United States v. Collier , 2009 CAAF LEXIS 608 ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Kimberly L. COLLIER,
Aviation Machinist’s Mate Third Class
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 08-0495
Crim. App. No. 200601218
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 17, 2008
Decided May 18, 2009
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and ERDMANN and STUCKY, JJ. joined. BAKER, J., filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Kyle Kilian, USMC (argued); Lieutenant
W. Scott Stoebner, JAGC, USN (on brief).
For Appellee: Colonel Louis J. Puleo, USMC (argued); Brian K.
Keller, Esq. (on brief).
Military Judges: Michael J. Catanese, Daniel E. O’Toole, and
Christopher D. Connor
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the military judge
erred in granting the Government’s motion in limine prohibiting
Appellant’s defense counsel from cross-examining HM2 C, the main
Government witness, about an alleged homosexual romantic
relationship between her and Appellant and from introducing any
evidence of such a relationship.1 While the military judge did
permit cross-examination about a close friendship, the defense
that Appellant wanted to present was that HM2 C framed Appellant
for larceny as a result of their romantic relationship ending
badly. Because of this ruling, Appellant was free only to
assert the motivation of an angry friend rather than a
disappointed lover; as the Government then argued in its
closing, the motivation of an angry, vengeful friend “strains
all logic; it’s just not credible.”
The military judge’s ruling prevented Appellant’s counsel
from fully exploring HM2 C’s bias and motive to misrepresent the
truth, and precluded Appellant from presenting her theory of the
1
Upon Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING, PURSUANT TO M.R.E. 403, RELEVANT EVIDENCE
OF A PRIOR HOMOSEXUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPELLANT
AND A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITNESS OFFERED BY THE
DEFENSE TO SHOW BIAS AND MOTIVE TO MISREPRESENT ON THE
PART OF THE GOVERNMENT WITNESS.
2
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
case. Under the facts of this case, this was a violation of
Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against
her. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)
(“[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation
Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in
otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness . . . .”).
Under the circumstances of this case, including the fact that in
its closing argument the Government exploited the evidentiary
limitation it requested to criticize the theory with which
Appellant was left, we find this constitutional error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA)
upholding the military judge’s ruling is reversed.
I. Facts
A special court-martial composed of members convicted
Appellant, contrary to her pleas, of one specification of
larceny of military property and one specification of
obstructing justice by wrongfully endeavoring to influence the
testimony of a witness, in violation of Articles 121 and 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 921, 934
(2000). The sentence adjudged by the court-martial and approved
by the convening authority included a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for six months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted
3
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
grade. The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed. United States v. Collier, No. NMCCA
200601218, 2008 CCA LEXIS 53, at *29, 2008 WL 495700, at *11 (N-
M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2008) (unpublished).
Prior to her court-martial, Appellant served as the tool
custodian for Helicopter Combat Support Squadron EIGHT (HC-8) in
Norfolk, Virginia. The larceny charge in this case involves
tools alleged to have been taken from this command. Hospitalman
Second Class (HM2) C testified for the Government that she found
these tools in her home. HM2 C testified that she and Appellant
had been good friends and that Appellant had stayed at her home
four or five nights a week. Appellant kept some of her
belongings at HM2 C’s home, specifically, in HM2 C’s son’s
bedroom. At some point, Appellant and HM2 C had a falling out
and HM2 C requested that Appellant not return to HM2 C’s home.
The women disagreed about how Appellant could retrieve her
belongings from HM2 C, which eventually resulted in Appellant
asking her command for help in obtaining several items she
claimed were still at HM2 C’s house, including tools, a
television, and a diamond ring. HM2 C testified that when she
checked her home for these items, she first found a bag of tools
in her garage, and later found more tools in a chest of drawers
in her son’s room.
4
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
After each discovery, HM2 C consulted with her command and
then arranged for the return of the tools to Appellant’s
command. There were 215 tools returned to HC-8 by HM2 C, of
which approximately 65 were etched with the command code “B10”
or “B1.” Among the tools returned was an etcher. Testimony at
trial established that prior to HM2 C turning them in, no one
had noticed this large quantity of tools missing. This was true
even though a cursory visual check of the locker in which such
tools were kept was done not long before the tools were turned
in. Testimony also established that while all of the recovered
tools were among those used by HC-8, many, if not all, of them
could be purchased at retail stores such as Sears.
Some time after Appellant had been charged with larceny of
the tools, HM2 C encountered Appellant at a beauty salon. HM2 C
testified that at the salon, she overheard Appellant speaking on
her cell phone. According to HM2 C, while Appellant was
standing close to her, Appellant said into her cell phone:
“Yeah, we should get this bitch; let’s get her.” When HM2 C
left the salon, she found that a tire on her car had been
slashed. Appellant admitted to the civilian authorities that
she had slashed the tire. Based on this incident, Appellant was
charged with one count of obstructing justice by wrongfully
endeavoring to influence the testimony of a witness, under
Article 134, UCMJ.
