United States v. Buford , 2015 CAAF LEXIS 308 ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES, Appellant/Cross-Appellee
v.
Aaron M. BUFORD, Senior Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
No. 14-6010
Crim. App. No. 2013-26
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 9, 2014
Decided March 24, 2015
OHLSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER,
C.J., and RYAN, J., joined. ERDMANN, J., filed a separate
dissenting opinion, in which STUCKY, J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant/Cross-Appellee: Captain Thomas J. Alford
(argued); Colonel Don Christensen and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq.
For Appellee/Cross-Appellant: Captain Christopher D. James
(argued).
Military Judge: Lynn Schmidt
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
Judge OHLSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises out of an interlocutory appeal under
Article 62, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
862 (2012), in a pending court-martial.
Appellee/Cross-Appellant (Appellee) was charged with a
single specification alleging indecent conduct under Article
120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012), and six specifications
variously alleging possessing, accessing, receiving, and
distributing child pornography under Article 134, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 934 (2012). These specifications were referred to
trial by general court-martial. Defense counsel subsequently
filed a motion to suppress evidence found on two laptop
computers and a flash drive, as well as related derivative
evidence. Upon conducting a motions hearing, the military judge
found that an individual who was involved in the initial viewing
and collecting of evidence in this matter was acting as an agent
of the Government, held that the actions of this individual
violated Appellee’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment, and suppressed the evidence.
After the military judge denied a request for
reconsideration, the Government appealed her decision to the
United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). United
States v. Buford, Misc. Dkt. No. 2013-26, 2014 CCA LEXIS 226,
2014 WL 2039102 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2014)
2
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
(unpublished). The CCA denied in part and granted in part the
Government’s appeal, agreeing with the military judge that the
individual involved in the initial stages of the case was acting
as an agent of the Government and that evidence from one of the
laptops should consequently be suppressed, but overturning the
military judge’s decision to suppress the evidence from the
other laptop and from the flash drive. 2014 CCA LEXIS 226, at
*19-20, 2014 WL 2039102, at *6. Following the CCA’s denial of
the Government’s request for en banc reconsideration, the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force certified the case to this
Court. The issue before us is whether the military judge abused
her discretion when she suppressed the evidence.
Based on the analysis provided below, we hold that the
military judge erred when she found that the individual involved
in the initial viewing and collecting of evidence in this matter
was acting as an agent of the Government. We further hold that
she abused her discretion when she used this erroneous
conclusion of law as the basis for suppressing the evidence from
the two laptop computers and flash drive. The CCA likewise
erred in proceeding from the same erroneous legal conclusion.
Accordingly, we summarily reverse the decision of the CCA and
the rulings of the military judge.
3
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
BACKGROUND
In March 2012, Appellee’s wife, AB, discovered a “fake”
Facebook account associated with Appellee’s e-mail address.
This Facebook account appeared to have been created and
maintained by Appellee, but the photo and name on the account
were not Appellee’s. Two months later, in May 2012, following
an argument with Appellee, AB went to the home of a friend,
accessed this fake Facebook account on her Dell laptop computer,
and showed the friend some of the contents of the account, which
included sexually explicit images and messages.
At the time this incident occurred, Airman First Class
(A1C) Ryan Marlow also was at the home of AB’s friend. Marlow
was off duty and helping the friend’s husband repair a
lawnmower. Marlow was an E-3 Security Forces airman who
generally engaged in gate security and patrol duty, and he had
no training as a criminal investigator. Knowing that Marlow was
a Security Forces member, the distraught AB asked him to look at
the fake Facebook page on her Dell laptop. Marlow explored the
site and then entered Appellee’s e-mail account using a password
provided by AB. He next created “screen shots” of sexually
explicit images and messages on these sites which appeared to
involve underage females. Although Marlow encouraged AB to
report this matter to criminal investigators, he told her that
4
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
it was “up to her” to decide what to do and that it was “her
decision.”
AB decided to report the matter, and Marlow escorted her to
the Security Forces office. An investigation was initiated and
AB consented to the search of her Dell laptop and provided
investigators with a written statement. The investigators found
what appeared to be child pornography on the laptop and obtained
a search authorization for Appellee’s residence. There they
seized, among other items, an HP laptop belonging to Appellee.
Several weeks later, AB discovered in her residence a flash
drive that apparently belonged to Appellee. The flash drive was
not password protected and Marlow examined its contents and
determined that it contained sexually explicit images of what
appeared to be underage females. The flash drive was then
turned over to investigators. Forensic imaging and analysis
later disclosed that child pornography was present on the Dell
laptop, the HP laptop, and the flash drive.
