United States v. Brooks , 2008 CAAF LEXIS 540 ( 2008 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
David M. BROOKS, Lance Corporal
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 07-0639
Crim. App. No. 200501266
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 4, 2008
Decided May 1, 2008
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Heather L. Cassidy, JAGC, USN
(argued); Lieutenant Richard H. McWilliams, JAGC, USN.
For Appellee: Captain James W. Weirick, USMC (argued);
Commander Paul C. LeBlanc, JAGC, USN, and Lieutenant Derek D.
Butler, JAGC, USN (on brief); Major Brian K. Keller, USMC.
Military Judges: Jeffrey P. Colwell, M. H. Sitler, and M. J.
Griffith
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Brooks, No. 07-0639/MC
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review in this case to decide whether brig
personnel violated Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to
appellate counsel by monitoring his telephone conversations with
his appellate counsel and by seizing his privileged
correspondence. We hold that, even assuming some interference
with his attorney-client relationship, Appellant failed to
articulate or show any prejudice, and affirm.
I.
Appellant pled guilty at a general court-martial to failing
to obey a restriction order, obstruction of justice, and
adultery. Articles 92 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 934 (2000). Contrary to Appellant’s
pleas, the military judge also found Appellant guilty of
assault, obstructing justice, and unlawful entry. Articles 128
and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 928, 934 (2000). The convening
authority approved the adjudged sentence -- a dishonorable
discharge, confinement for ninety-three months, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted
grade. The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals (NMCCA) affirmed. United States v. Brooks, NMCCA No.
200501266, 2007 CCA LEXIS 166, at *26, 2007 WL 1704348, at *8
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 16, 2007).
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II.
After trial, Appellant was confined in the brig at Camp
Lejeune. On May 3, 2006, Appellant’s appellate counsel e-mailed
brig officials, relaying Appellant’s complaints that brig
officials (1) stood so close to him during his telephone
conversations with his appellate counsel that they could
overhear what he was saying, and (2) seized a copy of a brig
regulation sent to him by his appellate counsel. The brig
officer admitted that the monitors were in the room when a
prisoner was using the telephone, but denied that they were so
close as to overhear Appellant’s conversations with his
attorney. The brig officer also informed defense counsel that
the brig regulation was confiscated because it “contain[ed]
sensitive information concerning Brig Operations” such that “it
[wa]s considered contraband and [wa]s unauthorized.”
On May 13, 2006, Appellant filed a complaint pursuant to
Article 138, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2000), that included
concerns about brig personnel listening to his telephone
conversations with his attorney, restricting the number of calls
he could place to his attorney, and opening and reading his
attorney-client privileged mail. After speaking with the
commanding officer, Appellant withdrew this complaint based on
assurances that the command would address Appellant’s concerns.
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Appellant filed another complaint in September 2007 that
included allegations that his privileged correspondence was
being unlawfully opened and read, but did not repeat the prior
allegation that his phone conversations were being improperly
monitored.1 Pursuant to a November 2007 formal investigation,
the investigating officer found that Appellant’s privileged
correspondence had been restricted three times in 2007 for
mailing or attempting to mail out contraband.2 He also found
that all of Appellant’s incoming and outgoing privileged
correspondence had been delivered, although one piece of
incoming privileged correspondence had been received at the brig
unsealed. He concluded that the brig properly handled prisoner
privileged correspondence and that the restrictions on
Appellant’s privileged correspondence accorded with applicable
directives.3
1
Nevertheless, during the resulting Commander’s Investigation,
Appellant mentioned in passing that he felt he could not
“effectively communicate with lawyers (civilian and military
appellate), even over the phone.”
2
Appellant was alleged to have mailed white powder, dust, dirt,
lint, and hair to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and to have
attempted to mail white powder and dirt to his appellate defense
counsel.
3
At oral argument, Appellant’s counsel stated that there was no
evidence that the Government had interfered with Appellant’s
communications after the case was docketed at this Court. We
now grant her February 15, 2008, motion to correct errata in
which she explained that Appellant’s June 18, 2007, affidavit
and the November 8, 2007, Command Investigation contain
assertions of interference with attorney-client communications.
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III.
Appellant raised the same issue concerning the denial of
his right to appellate counsel at the court below. The NMCCA
found the issue unripe for review “in that the appellant has
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.”
Brooks, 2007 CCA LEXIS 166, at *25, 2007 WL 1704348, at *7. The
court opined that even if Appellant had overcome the ripeness
problem, “the evidence before us fails to show how the alleged
improper brig practices have negatively impacted the appellant’s
ability to actively participate with his appellate counsel in
the appellate process.” Id. at *25, 2007 WL 1704348, at *7.
Appellant alleges that the ability of brig personnel to
overhear his telephone conversations with his appellate counsel
chilled his attorney-client communications and, thus, deprived
him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Claiming
structural error, he asks this Court to set aside the lower
court’s decision and order the NMCCA to conduct another review
under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2000). Instead,
we affirm the lower court’s decision. Any error was not
structural and Appellant failed to show prejudice.