5
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
Prior to court-martial, the Government filed a motion in
limine seeking to prohibit Appellant’s defense counsel from
cross-examining HM2 C about an alleged homosexual romantic
relationship between her and Appellant and from introducing any
evidence of such a relationship. The basis of the Government’s
motion was threefold: (1) no such relationship existed, and
even if it did exist it was not relevant; (2) even if the
relationship was relevant, prejudice created by statute and Navy
policy prohibiting homosexual conduct would substantially
outweigh the relevance; and (3) allowing this line of
questioning would “serve only to embarrass and harass the
witness.”
At the hearing on the motion, trial counsel advanced two
additional arguments. First, Appellant could show sufficient
bias by inquiring into the fact that the women were no longer
friends because the women had argued about HM2 C’s daughter and
also because HM2 C’s boyfriend didn’t like Appellant. Second,
the factual dispute about whether the two women actually had a
romantic or sexual relationship was a collateral matter that
threatened to take over the proceedings and confuse the members.
During the hearing trial counsel further asserted that evidence
of a homosexual relationship was “too inflammatory” for the
members to hear. As part of this assertion, trial counsel
emphasized the homosexual nature of the relationship and linked
6
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
the danger of unfair prejudice to the congressional finding that
“homosexuality presents an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order, and discipline in the
military.” Transcript of Record at 54, United States v.
Collier, No. 08-0495; 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (2000).
The defense opposed the motion, arguing that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and that the limitation requested by the Government
violated those rights. Defense counsel argued that cross-
examination and any related extrinsic evidence of a romantic
homosexual relationship would be admissible under Military Rule
of Evidence (M.R.E.) 608(c) to support a theory that HM2 C was
biased against Appellant and had a motive to lie in her
testimony because their relationship had ended badly. See
M.R.E. 608(c) (“Bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent
may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the
witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.”). In addition,
defense counsel argued that this evidence would be relevant to
show that the tire slashing was due to Appellant’s anger over
the breakup of their relationship, rather than done “with the
intent to influence” HM2 C’s testimony, as required to prove the
obstructing justice charge. Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States pt. IV, para. 96b(3) (2005 ed.) (MCM).
7
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
While the Government claimed that there was no qualitative
difference between a friendship and a romantic relationship for
purposes of showing bias, defense counsel disagreed, arguing:
“What motivates a person to do something, or how they may be
biased, I think, are completely different, apples and oranges,
between a friendship and a romantic relationship, whether it be
homosexual or heterosexual.”
After hearing argument on the motion, the military judge
stated on the record that the defense had “presented sufficient
evidence, for the purposes of the motion, that there was such a
sexual relationship.” Transcript of Record at 75-76, Collier,
No. 08-0495; see M.R.E. 104(a) (“Preliminary questions
concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence . . . shall be
determined by the military judge.”). In his formal ruling on
the motion, the military judge did not make a conclusive finding
of fact as to whether the sexual relationship actually occurred,
although he did note that during the hearing on the motion:
[T]he defense presented the testimony of the
accused that there was such a sexual
relationship. The accused also testified that
their relationship lasted four months and ended
just prior to the witness reporting the alleged
larceny. The accused also testified that their
relationship was always sexual, until it ended on
or about early March 2004. The government
presented evidence by cross-examination of the
accused and by affidavit that tends to refute any
sexual aspect to the relationship.
8
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
Findings and Ruling on Government Motion In Limine at 1, United
States v. Collier, Special Court-Martial, Tidewater Judicial
Circuit (Nov. 24, 2004). The military judge found that the
“nature of the relationship has some relevance to the
determination of [the bias] issue by the jury.” Id. at 2. He
then concluded that after “balancing this relevance with M.R.E.
403 and M.R.E. 611, the court finds that the sexual nature of
this relationship is not sufficiently relevant.” Id. Finally,
the judge ruled:
[T]he defense may ask, on cross-examination, if the
witness would characterize the relationship as close,
personal and/or emotionally close. The defense may
ask her if the relationship was closer than ordinary
friends. Pursuant to M.R.E. 608(c), the defense may
also introduce extrinsic evidence on the nature of the
relationship including testimony or documents, if
otherwise admissible. However, the defense will not
open the issue of any alleged sexual acts between the
witness and the accused. Specifically, the defense
will not ask any witness if the relationship was
sexual, homosexual, intimate or romantic.
Id. (emphasis added).
The CCA found that the military judge did not abuse his
discretion when he limited defense counsel’s cross-examination
of HM2 C. Collier, 2008 CCA LEXIS 53, at *11, 2008 WL 495700,
at *4. Specifically, the CCA stated: “Reviewing the facts
before the military judge at the time of his ruling, we conclude
that he correctly balanced the probative value against the
prejudicial impact of evidence that would have been of a
9
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
particularly inflammatory nature in a trial by court-martial.”
