United States v. Schuber ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Rory J. SCHUBER, Airman First Class
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 11-6002
CCA Misc. Dkt. No. 2010-14
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 30, 2011
Decided July 6, 2011
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STUCKY
and RYAN, JJ., joined. ERDMANN, J., filed a separate opinion
dissenting in part and concurring in the result, in which
EFFRON, C.J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Reggie D. Yager (argued); Colonel Eric N.
Eklund (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Gail E. Crawford.
For Appellee: Major Naomi N. Porterfield (argued); Colonel Don
M. Christensen and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief); Captain
Charles G. Warren.
Military Judge: Carl L. Reed II
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises from an interlocutory appeal. Appellant
was arraigned in a general court-martial convened at Travis Air
Force Base, California, on two specifications of wrongful use of
methamphetamine and marijuana on divers occasions, in violation
of Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. § 912a (2006). Prior to entering pleas, Appellant,
through counsel, moved to dismiss the charge and specifications
alleging a violation of his right to a speedy trial under
Article 10, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2006). The military judge
granted the motion, dismissing the charges and specifications
with prejudice.
On review, the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed, concluding that the Government acted with
reasonable diligence. United States v. Schuber, Misc. Dkt. No.
2010-14, 2010 CCA LEXIS 446, at *16 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 2,
2010) (unpublished).
We granted review of the following assigned issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED BY
REVERSING THE MILITARY JUDGE AND FINDING THE
GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN UNDER ARTICLE 10, UCMJ.
In addition, we specified the following issue:
WHETHER ARTICLE 10, UCMJ, SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED BY
THE MILITARY JUDGE AND THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
WHEN THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM CONFINEMENT
AFTER 71 DAYS, ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME ON LEAVE FOR 3
DAYS, AND WHEN HE RETURNED, WAS ONLY SUBJECT TO BASE
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RESTRICTION, A RESTRICTION THAT WAS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO
CONFINEMENT.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that
Appellant’s post-confinement restriction did not amount to
an arrest under Article 10, UCMJ. We further conclude that
Appellant’s right to a speedy trial under Article 10, UCMJ,
was not violated in this case. Therefore, we affirm the
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
As part of the Drug Demand Reduction Program, Appellant was
randomly selected to provide a urinalysis sample on December 1,
2009. When the sample tested positive for the presence of
amphetamine and methamphetamine, security forces initiated an
investigation. Appellant voluntarily provided a second sample
on December 21, 2009, which also tested positive. Security
forces concluded their investigation on January 26, 2010, after
Appellant provided two additional samples and both tested
positive.
On February 10, 2010, Appellant was placed in pretrial
confinement in a civilian facility pending court-martial.1
Before entering confinement, however, Appellant provided two
additional samples, both of which tested positive on February
1
Appellant was initially placed in a civilian pretrial
confinement facility for the first day of pretrial confinement
because Travis Air Force Base does not have a local military
confinement facility.
3
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26, 2010. The next day, February 11, 2010, Appellant was
transferred to a military facility for pretrial confinement. A
pretrial confinement hearing was conducted resulting in
Appellant’s continued pretrial confinement. Charges were
preferred against Appellant on March 10, 2010.
Appellant made his first discovery request on March 17,
2010, and included a request for a speedy trial. The next day,
an Article 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2006), investigating
officer (IO) was appointed. On March 29, 2010, Appellant made a
discovery request in preparation for the upcoming Article 32,
UCMJ, hearing and made another demand for a speedy trial. The
Government responded to this request the next day, which was
also the day the Article 32, UCMJ, hearing was held. On March
31, 2010, the IO requested additional evidence, prompting
another discovery request on the Government by Appellant, and a
response by the Government on the same day. The Article 32,
UCMJ, report was then processed from April 7, 2010, through
April 15, 2010, at which time the charges were forwarded. On
April 20, 2010, Appellant, through counsel, requested
reconsideration of his pretrial confinement. The next day,
April 21, 2010, due to the death of his grandfather, Appellant
requested an expedited review of his request. In addition, that
same day defense counsel made a third discovery request, which
also included a request for a speedy trial.
