United States v. Chatfield , 2009 CAAF LEXIS 738 ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Stephen P. CHATFIELD, Lieutenant Junior Grade
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 08-0615
Crim. App. No. 200602256
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 5, 2009
Decided June 26, 2009
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and STUCKY, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Kathleen L. Kadlec, JAGC, USN
(argued).
For Appellee: Captain Geoffrey S. Shows, USMC (argued); Brian
K. Keller, Esq., and Major Tai D. Le, USMC.
Amicus Curiae for Appellant: Natasha Nisttahuz (law student)
(argued); Daniel H. Benson, Esq. (supervising attorney), Clayton
Hightower (law student), Scott Luu (law student), Eric R. Pace
(law student) (on brief); Charles Pelowski (law student) -- of
the Texas Tech School of Law.
Amicus Curiae for Appellee: Jonathon C. Clark (law student)
(argued); Richard D. Rosen, Esq. (supervising attorney), James
V. Leito IV (law student); Jared M. Miller (law student), James
J. Mustin (law student), Courtney G. Stamper (law student) (on
brief) -- of the Texas Tech University School of Law.
Military Judge: Daniel E. O’Toole
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
I. Introduction
This case presents the questions whether the military judge
properly admitted statements Appellant gave to a civilian police
officer after being brought to the police station by his
executive officer (XO), and whether the evidence was legally
sufficient to support the guilty verdict.1 Under the facts as
found by the military judge, and credited as not clearly
erroneous by the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals (CCA) and this Court, we agree that Appellant’s
statements were voluntary and properly admitted into evidence.
Because Appellant was not in custody at any time, he was not
entitled to receive warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966). Further, the record demonstrates that
Appellant’s statements were the product of his free will and
thus voluntarily given. Considering these statements along with
the other evidence presented at trial, there was legally
1
We granted the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
MILITARY JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO SUPPRESS APPELLANT’S STATEMENT TO CIVILIAN
AUTHORITIES AS INVOLUNTARY.
II. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO AFFIRM APPELLANT’S
CONVICTION.
2
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
sufficient evidence to support the verdict. The decision of the
CCA is affirmed.2
II. Background
On October 13, 2004, Appellant, Ensign (ENS) R, and several
other servicemembers assigned to the USS Austin went on liberty
to Jacksonville Beach, Florida. Early the next morning, ENS R
filed a police report and complaint with the Jacksonville Beach
Police Department against Appellant for sexual assault.
Appellant was later interviewed by civilian Detective Amonette,
of the Jacksonville Beach Police Department. By the end of the
interview, Appellant had provided oral and written inculpatory
statements to Detective Amonette. These statements were
introduced into evidence at Appellant’s general court-martial,
which ultimately convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of
committing an indecent assault on ENS R in violation of Article
134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934
(2000). The convening authority approved the conviction and the
adjudged sentence of a dismissal. The CCA affirmed, finding
that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by
admitting Appellant’s statements. United States v. Chatfield,
2
Oral argument in this case was heard at the Texas Tech
University School of Law, Lubbock, Texas, as part of the Court’s
“Project Outreach.” See United States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346,
347 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2003). This practice was developed as part of
a public awareness program to demonstrate the operation of a
federal court of appeals and the military justice system.
3
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
No. NMCCA 200602256, 2008 CCA LEXIS 143, at *11 2008 WL 961497,
at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2008) (unpublished).
A. Facts
Detective Amonette contacted the USS Austin and spoke with
Commander (CDR) Landis, the XO, and requested to speak with
Appellant, if possible.3 CDR Landis told Detective Amonette that
Appellant was on shore leave, but that CDR Landis would inform
Appellant when he returned that Detective Amonette wished to
speak with him. CDR Landis and the commanding officer of the
USS Austin discussed the allegations, but decided not to pursue
any action against Appellant under the UCMJ at that time.
Although CDR Landis spoke with a Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS) agent to coordinate the communication with local
law enforcement, CDR Landis did not ask NCIS to begin a military
investigation of Appellant.