Id. at *10, 2008 WL495700, at *4. In support of this
conclusion, the CCA cited “‘the high degree of antipathy to
homosexuality in the armed forces’” as well as the fact that
“‘[a] person who engages in homosexual conduct . . . is subject
to mandatory discharge, with very limited exceptions.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Phillips, 52 M.J. 268, 273 (C.A.A.F.
2000) (Effron, J., dissenting)).
II. Discussion
A. The Sixth Amendment and limits on cross-examination
It is well settled that “the exposure of a witness’
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of
the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). Through cross-
examination, an accused can “expose to the jury the facts from
which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating
to the reliability of the witness.” Id. at 318. A limitation
on an accused’s presentation of bias evidence may be a violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The
question is whether “[a] reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression of [the witness’s]
credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his
proposed line of cross-examination.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at
680. The right of cross-examination is not unlimited, however;
10
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
the accused’s confrontation right does not give, for example,
free license to cross-examine a witness to such an extent as
would “‘hammer th[e] point home to the jury.’” United States v.
James, 61 M.J. 132, 135 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (quoting United States
v. Nelson, 39 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1994)). Whether
sufficient cross-examination has been permitted depends on
whether the witness’s motivation for testifying has already been
exposed and “further inquiry . . . would [be] marginally
relevant at best and potentially misleading.” United States v.
Carruthers, 64 M.J. 340, 344 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (finding cross-
examination of coconspirator about his pretrial agreement was
sufficient even though the military judge had refused to permit
questions related to the term setting a maximum punishment).
In this case, the military judge’s ruling prohibited all
cross-examination and extrinsic evidence regarding a sexual or
romantic relationship between Appellant and HM2 C. This did not
allow Appellant to expose the alleged nefarious motivation
behind HM2 C’s allegations and testimony. The Government argues
that Appellant was able to conduct sufficient cross-examination
without revealing whether the relationship between the two women
was a romantic one. However, it is intuitively obvious that
there is a qualitative difference between the breakup of a
friendship and a badly ended romantic relationship, whether that
romantic relationship was sexual or not. As has long been
11
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
recognized, “Heav’n has no Rage, like Love to Hatred turn’d.”
William Congreve, The Mourning Bride 39 (Jacob Tonson 1703)
(1697). We have no doubt that the romantic nature of a
relationship has a “special relevance” to motivation such that
allowing additional cross-examination in that area is not a mere
“opportunity . . . to hammer th[e] point home to the jury.”
Carruthers, 64 M.J. at 344 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Appellant claimed during her testimony on the motion in
limine that her relationship with HM2 C went beyond friendship,
to a sexual and romantic relationship that lasted four months,
during which time she lived with HM2 C. If the members had been
given evidence of a sexual and romantic relationship between HM2
C and Appellant, they might have had a significantly different
impression of HM2 C’s credibility. In the context of a romantic
relationship turned sour, Appellant’s theory of the case, in
which HM2 C framed Appellant, could have been credible to the
panel.
Of course, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as
the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. In this
12
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
case, the military judge acknowledged that Appellant had a Sixth
Amendment right to confront HM2 C, but ruled that evidence of a
sexual relationship between them was not admissible under M.R.E.
403 and M.R.E. 611, both of which reflect the concerns cited by
the Supreme Court in Van Arsdall. See M.R.E. 403 (requiring a
military judge to decide whether the probative value of evidence
is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the members, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence”); M.R.E. 611(a) (allowing
military judge to control the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses, including to “protect [them] from harassment or undue
embarrassment”).
A military judge’s ruling that bias evidence is
inadmissible is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Moss, 63 M.J. 233, 236 (C.A.A.F. 2006). For the
ruling to be an abuse of discretion, it must be “more than a
mere difference of opinion”; rather, it must be “‘arbitrary,
fanciful, clearly unreasonable’ or ‘clearly erroneous.’” United
States v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120, 130 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Miller, 46 M.J. 63, 65 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United
States v. Travers, 25 M.J. 61, 62 (C.M.A. 1987)). Although “[a]
military judge enjoys wide discretion in applying [M.R.E.]
403[,] . . . [t]his Court gives military judges less deference
13
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
if they fail to articulate their balancing analysis on the
record.” United States v. Manns, 54 M.J. 164, 166 (C.A.A.F.
