United States v. Pack ( 2007 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Daniel M. PACK Jr., Gunnery Sergeant
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 07-0085
Crim. App. No. 200400772
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 25, 2007
Decided December 12, 2007
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and STUCKY, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Kathleen L. Kadlec, JAGC, USN
(argued); Lieutenant Brian L. Mizer, JAGC, USN.
For Appellee: Captain Roger E. Mattioli, USMC (argued); Major
Brian K. Keller, USMC (on brief); Commander Paul C. LeBlanc,
JAGC, USN.
Amicus Curiae for Appellant: Susan A. Castorina (law student)
(argued); Seth M. Lahn, Esq. (supervising attorney); Emmanuel V.
R. Boulukos, (law student) (on brief) -- for the Indiana Law
School, Bloomington.
Amicus Curiae for Appellee: Paul H. Threatt (law student)
(argued); Aviva A. Orenstein, Esq. (supervising attorney);
Aravon B. McCalla (law student) (on brief) -- for the Indiana
Law School, Bloomington.
Military Judges: S. M. Immel (arraignment) and P. J. Betz Jr.
(trial)
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Pack Jr., No. 07-0085/MC
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The decisional issue in this case is whether Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) so undermined the reasoning in
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) that this Court is free
to disregard Craig and hold that anything short of face-to-face
confrontation at trial violates the Sixth Amendment. If so, it
would inexorably follow that Rule for Courts Martial (R.C.M.)
914A and Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 611(d), which are
based on the holding in Craig and permit a child witness to
testify via closed-circuit television, are unconstitutional.
There is support for Appellant’s argument that aspects of
Crawford are difficult to reconcile with aspects of Craig. See
infra, at pp. 8-11. But the Supreme Court did not overrule
Craig or even mention it in Crawford. And the holding in
Crawford turned on whether, and under what circumstances,
testimonial hearsay, which by definition does not involve face-
to-face confrontation at trial, may be admitted, consonant with
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Consequently,
Craig continues to control the questions whether and how child
witness testimony via closed-circuit television is
constitutional.
I. Procedural Background
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of six
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specifications of indecent acts with a child in violation of
Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
934 (2000). The sentence adjudged by the court-martial and
approved by the convening authority included a dishonorable
discharge, confinement for twenty-three years, and reduction to
the lowest enlisted grade. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals dismissed one specification, reassessed the
sentence, and approved the adjudged sentence, but reduced
confinement to twenty-two years. United States v. Pack, No.
NMCCA 200400772, 2006 CCA LEXIS 286, at *27, 2006 WL 4579021, at
*10 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2006) (unpublished).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the question:
[WHETHER] IN LIGHT OF CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36(2004), WAS APPELLANT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER WHEN THE MILITARY JUDGE ALLOWED MP TO
TESTIFY FROM A REMOTE LOCATION VIA ONE-WAY CLOSED-CIRCUIT
TELEVISION.1
II. Factual Background
The charges referred against Appellant arise from his
sexual abuse of his eight-year-old stepdaughter MP over a period
1
65 M.J. 276 (C.A.A.F. 2007). We heard oral argument in this
case at the Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington,
Indiana, as part of the Court’s Project Outreach. See United
States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346, 347 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2003). This
practice was developed as part of a public awareness program to
demonstrate the operation of a federal court of appeals and the
military justice system.
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in excess of a year. At the time of trial, MP was ten years
old. Appellant’s actions resulted in MP suffering psychological
problems, for which she required extensive counseling. The
Government petitioned the military judge to allow MP to testify
from a remote location via one-way closed-circuit television
pursuant to M.R.E. 611(d) and R.C.M. 914A. The defense objected
to the request, arguing that it denied Appellant his right to
confront his accuser.
The military judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
Government’s motion. At the hearing, the military judge heard
expert testimony from MP’s treating psychologist. Based on this
testimony, the military judge made findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The military judge recognized that the
requirements of M.R.E. 611 must be read in conjunction with
Craig, 497 U.S. at 836, in which the Supreme Court held the use
of remote live testimony via one-way closed-circuit television
permissible only where particular circumstances were found.2
Based on the evidence presented, the military judge found those
circumstances in this case: the need to protect the welfare of
the child witness seeking to testify; traumatization of the
child by the presence of the defendant, not the courtroom
2
Accord United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 330 (C.A.A.F.
2003).
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generally; and a more than de minimis emotional distress
suffered by the child.
MP’s testimony was under oath and in the presence of trial
counsel and defense counsel. A television monitor was
positioned in the courtroom so that Appellant, the members, the
military judge, and the court reporter could hear MP and observe
her demeanor. MP testified on both direct and cross-examination
from the remote location without ever seeing Appellant.
III. Analysis
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides,
inter alia, that: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The question of what law
controls resolution of a claimed constitutional violation is one
of law, which we review de novo. See United States v. Cabrera-
Frattini, 65 M.J. 241, 245 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
A. Maryland v. Craig
In Craig, the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland statute that
required: the “child witness . . . be competent to testify and
. . . testify under oath; the defendant retain[] full
opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the
judge, jury, and defendant . . . [be] able to view (albeit by
video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he or
she testifies.” 497 U.S. at 851.
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In the process, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[a]lthough
face-to-face confrontation forms ‘the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause,’ we have nevertheless
recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation
right.” Id. at 847 (citations omitted). Craig went on to
reject a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause in favor of
a “‘preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a
preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case.’” Id. at 849(citations omitted).
