United States v. Williams , 2004 CAAF LEXIS 1289 ( 2004 )

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Keith L. WILLIAMS, Jr., Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 04-0208
Crim. App. No. 20020327
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 13, 2004
Decided December 10, 2004
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., CRAWFORD, EFFRON and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Eric D. Noble (argued); Colonel Robert
D. Teetsel, Colonel Mark Cremin, Lieutenant Colonel Mark
Tellitocci, Major Allyson G. Lambert, and Captain Craig A.
Harbaugh (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Mason S. Weiss (argued); Colonel Steven
T. Salata, Lieutenant Colonel Theresa A. Gallagher, Lieutenant
Colonel Mark L. Johnson, and Major Mark A. Visger (on brief).
Military Judge: Gary W. Smith
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication.
United States v. Williams, Jr., No. 04-0208/AR
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Specialist Keith L. Williams, Jr., was charged with two
specifications of larceny, seven specifications of forgery and
one specification of wrongfully opening mail, in violation of
Articles 121, 123 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. §§ 921, 923 and 934 (2000) respectively. Williams
submitted an offer to plead guilty. The convening authority
accepted the offer and the parties entered into a pretrial
agreement.
At trial the military judge allowed the Government to
withdraw from the pretrial agreement. Williams subsequently
entered pleas of guilty to all charges and specifications and
was convicted on the basis of his pleas. He was sentenced to a
bad-conduct discharge, seven months confinement, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a fine
of $2,300.00.
In his appeal to the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals, Williams claimed that the convening authority should
not have been allowed to withdraw from the pretrial agreement.
After receiving briefs, the Court of Criminal Appeals ordered
the parties to submit affidavits. Following receipt of the
affidavits, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings
and sentence in a per curiam decision.
We granted review of the following issue:
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WHETHER THE TRIAL COUNSEL AND STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
UNLAWFULLY BREACHED THE PRETRIAL AGREEMENT BECAUSE
APPELLANT WAS NOT AFFORDED A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO
COMPLY WITH THE RESTITUTION PROVISION AFTER HE WAS GIVEN
NOTICE OF THE AMOUNT OF SAID RESTITUTION AND BECAUSE THE
CONVENING AUTHORITY DID NOT PERSONALLY MAKE THE DECISION TO
WITHDRAW.
We hold that Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 705(d)(4)(B)
provided a proper basis for the Government’s withdrawal and
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
BACKGROUND
Williams’ difficulties began when a Government travel card
issued to another service member was inadvertently placed in his
mailbox. Williams obtained a personal identification number for
the card and used the card to purchase various items from the
commissary and to make cash withdrawals. He offered to plead
guilty and enter into a stipulation of fact. The agreement
contained a separate term that required Williams to reimburse
the victims “once those individuals and the amounts owed have
been ascertained.” In return, the convening authority would
disapprove any confinement in excess of six months. The
convening authority agreed to the offer and the pretrial
agreement was effectuated.
Several days prior to trial there were discussions between
the trial counsel and Williams’ defense counsel concerning the
restitution provision. Williams’ defense counsel indicated that
Williams might not be able to make restitution before trial.
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The Government’s position was that Williams was required to make
restitution before entering his plea.
On the day of trial, Williams had not made restitution and
the Government informed the military judge that because of that
failure, it was withdrawing from the pretrial agreement.
Williams moved for specific performance of the agreement,
arguing that performance had commenced because he had already
entered into the stipulation of fact and had not breached any
material portion of the agreement. In response, the Government
conceded that as a result of its withdrawal from the pretrial
agreement, it would also have to withdraw from the stipulation
of fact. Williams’ defense counsel acknowledged that the
stipulation would not be entered into evidence or otherwise
used. The military judge then ruled:
All right. Well, I do find that the government is free at
this point under R.C.M. 705, the convening authority is
free to withdraw from the pretrial agreement based upon
failure to fulfill a material promise or condition in the
agreement. It would have been much better had the -- had
it been spelled out in writing in the Offer to Plead
Guilty, that it was before trial and not -- then we
wouldn't have this issue at all. So, I do find that the
prosecution is free to -- the convening authority is free
under that rule to withdraw from the pretrial agreement.
Following that ruling the defense asked "to note for the
record" that there had been no proffer or evidence from the
Government as to the victims and amounts at issue. The trial
counsel advised the military judge that the Bank of America was
the victim and that the Government had been "working with" the
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defense to contact representatives of the bank "to figure out a
way to pay them." The military judge asked the Government what
the specific amount of the restitution was, at which point trial
counsel advised that "just going with the amount of larceny, we
find the total of $2,302.01." That amount corresponds with the
amount set forth in the charge sheet.
After confirming that Williams could not "comply with that
term at this point," the military judge stated that he was
adhering to his ruling and that Williams' motion to compel
specific performance of the pretrial agreement was denied.
Williams then pleaded guilty without the benefit of a
pretrial agreement and was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge,
seven months confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
reduction to pay grade E-1, and a fine of $2,300.00. The
convening authority approved the sentence. Had the pretrial
agreement been in effect, he would have been obligated to
disapprove confinement in excess of six months. As there were
no limitations in the agreement as to any other aspect of
Williams' sentence, it is the difference between six and seven
months that serves as the basis for Williams' appeal.