3
As a threshold matter, we agree with the CCA’s conclusion that
the military judge’s findings of fact concerning Appellant’s
interview are not clearly erroneous, Chatfield, 2008 CCA LEXIS
143, at *8, 2008 WL 961497, at *3. Consequently, the following
summary of facts related to Appellant’s statements is largely
derived from those findings. In his brief to this Court,
Appellant challenges several of the military judge’s factual
findings as erroneous and also asserts the military judge failed
to credit certain testimony given by witnesses at the
suppression hearing. Contrary to these assertions, we find that
the factual findings challenged by Appellant are either
irrelevant to the issues at hand or adequately supported by the
record. Those disputed findings that bear on the outcome of
this case are analyzed within the discussion section below.
4
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
When Appellant returned to the USS Austin, CDR Landis sent
word to him that the Jacksonville Beach Police wished to talk to
him and that, if Appellant was willing, CDR Landis would arrange
a way for him to attend the interview. CDR Landis did not speak
directly with Appellant, but rather sent him the message by way
of one of two department heads. CDR Landis could not remember
which department head, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Hofheinz or
Lieutenant (LT) Compton, he instructed to notify Appellant.
Because the ship was sailing the next day, CDR Landis also told
the department head that if Appellant wanted to speak with the
police, the interview would have to take place that day.
Appellant testified that department head LCDR Hofheinz told him
to change into civilian clothes and to go to the chaplain’s
stateroom, without disclosing why. In the stateroom, the
chaplain informed Appellant of the accusations against him.
Some time later, CDR Landis received word back that
Appellant was willing to speak with the police. It is not clear
whether this word came from LCDR Hofheinz, LT Compton, or the
chaplain. CDR Landis and LCDR Hofheinz then went to the
chaplain’s stateroom, where CDR Landis knocked on the door and
said “Let’s go.” Concerned about not embarrassing Appellant in
front of the rest of the crew, CDR Landis informed the officer
on duty that he and Appellant, along with LCDR Hofheinz and the
5
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
chaplain, were going ashore for dinner. The four then left the
ship and drove by car to the Jacksonville Beach police station.
During the ride to the police station, CDR Landis discussed
the plan to drop Appellant off for the interview, while the
other three officers would wait at a nearby restaurant. At no
point did Appellant object or express resistance to going to the
police station. Appellant admitted during his suppression
hearing testimony that CDR Landis “never told him he had to go
to the police interview and never told him to make a statement
to the police.”
Detective Amonette met Appellant and CDR Landis at the
police station around 7:00 that evening. As it was a Saturday,
there were no other police present at the station. When they
arrived at the police station, CDR Landis and Appellant exited
the car. Although CDR Landis testified he expected Appellant to
follow him into the station, CDR Landis did not physically
escort him in -- CDR Landis did not open the car door for
Appellant or hold his arm. Once CDR Landis and Appellant were
inside, Detective Amonette spoke with CDR Landis in the presence
of Appellant. Detective Amonette stated that the interview
would only last a few minutes and that CDR Landis could wait at
the station. CDR Landis answered that he and the others were
going to have dinner at a nearby restaurant. Detective Amonette
and CDR Landis exchanged phone numbers with the understanding
6
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
that Detective Amonette would either drop Appellant off to join
the others at the restaurant or call CDR Landis to pick up
Appellant.
After CDR Landis and the other officers left, Detective
Amonette brought Appellant into his office, rather than one of
the station’s interrogation rooms. This office contained
typical office furniture and Detective Amonette’s personal
effects. Appellant was neither handcuffed nor placed under
arrest at this time. During the interview, Detective Amonette
sat at his desk, while Appellant sat in a chair across from the
detective. The office doors were open and Appellant had
unimpeded access to them.
The military judge found the evidence was insufficient to
show that Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights prior to
the interview.4 Detective Amonette did not specifically tell
Appellant that he was free to leave or that he did not have to
make a statement. After five to ten minutes of questions,
Appellant made a written statement to the effect that he did not
4
At the suppression hearing, Detective Amonette testified that
his usual practice was to give Miranda warnings before
interviews that involved serious charges, such as the charge in
this case, but could not recall specifically whether he had
warned Appellant. At trial, Detective Amonette testified that
he had consulted his notes and confirmed he had given the
Miranda warnings prior to the interview. However, this
testimony played no part in the military judge’s ruling on the
motion to suppress because it occurred after he issued the
ruling.