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On April 22, 2010, Appellant’s request for reconsideration
of his pretrial confinement was granted, though it was too late
for Appellant to attend his grandfather’s funeral, and Appellant
was ordered to remain within the confines of the base. However,
on April 23, 2010, Appellant was given a three-day pass to
travel to his hometown to grieve with his family. The
restriction orders required Appellant not to deviate from his
travel schedule, to provide a urine sample the day after he
returned to base, and to provide weekly urine samples thereafter
until trial. He subsequently traveled to his hometown and
returned to base without incident and without escorts.
On April 15, 2010, the charge and its two specifications
were forwarded to the convening authority. The charge was
referred against Appellant on April 26, 2010, and served on him
two days later. On May 2, 2010, Appellant made a fourth request
for speedy trial in the context of a discovery request. On May
4, 2010, the military judge was detailed to the case. On May
10, 2010, the Government provided its first response to
Appellant’s outstanding discovery requests. At the docketing
conference held on May 3, 2010, the trial date was set for June
28, 2010. The Government requested that date based on the
availability of the assigned expert witness from Brooks Air
Force Drug Testing Laboratory (AFDTL), where Appellant’s
urinalysis samples were apparently processed. However,
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realizing that the 120-day speedy trial time frame under Rule
for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 707 would expire on June 9, 2010,
the Government requested an accelerated arraignment.
Appellant was arraigned on June 2, 2010, at which time he
and the Government arranged for further discovery. On June 11
and 24, 2010, Appellant made his fifth and sixth requests for a
speedy trial in the context of these discovery requests.
On June 21, 2010, Appellant, through counsel, moved to
dismiss the charges for denial of a speedy trial based on the
138 days that had transpired between the first day of
Appellant’s pretrial confinement to the first day of trial. At
trial on June 28, 2010, the military judge granted Appellant’s
motion to dismiss.
The military judge concluded that Appellant’s right to a
speedy trial under Article 10, UCMJ, was violated, stating:
it took 75 days to refer the most basic of crimes
and they then arbitrarily elected to use a single
expert’s lack of availability as an excuse for
not taking this case to trial for another sixty-
three days. Given the chronology of this case, I
find the government’s actions to be negligent.
Although the CCA agreed that “[t]he government’s
prosecution of this case was not exemplary,” the CCA disagreed
with the conclusions of the military judge. Schuber, 2010 CCA
LEXIS 446, at *11-*12. The CCA concluded that the military
judge failed “to give credence to or even discuss the
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government’s proffered explanation” in requesting a later trial
date in light of the unsettled nature of the case law regarding
confrontation of expert witnesses. Id. at *8. The CCA also
questioned the sincerity of Appellant’s speedy trial requests,
stating that the requests were submitted “as part of much larger
requests for discovery,” and noting that Appellant made no such
request to the trial judge. Id. at *13-*14.
II. DISCUSSION
Article 10, UCMJ, provides:
When any person subject to this chapter is placed in arrest
or confinement prior to trial, immediate steps shall be
taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which he is
accused and to try him or to dismiss the charges and
release him.
Emphasis added. “While the requirements of Article 10[, UCMJ,]
are more rigorous than the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, it becomes operative only after arrest or
confinement.” United States v. Burrell, 13 M.J. 437, 440
(C.M.A. 1982) (emphasis added). The parties agree that
Appellant was placed in pretrial confinement for seventy-one
days; however, they dispute whether Appellant’s subsequent
restriction of sixty-seven days amounted to “arrest” for the
purposes of Article 10, UCMJ. As a result, the parties disagree
on whether Article 10, UCMJ, should be applied to seventy-one or
one-hundred thirty-eight days of “arrest or confinement.” Thus,
before addressing the granted issue of whether Appellant’s
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Article 10, UCMJ, speedy trial rights were denied, we must
necessarily address the specified issue of whether the Article
10, UCMJ, analysis should include Appellant’s sixty-seven-day
base restriction, in which category we include Appellant’s
three-day pass to grieve with his family.
A. Article 10, UCMJ, “Arrest”
Appellant contends that any form of restriction triggers
Article 10, UCMJ, protection and that, in reference to the last
clause of the Article, such protection “only terminate[s] upon
trial or release from restraint and dismissal of charges.” The
Government responds that “[a]rrest and restriction are not one
in the same” and that an arrest status for the purposes of
Article 10, UCMJ, must be determined based on the facts of each
case. The parties further appeal to Article 9, UCMJ, § 10
U.S.C. 809 (2006), case law, and legislative history in support
of their positions. There are indeed arguments on both sides of
the issue.
