United States v. Holbrook ( 2008 )


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  •                        UNITED STATES, Appellee
    v.
    Tom K. HOLBROOK, Seaman
    U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant
    No. 07-0350
    Crim. App. No. 1251
    United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
    Argued January 8, 2008
    Decided February 14, 2008
    RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
    C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and STUCKY, JJ., joined.
    Counsel
    For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander Necia L. Chambliss
    (argued); Lieutenant Lynn R. S. Capuano.
    For Appellee:   Lieutenant Commander Patrick M. Flynn (argued).
    Military Judge:   Steven J. Andersen
    THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
    United States v. Holbrook, No. 07-0350/CG
    Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
    A special court-martial composed of a military judge sitting
    alone convicted Appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of fraudulent
    enlistment, making a false official statement, damage to
    military property, reckless driving, use of marijuana, use,
    introduction, and distribution of cocaine, leaving the scene of
    an accident, and communicating a threat in violation of Articles
    83, 107, 108, 111, 112a, and 134, Uniform Code of Military
    Justice (UCMJ), 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 883
    , 907, 908, 911, 912a, 934
    (2000).   The sentence adjudged by the court-martial included a
    bad-conduct discharge, confinement for eleven months, and
    reduction to the lowest enlisted grade.   The convening authority
    approved the findings and sentence, but agreed to suspend
    confinement in excess of ten months until the date of
    Appellant’s release from confinement.   The United States Coast
    Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) set aside the findings of
    guilty to the leaving the scene of an accident specification and
    affirmed the remaining findings of guilty.   United States v.
    Holbrook, 
    64 M.J. 553
    , 558 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2007).     As a
    remedy for Appellant’s failure to receive speedy review of his
    case, the CCA only approved a reduction in grade to E-2.    
    Id.
    On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of:
    WHETHER APPELLANT’S PLEA TO FRAUDULENT ENLISTMENT
    (CHARGE I) WAS IMPROVIDENT BECAUSE THE MILITARY JUDGE
    FAILED TO ELICIT FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
    2
    United States v. Holbrook, No. 07-0350/CG
    APPELLANT KNEW HE LIED ABOUT A MATERIAL FACT RELEVANT
    TO HIS QUALIFICATIONS FOR ENLISTMENT.1
    I.     Facts
    The specification alleged that Appellant made:
    knowingly false representations that he had
    experimented with marijuana, a controlled substance,
    and that he did not use any other drugs, when in fact,
    he used marijuana frequently, used methamphetamines 2
    to 3 times a week for 2 months, and spent 2 months in
    drug rehabilitation for methamphetamine addiction,
    procure himself to be enlisted as a Seamen Recruit in
    the Coast Guard Delayed Entry Program, and did
    thereafter, receive pay and allowances under the
    enlistment so procured.
    Appellant stipulated to the above facts, and also that he
    executed various enlistment documents, including a
    questionnaire, DD Form 1966.       Consistent with the charged
    specification, Appellant further stipulated, inter alia, that he
    knowingly misrepresented on DD Form 1966 that he had
    “experimented with marijuana, but no other drugs.”      In fact,
    Appellant had used marijuana extensively, had been a heavy user
    of methamphetamines, and had spent two months in a drug
    rehabilitation facility.    The providence inquiry supported each
    of these facts, without contradiction.
    II.     Discussion
    Appellant argues that his guilty plea to fraudulent
    enlistment was nonetheless not provident because the military
    judge failed to establish that Appellant knew that the facts he
    1
    
