United States v. Osheskie , 2006 CAAF LEXIS 1077 ( 2006 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Frank J. OSHESKIE, Machinist’s Mate Second Class
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 05-0165
Crim. App. No. 200001296
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued January 10, 2006
Decided August 14, 2006
CRAWFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and EFFRON, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Aimee M. Cooper, JAGC, USNR (argued);
Captain James Valentine, USMC (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Roger E. Mattioli, USMC (argued);
Commander Charles N. Purnell, JAGC, USN, and Lieutenant
Guillermo J. Rojas, JAGC, USNR (on brief).
Military Judge: Robert W. Redcliff
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Osheskie, No. 05-0165/NA
Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
In accordance with his plea, Appellant was convicted by a
military judge at a general court-martial of murder while
engaging in an act inherently dangerous to another in violation
of Article 118(3), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. § 918(3) (2000). The Government proceeded to trial on
the greater offense of unpremeditated murder in violation of
Article 118(2), UCMJ, however, Appellant was found not guilty of
this offense. Appellant was sentenced to confinement for
twenty-seven years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
reduction to E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. Pursuant to the
terms of the pretrial agreement, the convening authority
suspended all confinement in excess of nineteen years from the
date of his action, suspended the forfeitures of pay for
nineteen years,1 and approved the remainder of the sentence with
the exception of the dishonorable discharge.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
On September 15, 2005, this Court granted review of the
following issues:
I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
APPELLANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
1
Appellant has not challenged the terms of this suspension.
Also the Government has not attempted to vacate this suspension.
It is not presently necessary that we address whether the
suspension of forfeitures for this period was an “unreasonably
long” period of probation, which is prohibited by Rule for
Courts-Martial. 1108(d). See Spriggs v. United States, 40 M.J.
158, 162-63 (C.M.A. 1994).
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WHEN THE TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO
ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF HIS CASE AS WELL AS A POTENTIAL DEFENSE TO THE
CHARGE OF PREMEDITATED MURDER. IN DOING SO, THE
LOWER COURT EXPRESSED A STATEMENT OF CONFIDENCE IN
APPELLANT’S GUILT THAT WAS BASED UPON EVIDENCE
RELATED TO A CHARGE OF WHICH APPELLANT WAS
ACQUITTED.2
II. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO
TIMELY REVIEW WHEN ALMOST FIVE YEARS PASSED
BETWEEN THE DATE OF SENTENCE AND COMPLETION OF
REVIEW PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 66, UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was stationed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as a
Machinist’s Mate Second Class. While stationed there, Appellant
lived in base housing with his wife and two children, including
the victim, AO, Appellant’s daughter, who was three and a half
months old. The events in this case occurred on the morning of
May 10, 1998. The night before, Appellant had been up with AO
2
Appellant’s assertion that the lower court erroneously
considered evidence related to a charge of which Appellant was
acquitted must be considered in context. As the Government
reserved its right to try to prove, and went forward with, the
greater charge of intentional murder (pursuant to Article
118(2), UCMJ), the lower court had a complete record to review
in determining whether Appellant received effective assistance
of counsel. Appellant told his trial defense counsel about
using the “laying of the hands” method to put his children to
sleep on prior occasions. The lower court sought and received
affidavits from both trial defense counsels. In determining
whether it was error for the trial defense counsel not to raise
this defense, the lower court was able to look at what evidence
was presented against Appellant and, therefore, what effect, if
any, this could have had on his case. We reject Appellant’s
assertion that the lower court erred in its consideration of the
evidence of record in evaluating his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
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twice. According to Appellant, because May 10, 1998, was
Mother’s Day, he let his wife sleep in and made her breakfast in
bed. At roughly 10:30 a.m., AO again began to cry and Appellant
went to attend to her. Appellant contends he was frustrated and
tired because his wife rarely assisted with the child care even
though Appellant worked all week. Appellant notes he placed AO
face down in her crib, covered her with a blanket, and placed
his left hand between her shoulder blades, holding her down with
his left hand in an attempt to make her lie still. Appellant
admits to feeling her struggle but continued to apply pressure
until she was still and quiet. Although he claims he was
concerned for AO, Appellant left the room for approximately
thirty minutes. At that point, Appellant looked in on AO.
Finding her unresponsive, Appellant performed CPR on AO until
paramedics arrived. AO could not be revived and was pronounced
dead at the hospital.
ISSUE I
This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel claims
de novo. United States v. Wiley, 47 M.J. 158, 159 (C.A.A.F.
