United States v. Alston , 2010 CAAF LEXIS 988 ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
John C. ALSTON, Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 10-0172
Crim. App. No. 20080504
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 4, 2010
Decided November 19, 2010
EFFRON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BAKER, ERDMANN, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan F. Potter (argued);
Colonel Mark Tellitocci, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Miller, and
Major Grace M. Gallagher (on brief), Major Timothy W. Thomas and
Major Peter Kageliery Jr.
For Appellee: Captain Madeline F. Yanford (argued); Colonel
Norman F. J. Allen III, Lieutenant Colonel Martha L. Foss, and
Major Christopher B. Burgess (on brief); Major LaJohnne A.
White.
Military Judge: John Saunders
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Alston, No.10-0172/AR
Chief Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members found Appellant not guilty of rape but guilty of
aggravated sexual assault, in violation of Article 120, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006). The
sentence adjudged by the court-martial and approved by the
convening authority included a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for 181 days, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
and reduction to the grade of Private E-1. The United States
Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. United States v.
Alston, NO. ARMY 20080504, 2009 CCA LEXIS 439, 2009 WL 6832586(A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2009) (unpublished).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE, OVER APPELLANT’S
OBJECTION, ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE PANEL THAT
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT WAS A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF RAPE BY FORCE.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the military judge
properly instructed the panel with respect to the lesser
included offense.
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I. BACKGROUND
At Appellant’s court-martial, the charge at issue alleged
that he caused Private E-2 (PV2) T, a fellow soldier, to “engage
in a sexual act, to wit: penetration of her vagina with his
fingers by using power or strength or restraint applied to her
person sufficient that she could not avoid or escape the sexual
conduct.” The charge alleged the offense of rape by force under
Article 120(a), UCMJ. See 10 U.S.C. § 120(a) (setting forth
various acts constituting the offense of rape, including under
paragraph (1), “caus[ing] another person of any age to engage in
a sexual act by . . . using force against that other person”);
id. Article 120(t)(1) (defining the term “sexual act” as
including, under subparagraph (B), “the penetration, however
slight, of the genital opening of another by a hand or finger or
by an object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or
degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person”); id. Article 120(t)(5) (defining the term “force”
as including, under subparagraph (C), “action to compel
submission of another or to overcome or prevent another’s
resistance by . . . physical violence, strength, power, or
restraint applied to another person, sufficient that the other
person could not avoid or escape the sexual conduct”).
The primary prosecution witness, PV2 T, testified that she
invited Appellant to her room to watch a movie. She had been
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involved in a social and romantic relationship with Appellant
for the past few weeks, and during the evening they engaged in
consensual kissing. After some time Appellant attempted to
remove PV2 T’s pants, and in response she stated that she did
not want her pants removed and attempted to resist. Eventually,
Appellant removed PV2 T’s pants and began to digitally penetrate
her vagina with his fingers. PV2 T tried to cover her vaginal
area, but testified that she was unable to block Appellant’s
movements. Appellant then asked if he could engage in sexual
intercourse with her, whereupon PV2 T made a “noise like a
crying, whimpering noise.” At this point Appellant removed his
fingers from her vagina and asked if she was going to cry. When
PV2 T responded that she was not, Appellant hugged her and left
the room. Two days later, PV2 T reported the incident to her
chain of command.
The defense, at trial, disputed the prosecution’s view of
the evidence. The defense contended that Appellant and PV2 T
had engaged in consensual romantic activity, and that Appellant
ceased his advances as soon as he sensed PV2 T’s desire to stop.
The military judge instructed the members on the elements
of rape prior to deliberation by the panel on findings. He
further instructed the members, over defense objection, that
they could consider whether Appellant was guilty of a lesser
included offense, aggravated sexual assault. See Article 120(c)
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(setting forth various acts constituting the offense of
aggravated sexual assault, including, under subparagraph (1)(B),
“caus[ing] another person of any age to engage in a sexual act
by . . . causing bodily harm”); id. Article 120(t)(8) (defining
the term “bodily harm” as meaning “any offensive touching,
however slight”). The members found Appellant not guilty of
rape by force but guilty of aggravated sexual assault.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellant contends that his conviction for the
offense of aggravated sexual assault should be set aside because
he did not have adequate notice that he would be required to
defend against that offense at trial. In support of this
contention, Appellant takes the position that aggravated sexual
assault is not a lesser included offense within the charged
offense, rape by force.
