United States v. Moffeit , 2006 CAAF LEXIS 419 ( 2006 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Christopher P. MOFFEIT, Airman First Class
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 04-0442
Crim. App. No. 35159
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued January 11, 2006
Decided April 3, 2006
CRAWFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and EFFRON and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. BAKER, J.,
filed a separate opinion concurring in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: John S. Keffer, Esq. (argued); Colonel Carlos L.
McDade, Colonel Beverly B. Knott, Lieutenant Colonel Mark R.
Strickland, Major Terry L. McElyea, Captain Christopher S.
Morgan, and Captain Jennifer K. Martwick (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Steven R. Kaufman (argued); Colonel LeEllen
Coacher, Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs, Lieutenant Colonel
Gary F. Spencer, and Major Michelle M. Lindo McCluer (on brief).
Military Judges: Thomas G. Crossan, Rodger A. Drew Jr., and Ann
D. Shane.
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
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Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Contrary to his pleas, Appellant was convicted of receiving
and possessing child pornography, and misusing the Internet in
an attempt to entice minors in violation of Article 134, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). The
convening authority approved the sentence of a dishonorable
discharge, forty-five months of confinement, forfeiture of all
pay and allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade.
FACTS
In light of United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450(C.A.A.F. 2003), we set aside the findings of guilty to
possessing and receiving child pornography and remanded the
case. United States v. Moffeit, 60 M.J. 348 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
The lower court was given the option of either dismissing those
specifications and reassessing the sentence based on the
remaining internet offense, or order a rehearing. Id. The
lower court reassessed the sentence reducing the confinement to
thirty-three months. The lower court, citing United States v.
Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1988), said:
Applying this [Sales] analysis, and after careful
consideration of the entire record, we are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that, in the absence of
Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge, the military
judge would have adjudged a sentence of no less than a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for [thirty-three]
months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
reduction to E-1.
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United States v. Moffeit, No. ACM 35159, 2004 CCA LEXIS 297, at
3, 2005 WL 11588, at 1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2004).
Judge Johnson, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
indicated she would have returned this case for a new sentence
rehearing. Id. at 2004 CCA LEXIS 297, at 4, 2005 WL 11588, at
1. After reassessment, we granted the following issue:
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION BY REASSESSING APPELLANT’S SENTENCE TO
INCLUDE A DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE AND 33 MONTHS OF
CONFINEMENT RATHER THAN ORDERING A REHEARING ON THE
SENTENCE.
In Sales, we held that a Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA),
in dismissing a charge, may reassess the sentence and that
sentence must be equal to or no greater than a sentence that
would have been imposed if there had been no error. 22 M.J. at
308. “Thus, if the court can determine to its satisfaction
that, absent any error, the sentence adjudged would have been of
at least a certain severity, then a sentence of that severity or
less will be free of the prejudicial effects of error . . . .”
Id. However, “[i]f the error at trial was of constitutional
magnitude, then the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that its reassessment cured the error.” United States v.
Doss, 57 M.J. 182, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing Sales, 22 M.J. at
307); see also United States v. Buber, 62 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F.
2006); United States v. Berry, 61 M.J. 91 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
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Further, it is error for a lower court to use an incorrect
standard. United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
We hold that the CCA correctly applied Sales. We note that
the lower court has reviewed the records of a substantial number
of courts-martial involving convictions for child pornography
activities and offenses involving sexual misconduct with
children and has extensive experience with the level of
sentences imposed for such offenses under various circumstances.
In this case, a substantial maximum was available based on the
remaining charge and specification. The reassessed sentence was
well below that maximum. The remaining charge, involving an
effort to solicit children for sexual activity via a website
posted on the Internet, was the most serious offense and had a
negative impact in the community around Shaw Air Force Base.
The website generated a number of hostile e-mail responses and
several complaints to law enforcement officials. The Chief of
Police for Sumter, South Carolina, was “appalled” when she
learned that a member of the United States Air Force had created
the site. Thus, we hold that the CCA did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that it could determine to its
satisfaction that, absent any error, the adjudged sentence for
the remaining offense would have been at least the severity of
the sentence that the court approved on reassessment.