2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case,
the military judge did not make any findings of fact or
conclusions of law about the objections raised by the Government
under R.C.M. 611 and M.R.E. 403; he merely recited their
arguments. Because of this failure to articulate his analysis,
we accord the military judge’s ruling less deference and will
examine the record to assess both his decision and that of the
CCA. United States v. Bins, 43 M.J. 79, 85-86 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
Harassment of the witness
The military judge’s ruling reiterated the Government’s
request that he use his authority under M.R.E. 611(a)(3) “to
control the scope and mode of witness interrogation, [and] to
prevent the harassment of witnesses.” Like the identical
federal rule, M.R.E. 611 “calls for a judgment under the
particular circumstance whether interrogation tactics entail
harassment or undue embarrassment.” Fed. R. Evid. 611 advisory
committee’s note, reprinted in 28 Charles Alan Wright & Victor
James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure 320 (1993). In this
case, the military judge made no findings about the likelihood
that HM2 C would suffer from undue embarrassment or harassment
as a result of cross-examination or the presentation of bias
evidence. Nor do we see any evidence in the record that defense
14
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
counsel planned to conduct cross-examination in a threatening or
embarrassing manner. From a practical standpoint, all bias
evidence has some potential to embarrass the witness; after all,
counsel is attempting to show that the witness has reason to lie
and is promoting the inference that the witness is in fact
lying. See United States v. Williams, 40 M.J. 216, 218 (C.M.A.
1994) (“By definition, effective impeachment evidence should be
prejudicial to a witness” being cross-examined.) (emphasis in
original). Moreover, while M.R.E. 611 permits a military judge
to impose limitations on the length and details of cross-
examination, it does not purport to authorize preemptively
shutting the door completely on otherwise relevant cross-
examination. See United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85, 88
(C.A.A.F. 1998) (noting that a military judge has wide latitude
to restrict cross-examination “‘only after there has been
permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examination’”
(quoting United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1160 (11th
Cir. 1983))). The military judge’s use of M.R.E. 611 to
foreclose any cross-examination into a romantic or sexual
relationship without evidence of potential harm was an abuse of
discretion under these circumstances.
Waste of time or confusion of issues
The Government also asserted that the uncertainty over
whether there was a homosexual relationship between Appellant
15
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
and HM2 C was a “disputed collateral matter, which may involve
the conflicting testimony of several witnesses, leading to a
waste of time and a confusion of the issues for the jury.”
Although the military judge found that there was conflicting
evidence on the existence of a homosexual romantic relationship
between Appellant and HM2 C, he made no factual findings about
any delay or confusion that could result from the cross-
examination of HM2 C or the presentation of extrinsic evidence
under M.R.E. 608(c) on the question. From a review of the
record, we note that defense counsel planned to ask HM2 C about
the relationship and, if she denied it existed, to ask two
additional witnesses, one of whom ultimately testified at the
court-martial. The record does not support the military judge’s
decision to take the ultimate questions -- whether that
relationship existed and whether it led HM2 C to lie -- away
from the members. Having found that Appellant made a threshold
showing there was “some evidence” of such a relationship, it was
for the members, as the triers of fact, to decide if a
relationship existed and if its end caused HM2 C to be biased or
to misrepresent. See Bins, 43 M.J. at 85 (noting that it is the
military judge’s duty to determine only whether there is “some
evidence that tend[s] to establish” a fact and finding that the
military judge “exceeded his authority and usurped the members’
16
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
role” when he decided for himself whether the witness was biased
for the reason proffered by the appellant).
Danger of unfair prejudice
The third main argument offered by the Government, but not
recited in the military judge’s ruling, was that evidence of a
homosexual relationship was too prejudicial to be admitted. It
was this argument that the CCA credited in its decision
upholding the ruling of the military judge, concluding that the
military judge did not err in excluding the evidence due to “the
prejudicial impact of evidence that would have been of a
particularly inflammatory nature in a trial by court-martial.”
Collier, 2008 CCA LEXIS 53, at *10, 2008 WL 495700, at *4. This
conclusion supplied a rationale for the military judge’s ruling
that the military judge himself did not articulate and, further,
it inappropriately focused on a generalized and amorphous
“prejudicial impact” without identifying who or what would be
prejudiced. Id. (citing as evidence of prejudicial impact the
“‘high degree of antipathy to homosexuality in the armed
forces’” as reflected in congressional findings supporting the
mandatory discharge of most servicemembers who engage in
homosexual conduct (quoting Phillips, 52 M.J. at 273 (Effron,
J., dissenting)).
First, the term “unfair prejudice” in the context of M.R.E.
403 “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence
17
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground
different from proof specific to the offense charged.” Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (analyzing the
purpose behind Fed. R. Evid. 403, which is identical to M.R.E.
403) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory
committee’s note (“‘Unfair prejudice’ within [Fed. R. Evid. 403]
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”).