Craig then considered those principles in the context of a
child witness testifying remotely against a defendant in a
criminal trial. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that one-way
closed-circuit testimony was admissible and consonant with the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause when: (1) the court
determines that it is necessary “to protect the welfare of the
particular child witness”; (2) the court finds “that the child
witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally,
but by the presence of the defendant”; and (3) “the trial court
[finds] that the emotional distress suffered by the child
witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de
minimis.” Id. at 855-56 (citations omitted).
Appellant does not argue that the requirements under R.C.M.
914A or M.R.E. 611(d) were not met. Nor does he argue that the
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three requirements outlined in Craig went unsatisfied. The
narrow question in this case is whether the holding in Craig
allowing this type of testimony may be disregarded by this Court
in light of Crawford.
B. Crawford v. Washington
Crawford considered whether and how testimonial hearsay
statements made by witnesses who did not testify at trial were
admissible in light of the Confrontation Clause. 541 U.S. at
68-69. The issue of face-to-face confrontation at trial was not
directly implicated by Crawford, although Crawford did consider
fully the historical context within which the Confrontation
Clause was drafted and the evils at which it was aimed. Id. at
43-50.
Crawford did hold that testimonial hearsay statements were
inadmissible absent the right to confrontation. Id. at 68-69.
But it concluded that the Sixth Amendment as informed by the
common law required, at least in the context of testimonial
hearsay, “unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination,” not face-to-face confrontation at trial. Id. at
68.
C. Craig Was Not Overruled by Implication
Crawford did not purport to overrule Craig explicitly;
Craig is not even cited in the opinion. In light of the dissent
in Craig and the plethora of state and federal laws permitting
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remote testimony, including M.R.E. 611 and R.C.M. 914A, we
expect that if the Supreme Court were overruling or undermining
Craig, it would have said so explicitly. See, e.g., Carmell v.
Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 538 (2000) (stating that where the Supreme
Court expressly overruled two cases in a decision, it should not
be assumed that it impliedly overruled a third in the same
decision).
Appellant, nonetheless, argues that Crawford overruled
Craig by implication because it undermined the foundations upon
which it rested. Of course, overruling by implication is
disfavored. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19-20
(2005) (stating that circuit courts should adhere to precedent
even when subsequent decisions call earlier Supreme Court
decisions into question); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 19
(1997) (stating the same); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(stating “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions”). But even if overruling by
implication were acceptable, we disagree that Crawford had the
impact on Craig that Appellant suggests.
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Crawford explicitly rejected the rationale of Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 541 U.S. at 63-65. Roberts held
that admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable witness did not violate the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, reasoning that reliability could be
“inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception” because “hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values,” and “stem from the same roots.” 448 U.S. at 66(citations and quotation marks omitted). Roberts, like Craig,
turned in part on reliability. But the focus in Craig was not
simply on reliability, but on the adversarial process. 497 U.S.
at 846 (“The combined effect of these elements of confrontation
. . . serves the purpose of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring
that evidence admitted against the accused is reliable and
subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of
Anglo-American criminal proceedings.”). That focus was retained
in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[T]he Clause’s ultimate goal is to
ensure reliability of evidence” and that “reliability be
assessed . . . by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”). It is important to recognize that Crawford did
not hold that face-to-face confrontation is required in every
case. Rather, it held that the Confrontation Clause required
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cross-examination and unavailability before testimonial hearsay
could be admitted into evidence. Id. at 69.
In fairness to Appellant, there are glimmers of an
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause tied more closely to
its text and historical context in the Supreme Court’s recent
opinions. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274-77
(2006) (discussing text of the Confrontation Clause, citing to
the dictionary definition of “testimony,” reviewing early
American cases involving the right to confrontation, and
comparing the evidence adduced in Davis to that in Raleigh’s
Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603)); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-47(discussing historical framework of the right to confrontation
within the context of English and American common law dating to
1554). And no one, having read the dissent in Craig, doubts
that it argues for an undilutable requirement for face-to-face
confrontation at trial.
Moreover, the Crawford opinion itself contains statements
that are difficult to reconcile with certain other statements in
the Craig opinion. Compare, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 848 (“a
literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would ‘abrogate
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as
unintended and too extreme’”) (citation omitted), and id. at 845(“any exception to the right ‘would surely be allowed only when
necessary to further an important public policy’”) (citation
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omitted), with Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“[l]eaving the
regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence
would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even
the most flagrant inquisitorial practices”), id. at 54 (“[t]he
text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended
exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by
the courts”), and id. at 61 (“[a]dmitting statements deemed
reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right to
confrontation”).
But the question is neither whether tension exists between
aspects of particular cases nor whether this Court, as a matter
of first impression, might hold that the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the “‘right to
meet face-to-face all those who appear and give evidence at
trial’” in every case, without exception. Craig, 497 U.S. at
862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1016 (1988)). “Rather, lower courts should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (citation omitted); see U.S.
Const. art. III, § 1; Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19-20. The Supreme
Court has not overruled Craig nor distinguished its holding in a
manner that alters its application to military practice. Nor
have the parties proffered any reason why Craig should apply
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differently in the military context. Under these circumstances,
this Court is not free to disregard Craig.
We join the weight of authority in holding that Craig
continues to control the questions whether, when, and how,
remote testimony by a child witness in a criminal trial is
constitutional. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313-18
(11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553-
54 (8th Cir. 2005); State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, ¶ 13-17, 131
P.3d 232, 237; State v. Blanchette, 134 P.3d 19, 29 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2006); State v. Griffin, 202 S.W.3d 670, 680-81 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006); State v. Vogelsberg, 2006 WI App 228, ¶ 13-17, 297
Wis. 2d 519, 527-29, 724 N.W.2d 649, 654.
IV. Decision
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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