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The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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BAKER, Judge (concurring in the result):
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals did not abuse its discretion in
reassessing Appellant’s sentence. Therefore, I also agree with
the result. However, I believe we are nearing a crossroads on
sentence reassessment under United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305(C.M.A. 1986), if we have not already reached it. In my view,
we should either reassess the continued viability of the Sales
presumption or offer further guidance on its application. This
case offers an opportunity to do so.
The law invokes and accepts a number of presumptions. For
example, “military judges are presumed to know the law and to
follow it, absent clear evidence to the contrary. . . .
[A]ppellate judges of the Courts of Criminal Appeals are
deserving of no less a presumption.” United States v. Mason, 45
M.J. 483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (citations omitted). In addition,
“in the absence of evidence to the contrary, court members are
presumed to have followed the military judge’s instructions.”
United States v. Pollard, 38 M.J. 41, 52 (C.M.A. 1993)
(quotation marks omitted). And, of course, the law presumes the
innocence of an accused, notwithstanding anything that may be
known before trial, until the government proves each element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. “In the courtroom, the
presumption of innocence means not only that the Government
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bears the burden of proving every element of crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, but that the trier of fact -- panel, jury, or
judge -- approaches the case without negative predisposition
drawn from the accused’s presence in the courtroom.” United
States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 402 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (Baker,
J., concurring). Indeed, law would operate with great
difficulty were it not for the use of presumptions.
Presumptions are pragmatic creations, “rooted less in the
absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the
belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation
of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal
justice process.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211
(1987).
In Sales and its antecedents, we adopted a further
presumption of law that a Court of Criminal Appeal could, in
certain contexts, “determine to its satisfaction that, absent
any error, the sentence adjudged would have been of at least a
certain severity. . . .” Sales, 22 M.J. at 308. Of course, as
Appellant points out, there is a certain leap of logical faith
involved in such an assumption. Absent clairvoyance, we cannot
actually know how a military judge or a panel of members would
have sentenced an appellant following a change in factual
circumstances. This is especially true within a sentencing
construct not based on guidelines or bands, but on discretionary
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sentence maximums and individualized adjudication. However,
this Court nonetheless concluded in Sales that the lower court
may reassess an appropriate sentence for an offense so long as
the reassessed sentence “is no greater than that which would
have been imposed if the prejudicial error had not been
committed.” Id. Our holding in Sales was based on an
understanding that given the substantial experience of the lower
court, it could act in accordance with the above-noted
presumption and accurately reassess an appropriate sentence.
See United States v. Hawes, 51 M.J. 258, 260 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
Heretofore, this Court’s review for abuse of discretion has
been case specific, conveying something of a “knowing it when we
see it” feel. This approach reflects reasonable and principled
views regarding what Sales means and how it should apply.
However, there are important public policy and legal policy
reasons to enjoin a more predictable framework for reviewing
sentence reassessments. Among other things, there is
considerable societal cost in time, money, and emotional
investment when a sentence is reassessed by a Court of Criminal
Appeals and then overturned by this Court -- sending it back
years later for a sentence rehearing. Finality is lost.
Sentencing witnesses must be recalled to testify about events
long since past. Military members must also be pulled from the
line of duty. As a result, I believe we should identify, in a
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nonexhaustive fashion, factors we will use to review
reassessments of the Courts of Criminal Appeals.
In other words, we should identify those factors that
buttress the presumption that appellate judges can indeed
reassess a sentence for the offense involved. Otherwise, we
should consider whether to abandon the presumption altogether.
I believe the following nonexhaustive list of factors is
relevant:
(1) whether there are changes in the penalty landscape,
including instances where charges with significant exposure
or aggravating circumstances are taken off the table.