    65 M.J. 323
     (C.A.A.F. 2007).
    3
    United States v. Holbrook, No. 07-0350/CG
    misrepresented were “material” to his enlistment at the time he
    made them.    The question for us is whether that knowledge was
    necessary for Appellant’s plea to have been provident in this
    case.    We hold that it was not.
    A.
    To reject a guilty plea, the trial record must show “a
    ‘substantial basis’ in law and fact for questioning the guilty
    plea.”    United States v. Prater, 
    32 M.J. 433
    , 436 (C.M.A. 1991).
    Review of the statutory elements required to establish an
    offense is a question of law we undertake de novo.    Cf. United
    States v. Garcia, 
    44 M.J. 496
    , 497 (C.A.A.F. 1996).     If
    Appellant’s providence inquiry established the facts necessary
    to support the elements of the UCMJ offense charged, the plea to
    that charge is provident.    United States v. Faircloth, 
    45 M.J. 172
    , 174 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
    The text of Article 83, UCMJ, states, inter alia, that
    “[a]ny person who . . . procures his own enlistment or
    appointment in the armed forces by knowingly false
    representation or deliberate concealment as to his
    qualifications for that enlistment or appointment and receives
    pay or allowances thereunder . . . shall be punished as a court-
    martial may direct.”    The elements of the offense, as listed by
    the President, are:
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    United States v. Holbrook, No. 07-0350/CG
    (a) That the accused was enlisted . . . in an armed
    force;
    (b) That the accused knowingly misrepresented or
    deliberately concealed a certain material fact or
    facts regarding qualifications of the accused for
    enlistment . . . ;
    (c) That the accused’s enlistment was obtained or
    procured by that knowingly false representation or
    deliberate concealment; and
    (d) That under this enlistment . . . that accused
    received pay or allowances or both.
    Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt. IV, para. 7.b.(1)
    (2005 ed.) (MCM).
    Both the statute and MCM provide that a misrepresentation
    needs to be knowing, and concealment deliberate.   But we see no
    requirement within either the text of Article 83, UCMJ, or the
    elements set forth in the MCM that the accused actually know
    anything other than that his answers to questions regarding his
    qualifications are untruthful by commission or omission.    The
    question whether a fact is “regarding qualifications” for
    “enlistment,” and “material,” is analyzed from the perspective
    of the service making the decision on the enlistment, not from
    the perspective of the untruthful applicant.2   See, e.g., United
    2
    Of course, not every fact regarding a qualification for
    enlistment may be material. The President’s addition of the
    adjective “material” in MCM pt. IV, para. 7.b.(1) limits the
    scope of actionable untruths regarding qualifications for
    enlistment. In determining whether a statement is material to
    qualifications for enlistment, we look at what the
    misrepresentation concealed and what qualities the service
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    United States v. Holbrook, No. 07-0350/CG
    States v. Gaudin, 
    515 U.S. 506
    , 512 (1995) (describing
    materiality under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
     as requiring a finding that
    the accused made a statement to a listener who was attempting to
    make a decision based on that statement); cf. United States v.
    Loyd, 
    7 C.M.R. 453
    , 454 (N.B.R. 1953) (holding that an Article
    83, UCMJ, conviction cannot be sustained unless the government
    shows that but for the fraudulent statement the accused would
    not have been permitted to enlist).
    No authority supports the contrary argument, which makes
    criminal liability turn on whether the untruthful applicant to
    the armed forces knows that the truth might preclude his
    enlistment.   We agree with the lower court that it would be
    irrational to require that an applicant fully understand the
    consequences of a truthful statement because it would mean
    prospective enlistees would need to possess thorough knowledge
    of the service’s enlistment standards and policies prior to
    applying for and entering active duty.   Holbrook, 64 M.J. at
    556.
    B.
    It is undisputed that Appellant’s providence inquiry
    established that he was enlisted in the armed forces, received
    sought to assess in determining fitness for duty. Gaudin, 
    515 U.S. at 512
    . The threshold is low, as a material statement is
    one that need only have a tendency to influence the decision-
    making body to which it is addressed. 
    Id. at 509
    .
    6
    United States v. Holbrook, No. 07-0350/CG
    pay and allowances, knowingly misrepresented the extent of his
    preservice drug use, and that such prior drug use is relevant to
    qualification for enlistment in the Coast Guard -- i.e.,
    material.   Appellant’s providence inquiry established both every
    element of an Article 83, UCMJ, offense and the facts alleged in
    the specification.   Any prevarication during the providence
    inquiry regarding the timing of Appellant’s knowledge of the
    materiality of his misrepresentations did not raise a
    substantial basis in law and fact for questioning his guilty
    plea to a violation of Article 83, UCMJ.
    III.    Decision
    The decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of
    Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-0350-CG

Judges: Ryan

Filed Date: 2/14/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/9/2024