Article 9(a), UCMJ, defines “[a]rrest” as “the restraint of
a person by an order, not imposed as a punishment for an
offense, directing him to remain within certain specified
limits.” Under this definition, any limitation, including base
restriction, could certainly qualify as arrest. Indeed, some
early case law holds as much. See, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 16 C.M.A. 589, 592-93, 37 C.M.R. 209, 212-13 (1967)
8
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
(holding that restricting the appellant to his company area fell
within the definition of “arrest,” despite being labeled as
“restriction”); United States v. Weisenmuller, 17 C.M.A. 636,
637-40, 38 C.M.R. 434, 435-38 (1968) (holding that the accused’s
restriction to the barrack’s cubicle, the head, laundry room,
necessity store, mess hall, barber shop, working area, and
direct routes to these locations, as well as almost hourly sign-
in requirements, constituted “arrest”); United States v. Powell,
2 M.J. 6, 7 (C.M.A. 1976) (holding that withdrawing the
appellant’s pass privileges, where that privilege was provided
as a matter of course and was only withdrawn where an individual
was charged with misconduct, had “the same substantive effect of
restricting the appellant”); United States v. Nelson, 5 M.J.
189, 190-91 (C.M.A. 1978) (clarifying that the circumstances of
Powell constituted an “arrest,” subjecting the case to Article
10, UCMJ).
However, later case law recognized that not every
geographic restriction amounts to arrest. “[T]he two forms of
restraint, arrest and restriction, are not per se equivalent for
the purpose of assessing the applicability of Article 10.”
United States v. Walls, 9 M.J. 88, 88-90 (C.M.A. 1980) (holding
that the withdrawal of an appellant’s pass privileges alone was
insufficient to constitute arrest where an appellant remained on
full-duty status and the barracks to which he was restrained
9
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included a variety of amenities); see also Burrell, 13 M.J. at
439-40 (holding that an appellant’s orders to remain in the
hospital for treatment and to obtain an escort when he chose to
leave, without time or place limitations, and partly for his own
protection, did not constitute “arrest” or “confinement”).
The distinctions and variants between arrest and
restriction recognized through case law are amplified and
reflected in the Rules for Courts-Martial. For example, R.C.M.
304 distinguishes between arrest and “restriction in lieu of
arrest,” which it defines in the following manner:
Restriction in lieu of arrest is the restraint of a person
by oral or written orders directing the person to remain
within specified limits; a restricted person shall, unless
otherwise directed, perform full military duties while
restricted.
R.C.M. 304(a)(2). The Discussion proceeds to contrast
restriction in lieu of arrest with arrest:
Restriction in lieu of arrest is a less severe
restraint on liberty than is arrest. Arrest includes
suspension from performing full military duties and the
limits of arrest are normally narrower than those of
restriction in lieu of arrest. The actual nature of the
restraint imposed, and not the characterization of it by
the officer imposing it, will determine whether it is
technically an arrest or restriction in lieu of arrest.
R.C.M. 304(a) Discussion. Articles 9 and 10, UCMJ, do not
preclude such a reading, nor have the parties either challenged
R.C.M. 304 or asked us to overrule Walls, and its progeny.
Indeed, the legislative history to Article 10, UCMJ, supports
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the Rules for Courts-Martial’s more nuanced treatment of the
distinctions between restriction and arrest. These distinctions
take their root in the historical distinctions found in the
Articles of War between open and closed arrest. Indeed, the
legislative history reflects the fact that military practice has
long distinguished between different forms of arrest,
restriction, and confinement, a practice that is now
incorporated, albeit in more clearly distinguished gradations,
in R.C.M. 304 and case law under Articles 9 and 10, UCMJ.
Article 10, UCMJ, traces its origins to the Articles of War
69 and 70. H. Rep. No. 81-491, at 13 (1949); S. Rep. No. 81-
486, at 10 (1949). Article of War 70 required the release of a
prisoner not provided with timely notice of the charges against
him.2
2
This Article was the result of the prolonged confinement of
Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Charles P. Stone without notice
of the charges against him. His confinement followed the defeat
of Union forces under his general command in the Civil War
Battle of Ball’s Bluff. 2 Thomas Yoseloff, Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War 123-34 (1956). Brig. Gen. Stone was arrested
and confined for 188 days without trial at Fort Lafayette. S.
Rep. No. 64-130, at 50, Appendix Revision of the Articles of
War, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Affairs, 64th Cong.
