United States v. Tate , 2007 CAAF LEXIS 13 ( 2007 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
David D. TATE, Hospital Corpsman Second Class
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 06-0291
Crim. App. No. 200201202
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 25, 2006
Decided January 16, 2007
EFFRON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER
and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
STUCKY and RYAN, JJ., did not participate.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Brian L. Mizer, JAGC, USN (argued);
Lieutenant Commander Jason S. Grover, JAGC, USN (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Brian K. Keller, USMC (argued); Commander
P. C. LeBlanc, JAGC, USN, and Lieutenant Jessica M. Hudson,
JAGC, USN (on brief); Commander Charles N. Purnell, JAGC, USN.
Military Judge: K. B. Martin
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Tate, No. 06-0291/NA
Chief Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of a military judge sitting
alone convicted Appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of conspiracy
to obstruct justice, false official statement (three
specifications), premeditated murder, sodomy, obstruction of
justice (five specifications), and adultery, in violation of
Articles 81, 107, 118, 125, and 134, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 907, 918, 925, 934 (2000),
respectively. The adjudged and approved sentence included a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for life without parole,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority suspended
confinement in excess of fifty years for twelve months pursuant
to a pretrial agreement. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. United
States v. Tate, No. NMCCA 200201202, 2005 CCA LEXIS 356, at *16
2005 WL 3111979, at *6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2005).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE PRETRIAL AGREEMENT VIOLATED RULE FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL 705(c) BY DENYING APPELLANT THE
POST-TRIAL RIGHT TO SEEK CLEMENCY AND PAROLE.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the
pretrial agreement included conditions not permitted by Rule for
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Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 705(c). Our decretal paragraph orders
appropriate corrective action.
I. BACKGROUND
A. POST-TRIAL AND APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
The military justice system is administered primarily by
military commanders empowered to convene courts-martial, who are
dispersed throughout the United States and numerous foreign
countries. Pretrial agreements are made between those convening
authorities and servicemembers accused of offenses.
In the UCMJ, Congress sought to balance the relatively
autonomous power of convening authorities by centralizing review
and clemency functions in the appellate courts and senior
executive branch officials. See H.R. Rep. No. 81-491, at 3-8
(1949); S. Rep. No. 81-486, at 1-3 (1949), reprinted in 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2222, 2222-24; 96 Cong. Rec. S1362-63 (Feb. 2,
1950) (statement of Sen. Estes Kefauver); see also Waldemar A.
Solf, Appellate Review –- New Trial, in Legal and Legislative
Basis, Manual for Courts-Martial United States 146-47 (1951).
Under Subchapter IX of the UCMJ, entitled “Post-trial
Procedure and Review of Courts-Martial,” convening authorities
conduct the initial review of courts-martial. Article 60, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 860 (2000). The responsibility for review then
moves to centralized authorities, the Court of Criminal Appeals,
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this Court, and the Supreme Court, with clemency and parole
responsibilities vested in the service secretaries. Articles
66, 67, 67a, and 74, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866, 867, 867a, 874
(2000).
In Article 74, UCMJ, Congress authorized the service
secretaries to exercise “clemency and parole powers as well as
ultimate control of sentence uniformity.” S. Rep. No. 81-486,
at 31. The service secretaries administer parole under 10
U.S.C. § 952 (2000) (“Parole”). The Navy implements these
provisions in various issuances, including Dep’t of the Navy,
Secretary of the Navy Instr. 5815.3J, Department of the Navy
Clemency and Parole Systems (June 12, 2003) [hereinafter
SECNAVINST 5815.3J]. Paragraph 201 of the Instruction states:
This regulation implements the clemency and parole
systems authorized by 10 U.S.C. sections 874 and
952-954. It must be read in a manner that is
uniform and consistent with good order and
discipline within the military as defined by the
UCMJ (10 U.S.C. sec. 801-946), the Manual for
Courts-Martial, other rules and procedures of the
Departments of Defense and Navy and, where
appropriate, enforced by corrections policy
established by law and regulations implementing 10
U.S.C. sec. 951 (Military Correctional
Facilities).