United States v. Buber, 62 M.J __ (8) (C.A.A.F. 2006);
(2) whether an appellant chose sentencing by members,
instead of by military judge alone. As a matter of logic,
judges of the Courts of Criminal Appeals are more likely to
be certain of what a military judge alone would have done
than what a panel of members would have done. Moreover,
where an appellant selected sentencing by members, there
may be due process considerations if sentence reassessment
is conducted by appellate judges;
(3) the nature of the remaining offenses. Are the
remaining offenses of the sort that a Court of Criminal
Appeals should have the experience and familiarity with to
reliably determine what sentence would have been imposed at
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trial by the military judges or members? Do the remaining
offenses fit within a particular normative range based on
repetition and scale within a construct of individualized
sentencing based on individual offenses? Use or possession
of certain drugs and unauthorized absence offenses might
fit this category;
(4) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals identified and
evaluated the factors that informed its reassessment
decision on the record. We should afford greater deference
to a clear and logical reassessment on the record.
Although there will always remain room for debate about the
application of law to fact when dealing with a presumption
rather than the reality of knowing what the factfinder would
have actually done, if this Court cannot identify a list of
factors that underscore this presumption, I wonder if we
shouldn’t conclude that Sales is unworkable as a uniform,
predictable, and fair mechanism to reassess sentences.
At this time, my view is that Sales is a viable and
valuable mechanism. It promotes judicial economy, economy of
military force, and the government’s and the appellants’
interests in finality. And it is fair in situations where Court
of Criminal Appeals judges can indeed reliably determine what
the factfinder would have done.
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Applying these factors to the circumstances of this case, I
would affirm. First, the original sentencing action was before
a military judge alone, increasing the probability that
experienced judges sitting on the Court of Criminal Appeals
could determine what a military judge would have done on
sentencing, although it is noteworthy that one appellate judge
dissented.
Second, the Court of Criminal Appeals identified the
correct framework for addressing sentence reassessment and
applied it to the facts of this case. However, the Court of
Criminal Appeals did not develop its analysis with respect to
the possibility that Appellant might have received a bad-conduct
discharge rather than a dishonorable discharge at trial, so its
determination on this point merits less deference.
Third, the relative change in sentencing landscape was
significant. Appellant’s original exposure was to forty-five
years. Following the dismissal of Specifications 1 and 2,
Appellant was exposed to fifteen years of confinement. This
fact weighs most heavily in the direction of a rehearing. On
the other hand, the prosecution had asked for four years of
confinement at Appellant’s original trial. In addition, the
dismissed specifications were for offenses regularly reviewed by
the Court of Criminal Appeals and therefore the experienced
judges on the court would have a well-founded appreciation for
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the range of sentence imposed by military judges. Most
importantly, the remaining offense considered by the Court of
Criminal Appeals on reassessment was a serious offense, at least
as serious as the dismissed offenses, with significant
aggravating factors.
In summary, while the change in sentencing landscape weighs
in favor of a sentence rehearing, the remaining factors place
this case within the zone of Sales reassessment. The original
sentence was determined by a military judge, the Court of
Criminal Appeals applied the correct Sales framework, and the
dismissed charges were of a nature generally reviewed by Court
of Criminal Appeals. Finally, the reassessed offense was
serious, bore aggravating circumstances, and was also of a
nature that a Court of Criminal Appeals would have experience
with and practical knowledge of what military judges normally
award.
On reassessment, Appellant stood convicted of trying to
entice multiple young children into engaging in sexual relations
under the guise of an Internet invitation to participate in a
pagan ritual. Among other things, Appellant’s advertisement
cautioned that participants must be ages thirteen to twenty
years old, must not have any sexually transmitted diseases, and
“must go through no matter what intales [sic].” For this
offense, the Court of Criminal Appeals sentenced Appellant to
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thirty-three months and a dishonorable discharge, in lieu of the
original sentence of forty-five months, and a dishonorable
discharge. On such facts, it is within the reasonable
discretion of the Court of Criminal Appeals to conclude that a
military judge sitting alone would have awarded a dishonorable
discharge as opposed to a bad-conduct discharge to a
servicemember convicted of enticing underage children to have
sex through an Internet advertisement.
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