(1916) (statement of Brig. Gen. Enoch H. Crowder, United States
Army) [hereinafter Appendix to S. Rep. No. 64-130, statement of
Brig. Gen. Crowder]. Having been advised of Brig. Gen. Stone’s
“protracted arrest and confinement,” Congress inserted Article
of War 1, which was the basis for Article of War 70 of the 1916
and 1920 Articles of War. Id.
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Article of War 69 of the Articles of War of 19203 outlined
the circumstances of arrest and confinement:
Any person subject to military law charged with crime or
with a serious offense under these articles shall be placed
in confinement or in arrest as the circumstances may
require; but when charged with a minor offense only such
person shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement. Any
person placed in arrest under the provisions of this
article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks,
quarters, or tent, unless such limits shall be enlarged by
proper authority.
The Articles of War 20 (Government Printing Office 1920). In
addition, an arrested officer was deprived of his sword.
Appendix to S. Rep. No. 64-130, statement of Brig. Gen. Crowder
at 74.
However, as the legislation reflects, in practice, arrest
under Article of War 69 was meted out in a manner akin to the
3
Article of War 69 of the Articles of War of 1920 consolidated
Articles of War 65 (arrest of officers) and 66 (arrest of
enlisted soldiers) of the 1874 Articles of War. Appendix to S.
Rep. No. 64-130, statement of Brig. Gen. Crowder, at 73-74.
Article of War 65 stated:
Officers charged with crime shall be arrested and confined
in their barracks, quarters, or tents, and deprived of
their swords by the commanding officer.
Article of War 65 (1874), reprinted in The Military Laws of the
United States 1001 (John Biddle Porter ed., 4th ed. 1901)
(Government Printing Office 1911); William Winthrop, 1 Military
Law 137 (1886). Article 66 stated:
Soldiers charged with crimes shall be confined until tried
by court-martial, or released by proper authority.
Article of War 66 (1874), reprinted in The Military Laws of the
United States, supra at 1001; 1 Winthrop, supra at 157.
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distinctions reflected in the current Rules for Courts-Martial.
Nonetheless, the language of Article of War 69 remained
virtually unchanged from that of its predecessors despite the
fact that “in a large number of cases no arrest [was] imposed at
all” and in other cases servicemembers were placed on
restriction commonly referred to as “open arrest.” Id. Thus,
it appears that the 1920 Articles of War permitted the commander
to exercise discretion under Article of War 69 to impose
confinement, arrest, “open arrest,” or no arrest at all. Id.4
Thus, the legislative history to Article 10, UCMJ, and its
predecessors recognized and incorporated distinctions between
arrest and restriction in lieu of arrest. These distinctions
are also reflected in R.C.M. 304, which is also consistent with
the legislative history discussed above. First, an arrest
historically involved confinement to barracks, quarters, or
tent, in short one’s military living space, however defined.
Second, an arrest historically required the surrender of an
officer’s sword, signifying the suspension of command authority
and the performance of military duties. See 1 Winthrop, supra
note 3, at 140. Finally, there are historical examples of non-
arrest restriction permitted under Articles of War 60 and 70,
4
There also existed a practice of constructive release from
arrest when an officer was returned to duty at his own request
to go into an engagement with his regiment, requiring re-arrest
at the close of the engagement. 1 Winthrop, supra note 3, at
149.
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including the imposition of “open arrest,” but certainly
including the imposition of no arrest at all. As a result,
consistent with Walls and R.C.M. 304, we hold that restriction
and arrest are not conterminous. Rather, as outlined in the
Rules for Courts-Martial, there are gradations of restriction.
Whether a particular restriction amounts to arrest for the
purposes of Article 10, UCMJ, will depend on a contextual
analysis akin to that applied to “close arrest,” including
consideration of such factors as the geographic limits of
constraint, the extent of sign-in requirements, whether
restriction is performed with or without escort, and whether
regular military duties are performed.
In this case, Appellant was restricted to base rather than
to quarters. Although he was required to provide weekly urine
samples, he was permitted to avail himself of all usual base
activities. He was also given a three-day pass to grieve with
his family upon the death of his grandfather. He was not placed
under guard or escort during his base restriction or travel.
Nor did the restriction orders suspend Appellant from performing
full, meaning normal, military duties.5 Appellant has not
demonstrated otherwise. R.C.M. 304(a)(2) (“[A] restricted
person [in lieu of arrest], unless otherwise directed,
5
Appellant filed a motion to attach additional documents,
including the restriction orders. In the context of this case,
we grant Appellant’s motion.