7
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
remember the events on the night in question. Before concluding
the interview, Detective Amonette mentioned to Appellant that
the victim had undergone a forensic exam and asked whether
Appellant’s DNA might be found on the victim. Appellant then
asked whether DNA could come from a finger. After Detective
Amonette answered that it could, Appellant admitted that he
touched the victim “down below” and might have penetrated her.
Detective Amonette was surprised that Appellant gave a
statement. Detective Amonette consulted the state attorney and
then called ENS R to see if she wanted to pursue the matter.
After the call to ENS R, Detective Amonette was instructed by
the state attorney to arrest Appellant. The total time that
elapsed between the start of the interview and Appellant’s
arrest was less than one hour, and the interview “was conducted
in a conversational manner without the use of intimidating or
coercive techniques.”
B. Appellant’s Motion to Suppress
At his court-martial, Appellant moved to suppress the
statements he made to Detective Amonette. Specifically,
Appellant argued that his confession was obtained in violation
of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
This argument was based on Appellant’s assertions that: (1) CDR
Landis’s actions were tantamount to an order that Appellant give
Detective Amonette a statement; (2) Detective Amonette failed to
8
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
give Appellant Miranda warnings despite the fact that he was in
custody; and (3) the coercive actions of the civilian police
overbore Appellant’s free will, making his resulting statements
involuntary. At the suppression hearing, the Government
presented testimony by Detective Amonette and CDR Landis. The
defense presented testimony by the department head LCDR Hofheinz
and by Appellant, who testified for the limited purpose of the
suppression hearing, pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence
304(f). Neither the chaplain nor LT Compton testified.
As relevant to the granted issue regarding the statements
to Detective Amonette, the military judge’s conclusions of law
were that: (1) Appellant was not in custody and Detective
Amonette was not required to administer Miranda warnings before
the interview; (2) CDR Landis’s actions did not amount to an
order to Appellant to make a statement to Detective Amonette;
and (3) the civilian police’s actions were not coercive.5 In
5
In addition, in response to Appellant’s argument that his
statements should be suppressed due to CDR Landis’s failure to
give Appellant warnings under Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 831(b) (2000), the military judge found that CDR Landis never
questioned Appellant. By its terms, Article 31(b), UCMJ, only
applies when a member of the military “interrogate[s], or
request[s] any statement from, an accused or a person suspected
of an offense[.]” Article 31(b), UCMJ. Further, the military
judge also found that CDR Landis’s actions were not part of a
military or civilian law enforcement investigation. See United
States v. Loukas, 29 M.J. 385, 387 (C.M.A. 1990) (holding that
Article 31, UCMJ, is only triggered when there is a questioner
acting in an official capacity and the questioning is done as
part of an official law enforcement investigation). Appellant
9
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
light of these conclusions, the military judge held that
Appellant’s statements to Detective Amonette were admissible.
In support of his ruling, the military judge entered
findings of fact and made credibility determinations for CDR
Landis, Detective Amonette, and Appellant. He concluded that
CDR Landis was “a highly credible witness” who was “forthright
and responsive in his answers.” Detective Amonette was
“sincere” and “honest” although also an “ill-prepared witness.”
Finally, the military judge found Appellant was a “defensive”
witness with an “aggressive attitude” who was “unconvincing due
to the manner, tone, and content of his responses.”
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A military judge’s denial of a motion to suppress a
confession is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Pipkin, 58 M.J. 358, 360 (C.A.A.F. 2003). We will not
disturb a military judge’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. United States
v. Leedy, 65 M.J. 208, 213 (C.A.A.F. 2007). However, we review
de novo any conclusions of law supporting the suppression
ruling, including: (1) whether someone is in custody for the
did not challenge the military judge’s conclusion that no
Article 31, UCMJ, warnings were required, either before the CCA
or in his brief to this Court, and we decline to revisit that
issue here.