1997). In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
Supreme Court established the following test for determining
ineffective assistance of counsel:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of
a conviction or death sentence has two components.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
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performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that
the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the
result unreliable.
Id. at 687. This Court has followed the Strickland analysis
when dealing with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
United States v. Burt, 56 M.J. 261, 264 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
The Strickland test governs ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in cases involving guilty pleas. United States
v. Alves, 53 M.J. 286, 289 (C.A.A.F. 2000). Because this is a
guilty plea case, Appellant must show not only that his counsel
was deficient but also that “‘there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Id. at 289(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). United
States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236 (C.A.A.F. 1997), furnished a number
of circumstances where, despite an appellant’s submission of an
affidavit, this Court determined it could independently resolve
the factual and legal issues in the case. Id. at 248. One of
those circumstances is, “[I]f the affidavit is factually
adequate on its face but the appellate filings and the record as
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a whole ‘compellingly demonstrate’ the improbability of the
facts.” Id. This is the situation we find before us today.
Appellant makes two basic assertions of inadequate
performance of counsel:
(1) defense counsel did not adequately investigate the
circumstances of AO’s death and potential defenses, such as
accident or mistake, that might have resulted in his acquittal
or mitigated the seriousness of the finding of guilty, including
learning that the “laying of the hands” technique is a medically
accepted method for calming crying children; and
(2) defense counsel did not advise Appellant of his right
to plead guilty without a pretrial agreement to lesser included
offenses, which included involuntary manslaughter and negligent
homicide. We address these claims in order.
Failure to Investigate
Appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial defense counsel did not investigate
the “laying of the hands” child care technique.3 In their post-
trial affidavits, both members of Appellant’s trial defense team
admitted that they did not investigate the “laying of the hands”
3
Appellant asserts that his actions that resulted in AO’s death
were in line with an accepted child care technique called
“laying of the hands” in which a parent applies light pressure
to a child’s back in order to calm the child so that he or she
can sleep.
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technique. However, this does not amount to an ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In United States v. Brownfield, 52 M.J. 40, 42 (C.A.A.F.
1999), this Court ruled that, “Defense counsel must perform a
reasonable investigation, or make a reasonable decision that an
avenue of investigation is unnecessary.” This principle was
first explained by the Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. at
691. In the case at bar, it is clear that Appellant’s trial
defense counsel determined that investigating the “laying of the
hands” technique was unnecessary. As Mr. Richard M. Harper II
(formerly lieutenant) stated in his affidavit:
I did not investigate whether light rubbing or “the
laying of hands” had received the imprimatur of
professional acceptance as a method of soothing or
quieting a fussy infant. After my many conversations
with MM2 [Machinist’s Mate] Osheskie, it was my
understanding that MM2 Osheski[e] did not merely lay
his hands on [AO], but rather pushed her so hard into
the mattress that he knew that his actions were
inherently dangerous to [AO].
The defense team did not make an arbitrary decision not to
investigate the “laying of the hands” technique.
Lieutenant (LT) Marcus N. Fulton described how the
defense team reasonably determined this avenue did not need
further investigation:
During a pretrial interview in my office, Dr. Ophoven
[a Government expert] told me that Petty Officer
Osheskie would have seen AO flail about with her body,
arms and legs and struggle to move her head and get
air. I was told Petty Officer Osheskie would have
been able to hear her cry through the mattress, crying
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she described to me as “high gear” crying or
screaming. Dr. Ophoven told me that a great deal of
force would have been necessary to smother [AO]. Dr.
Ophoven told me that this would have likely gone on
for two minutes or more, a duration with which other
physicians I interviewed agreed. With respect to his
statement that he had [previously used the “laying of
hands” technique with his older child when he] pressed
on his son’s back, I believed that either he had
applied only a soothing amount of pressure, or that he
had smothered [his son] to the point of
unconsciousness without killing him. I did not view
either possibility as helpful in terms of showing that
Petty Officer Osheskie did not commit an inherently
dangerous act with wanton disregard of human life when
he pressed [AO]’s face into the mattress.
According to Appellant’s trial defense
counsel, they did not find the “laying of the hands” technique a
plausible defense given the facts of the case, based on
interviews with expert witnesses and the statements of
Appellant. The amount of force and time required to kill AO, as
well as the physical distress AO would have demonstrated when
Appellant was holding her face into the mattress, negated the
need to pursue a “laying of the hands” theory for AO’s death.