14
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perform[s] full military duties while restricted.”). Thus, we
conclude that in this case Appellant was subject to restriction
not tantamount to arrest during that period following his
seventy-one days in pretrial confinement.
Regardless of the analysis regarding the specified issue,
Appellant argues that the time spent on restriction “counts” for
Article 10, UCMJ, purposes because Article 10 UCMJ, can only be
suspended either by the commencement of trial or dismissal of
the charges. That did not occur in this case until Appellant
was brought to trial 138 days after his initial pretrial
confinement. We disagree.
The right to a speedy trial is expressly guaranteed by
R.C.M. 707 and the Sixth Amendment. Although Article 10, UCMJ,
is generally directed toward the advent of a speedy trial, it is
specifically addressed to a particular harm, namely causing an
accused to languish in confinement or arrest without knowing the
charges against him and without bail. See United States v.
Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122, 124 (C.A.A.F. 2005). Therefore, if the
condition precedent is addressed -- the accused is no longer
confined without knowing the charges of which he is accused and
without opportunity for bail -- the purpose of Article 10, UCMJ,
is vindicated. He is not General Stone. In this case,
Appellant’s placement on restriction not amounting to arrest
removed the particular harm Article 10, UCMJ, was intended to
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United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
address. It did not remove Appellant’s right to a speedy trial
thereafter vindicated through application of R.C.M. 707 and the
Sixth Amendment.
Therefore, we conclude that Appellant’s restriction did not
amount to an arrest under Article 10, UCMJ, and that for the
purposes of Article 10, UCMJ, he was subject to seventy-one days
of “arrest or confinement.”
B. Did Appellant’s Confinement Violate Article 10, UCMJ
Having addressed Appellant’s sixty-seven days of base
restriction and travel, and concluding that they do not trigger
an Article 10, UCMJ, analysis, we now consider whether the
Government met its burden under Article 10, UCMJ, with respect
to the seventy-one days Appellant was in pretrial confinement.
“This Court reviews de novo the question of whether
[Appellant] was denied his rights to a speedy trial under
Article 10, UCMJ, as a matter of law and we are . . . bound by
the facts as found by the military judge unless those facts are
clearly erroneous.” United States v. Cossio, 64 M.J. 254, 256
(C.A.A.F. 2007). “In reviewing claims of a denial of a speedy
trial under Article 10, UCMJ,” this Court has interpreted
“immediate steps” to mean “not . . . constant motion, but
reasonable diligence in bringing the charges to trial.” Id.(quoting Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 127) (quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Government must demonstrate reasonable diligence in
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proceeding toward trial during Appellant’s pretrial confinement.
However, “[b]rief inactivity is not fatal to an otherwise
active, diligent prosecution.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Tibbs, 15 C.M.A. 350, 353, 35 C.M.R. 322, 325 (1965)).
Although Article 10, UCMJ, creates a more stringent speedy
trial standard than a Sixth Amendment analysis, we analyze
alleged Article 10, UCMJ, violations using the four-factor
structure from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): (1)
the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3)
whether Appellant made a demand for speedy trial; and (4)
prejudice to Appellant. Cossio, 64 M.J. at 256; Mizgala, 61
M.J. at 129. “The first factor under the Barker analysis . . .
is to some extent a triggering mechanism, and unless there is a
period of delay that appears, on its face, to be unreasonable
under the circumstances, there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors that go into the balance.” Cossio, 64 M.J. at
257 (quoting United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 208-09 (6th
Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). That is the circumstance
here.
The initial question is therefore whether the seventy-one
days in which Appellant was in pretrial confinement was facially
unreasonable in the context of this case. Certainly, the
prosecution of this case was less than commendable. This is a
random sample urinalysis case, which both parties generally
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agree to be a straightforward class of cases. Even so, the
Government did not prefer the charges, initiate an Article 32,
UCMJ, investigation, forward the charges, or respond to
Appellant’s first three discovery requests, which included
demands for a speedy trial, in a timely manner. However, the
test is reasonable diligence, not textbook prosecution.