10
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
purposes of Miranda warnings, Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
112-13 (1995); or (2) whether a confession is involuntary,
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); United States
v. Bubonics, 45 M.J. 93, 94 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
B. Custodial Interrogations
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme
Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444. It further held that the
safeguard must take the form of specific warnings –- “[p]rior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. Appellant
argues that his statements should have been suppressed based on
Detective Amonette’s failure to give him these Miranda warnings
before the interview began. The Government asserts that
warnings were not required because Appellant was not in custody
during his interview.
11
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
In Miranda, the Supreme Court defined custodial
interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.
(emphasis added). To answer the question whether an accused is
in custody for purposes of Miranda, we consider “all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation” to determine “how a
reasonable person in the position of the [accused] would gauge
the breadth of his or her freedom of action.” Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 325 (1994) (quotation marks
omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that two inquiries are
essential to a custody determination: “first, what were the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given
those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave.” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112. We consider the facts
objectively in the context of a reasonable person’s perception
when situated in Appellant’s position. See Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (holding that a policeman’s subjective
belief did not bear on whether an accused was in custody).
To be considered in custody for purposes of Miranda, a
reasonable person in Appellant’s position must have believed he
or she was restrained in a “formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
12
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per
curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As an initial
matter, there is no per se rule that whenever a suspect appears
at a police station for questioning, the suspect is therefore in
custody. See id. (“[W]e have explicitly recognized that Miranda
warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes
place in the station house.’” (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 495 (1977))). The Supreme Court has looked to several
factors when determining whether a person has been restrained,
including: (1) whether the person appeared for questioning
voluntarily; (2) the location and atmosphere of the place in
which questioning occurred, and (3) the length of the
questioning. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (finding no custody
when the appellant voluntarily went to the police station, where
he was immediately told he was not under arrest, and left after
a thirty-minute interview). In addition, the federal circuit
courts of appeals have evaluated the circumstances of an
interrogation based on a variety of factors, including “‘the
number of law enforcement officers present at the scene [and]
the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect.’”
United States v. Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 809 (1st Cir.
1987) (finding custody where the appellant was physically
13
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
restrained by eight officers in his home and questioned for
ninety minutes to two hours).
We conclude, in agreement with the military judge and the
CCA, that Appellant was not in custody. Appellant asserts that
the mere involvement of CDR Landis and other officers created a
custodial situation from the time he learned from the chaplain
that civilian authorities wanted to speak to him up to and
including his interview with the civilian police. However, the
facts as found by the military judge support the military
judge’s conclusion that Appellant was not in custody.
1. Voluntary Appearance
As to whether Appellant appeared for questioning
voluntarily, we conclude that CDR Landis and the other officers
did not compel Appellant to go to the police station. First, as
Appellant himself acknowledged, neither CDR Landis nor any other
officer ordered Appellant to go to the station or to answer
questions once he was there. To the contrary, the military
judge found that CDR Landis gave Appellant a choice whether to
speak to the civilian police and received word back from
Appellant that he voluntarily agreed to go. Although Appellant
testified that he “felt compelled” to go to the station, he did
not identify any express order from a superior establishing that
obligation. While Appellant indicated that he felt compelled by
the circumstances of being taken to the police station by his
14
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
XO, the military judge found that Appellant’s testimony was not
credible, and Appellant has not demonstrated on appeal that the
military judge’s findings of fact related to the alleged
compulsion were clearly erroneous. United States v. Owens, 51
M.J. 204, 209 (C.A.A.F. 1999). Second, Appellant was never
physically restrained, either on board the USS Austin or in the
car on the way to the police station. Third, the actions of CDR
Landis and the other officers were designed to facilitate an
interview prior to the ship leaving if Appellant chose to
participate and to keep the civilian authority’s interest in
Appellant confidential; a fair reading of the record is that
Appellant understood both these things. Finally, we also find
it telling that much of the communication was made to Appellant
through the chaplain, who is outside the chain of command and
normally is not a conduit through which orders are conveyed.