Following a motions hearing, the military judge suppressed
all of the images and chat logs found on AB’s Dell laptop,
Appellee’s HP laptop, and Appellee’s flash drive. She likewise
suppressed all derivative evidence from these items. The
military judge based her ruling on Fourth Amendment grounds,
finding that Marlow was acting as an agent of the Government
when he viewed and collected evidence from Appellee’s Facebook
5
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
account, e-mail account, and flash drive without a warrant or
Appellee’s authorization, and that Marlow thereby violated
Appellee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. We are now
presented with the issue of whether the military judge abused
her discretion in suppressing this evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, this Court reviews the
military judge’s decision directly and reviews the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party which prevailed below.
United States v. Baker, 70 M.J. 283, 287-88 (C.A.A.F. 2011). In
this case, the prevailing party was Appellee. Further, “‘[i]n
reviewing a military judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we
review factfinding under the clearly-erroneous standard and
conclusions of law under the de novo standard.’” Id. at 287
(quoting United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296, 298 (C.A.A.F.
1995)). When an appeal presents a mixed question of law and
fact, as this one does, this Court will find that a military
judge abused her discretion if her “findings of fact are clearly
erroneous or [her] conclusions of law are incorrect.” Ayala, 43
M.J. at 298. A finding by this Court that a military judge
abused her discretion requires “‘more than a mere difference of
opinion.’” United States v. Lloyd, 69 M.J. 95, 99 (C.A.A.F.
2010) (quoting United States v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120, 130
(C.A.A.F. 2000)).
6
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
ANALYSIS
As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109 (1984), the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment do not apply to “‘a search or seizure, even an
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as
an agent of the Government or with the participation or
knowledge of any governmental official.’” Id. at 113-14
(quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Thus, the threshold question in
the instant case is whether A1C Marlow was acting as “an agent
of the Government” at the time he viewed and collected evidence
in this case. This Court’s recent and unanimous decision in
United States v. Jones, 73 M.J. 357 (C.A.A.F. 2014), is
instructive on this point.
Although the Jones opinion was decided in a different
context, 1 its central tenets are applicable here. Namely, the
fact that an individual is affiliated with a law enforcement
organization is not, standing alone, determinative of the issue
of whether that individual was acting as an agent of the
government in any particular case. Rather, it is necessary to
1
In Jones, the accused was questioned about a robbery by a
military police (MP) augmentee who also was an acquaintance of
the accused. 73 M.J. at 359. The issue before the Court was
whether the accused’s incriminating statements to the MP
augmentee were admissible at trial despite the fact that the
accused had not been read his rights pursuant to Article 31(b),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2012). Id. at 360.
7
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
examine “all the facts and circumstances” in a case when
“determining [an individual’s] authority as an agent of the
[Government].” Id. at 358, 362 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, although we certainly give some weight to the
fact that Marlow served as a member of the Security Forces, our
analysis does not stop there. Instead, we also note that there
is abundant additional evidence in the record that demonstrates
that Marlow was not acting on behalf of the Security Forces --
and was not acting in any other capacity as an agent of the
Government -- when he assisted AB with examining Appellee’s
Facebook page and e-mail account and making screenshots of
relevant portions thereof. Specifically, we note the following
points:
First, Marlow was off duty fixing a lawnmower at a friend’s
house at the time AB enlisted his aid in this matter.
Second, Marlow was not a criminal investigator. He was an
E-3 who served essentially as a “gate guard” who also had some
vehicle patrol responsibilities. The Government had never
provided him with training to be an investigator, nor had the
Government ever used him as an investigator. Further, the
Government had not provided him with any computer training that
he used in this case.
Third, the Government had no prior knowledge that Marlow
was involved in examining Appellee’s Facebook page or e-mail
8
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
account or taking screenshots of them, and there was no
participation in, or approval of, these activities by duly
authorized agents of the Government.
Fourth, although Marlow’s actions of exploring Appellee’s
Facebook page, examining Appellee’s e-mail account with a
password provided by AB, and taking screenshots of relevant
portions thereof could be characterized as investigatory in
nature, these acts could also be characterized as little more
than the type of steps that a curious, tech-savvy individual
might take at the behest of a distraught friend in an effort to
assist her.
Fifth, once Marlow loaded the incriminating screenshots
onto a flash drive, he gave the flash drive to AB. He then said
it was “up to her” to decide what to do with the information and
that it was “her decision” whether to report the matter to
appropriate authorities. This laissez-faire approach to a
matter where there was strong evidence of criminal conduct is
hardly the hallmark of someone who was acting as an agent of the
Government.