M.R.E. 403 addresses prejudice to the integrity of the trial
process, not prejudice to a particular party or witness. In
this case, the military judge made no findings related to
potential prejudice to the trial process that could be created
by evidence of homosexuality, such as a tendency for members
either to disbelieve the witness or to find Appellant guilty
without a proper basis. In the context of an interracial
relationship, the Supreme Court recognized that “[s]peculation
as to the effect of jurors’ racial biases cannot justify
exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential to
demonstrate the falsity of [the witness’s] testimony.” Olden v.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988). Any conclusion that the
factfinders would be predisposed against either HM2 C or
Appellant in this case would have been similarly speculative.
Members are presumed to follow a military judge’s instructions
to consider evidence for a proper purpose, such as bias or
18
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
motive to misrepresent, and not let personal beliefs or feelings
affect their determinations about witness credibility. United
States v. Taylor, 53 M.J. 195, 198 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
Second, the CCA’s decision placed unwarranted emphasis on
the military context when it based its conclusion on the
potential for unfair prejudice. We recognize the policy
subjecting homosexuals to mandatory separation if they have
engaged in, or solicited another to engage in, homosexual acts.
10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000). However, that policy is not a per se
indication of unfair prejudice within the military justice
system. This Court has not allowed the military’s policy on
homosexuality to prevent evidence of homosexuality from being
used against an accused. See Phillips 52 M.J. at 272-73
(permitting trial counsel to offer evidence that the accused was
engaged in a homosexual relationship). And we see no principled
reason to prevent an accused from using this same type of
evidence to potential advantage, particularly where, as here,
Appellant was the proponent of the evidence of a homosexual
relationship with the Government’s primary witness. See
Williams, 40 M.J. at 218 (stating the military judge erred if he
excluded evidence based on the potential for prejudice to the
accused because the accused “was the proponent of the evidence
and waived objection to any adverse inferences from such
evidence”). Finally, we note that the CCA decision relied upon
19
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
language from the dissenting opinion in Phillips to conclude
that the evidence was too prejudicial. Collier, 2008 CCA LEXIS
53, at *10-*11, 2008 WL 495700, at *4. The dissent in Phillips,
however, did not foreclose the possibility that evidence of a
homosexual relationship could be admissible. See Phillips, 52
M.J. at 273 (Effron, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “a sexual
relationship that both pre-dates and post-dates a marriage,
regardless of sexual orientation, is potentially relevant on the
question of whether the marriage is a sham”).
Because the military judge’s ruling lacked an articulated
or supportable legal basis, and was thus an abuse of discretion,
and the decision of the CCA was based on speculation about
prejudicial impact unrelated to any specific findings of the
military judge,2 we find that the limitation on cross-examination
and related bias evidence was a violation of Appellant’s Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights.
B. Harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt
Having found constitutional error, the question
remains whether that error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In
the case of limitation of cross-examination, “the correct
2
For example, the military judge made no comments or assessment
on the record of prejudice related to the risks of investigation
and separation associated with the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy, which was the prejudice referenced by the CCA.
Collier, 2008 CCA LEXIS 53, at *10, 2008 WL 495700, at *4.
20
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of
the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing
court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.
The burden is on the Government to show that “there is no
reasonable possibility” that the error “contributed to the
contested findings of guilty.” United States v. Othuru, 65
M.J. 375, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2007). An error has not
contributed to the verdict when it was “‘unimportant in
relation to everything else the jury considered on the
issue in question, as revealed in the record.’” Id.
(quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 72 n.4 (1991)).
To find that the error here warrants relief, we need
not conclude that Appellant’s defense would have succeeded.
Instead the inquiry should focus on whether the military
judge’s ruling “essentially deprived Appellant of [her]
best defense” that “may have tipped the credibility balance
in Appellant’s favor.” Moss, 63 M.J. at 239. Because this
error was a violation of Appellant’s right to confront
witnesses, we apply the balancing test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Van Arsdall:
21
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
the importance of the witness’ testimony in the
prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution’s case.
475 U.S. at 684.
At trial, Appellant’s strategy was to discredit HM2 C’s
testimony through the use of bias evidence. The main theory
offered to defend against the larceny charges was that HM2 C
framed Appellant for the theft of the tools by buying and
etching tools to look like they came from the squadron. Due to
the military judge’s limitation on cross-examination of HM2 C,
defense counsel was able to offer only the end of a friendship
as motivation for the framing. If there had been no such
limitation, and depending on the evidence introduced at trial,
defense counsel could have argued that HM2 C’s distress over the
breakup of her romantic relationship with Appellant inspired her
to frame Appellant. In addition, defense counsel wanted to show
that Appellant slashed HM2 C’s tire out of anger over the
breakup, rather than with the intent to influence testimony.