2. Environment of the Interview
Having concluded that Appellant was not ordered to appear
at the station, we will look to the environment created by the
civilian police -- including the location, atmosphere, and
physical restraint involved in the questioning -- to determine
whether that environment resulted in a custodial situation.
Given the other circumstances of the interview, a reasonable
person in Appellant’s situation would have realized that he was
free to leave and would not have believed he was subject to a
15
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
“formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
At the time of the interview, there were no other police
officers at the station. In front of Appellant, Detective
Amonette stated that it would be a short interview. Further,
Detective Amonette and CDR Landis made plans for returning
Appellant to the officers for dinner, thereby conveying the
impression that Appellant would not have to remain at the police
station indefinitely.6 Cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (stating
that Miranda warnings are designed to prevent the “inherent
pressures” resulting from “an interrogator’s imprecations,
whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will
continue until a confession is obtained”). Detective Amonette
took Appellant to his office rather than an interrogation room.
They spoke for less than one hour, which included the time
Detective Amonette spent calling the State Attorney and ENS R.
The entire interview was conducted with the office door open.
6
Appellant disputes the military judge’s finding that there were
plans in place for Appellant to rejoin the other officers for
dinner. However, this finding is supported by CDR Landis’s
testimony that during the ride to the police station he “talked
through the . . . plan to drop [Appellant] off” while “the other
three of us were going to dinner at a restaurant . . . and that
when the interview was completed, he could either call us, or if
we finished dinner, we would come back, pick him up and get him
something to eat before we went back to the ship.”
16
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
Appellant was neither handcuffed nor told he could not leave.
Detective Amonette described the interview as “very relaxed” and
“casual.” Appellant admitted that Detective Amonette was “not
accusatory” during the interview. That the interview was not
coercive is also supported by Detective Amonette’s testimony
that he was surprised that Appellant made inculpatory
statements.
The facts as a whole show that Appellant’s interview, which
was facilitated by members of his command in a manner designed
to avoid embarrassment to Appellant, did not contain the
“inherently compelling pressures” with which the Miranda Court
was concerned. 384 U.S. at 467. Rather, the atmosphere of the
interview would have made it transparent to a reasonable person
in Appellant’s position that he was not subject to “formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125.
C. Voluntariness of Appellant’s Confession
While Miranda warnings provide procedural safeguards to
secure the right against self-incrimination during custodial
interrogations, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect an accused generally against the
admission of any involuntary statements, whether made in or out
of custody. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433-34
(2000) (reviewing the Court’s jurisprudence on involuntary
17
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
statements). Appellant asserts that the actions taken by CDR
Landis and Appellant’s other superiors were tantamount to an
order requiring Appellant to give the civilian police a
statement, rendering Appellant’s subsequent statement
involuntary.
When introducing a confession, the Government has the
burden of showing “the confession is the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.”
Bubonics, 45 M.J. at 95. We review the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether Appellant’s “will was
overborne and his capacity for self-determination was critically
impaired.” Id. The factors to consider include “‘both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
This Court has previously found it appropriate to consider
the accused’s age, education, experience, and intelligence as
part of the circumstances bearing on the question whether a
statement was voluntary. United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451,
454 (C.A.A.F. 2008). In this case, Appellant was a thirty-six-
year-old officer with about twelve years of experience in the
Navy, including both active and reserve service. Appellant had
experience with several of his subordinates being investigated
for crimes under the UCMJ. There is no evidence in the record
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United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
that Appellant was of low intelligence or had any mental
disability to prevent him from understanding the investigative
procedures. Overall, Appellant’s characteristics weigh in favor
of his statement being found voluntary.
Turning to the details of the meeting with Detective
Amonette, the facts of this case do not suggest that CDR Landis
expressly or impliedly ordered Appellant to give a statement to
the civilian police. Certainly, it is unclear what exact
message was communicated to Appellant regarding the interview,
and the military judge’s findings of fact do not settle this
particular point. But the military judge expressly found that
CDR Landis sent a message down to Appellant advising him that an
interview would be facilitated should he choose to go -- a
finding supported by the record. In addition, CDR Landis
testified that he had received word that Appellant had agreed
voluntarily to speak with the civilian police. The only direct
communication from CDR Landis to Appellant before leaving the
USS Austin was to say “Let’s go” when he arrived at the
chaplain’s office. None of these statements constituted orders
to Appellant that he was either required to go to the police
station to be interviewed or that he was required to give a
statement once there.