Ultimately, an analysis of the first factor is not meant to
be a Barker analysis within a Barker analysis. However, Barker
itself suggests that circumstances that are appropriate to
consider under the first factor include the seriousness of the
offense, the complexity of the case, and the availability of
proof. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 & n.31. Whether the amount
of time is facially unreasonable in an Article 10, UCMJ, context
also depends on other factors specific to the purposes of
Article 10, UCMJ, which is to prevent an accused from
languishing in prison without notice of the charges and without
an opportunity for bail. These additional circumstances include
whether Appellant was informed of the accusations against him,
whether the Government complied with procedures relating to
pretrial confinement, and whether the Government was responsive
to requests for reconsideration of pretrial confinement.
On the one hand, Appellant was placed in pretrial
confinement based on a straightforward accusation of drug use,
supported by four positive samples. On the other hand, evidence
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United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
consisting of the final two positive samples was not reported
until fifteen days into pretrial confinement. In addition, this
became a contested case requiring additional discovery and the
services of an expert witness. Indeed, there was ongoing
discovery throughout the seventy-one days. In addition,
Appellant was informed of the accusations against him as early
as his pretrial confinement hearing, the second day of
confinement. Moreover, absent any complaint by Appellant, and
under the presumption of regularity, we presume the Government
complied with pretrial confinement procedures, including a
twenty-four-hour report to the commander, a forty-eight-hour
probable cause determination, the commander’s seventy-two-hour
memorandum, and a seven-day review. See R.C.M. 305(h)-(i).
Furthermore, the Government responded within two days of
Appellant’s initial request for reconsideration of pretrial
confinement and within one day of Appellant’s expedited request
for reconsideration of pretrial confinement. Having reviewed
the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the period of
seventy-one days was not facially unreasonable under Article 10,
UCMJ, rendering a review of the remaining Barker factors
unnecessary.
Therefore, the lower court did not err in reversing the
trial court decision.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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ERDMANN, Judge, with whom EFFRON, Chief Judge, joins
(dissenting in part and concurring in the result):
This court reviews whether an accused received a speedy
trial “de novo as a legal question, giving substantial deference
to a military judge’s findings of fact that will be reversed
only if they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Mizgala,
61 M.J. 122, 127 (C.A.A.F. 2005). This case presents two
issues: whether Schuber’s base restriction constituted “arrest”
for purposes of an Article 10, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2006), speedy trial motion; and whether
the period of delay resulted in a violation of Article 10, UCMJ.
While I would hold that Schuber’s restriction to base
constituted “arrest” as that term is defined in Article 9, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 809 (2006), I do not believe that Schuber suffered
prejudice based on the delay. In balancing the Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), factors, I would not find an Article 10,
UCMJ, violation. Accordingly, while I respectfully dissent from
the majority’s decision as to the meaning of “arrest” for
purposes of Article 10, I concur in the result as to the Article
10 violation.
Whether Schuber’s Restriction Constituted “Arrest” As That Term
is Defined in Article 9, UCMJ
In calculating the time period for speedy trial purposes,
the military judge included both the period that Schuber was in
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
pretrial confinement and the period he was subject to base
restriction. In reviewing the military judge’s speedy trial
determination, the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals also included both time periods.1 “A military judge is
presumed to know and apply the law correctly.” United States v.
Raya, 45 M.J. 251, 253 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
Article 10 is implicated when a “person subject to this
chapter is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial.”
There is no dispute that the seventy-one days Schuber spent in
pretrial confinement is appropriate for consideration under
Article 10. The issue in contention is whether the sixty-seven
additional days that Schuber was restricted to base constitute
“arrest” as that term is defined in the UCMJ. The only
definition of “arrest” in the UCMJ is found in Article 9: “the
restraint of a person by an order, not imposed as a punishment
for an offense, directing him to remain within certain specified
limits.” Article 9, UCMJ. This court uses well-established
principles of statutory construction to construe provisions in
the Manual for Courts-Martial. United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J.
85, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2007). “The plain language will control,
1
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that it would follow the
decision in United States v. Munkus, 15 M.J. 1013 (A.F.C.M.R.
1983), where the Air Force Court of Military Review included
both the period of confinement and the period of base
restriction in analyzing an Article 10 speedy trial claim.
2
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
unless use of the plain language would lead to an absurd
result.” Id.The majority notes that while this court has found that
some restrictions constitute arrest, others do not. United
States v. Schuber, __ M.J. __ (8-10) (C.A.A.F. 2011). The
majority then examines the legislative history of Article 10 and
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 304 and the “more nuanced
treatment of the distinctions between restriction and arrest.”