The test for determining lesser included offenses under the
UCMJ provides in pertinent part that “[a]n accused may be found
guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense
charged.” Article 79, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 879 (2006). A similar
provision applies in federal civilian criminal trials. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 31(c)(1). The Supreme Court has articulated an
“elements” test with regard to interpreting the federal civilian
rule, stating that “one offense is not ‘necessarily included’ in
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another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset
of the elements of the charged offense. Where the lesser
offense requires an element not required for the greater
offense, no instruction [regarding a lesser included offense] is
to be given.” United States v. Schmuck, 489 U.S. 705, 716
(1989). This approach “permits lesser offense instructions only
in those cases where the indictment contains the elements of
both offenses,” and as a result “gives notice to the defendant
that he may be convicted on either charge.” Id. at 718. The
elements test does not require that the two offenses at issue
employ identical statutory language. Instead, the meaning of
the offenses is ascertained by applying the “normal principles
of statutory construction.” See Carter v. United States, 530
U.S. 255, 263 (2000).
We have applied the elements test in the course of
determining whether an offense is “necessarily included” within
another offense for purposes of Article 79, UCMJ. See United
States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2010). Appellant
suggests that we should treat as significant the fact that the
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), in providing guidance regarding
the offense of rape, does not list aggravated sexual assault as
a lesser included offense with respect to rape by force. See
MCM pt. IV, para. 45.e.(1)(a) (2008 ed.). The MCM, however,
expressly notes that the listing of lesser included offenses in
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the MCM is “not all-inclusive.” Id. pt. IV, para. 3.b.(4).
Under these circumstances, we resolve the question before us by
applying the elements test to compare the two offenses.
The offense of aggravated sexual assault, in the context of
the charge at issue in the present case, has two elements: (1)
causing another to engage in a sexual act, and (2) causing
bodily harm. See Article 120(c)(1)(B). The first element --
causing another person “to engage in a sexual act” -- is the
same for both the charged offense, rape by force, and the
offense of which Appellant was convicted, aggravated sexual
assault. Compare Article 120(a), with Article 120(c)(1).
The second element of aggravated sexual assault -- “causing
bodily harm” under Article 120(c)(1)(B) -- means “any offensive
touching of another, however slight.” Article 120(t)(8). The
parallel element in the offense of rape as charged in the
present case -- using “force” under Article 120(a)(1) -- means
“action to compel submission of another or to overcome or
prevent another’s resistance by . . . physical violence,
strength, power, or restraint applied to another person,
sufficient that the other person could not avoid or escape the
sexual conduct.” Article 120(t)(5)(C).
The bodily harm element of aggravated sexual assault under
Article 120(c) -- defined in Article 120(t)(8) to include an
offensive touching, however slight -- is a subset of the force
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element in the offense of rape under Article 120(a), as defined
in Article 120(t)(5)(C). We note that the definitions of force
in Article 120(t)(5)(A) and Article 120(t)(5)(B), which do not
require an offensive touching, are not at issue in the present
case.
Each circumstance set forth in Article 120(t)(5)(C)
describes an act of force applied by one person against another
person involving sufficient power to compel submission or
overcome or prevent resistance. Applying the common and
ordinary understanding of the words in the statute, each act of
force described in Article 120(t)(5)(C), at a minimum, includes
an offensive touching that satisfies the bodily harm element of
Article 120(t)(8). See Carter, 530 U.S. at 263; 2A Norman J.
Singer & J. D. S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
149-50 (7th ed. 2007) (explaining that “words used in [a]
statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted
meaning, and the plain language of the statute should be
afforded its plain meaning”). Under these circumstances the
military judge appropriately concluded that the lesser included
offense instruction should be given in this case,
notwithstanding the defense objection. See Rule for Courts-
Martial 920(e)(2) (requiring the military judge to instruct the
members on lesser included offenses).
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III. DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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