The Instruction further states that it “must also be read in a
manner that promotes uniformity and consistency of application of
military justice as set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial”
and other regulatory issuances. Id. at para. 203.
The proceedings of the Navy Clemency and Parole Board are
independent of the authorities that may be exercised by other
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officials under Article 74, UCMJ, and the Instruction provides a
mechanism for coordinating the actions of the Board with other
officials. SECNAVINST 5815.3J, paras. 101, 414; see Dep’t of the
Navy, Judge Advocate General Instr. 5800.7D, Manual of the Judge
Advocate General (JAGMAN) para. 0158 (Mar. 15, 2004).
B. LIMITATIONS ON PRETRIAL AGREEMENTS
R.C.M. 705(c), which governs the scope of pretrial
agreements, ensures that such agreements will not disturb the
balance established by Congress between the relative
responsibilities of convening authorities and reviewing
authorities. R.C.M. 705(c) identifies both permissible and
prohibited terms and conditions. With respect to prohibited
terms, R.C.M. 705(c) states:
A term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall
not be enforced if it deprives the accused of:
the right to counsel; the right to due process;
the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the
court-martial; the right to a speedy trial; the
right to complete sentencing proceedings; the
complete and effective exercise of post-trial and
appellate rights.
R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
R.C.M. 705(c) identifies certain rights fundamental to the
fair administration of the military justice system that cannot
be bargained away. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, Analysis of the Rules for Courts-Martial app. 21 at A21-
39 (2005 ed.) and cases cited therein. The prohibition extends
to terms or conditions concerning certain rights that otherwise
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may be waived during subsequent trial and appellate proceedings,
such as the right to counsel, see Article 27, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
827 (2000); the right to a speedy trial, see Article 33, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 833 (2000); the right to submit post-trial matters
to the convening authority, see Article 60(b)(1), (c)(2), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 860(b)(1), (c)(2) (2000); and the right to certain
forms of appellate review, see Article 61, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 861(2000). Cf. United States v. Hernandez, 33 M.J. 145, 148-49
(C.M.A. 1991) (concluding that appellate review may not be
waived before the accused knows the results of the convening
authority’s action on the case). R.C.M. 705(c) recognizes that
the bargaining relationship between a servicemember and the
convening authority at the pretrial stage is fundamentally
different from the circumstances in which rights may be waived
during trial and post-trial proceedings.
R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B), which addresses rights provided under
the UCMJ, does not preclude an agreement to waive rights that
may be waived in collateral or unrelated proceedings. For
example, as part of a pretrial agreement an accused may agree to
waive an administrative discharge board hearing, as provided in
applicable administrative regulations. See United States v.
Gansemer, 38 M.J. 340, 342 (C.M.A. 1993).
C. APPELLANT’S PRETRIAL AGREEMENT
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Appellant and the convening authority entered into a
pretrial agreement. Appellant agreed to: (1) plead guilty to
all charges; (2) request a trial by military judge alone and
waive his right to trial by members; (3) forego the production,
at government expense, of sentencing witnesses except for
personal family members; (4) begin and complete trial within
specified dates; (5) not object to the prosecution’s sentencing
evidence; and (6) waive both mandatory and discretionary
consideration by the Navy Clemency and Parole Board for a period
of twenty years, ending on July 9, 2019, and decline clemency or
parole if offered during that period. In return, the convening
authority agreed to: (1) dismiss one of the charges; (2)
provide a non-binding recommendation that Appellant serve his
confinement at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas; (3) suspend any period of confinement in
excess of fifty years; and (4) defer and suspend adjudged and
automatic forfeitures for specified periods, and waive automatic
forfeitures for six months for the benefit of his sons.
Appellant complied with the terms of agreement at trial and
received a sentence that included confinement for life without
parole. The convening authority, pursuant the pretrial
agreement, suspended the forfeitures and suspended the period of
confinement in excess of fifty years.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. THE TERMS OF THE PRETRIAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING
CLEMENCY AND PAROLE
Whether a condition of a pretrial agreement violates R.C.M.
705(c)(1)(B) is a question of law that this Court reviews de
novo. See United States v. Best, 61 M.J. 376, 381 (C.A.A.F.