IV.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has extended the right
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to counsel to first appeals guaranteed as a matter of right.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97 (1985). In military
jurisprudence, “[a]n accused has the right to effective
representation by counsel through the entire period of review
following trial, including representation before the Court of
Criminal Appeals and [this] Court by appellate counsel appointed
under Article 70, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (2000).” Diaz v. Judge
Advocate General of the Navy, 59 M.J. 34, 37 (C.A.A.F. 2003);
accord United States v. Adams, 59 M.J. 367, 370 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
Necessarily included in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
the right of an accused to confer privately with his attorney.
United States v. Godshalk, 44 M.J. 487, 490 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-91 (1976) (holding
that, by sequestering the accused from his attorney for
seventeen hours during an overnight recess of the trial, the
trial court impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment).
Not all impingements on attorney-client communication
constitute per se violations of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel thereby requiring reversal. See United States v.
Pinson, 56 M.J. 489, 492 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)). Per se violations are limited to
“structural errors” and require no proof of prejudice for
reversal. “Structural errors involve errors in the trial
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mechanism” so serious that “a criminal trial cannot reliably
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991).
They are not amenable to harmless error review and will always
result in reversal if properly preserved for appeal. Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993). Generally, for all
other errors, an appellant must show an effect on the
proceedings or prejudice to substantial rights. Fulminante, 499
U.S. at 306. There is a “strong presumption” that an error is
not structural. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986),
overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 637 (1993).
The Supreme Court has recognized two tests for structural
error: (1) when a court is faced with “the difficulty of
assessing the effect of the error,” as in:
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984)
(violation of the public-trial guarantee is not
subject to harmlessness review because “the benefits
of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult
to prove, or a matter of chance”); Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (“[W]hen a petit jury has
been selected upon improper criteria or has been
exposed to prejudicial publicity, we have required
reversal of the conviction because the effect of the
violation cannot be ascertained”).
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564 n.4
(2006) (holding denial of counsel of choice is not subject to
harmless error analysis because of difficulty in assessing the
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effect of the error in light of the many unquantifiable and
indeterminate variables involved in representation); and (2)
when harmlessness is irrelevant, as in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (“Since the right to self-
representation is a right that when exercised usually increases
the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant,
its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis”).
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2564 n.4
This case fits neither structural error category. If an
appellant thought he could not freely converse with counsel, he
should be able to articulate with some specificity what he
deleted from those communications. An appellate court would
then be able to assess the significance of the missing matter on
the ability of counsel to defend the appellant. Appellant’s
failure to do so does not render it impossible to assess
prejudice as a matter of law in all cases; rather, his silence
suggests that little, if anything, was chilled from Appellant’s
attorney-client conversations. Similarly, a refusal to make
certain undefined communications, especially when the appellant
had ample alternative opportunities to speak freely with
counsel, does not, as a general matter, constitute prejudice.
While structural error might be present if Appellant was somehow
completely deprived of all opportunities to speak with appellate
counsel, that is not the case here. See Johnson v. United
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States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) (citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that total
deprivation of the right to counsel at trial constitutes a
structural error and requires reversal).
Therefore, in this case, Appellant must show prejudice.
See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1981)
(limiting remedy, where government agents met with accused
without his defense counsel’s knowledge or permission, to
“denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression”);
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 557-58 (declining to apply per se error
standard to undercover agent’s presence during attorney-client
communications); Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 683 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that “[w]hen the government deliberately
interferes with the confidential relationship between a criminal
defendant and defense counsel [by disparaging that counsel in
front of the defendant], that interference violates the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel if it substantially prejudices the
criminal defendant. Substantial prejudice results from the
introduction of evidence gained through the interference against
the defendant at trial, from the prosecution’s use of
confidential information pertaining to defense plans and
strategy, and from other actions designed to give the
prosecution an unfair advantage at trial”) (citations omitted);
Ervin v. Busby, 992 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1993) (requiring a
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prejudice showing where inmate’s transfer to a more distant
detention facility resulted in his having to make a toll call to
his attorney where only a local call had been needed prior to
the transfer).
After all, “[n]ot all government interference with the
attorney-client relationship renders counsel’s assistance so
ineffective as to violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to
counsel.” Hall v. Iowa, 705 F.2d 283, 290 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding that police obtaining consent to search without
contacting accused’s counsel did not amount to violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the police could have
seized the evidence anyway) (citations omitted); accord United
States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 266-67 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that agent’s failure to terminate conversations initiated by an
accused without the knowledge of his attorney did not rise to a
constitutionally impermissible invasion into the attorney-client
relationship -- some showing of prejudice is required).
Even assuming the Government interfered with Appellant’s
right to counsel by allowing brig personnel to be present during
attorney-client telephone conversations and seizing the brig
regulation, Appellant has not cited, and the record fails to
establish, how he was prejudiced -– namely, what issues he
wanted to raise before the NMCCA but was unable to do so because
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of the chilling effect the brig officials’ actions had on his
attorney-client communications.
This should not be taken to confer upon confinement
facility officials carte blanche to eavesdrop upon confidential
communications between attorney and client, beyond what is
strictly necessary to maintain the order and safety of the
institution. While we are not, and do not intend to be,
overseers of the day-to-day operations of such facilities, a
case in which an appellant can articulate particularized
prejudice (let alone one in which the fruits of such
eavesdropping were used at trial) would raise far more acute
issues. This, however, is not such a case.
V.
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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