Sixth, the record shows that once investigators learned of
this matter, they took steps to exclude Marlow from any further
involvement in the case. In fact, the record shows that
investigators initially pondered whether Marlow had “planted”
the evidence against Appellee because of a possible personal
9
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
interest in AB, and they ordered him to discontinue his
involvement in the matter. Indeed, Marlow’s continued unwanted
interest in the case ultimately culminated in a no-contact order
with either AB or Appellee in the July/August time frame.
Seventh, upon review of the rest of the record, we have
discovered no other “‘clear indices of the Government’s
encouragement, endorsement, and participation’ in the challenged
search.” United States v. Daniels, 60 M.J. 69, 71 (C.A.A.F.
2004) (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989)).
Eighth, although AB sought Marlow’s involvement in this
matter knowing that he was a member of the Security Forces, and
although he may have wished to demonstrate some investigative
prowess to his assembled friends, “the question of whether a
private actor performed as a government agent does not hinge on
motivation.” Id. Thus, the military judge erred when she
applied a subjective test and relied on Marlow’s expectations
and motivations when making her determination, rather than
applying an objective test and weighing the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether Marlow was acting as a
government agent. Id.
Therefore, although we have viewed the evidence in the
light most favorable to Appellee, upon analyzing and weighing
all of the points cited above and making a de novo determination
10
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
of this matter, we conclude that although Marlow was a member of
the Security Forces, he was not acting as an agent of the
Government during all relevant times in the instant case.
Therefore, we find that the military judge erred when she
reached a legal determination to the contrary. We further find
that her order suppressing the evidence of the Dell laptop, the
HP laptop, and the flash drive on that basis constituted an
abuse of discretion.
This Court’s review of the issues presented in this Article
62, UCMJ, appeal is now complete. However, the military judge
retains full authority to further rule on the admissibility of
the evidence in this case on other grounds not addressed in this
opinion. Specifically, the military judge may now consider
other evidentiary principles and jurisprudence, such as this
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93
(C.A.A.F. 2014), in deciding whether to admit at trial the Dell
laptop, the HP laptop, and the flash drive, as well as all
derivative evidence.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, upon de novo review, we conclude that the
military judge erred and abused her discretion in determining
that the evidence gathering in this case was a government search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and likewise erred
in applying the exclusionary rule on that basis. The CCA erred
11
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
in proceeding from that same premise. The record of trial in
this case is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Air
Force for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
12
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
ERDMANN, Judge, with whom STUCKY, Judge, joins
(dissenting):
This case calls on us to review a military judge’s decision
to suppress evidence, which the military judge held was seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Following a hearing on the
motion to suppress, the military judge concluded: the
government has not proven by a “preponderance of evidence that
the items seized and ultimately searched (the Dell Laptop, the
HP Laptop and the Centon thumb drive) were done so in accordance
with the Fourth Amendment and the MREs.” As I view this case
turning on the government’s initial burden of proof in
responding to a motion to suppress and the standard of review we
are required to apply to that decision, I respectfully dissent
from the majority opinion.
Background
While visiting a friend’s house, Senior Airman Buford’s
wife, AB, became distraught as she looked at a “fake” Facebook
account that was associated with her husband’s e-mail. Airman
First Class RM, a member of Security Forces, was also visiting at
the house and was asked by AB to take a look at the Facebook page
because she knew he was a “cop.”
When RM began looking at the Facebook page his initial
instinct was that it might contain evidence that Buford was
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
cheating on his wife. He was aware at the time that adultery was
a Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) offense and he agreed
that his “cop” training kicked in and he began to gather
evidence. RM looked at multiple conversations on the Facebook
page. He then searched the messages folder of the Facebook page
and found pictures of male genitalia as well as sexually explicit
communications. RM began to take screen shots because he “knew
it could possible [sic] go some more places than just cheating.
And just in case that Facebook account was deleted or something
of the sort that we would have screenshots for proof.”
RM then asked AB to access the e-mail account used to create
the Facebook page. AB signed into her husband’s e-mail account
and RM specifically searched for messages with photo attachments.
He found pictures of what appeared to be underage nude females.
He took screenshots of the pictures because “there was something
a lot more than cheating and that because of the appearance of
the females looking under age [sic] that it should be taken to
investigations.”
RM placed the screenshots on a USB flash drive and gave the
flash drive to AB. RM then encouraged AB to take the evidence to
Security Forces investigations and, when she agreed, he drove her
there that night. Security Forces then contacted the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (OSI).
2
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
The next day, RM drove AB to OSI where she signed a consent
to search her Dell laptop, a flash drive, and 1 GB memory card.