Id. at __ (10-11). What is not examined is the clear language
found in the definition of “arrest” in Article 9. Despite that
definition, the majority concludes that:
[w]hether a particular restriction amounts to arrest for
the purposes of Article 10, UCMJ, will depend on a
contextual analysis akin to that applied to “close arrest,”
including consideration of such factors as the geographic
limits of constraint, the extent of sign-in requirements,
whether restriction is performed with or without escort,
and whether regular duties are performed.
Id. at __ (14).
As the language of Articles 9 and 10 are clear and
unambiguous, I do not believe it necessary to delve into either
a “close arrest” contextual analysis or the legislative history
of the term “arrest.” Schuber was restricted to base and
ordered to provide weekly urine samples. Clearly he was
“[restrained] . . . by an order, not imposed as punishment for
an offense, directing him to remain within certain specified
3
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
limits.”2 Article 9, UCMJ. I would find that the military judge
and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly included the time
Schuber was restricted to base in calculating the time period
for speedy trial purposes.
Article 10 Speedy Trial Violation
“The test for assessing an alleged violation of Article 10
is whether the Government has acted with ‘reasonable diligence’
in proceeding to trial.” United States v. Birge, 52 M.J. 209,
211 (C.A.A.F. 1999). “Short periods of inactivity are not fatal
to an otherwise active prosecution.” Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 127.
The military judge issued detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law in finding an Article 10 speedy trial
violation. In his conclusions of law, the military judge
balanced the four factors laid out by the Supreme Court in
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, to evaluate violations of a defendant’s
speedy trial right. While he did not find a Sixth Amendment
speedy trial violation, he did find an Article 10 violation.
2
Even if we were to assume that the plain language of Article 9
was ambiguous as to the definition of arrest, the majority’s
analysis requires an evaluation of whether regular duties are
performed. Schuber, __ M.J. at __ (9) (relying on United States
v. Walls, 9 M.J. 88, 89 (C.M.A. 1980), wherein “appellant’s
commanding officer maintained the appellant in a full-duty
status, but withdrew his pass privileges”). While the majority
notes that “the restriction orders [did not] suspend Appellant
from performing full, meaning normal, military duties,” the
record is silent as to whether Schuber did indeed resume his
regular military duties. Id. at __ (14).
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United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
We have consistently held that:
Article 10 creates a more exacting speedy trial demand
than does the Sixth Amendment. . . . While the full
scope of this “more exacting” Article 10 right has not
been precisely defined by this court, it cannot be
“more exacting” and at the same time be “consistent”
with Sixth Amendment protections.
Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 124-25 (citations omitted). We have noted
that while “Sixth Amendment speedy trial standards cannot
dictate whether there has been an Article 10 violation, the
factors from Barker v. Wingo are an apt structure for examining
the facts and circumstances surrounding an alleged Article 10
violation.” Id. at 127. As we discussed in Mizgala, the four
Barker factors are: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) whether appellant made a demand for a speedy
trial; and (4) prejudice to the appellant. Id. at 129.
Length of delay
The majority analyzes this factor utilizing the seventy-
one-day period that Schuber was in pretrial confinement in
finding that the delay was not unreasonable on its face and that
the Barker test therefore was not triggered. Schuber, __ M.J.
at (19). Were we dealing only with a seventy-one-day delay,
I might agree with the majority’s analysis. However, as I would
include the entire 138-day time period, our prior cases make it
clear that a delay of that duration is sufficient to trigger the
5
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
full Barker analysis in an Article 10 context.3 See United
States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258, 261 (C.M.A. 1993) (holding that
“nothing in Article 10 that suggests that speedy-trial motions
could not succeed where a period under 90- or 120-days is
involved.”); see also Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 128-29 (117-day delay
triggered the full Barker analysis); United States v. Cossio, 64
M.J. 254, 257 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (117 days); United States v.
Thompson, 68 M.J. 308, 312 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (145 days).
Reasons for the delay
At the trial level the Government argued that the initial
seventy-five-day delay was due to the “adjudicative process” and
the press of other business. As to the period of delay after
referral, the Government argued that the delay was justified as
they had to wait for a particular expert from the Air Force Drug
Testing Laboratory. After taking testimony on the speedy trial
motion, the military judge found that the Government had been
unconcerned with the multiple speedy trial requests in this
case. The military judge noted that of the ten cases that were
completed while Schuber was in confinement, only one involved an
individual in pretrial confinement who had made a speedy trial
3
The Court of Criminal Appeals also found that when “the
appellee has been in nearly continuous confinement and restraint
for 138 days and made a timely demand for a speedy trial, the
length of delay is sufficient to trigger the full Barker
inquiry. United States v. Schuber, No. 2010-14 2010, slip op.
at 5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2010) (unpublished).