After considering the Van Arsdall factors in relation to these
defense strategies, we find that on balance they compel the
conclusion that the limitation on cross-examination and related
evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
22
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
Obstruction charge
On the obstruction charge, the Government had
circumstantial evidence of motive that included the following
facts: (1) Appellant had been informed about the pending
larceny charges; (2) Appellant knew HM2 C had turned her in; and
(3) the offense occurred about one month after Appellant had
been informed the larceny charges. A civilian testified that
Appellant admitted to her that she was the one who slashed HM2
C’s tire. Because HM2 C was one of only two witnesses on the
influencing testimony charge, any additional damage to HM2 C’s
credibility could have been very significant to the outcome of
the case. The other witness was the civilian police officer in
charge of the investigation, but her testimony only established
the fact that Appellant admitted slashing the tire. The
detective testified that she did not discuss the impending
court-martial with HM2 C and therefore did not establish the
motive necessary to prove obstruction of justice. When defense
counsel was prevented from trying to elicit evidence of a
romantic or sexual relationship between Appellant and HM2 C,
Appellant lost her best chance at showing the tire slashing was
motivated by anger over the end of that relationship, rather
than an attempt to influence testimony.
23
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
Larceny Charge
To assess the strength of the Government’s case on the
larceny charge, we must take into account the presence of the
following corroborating evidence. Many, although by no means
all, of the tools HM2 C returned to Appellant’s command had the
helicopter squadron’s markings etched on them. There was
testimony that all of the recovered tools were ones that the
squadron typically kept in stock, and that some of them were
specialized to aircraft. One of the bags of tools returned to
the squadron also contained personal papers belonging to
Appellant. In addition, one of Appellant’s coworkers testified
that he once saw her struggling to remove a heavy bag of unknown
contents from the squadron.
On the other hand, the larceny case was based on
circumstantial evidence: Appellant did not confess; no one saw
or claimed to see her actually take the tools; and no
fingerprint evidence was presented. Although a Government
witness testified he saw Appellant removing a heavy bag from the
squadron, there was also testimony from a defense witness that
Appellant stored heavy ratings manuals in a duffel bag in their
shared locker. Some of the physical evidence presented
supported Appellant’s theory of the case: all of the tools
appeared to be new, and some were still in their original
packaging. Although some tools were etched, an etcher was found
24
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
with the tools, which supports Appellant’s theory that HM2 C
bought the tools herself and etched them. Testimony at trial
established that the command code, either “B10” or “B1,” was
marked by hand on the tool itself. Because this code was a
simple marking, anyone who knew it could have etched it into the
tools. Testimony also established that many, if not all, of the
tools could have been purchased at a retail store such as Sears.
Finally, HM2 C was a principal prosecution witness and, as the
person who found the tools, her testimony was crucial to the
case. The case was initiated solely by HM2 C’s report;
otherwise, no one at HC-8 had noticed that any tools were
missing, and no inventory list showed any missing tools.
Looking at the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, none was specifically allowed on the romantic or
sexual nature of the relationship. This favors Appellant,
unless there was “effective cross-examination without the use of
the excluded evidence.” Williams, 40 M.J. at 219. Defense
counsel was permitted to ask HM2 C about several things that
could have indicated she had a motive to lie about the tools,
including: HM2 C’s concern that Appellant had a crush on her;
situations in which Appellant contributed to tensions between
HM2 C and her boyfriend or between HM2 C and her daughter; and
HM2 C’s unsuccessful attempt to take out a restraining order on
Appellant. As we have previously emphasized, however, there is
25
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
a qualitative difference between the cross-examination permitted
by the military judge and the prohibited inquiry into a failed
romantic, sexual relationship. When Appellant was refused
permission to delve into the motive to lie that would arise from
that kind of experience, she was deprived of her best chance to
show the members that HM2 C was biased to the extent that she
would fabricate the story about the tools or frame Appellant.
Adding insult to injury, the Government exploited the very
evidentiary limitation it requested in closing argument. “Are
we supposed to believe that [HM2 C] or somebody else went out
and spent $2,700.00 on tools to set this up because she’s mad at
somebody? That strains all logic; it’s just not credible.”
Transcript of Record at 620, Collier, No. 08-0495. Even if it
would seem incredible for an ex-friend to concoct this type of
revenge, it would not strain all logic to imagine that an ex-
lover would do so. The cross-examination that was prohibited
“may have tipped the credibility balance in Appellant’s favor.”
Moss, 63 M.J. at 239. That we find this could have tipped the
balance does not mean it will, or even should, do so at a
rehearing. But ultimately, that is for the finders of fact to
determine, not this Court.
III. Decision
Under all the circumstances, and particularly in light of
the Government’s closing argument, we cannot say that the error
26
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
was “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered,” and therefore, there is a reasonable possibility it
contributed to the verdict and it was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Othuru, 65 M.J. at 377 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). The decision of the United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The
findings of guilty to both the charges and specifications and
the sentence are set aside and a rehearing is authorized.