During the providence inquiry, Appellant admitted to the
elements of Article 118(3), UCMJ, which would have made
investigation into the “laying of the hands” theory irrelevant
because he stated that he knew “that death was a probable
consequence” of his actions. The military judge fulfilled his
duty in ensuring a knowing, voluntary guilty plea during the
inquiry:
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MJ: Can you explain to me, in your own words, if you
can, how it is that your act was inherently dangerous,
under these circumstances? What is it that you did
which would be inherently dangerous, under these
circumstances, to someone the size of [AO]?
ACC: I was well larger than [AO]. She was young.
She was definitely not fully developed. She didn’t
have the strength to fight me. She couldn’t
verbalize, either. She couldn’t say it hurt.
Appellant goes on to admit that he knew his actions
were inherently dangerous to AO. Appellant’s
statements during the providence inquiry are consistent with his
trial defense counsels’ affidavits, not his own.
The decision not to investigate further was reasonably
made, and therefore there was no deficiency in counsel
performance. See United States v. Scott, 24 M.J. 186, 192-93
(C.M.A. 1987) (concluding counsel failed to investigate
adequately). We need not address the second prong of the
Strickland analysis.
Advice of Right to Plead Guilty to Lesser Included Offenses
In his affidavit, Appellant states, “At no time was I
advised that I could plead guilty to a lesser-included offense
such as negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter without
an agreement with the convening authority. This option was
never explained to me prior to trial.”
Appellant’s trial defense counsel told a different story.
As stated above, both of Appellant’s trial defense counsels
submitted affidavits to the court below. Regarding Appellant
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pleading guilty to either a violation of Article 119, UCMJ, or
Article 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000), Mr. Harper wrote:
I completely disagree with MM2 Osheskie’s statement
that we did not advise him he could plead to these
lesser included offenses without a pretrial
agreement. On more than one occasion, when MM2
Osheskie expressed exasperation at having to plead
guilty to Art. 118(3) in order to obtain a pretrial
agreement limiting confinement, we informed MM2
Osheskie that he could plead guilty to a lesser
offense without a pretrial agreement. We also
informed MM2 Osheskie of the government’s statement
that if MM2 Osheskie [pled] blind to a lesser
included offense, the government would go forward in
an attempt to prove premeditated murder.
Appellant’s other trial defense counsel corroborated Mr.
Harper’s statements. In his own affidavit, LT Fulton wrote:
During the course of preparation for the case, we
reviewed with Petty Officer Osheskie what his options
were concerning the case. Among the options we
discussed were the possibilities that he could plead
to one of the lesser included offenses of Article 118
such as Article 119 involuntary manslaughter or
Article 134 negligent homicide. We informed him that
he would not receive the benefit of an agreed to cap
on punishment, and that if he was found guilty as
charged he would be facing a mandatory minimum
sentence of confinement for life.
Appellant presents no evidence, other than his own statements,
to prove that trial defense counsel did not explain that he
could plead guilty to a lesser included offense. In light of
both trial defense counsels’ affidavits, Appellant cannot carry
his burden to show a deficiency based on this claim. Defense
counsels’ responding affidavits, taken in context with the
record as a whole, particularly Appellant’s own statements
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during the providence inquiry regarding his satisfaction that he
had considered any possible defense arising from the
circumstances, demonstrate the improbability of his assertion.
See Ginn, 47 M.J. at 248 (no affidavit required under the
principles set forth).
ISSUE II
We review claims of post-trial and appellate delay using
the four-factor analysis from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972). United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F.
2006).4 If there has been a denial of due process, an appellant
is entitled to relief unless the court is convinced that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Toohey, 63 M.J. ___ (24) (C.A.A.F. 2006). Where we can
determine that any violation of the due process right to speedy
post-trial review and appeal is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, we need not undertake the four-factor Barker analysis
prior to disposing of that post-trial or appellate delay issue.
See United States v. Allison, 63 M.J. ___ (15) (C.A.A.F. 2006).
In this case, we conclude that even if Appellant was denied his
due process right to speedy review and appeal, that error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and no relief is warranted.
4
We apply the analysis from the majority opinion in Moreno, but
see Moreno, 63 M.J. at 144 (Crawford, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to prove either prong of the
Strickland test with respect to his allegations of ineffective
assistance of his trial defense counsel. Appellant’s trial
defense counsel were competent in their representation and there
has been no showing that Appellant was prejudiced by the
counsels’ actions and advice. In fact, Appellant’s trial
defense counsel, through the pretrial agreement, saved Appellant
from one-third of his adjudged sentence. Therefore, pursuant to
our decision in Ginn, 47 M.J. at 248, we hold that the record as
a whole “compellingly demonstrate[s]” the improbability of
Appellant’s post-trial affidavit. Accordingly, the decision of
the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed.
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