2005). The granted issue concerns the restrictions in the
pretrial agreement concerning consideration by the Navy Clemency
and Parole Board. Under the Board’s rules, a person serving
Appellant’s sentence -- confinement for fifty years -- would be
eligible for clemency consideration after five years, and for
parole consideration after ten years. SECNAVINST 5815.3J,
paras. 403.d(3), 504.a(3). Under the agreement, Appellant would
not be eligible for either clemency or parole consideration for
twenty years.
The Court of Criminal Appeals separately addressed: (1)
the terms of the pretrial agreement that require Appellant to
not accept clemency or parole if offered during the twenty-year
period; and (2) the terms of the pretrial agreement that
preclude Appellant from requesting clemency during that period.
Tate, 2005 CCA LEXIS 356, at *7, 2005 WL 3111979, at *3. With
respect to the requirement to refuse clemency or parole, the
court held that those terms “are unenforceable as a violation of
public policy, because the convening authority would be usurping
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the service secretary’s authority and the President’s authority
to exercise their independent discretion in granting clemency.”
2005 CCA LEXIS 356, at *7, 2005 WL 3111979, at *3 (citing United
States v. Thomas, 60 M.J. 521, 529 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2004)).
With respect to the agreement to not request clemency or parole,
the court concluded that the terms were “consistent with public
policy and our own notions of fairness.” 2005 CCA LEXIS 356, at
*7, 2005 WL 3111979, at *3.
In the present appeal, the Government has not challenged
the decision of the lower court, acting on its own motion, to
strike the terms precluding the Board from considering clemency
or parole. See 2005 CCA LEXIS 356, at *7-*8, 2005 WL 3111979,
at *3. Appellant has challenged the decision of the lower court
to sustain the terms precluding Appellant from requesting
clemency or parole.
The lower court based its decision in the present case, as
in Thomas, on considerations of public policy and fairness. In
both cases, the court did not discuss R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B), which
states that a “term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall
not be enforced if it deprives the accused of . . . the complete
and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate rights.” As
noted in Part I.A., supra, Congress identified greater
uniformity as one of the central goals in enacting the UCMJ;
post-trial and appellate procedures formed a critical element of
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the structure created by Congress to achieve uniformity; and
Congress viewed the clemency process as the “ultimate control of
sentence uniformity.” S. Rep. No. 81-486, at 31. Consistent
with the congressional purposes in enacting the post-trial and
review provisions of the UCMJ, the President, in R.C.M.
705(c)(1)(B), has precluded use of pretrial agreement terms
inconsistent with the complete and effective exercise of post-
trial and appellate rights. The terms and conditions that would
deprive Appellant of parole and clemency consideration under
generally applicable procedures are unenforceable under R.C.M.
705(c)(1)(B).
Our decision in this case is confined to the relationship
between pretrial agreements and the availability of clemency or
parole. In view of the limited scope of our review of programs
for early release from confinement, see United States v. Pena,
64 M.J. ___ (12) (C.A.A.F. 2007), we note that our decision
today does not address the general administration of clemency or
parole proceedings.
B. REMEDY
By its terms, R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B) provides that an
impermissible term or condition “shall not be enforced.” In
some cases, we have concluded that the presence of an
impermissible term requires us to void the entire agreement and
authorize a rehearing. United States v. Holland, 1 M.J. 58, 60
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(C.M.A. 1975). In other cases, we have concluded that an
impermissible term may be treated as null without impairing the
remainder of the agreement. See, e.g., United States v.
McLaughlin, 50 M.J. 217, 218-19 (C.A.A.F. 1999). In the present
case, Appellant seeks only a ruling that would strike the
impermissible terms from the agreement. The Government, during
oral argument, agreed that if we were to hold that the
challenged provisions were impermissible, those provisions could
be stricken and the remainder of the agreement and the plea
could be sustained. In view of the agreement of the parties,
and under the particular facts and circumstances of this case,
we agree that the terms and conditions at issue may be stricken
without impairing the balance of the agreement and the plea.
IV. DECISION
Paragraphs 11(b) and 11(c) of the pretrial agreement
between Appellant and the convening authority are void. The
balance of the agreement may be enforced. The decision of the
United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed as to the findings and the sentence.
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