In addition, the military judge specifically found
Appellant’s testimony that he felt compelled to make a statement
19
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA
was “simply not believable.” We grant deference to this
determination because “the military judge was in a unique
position to decide the appropriate weight to give appellant’s
assertion of an overborne will.” United States v. Martinez, 38
M.J. 82, 86 (C.M.A. 1993) (“Where, as here, the military judge
expresses special influence of that unique viewpoint on his
judgment, that expression must weigh heavily in our reaching our
own determination.”).7
The conclusion that Appellant’s statements were voluntary
is further buttressed by the lack of evidence of any
overreaching tactics employed by Detective Amonette. As
Appellant himself testified, Detective Amonette was not
accusatory, which supports the military judge’s finding that the
interview was “conversational” in tone. It was short and
undertaken with the expectation that Appellant would be free to
have dinner with the officers after it was over. Indeed,
Appellant conceded at argument on the suppression motion that
there were no coercive police tactics employed.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
neither CDR Landis’s actions in facilitating Appellant’s
7
In addition, the military judge’s specific finding regarding
Appellant’s credibility explains why he did not rely on
speculative answers to defense cross-examination, either from
Detective Amonette, that he “had the perception that [Appellant]
had the impression that he had to speak with” him, or from CDR
Landis, that Appellant “could have” felt compelled to appear for
the interview.
20
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interview nor the interview itself created a situation that
impaired Appellant’s “capacity for self-determination,”
Bubonics, 45 M.J. at 95, to an extent that his subsequent
statements were involuntary.
D. Conclusion
The events leading up to and taking place during Detective
Amonette’s interview of Appellant created neither a custodial
situation in which Miranda warnings were required nor a coercive
setting in which Appellant’s will was overborne. We conclude
that Appellant’s statements to Detective Amonette were given
voluntarily, and, as such, the military judge did not abuse his
discretion by admitting them.
IV. Legal Sufficiency of Evidence
In his second point of error, Appellant alleges the
evidence was legally insufficient for the panel to return a
guilty verdict. We review questions of legal sufficiency de
novo. United States v. Young, 64 M.J. 404, 407 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
The test for legal sufficiency is “whether, considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dobson,
63 M.J. 1, 21 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
21
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The elements of indecent assault under Article 134, UCMJ,
are that: (1) the accused assaulted a person; (2) the act was
done to gratify sexual desires; and (3) the conduct was
prejudicial to good order or of a nature to bring discredit to
the armed forces. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt.
IV, para. 63.b. (2005 ed.). Appellant specifically asserts the
second element -- that the act was done with the intent to
gratify sexual desires -- was insufficiently proved. After
reviewing the record, we hold that the evidence produced by the
Government at trial was legally sufficient to prove each element
beyond a reasonable doubt.
At trial, in addition to the statements made by Appellant
to Detective Amonette, the Government offered testimony from ENS
R that she woke on a bed in the group’s shared hotel room to
find Appellant behind her and her underwear pulled down around
her knees. She testified that she felt like she had been
penetrated. Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) Buckner, who
witnessed the incident, testified that he saw Appellant grabbing
ENS R’s breast and saw movement under the covers around ENS R’s
waist. LTJG Buckner also testified that he saw Appellant turn
away and button his pants after ENS R awoke. The panel would
have considered this evidence in conjunction with Appellant’s
statements to Detective Amonette that he had rubbed ENS R “down
below” and that he might have penetrated her. Based on the
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evidence presented, the panel could have reasonably concluded
that Appellant digitally penetrated ENS R with the intent to
gratify his sexual desires and that this conduct was prejudicial
to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit
to the armed forces.
V. Decision
We hold that the military judge did not abuse his
discretion by admitting Appellant’s statements to Detective
Amonette and that there was legally sufficient evidence to
support the panel’s verdict. The decision of the United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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