The OSI searched AB’s house later that day. During the search RM
acted as a conduit between AB and the OSI. RM was told by the
OSI to discontinue his involvement in the investigation.
However, RM testified that at the same time he was also told “if
I did find something or something was brought to my attention, to
give them a call immediately and turn it into them and don’t do
anything myself.”
Later, AB and a friend approached RM with a Centon flash
drive they had found in the back of the TV entertainment center
at the Buford’s residence. RM testified that he wasn’t sure
whether it was AB or her friend who actually gave him the flash
drive. RM opened the flash drive on his personal laptop because
he wanted to ensure there was evidence on it. The drive
contained pornography that RM believed included images of
underage females. RM then called the OSI and after informing
them of the flash drive, he was directed to turn the drive over
to them, which he did the next day.
Standard of Review:
As the military judge correctly identified, when responding
to a motion to suppress evidence, the government has the “burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence
was not obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure.”
3
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
Military Rule of Evidence 311(e)(1). We review that ruling for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sullivan, 42 M.J. 360,
363 (C.A.A.F. 1995). I agree with the majority that “[w]hen an
appeal presents a mixed question of law and fact, as this one
does, this Court will find that a military judge abused her
discretion if her ‘findings of fact are clearly erroneous or
[her] conclusions of law are incorrect.’” United States v.
Buford, __ M.J. __, __ (6) (C.A.A.F. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296, 298 (C.A.A.F. 1995)) (second set
of brackets in original). “The abuse of discretion standard
calls for more than a mere difference of opinion. The
challenged action must be arbitrary[,] clearly unreasonable, or
clearly erroneous.” United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 98
(C.A.A.F. 2014) (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted). As we are reviewing this matter in an interlocutory
Article 62, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 862 (2012), appeal, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at
trial. United States v. Baker, 70 M.J. 283, 287–88 (C.A.A.F.
2011).
Discussion
I have no quarrel with the facts relied upon in the majority
opinion. However those facts, while supporting the majority’s
position, do not reflect the totality of the testimony heard by
the military judge, much of which was conflicting. The military
4
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
judge’s opinions reflect that she considered these conflicts and
reached her factual findings after considering all of the
evidence. 1 For instance, the military judge found that:
Throughout the time [RM] acted, in his words, “as a
conduit” between [AB] and OSI, although he stated he
was not acting in an official capacity, his testimony
leads the court to believe otherwise. He stated “[AB]
asked him to look at the laptop because he was a cop;
that he began searching for and collecting evidence;
that he didn’t want evidence to get lost; that he was
going off his instincts as a SFS member; that he
searched the messages section because he knew that’s
where people hide stuff; that once he saw the names
associated with the pictures, he became more curious.”
At no time up to this moment, had [RM], then an active
duty SFS member, sought search authorization or even
requested search authorization. He further relayed to
the Court that “he encouraged [AB] to go to
investigations and that he felt responsible until the
laptop was turned over to SFOI and then OSI.”
. . . .
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that [RM],
then an active duty Security Forces member with some,
all be it not nearly as extensive as an OSI agent,
training in conducting investigations, was acting as
an agent for Government at the time he searched the
Dell laptop and saved the evidence to a thumb drive.
His actions went far and beyond those expected of a
private citizen.
The military judge set forth her legal conclusion on this issue
in her ruling on the government’s motion for reconsideration:
In U.S. Volante, 16 C.M.R 263, 266, the Court of
Military Review found in 1954 that: “Plainly, not
every search made by persons in the military service
is under the authority of the United States. However,
1
The military judge issued a seven-page opinion on October 5,
2013, and a five-page opinion on October 7, 2013.
5
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
we need not attempt to establish categories of persons
or situations which will make the search either
official or private. Certainly, a search by a person
duly assigned to law enforcement duty and made for the
sole purpose of enforcing military law, is conducted
by a person acting under the authority of the United
States.”
Emphasis in original.
Since Volante was decided, we have focused more on whether
the government authorized or participated in the search, but we
have not modified or overruled the holding in Volante. In
United States v. Daniels, 60 M.J. 69, 71 (C.A.A.F. 2004) we
specifically examined the issue of private actors/government
agents in the context of Fourth Amendment searches:
Moreover, the question of whether a private actor
performed as a government agent does not hinge on
motivation, but rather “on the degree of the
Government’s participation in the private party’s
activities, a question that can only be resolved ‘in
light of all the circumstances.’” Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15, 103 L.
Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (internal citations
omitted). To implicate the Fourth Amendment in this
respect there must be “clear indices of the
Government’s encouragement, endorsement, and
participation” in the challenged search. Id. at 615-
16.