DISCUSSION
Williams has not asked us to reject his guilty plea.
Rather, he has asked us for a one month reduction in the
duration of his confinement, consistent with the terms of the
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disputed pretrial agreement. He also asks us to set aside his
fine, which closely approximates the amount of his larcenies.
As his claim involves an interpretation of the pretrial
agreement, our review here is de novo. United States v.
Acevedo, 50 M.J. 169, 172 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
Under R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B), the convening authority may
withdraw from a pretrial agreement:
(1) at any time before an accused begins performance of his
or her promises under the agreement;
(2) upon the failure of an accused to fulfill any material
promise or condition in the agreement;
(3) when inquiry by the military judge discloses a
disagreement as to a material term in the agreement; or
(4) if findings are set aside because a guilty plea is
deemed improvident on appellate review.
The military judge determined that withdrawal was authorized by
virtue of Williams' failure to fulfill a material promise or
condition in the agreement. Williams contends that the military
judge erred in allowing the withdrawal because (1) he had begun
performance of his obligations under the agreement and (2) none
of the other circumstances listed in R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B) were
present.
The language at issue in the pretrial agreement provides:
“I agree to reimburse the victim or victim(s) of the larcenies
for which I have been charged, once those individuals and the
amounts owed have been ascertained.” This language is not a
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model of clarity and does not provide a date certain for payment
of the reimbursement. Williams consequently argues that the
language does not require that the restitution be made prior to
trial. He asserts that a plain reading of the language
indicates that if the amount and identity of the victim have not
been ascertained prior to trial, the pretrial agreement is not
affected because he would be allowed to make reimbursement after
trial. The Government argues that the identity of the victim
and the amount of reimbursement were not in dispute from the day
the charges were preferred. The charge sheet, bank records and
other documents in the case file identified the Bank of America
as the victim of the larcenies and the total amount stolen as
$2,302.01, the same figure the Government provided at trial to
the military judge.
We have long emphasized the critical role that a military
judge and counsel must play to ensure that the record reflects a
clear, shared understanding of the terms of any pretrial
agreement between an accused and the convening authority.
United States v. Felder, 59 M.J. 444, 445 (C.A.A.F. 2004)(citing
United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977) and United
States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453 (C.M.A. 1976)). Whatever else the
record reflects in this case, the exchange between the parties
and the military judge plainly demonstrates something far short
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of "a clear, shared understanding" of the disputed restitution
provision.
Accordingly, we need not determine whether Williams'
execution of a stipulation of fact constituted the beginning of
performance or whether the military judge properly concluded
that Williams had “fail[ed] to fulfill a material promise or
condition in the agreement.” Rather, this is an instance in
which the parties had an underlying disagreement as to the
restitution clause itself. The President has set forth four
alternative circumstances in R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B) under which the
convening authority is authorized to withdraw from a pretrial
agreement. The third circumstance is when an “inquiry by the
military judge discloses a disagreement as to a material term in
the agreement.”
A distinct, separate provision offering to make restitution
can provide a significant inducement for a convening authority
to accept an accused’s offer to plead guilty. See R.C.M.
705(c)(2)(C). Here the record on appeal demonstrates that
Williams sought a more favorable pretrial agreement by extending
an offer to make restitution and reflects the significance
attached by the convening authority to that offer. Under those
circumstances, there can be little doubt that the restitution
provision was “material” to the resultant pretrial agreement.
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The inquiry conducted by the military judge clearly
established "a disagreement as to a material term in the
agreement," and that circumstance alone provides a factual and
legal basis for the convening authority to withdraw. Although
the military judge’s inquiry did not focus on the "disagreement
as to a material term" component of R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B), his
inquiry and the record nonetheless demonstrate that as a proper
basis for withdrawal under the rule. Because the withdrawal
provisions of R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B) are disjunctive, we need not
determine whether there was specific performance or detrimental
reliance upon the agreement by Williams. Nor do we need to
address what remedies might be appropriate in a case involving
detrimental reliance.
We do not hold today that a convening authority may
withdraw from a pretrial agreement by simply claiming that a
disagreement exists. Rather, the President has required that
the existence of a disagreement and the materiality of the terms
at issue be ascertained by the military judge through his or her
inquiry. That requirement reflects the critical role that a
military judge plays during a plea colloquy in ensuring that the
record reflects a clear, shared understanding by the parties of
the terms of the agreement. Felder, 59 M.J. at 445.
We also reject Williams' claim that the withdrawal was
improper because the convening authority did not personally make
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the decision to withdraw. When the staff judge advocate (SJA)
recommended to the convening authority that Williams’ offer to
plead guilty be accepted, he was induced to do so based on
Williams’ offer to make restitution. Following their discussion
about this case, the SJA believed that the restitution provision
was the reason the convening authority approved the offer and he
left the office with the clear understanding that if there were
no restitution prior to trial, there was no deal.
As the SJA knew the circumstances under which the convening
authority approved the offer, once those circumstances were no
longer present, the trial counsel who had communicated with the
SJA on this matter could effect the Government’s withdrawal from
the pretrial agreement. Cf. Satterfield v. Drew, 17 M.J. 269,
273 (C.M.A. 1984)(noting trial counsel authorized to take
necessary, usual, and proper actions to accomplish or perform,
the main authority expressly delegated to him).
DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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