27
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
BAKER, Judge (dissenting):
This Court reviews a military judge’s decision on the
admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Collier, __ M.J. __ (13) (C.A.A.F. 2009). In
this case, the military judge made a reasonable decision to
exclude the evidence of Appellant’s alleged sexual relationship
with HM2 C, certainly a decision that was within his discretion.
This Court should not reverse that decision because it would
have reached a different result.
DISCUSSION
“To reverse for an abuse of discretion involves far more
than a difference . . . in opinion. . . . The challenged action
must [be] . . . clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous in
order to be invalidated on appeal.” United States v. Travers,
25 M.J. 61, 62 (C.M.A. 1987) (citations and quotation marks
omitted) (brackets added; ellipses in original). The military
judge conducted a Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 403
balancing test, which he articulated on the record, and placed
reasonable limits on the manner in which Appellant could seek to
impeach HM2 C’s testimony based on their alleged sexual
relationship.
A. Deference
The majority concludes that we should “accord the military
judge’s ruling less deference” because he failed to articulate
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
his analysis on the record. Collier, __ M.J. at __ (14). A
military judge is only required to “record his balancing
analysis to the extent that his exercise of discretion may be
fairly reviewed on appeal.” Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). In my view, the military judge’s
articulation makes it clear how and why he determined that
evidence of an alleged sexual relationship was not legally
relevant to bias and why the M.R.E. 403 and M.R.E. 611
considerations outweighed any potential factual relevance. The
military judge cited the parties’ arguments to explore, on the
one hand, the probative value of the evidence, and, on the other
hand, the risk of prejudice, confusion, and waste of time. The
record reflects that the military judge conducted a “proper
balancing test” under M.R.E. 403, and this Court should give the
appropriate deference to his ruling. United States v. Manns, 54
M.J. 164, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
B. M.R.E. 403
Based on his analysis, the military judge found that the
probative value of an alleged homosexual relationship to show
HM2 C’s bias was “substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues” and “waste of time.”
M.R.E. 403. This conclusion was based, inter alia, on the
disputed nature of Appellant and HM2 C’s relationship.
2
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
Appellant’s proffer consisted of her statement to the military
judge that the relationship was sexual. Although defense
counsel offered no further detail or tangible evidence of a
sexual relationship, defense counsel stated that, “there are two
other witnesses that we could call that would provide extrinsic
evidence that would go to her bias.”1 However, as defense
counsel acknowledged, HM2 C denied that the relationship was
sexual. So did HM2 C’s daughter, who filed an affidavit stating
that the relationship was based on friendship and “nothing
more.”
Based on the information presented during the Article
39(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
839(a) (2000), session and in the parties’ briefs on the Motion
for Appropriate Relief, the military judge reached the following
findings and conclusions:
• “The defense has met their preliminary burden that the
break-up of the relationship between this key witness and
the accused may relate to motive by the witness to make
the false allegation of larceny of military property.”2
1
One of these witnesses was the detective who investigated the
case.
2
Findings and Ruling on Government Motion In Limine at 2, United
States v. Collier, Special Court-Martial, Tidewater Judicial
Circuit (Nov. 24, 2004).
3
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
• “The government presented evidence by cross-examination
of the accused and by affidavit that tends to refute any
sexual aspect to the relationship.”3
• “[T]he sexual nature of this relationship is not
sufficiently relevant.”4
The military judge noted, “under [M.R.E] 403, . . . there’s a
danger that there’s going to be a confusion of the issues
because what the trial may deteriorate into is a trial within a
trial as to whether or not there was a sexual relationship.” In
this case, the risk was well-founded, as would be the case
regardless of the nature of the evidence offered, not less so
because of the sensitive nature of this information. Indeed,
this raised the specter that HM2 C would be put “on trial” in
addition to the accused.
Further, the military judge looked to M.R.E. 611 “to
control the scope and mode of witness interrogation, to prevent
the harassment of witnesses.” Questions regarding a homosexual
relationship not only had the risk of embarrassing HM2 C, they
carried the potential risk of investigation and separation under
the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. 10 U.S.C. §
654(b)(1) (2000).
3
Id. at 1.
4
Id. at 2.
4
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
Thus, the military judge properly identified the risks
associated with permitting testimony regarding a sexual
relationship, most of which would exist whether the information
pertained to a heterosexual or homosexual relationship. The
military judge reasonably concluded that those risks
substantially outweighed the probative value of the information.
C. Reasonable Restriction
A witness’s bias “is subject to exploration at trial, and
is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting
the weight of his testimony.’” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
316 (1974) (citation omitted). However, bias evidence, like any
evidence, is subject to reasonable restrictions “to take account
of such factors as ‘harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that [would be]
repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” Olden v. Kentucky,
488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 679 (1986)); see also Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (“Subject
always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude
repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, . . . the cross-
examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e.,
discredit, the witness.”). “Generally speaking, the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
5
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).