While the identity and motivation of the individual conducting
the search is not determinative on its own as to the status of a
private actor, it is a circumstance that must be considered “in
light of all circumstances.”
In this case, it is clear that the government did not direct
RM to conduct the initial searches. It is also clear that while
6
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
the government told RM to stop his involvement in the
investigation, at the same time the government told him: “if I
did find something or something was brought to my attention, to
give them a call immediately and turn it into them and don’t do
anything myself.” RM was later given the Centon flash drive and
after searching the drive for evidence, he contacted the OSI as
he had been directed to do and turned the drive over to them.
The question then becomes whether this later involvement by
the government, in combination with all other circumstances of
the search, is sufficient to constitute a government search for
Fourth Amendment purposes. This area was addressed in United
States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir. 1994):
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Lustig v. United
States that “a search is a search by a federal
official if he had a hand in it” and that “so long as
he was in it before the object of the search was
completely accomplished, he must be deemed to have
participated in it.” 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949)
(plurality opinion). Lustig makes clear that it is
“immaterial” whether the government originated the
idea for a search or joined it while it was in
progress. Id. at 79. The government may become a
party to a search through nothing more than tacit
approval. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §
1.8(b), at 180 (2d ed. 1987).
See also United States v. Coronna, 420 F.2d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir.
1970); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1120 (6th Cir.
1978); United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169, 170 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.
2000); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615, 109 (finding the “[g]overnment
7
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying
private conduct”).
The OSI told RM that if he received additional evidence, he
should turn it over to them. He was not told that if anyone
approached him with additional evidence he should direct that
individual to the OSI. The OSI’s investigation in Buford’s
activities was an ongoing effort when RM received the Centon
flash drive and turned it over to them, as the drive was the
basis for one of the charges against Buford. The purpose of the
OSI’s seizure -– to obtain incriminating evidence against Buford
-- had not yet been completely accomplished. Where the
government had accepted the initial evidence seized by RM, their
later direction to him to turn over any further evidence he
might obtain, which he did, reflects sufficient government
involvement to render the search a governmental search.
Given the initial burden of proof on the government,
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Buford,
and applying our abuse of discretion standard to this mixed
question of law and fact, I conclude that the military judge did
not abuse her discretion in finding that RM was acting as a
government agent. I would therefore affirm the military judge’s
ruling to suppress the evidence. 2
2
While the military judge held that AB gave RM consent to search
her Dell laptop when she first asked him to look at the
8
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
While in Article 62, UCMJ, appeals we review the military
judge’s decision directly, one of the CCA’s holdings deserves
comment. The military judge held that the Centon flash drive
should be suppressed as RM was acting as a government agent and
the government had not otherwise established that it would be
admissible. The CCA reversed this determination. The CCA found
that the Centon flash drive was given to RM by AB and although
the drive was used exclusively by Buford, it was not password
protected and was found in a common area of the house. The CCA
held that AB therefore had common control over the drive.
However, the CCA’s factual finding that the flash drive was
given to RM by AB is in conflict with a factual finding made by
the military judge that it was impossible to determine whether
the drive was given to RM by AB (who may have had common
control) or by her friend (who had no claim to common control).
computer, she also held that the consent did not extend to the
Facebook profile or Buford’s e-mail account. Although the
military judge did not discuss the admissibility of evidence
found on the Dell laptop hard drive, it appears she did not
intend for that evidence to be suppressed. That is the same
conclusion reached by the CCA:
We concur with the military judge’s determination on the
issue of consent. AB gave consent to the search of the
Dell laptop and had both actual and apparent authority over
that laptop. Nevertheless, we also agree that consent to
the search of the Dell laptop did not extend to the
Facebook and e-mail accounts of the appellee.
United States v. Buford, Misc. Dkt. No. 2013-26, slip op. at 6
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2014).
9
United States v. Buford, No. 14-6010/AF
The CCA cannot make findings of fact in direct conflict
with a factual finding of the military judge without holding
that the military judge’s finding was clearly erroneous. United
States v. Czachorowski, 66 M.J. 432, 434 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
(“findings of fact are affirmed unless they are clearly
erroneous”); United States v. Martin, 56 M.J. 97, 106 (C.A.A.F.
2001) (“[F]indings of fact made by the trial judge shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous.” (quoting Main v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here the military judge’s finding was fairly supported by the
record. Given the government’s burden of proof, taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to Buford, the military
judge did not abuse her discretion in suppressing the flash
drive and the CCA’s factual findings and conclusion of law to
the contrary was in error. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.”).
10