6
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
request. Noting that the Government had failed to notify the
court of the pre-referral speedy trial requests, which reflected
its lack of concern for processing the case in a timely manner,
the military judge concluded that this was a commonplace
urinalysis drug case that was factually “uncomplicated and
unproblematic.” In this context I do not believe the military
judge erred when he concluded that “in looking at the proceeding
as a whole, the government did not expeditiously move this case
along.”
Demand for a speedy trial
It is not disputed that Schuber made six demands for a
speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals questioned the
sincerity of the speedy trial requests as they were included as
part of Schuber’s discovery requests and therefore found that
the defense’s desire to move the case along was “debatable.”
Schuber, No. 2010-14, slip op. at 7. In reaching this finding
the lower court was making findings of fact, as it is permitted
to do under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2006).
However, the principle stated in Cossio, 64 M.J. at 257, that a
military judge “must be careful to restrict findings of fact to
things, events, deeds or circumstances that ‘actually exist’ as
distinguished from ‘legal effect, consequence or
interpretation’” is equally applicable to a Court of Criminal
Appeals when it engages in its fact-finding function. The lower
7
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
court discounted Schuber’s requests for a speedy trial by
speculating that the requests were somehow not serious.
Schuber, No. 2010-14, slip op. at 7. However, the record
reflects that the requests were made and without further
evidence on the record, they must stand for what they are -- six
requests for a speedy trial.
Prejudice
Barker explained that prejudice “should be assessed in the
light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial
right was designed to protect.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Those
three interests are: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired.” Id. The Supreme Court noted that the most
serious factor is the third, the possibility that the defense
will be impaired by the delay. Id.In the defense motion to dismiss, Schuber argued that he
suffered anxiety and concern after missing the funerals of two
close family members. The military judge found that though
Schuber suffered “some prejudice” after missing the funerals of
two family members and the anxiety of awaiting court-martial
proceedings, he did not suffer prejudice “sufficient to violate
the Sixth Amendment.” Nevertheless, properly recognizing that
Sixth Amendment speedy trial standards do not dictate whether
8
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
there has been an Article 10 speedy trial violation, the
military judge went on to find a violation of Article 10.
As to the first Barker prejudice factor, it is clear that
Schuber did not suffer oppressive incarceration, nor does he
make that argument. As to the third Barker prejudice factor,
whether the defense was impaired by the delay, Schuber concedes
that he had not suffered “extensive prejudice to his defense”
although he argues that he suffered “legitimate prejudice.” In
this case, as in Mizgala, there is “no indication that his
preparation for trial, defense evidence, trial strategy, or
ability to present witnesses . . . [was] compromised by the
processing time in this case.” Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 129.
In regard to the second prong, the question as to whether
the anxiety Schuber suffered as a result of missing the funerals
of family members constitutes sufficient prejudice for Article
10 purposes, presents a closer question. I agree with the
military judge that Schuber did suffer some anxiety in this
regard but also agree with his determination that the anxiety
did not reach the level of Sixth Amendment prejudice. As we
have noted, however, the Sixth Amendment speedy trial
determination does not necessarily dictate the result in an
Article 10 analysis and further inquiry is necessary.
Here the record reflects that the Government took steps to
minimize Schuber’s anxiety by granting his request for release
9
United States v. Schuber, No. 11-6002/AF
from pretrial confinement and placing him on base restriction,
as well as granting his request for leave to attend his
grandfather’s funeral. While Schuber was not released from
confinement in time to make it to the funeral service, he was
able to join his family in the days following the funeral. In
light of these accommodations by the Government to minimize
Schuber’s anxiety and concern, even under the more stringent
Article 10 analysis, I do not believe that he suffered prejudice
for Article 10 purposes.
While I would find that Schuber’s restriction to base
constituted “arrest” for purposes of Article 10, in balancing
the Barker factors in an Article 10 context, I would find that
they weigh in favor of the Government and would affirm the CCA’s
reversal of the military judge’s ruling on the Article 10
violation.
10