execution of the punitive
separation of an enlisted member. We have considered whether
11
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
these differences in Article 71 have an import with respect to
the meaning of the phrase “as finally approved” in Article
58b(c). Although the word “approved” does not appear in the
enlisted separation language of Article 71(c), a convening
authority acting under that section must take affirmative action
to order a punitive separation, and has discretion to not do so.
See R.C.M. 1113(c); Article 74, UCMJ. Moreover, if we were to
find significance in the use of the word “approved” in Article
71(b) regarding officers for purposes of interpreting Article
58b(c), such an interpretation would mean that officers would
receive a return of forfeitures upon favorable executive branch
action under Article 71, but enlisted persons would not receive
the benefit of such action. Although there are important
elements of military life in which Congress has provided for
distinctions between enlisted personnel and officers, there is
nothing in the purpose or structure of Article 58b(c) indicating
that Congress used the words “finally approved” to deny enlisted
personnel the return of forfeitures in situations where such a
return would occur for officers.
In summary, we hold that actions taken by executive branch
authorities in the course of acting on a punitive separation
under Article 71 are pertinent to the nature of a sentence
finally approved for purposes of Article 58b(c). When a
punitive separation has been remitted, and consequently cannot
12
United States v. Pflueger, No. 05-0139/MC
be executed under Article 71, the servicemember is entitled to
relief under Article 58b(c). In that context, the decision by
the lower court to disapprove Appellant’s bad-conduct discharge
did not provide him with meaningful relief under Tardif.
III. DECISION
The December 5, 2006 decision of the Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The record of trial is
returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for remand to
the Court of Criminal Appeals to determine and award meaningful
sentence relief to Appellant pursuant to its powers under
Article 66(c) and the principles set forth in United States v.
Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
13