Consistent with these constitutional dictates, the military
judge did not adopt an all or nothing approach, as the majority
suggests. Rather, exercising his discretion, the military judge
balanced the factors at hand in light of the law permitting the
defense “to explore the issue of bias and motive to
misrepresent, under M.R.E. 608(c),” and ultimately limited the
evidence to uncontested evidence that had less risk of prejudice
or harassment. Specifically, the military judge allowed the
defense to “characterize the relationship as close, personal
and/or emotionally close,” but restricted the defense from
“open[ing] the issue of any alleged sexual acts between the
witness and the accused.” The military judge also permitted
defense counsel to ask HM2 C whether she “believed [Appellant]
had a crush on [HM2 C].” As this Court has said, “once the
defendant has been allowed to expose a witness’s motivation in
testifying, ‘it is of peripheral concern to the Sixth Amendment
how much opportunity defense counsel gets to hammer that point
home to the jury.’” United States v. Carruthers, 64 M.J. 340,
344 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citation omitted).
D. Speculation About Unfair Prejudice
Even if the military judge had meticulously articulated
every detail of his analysis (and he came close), the majority
6
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
implies that the military judge could not have reached a
reasonable decision to exclude the evidence because any such
decision would require speculation. See Collier, __ M.J. at __
(18). Presented with these facts, if the military judge could
not reasonably speculate about “the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the members” and whether
those considerations outweigh the probative value of evidence,
it seems that the military judge had no discretion whatsoever.
M.R.E. 403.
The majority compares this case to Olden v. Kentucky, in
which the Supreme Court held that the judge abused his
discretion by excluding evidence of an interracial sexual
relationship based on “[s]peculation as to the effect of jurors’
racial biases.” 488 U.S. at 232. However, in contrast to this
case, the relationship at issue in Olden was uncontested. Id.
at 230. Further, while the relationship in Olden showed the
victim’s potential motive to lie about the crime, as in this
case, Appellant’s theory is much less plausible than that
presented in Olden. Id. In addition to lying about the crime,
Appellant and the majority posit that HM2 C purchased 215 tools
(even though it is questionable whether all were publicly
available for purchase), etched Appellant’s command code on 65
of them, and otherwise fabricated the entire crime. Collier, __
M.J. at __ (24-25). Thus, under this theory, after exposing
7
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
herself to perjury charges, revealing an illicit sexual
relationship, and risking separation from the service, HM2 C
would have her revenge. This theory, of course, also
presupposes that the Navy, having received the store-bought
tools, negligently concluded that the tools were government
property or wittingly joined in HM2 C’s conspiracy.
Additionally, the majority argues that the suggestion of a
sexual relationship would have made it more likely that
Appellant slashed HM2 C’s tires out of anger, rather than to
interfere with the key witness against her. Id. at __ (23).
Here too, rather than speculating about how the members might
apply this information, the military judge’s well-balanced
decision permitted the members to draw their own reasonable
conclusions regarding the animosity between Appellant and HM2 C.
The members heard that HM2 C and Appellant had a falling out,
HM2 C attempted to obtain a restraining order against Appellant,
and that, just prior to the tire slashing incident, they had
argued about HM2 C returning Appellant’s property to her. It is
doubtful that an additional suggestion, disputed and refuted, of
a sexual relationship between Appellant and HM2 C would have
caused the members to reach a different verdict.
It equally “strains all logic” to suggest that an angry,
vengeful lover would go to such extremes, but that an “angry,
vengeful friend” would not. Id. at __ (2). To be sure, it is a
8
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
leap in logic to conclude that a sexual relationship would drive
someone to do all this in a way that the disintegration of a
relationship that was “emotionally close” and “closer than
ordinary friends” would not. It also thoroughly discounts the
sophistication of military members to identify and assess the
myriad ways in which relationships are formed and broken and the
hurt that results. Therefore, the military judge reasonably
concluded that information about the alleged sexual nature of
Appellant’s and HM2 C’s relationship, above and beyond what the
military judge actually admitted, was “not sufficiently
relevant.”
CONCLUSION
Limiting defense questioning about a witness’s sexual life
absent a valid showing of proof and legal relevance is a
reasonable limitation on an accused’s right to present a defense
and confront a witness. The military judge properly used his
discretion to allow Appellant to identify HM2 C’s potential bias
while limiting it to avoid prejudice, confusion, waste of time,
and harassment of the witness.
As a result, like the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals, I would conclude that the military judge
did not abuse his discretion by excluding evidence of an alleged
sexual relationship between HM2 C and Appellant. United States
v. Collier, No. NMCCA 200601218, 2008 CCA LEXIS 53, at *11, 2008
9
United States v. Collier, No. 08-0495/NA
WL 495700, at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2008)
(unpublished). I respectfully dissent.
10