United States v. Parker , 2003 CAAF LEXIS 1372 ( 2003 )

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Wayne M. PARKER, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 02-0937
Crim. App. No. 9600945
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 8, 2003
Decided December 22, 2003
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., GIERKE, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Smith (argued).
For Appellee: Captain Mark J. Hamel (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Margaret B. Baines and Captain Janine P. Felsman (on
brief); and Captain Theodore C. Houdek.
Military Judge: C. S. Schwender (trial); R. L. Swan (rehearing)
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Parker, No. 02-0937/AR
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of rape (2
specifications), forcible sodomy, sodomy, assault and battery,
and adultery (three specifications), in violation of Articles
120, 125, 128, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
[hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 925, 928, and 934 (2000).
The members sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for ten years, total forfeitures, and reduction to
Private (E-1). The convening authority disapproved the sodomy
conviction and approved only so much of the sentence as provided
for a dishonorable discharge, confinement for nine years and six
months, total forfeitures, and reduction to Private (E-1).
The Court of Criminal Appeals disapproved two of the
findings (the assault and battery conviction and one of the rape
convictions), modified the forcible sodomy finding (to sodomy),
and affirmed the remaining findings of guilty. The court also
set aside the sentence and ordered a sentence rehearing. United
States v. Parker, 54 M.J. 700, 717 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001).
At the rehearing, Appellant was sentenced to a bad-conduct
discharge, confinement for 45 months, total forfeitures, and
reduction to Private (E-1). The convening authority approved
the sentence, granting confinement credit for 1,736 days served.
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Thereafter, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an
unpublished memorandum opinion.
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE ALLOWED THE
GOVERNMENT TO PRESENT VIDEOTAPED EVIDENCE, OVER DEFENSE
OBJECTION, FOR THE LIMITED MIL.R.EVID. 413 PURPOSE OF
SHOWING SIMILAR CRIMES WITH RESPECT TO A KEY GOVERNMENT
WITNESS [AL] CONCERNING AN ALLEGED RAPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT
CHARGED OCCURRED IN 1995 WHERE THE FACTS SUPPORTING THE
ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED IN 1993, AND WHERE THE MILITARY JUDGE
PREVIOUSLY RULED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AMEND THE
CHARGE SHEET TO CHANGE THE DATES, YET ALLOWED THE
GOVERNMENT TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO MIL.R.EVID.
413 (WITHOUT CONDUCTING A MIL.R.EVID. 403 BALANCING TEST),
AND ALLOWED THE COURT-MARTIAL PANEL TO FIND APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CHARGED RAPE BY EXCEPTIONS AND SUBSTITUTIONS,
CHANGING THE DATES OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE BY TWO YEARS.
A. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO
DIRECT THE GOVERNMENT, PURSUANT TO R.C.M. 603(d), TO
EITHER DISMISS OR WITHDRAW AND PREFER ANEW THE
OFFENSES RELATING TO [AL] (SPECIFICATION 4 OF CHARGE
II AND SPECIFICATION 2 OF CHARGE V) ONCE HE SUSTAINED
THE DEFENSE OBJECTION TO THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSED
MAJOR CHANGE TO THESE SPECIFICATIONS, AND INSTEAD
ALLOWED THE SPECIFICATIONS TO GO FORWARD TO THE PANEL
WHERE THE PANEL FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY BY EXCEPTIONS
AND SUBSTITUTIONS.
B. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE FAILED TO
GRANT THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR A FINDING OF NOT GUILTY
AS TO THE [AL] SPECIFICATIONS.
C. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY ADMITTING THE
VIDEOTAPED TESTIMONY OF [AL] UNDER MIL.R.EVID. 413
WITHOUT CONDUCTING A MIL.R.EVID. 403 BALANCING TEST.
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II.
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN HE
ALLOWED, OVER DEFNESE OBJECTION, A GOVERNMENT WITNESS [AL]
TO TESTIFY VIA VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE WITNESS,
THEREBY VIOLATING APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the military
judge erred when he denied a defense motion to dismiss the
specifications referenced in Issue I.B. In light of that
decision, we need not address the remaining questions under
Issues I and II.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant was charged with three separate sets of offenses
pertinent to the granted issues: (1) rape, forcible sodomy, and
assault of Ms. KD, as well as adultery with Ms. KD, at various
times between October 1, 1994, and June 30, 1995; (2) rape,
forcible sodomy, and assault of Ms. USG, as well as adultery
with Ms. USG, at various times between June 1, 1994, and June 1,
1995; and (3) rape of Ms. AL between February 1 and March 31,
1995, as well as adultery with Ms. AL during February or March
1995. With respect to the charges involving Ms. AL, the panel
found by exceptions and substitutions that he was guilty of
committing the rape and adultery offenses between August 1993
and March 1995. In this appeal, Appellant contends that the
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military judge committed various errors with respect to the
findings involving Ms. AL, including failure to grant a defense
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case,
and allowing the panel to change the nature of the offense
during deliberations on findings.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: MODIFICATION OF CHARGES AND
SPECIFICATIONS AFTER ARRAIGNMENT
This appeal involves the legal principles concerning
modification of charges or specifications after arraignment.
Minor changes to charges and specifications after arraignment
are permitted prior to the announcement of findings, but major
changes may not be made over the objection of the accused. Rule
for Courts-Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 603. R.C.M. 603
provides:
(a) Minor changes defined. Minor changes in
charges and specifications are any except
those which add a party, offenses, or
substantial matter not fairly included in
those previously preferred, or which are
likely to mislead the accused as to the
offenses charged.
. . . .
(c) Minor changes after arraignment. After
arraignment the military judge may, upon
motion, permit minor changes in the charges
and specifications at any time before
findings are announced if no substantial
right of the accused is prejudiced.
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(d) Major changes. Changes or amendments to
charges or specifications other than minor
changes may not be made over the objection
of the accused unless the charge or
specification affected is preferred anew.
Charges and specifications also may be modified during
deliberations on findings. The panel, or the military judge in
a bench trial, may modify the charges and specifications under
the authority to make "exceptions and substitutions." R.C.M.
918(a)(1). This power may be used to conform the findings to
the evidence, but it "may not be used to substantially change
the nature of the offense . . . . " Id. See Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States (2002 ed.) [hereinafter MCM], Analysis of
the Military Rules of Evidence A21-66 [hereinafter Drafter’s
Analysis]. The non-binding Discussion accompanying R.C.M.
918(a) notes: "Changing the date or place of the offense may,
but does not necessarily, change the nature or identity of the
offense." Compare United States v. Allen, 50 M.J. 84, 86
(C.A.A.F. 1999), and United States v. Hunt, 37 M.J. 344, 347
(C.M.A. 1993), with United States v. Wray, 17 M.J. 375, 376
(C.M.A. 1984).
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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Ms. AL’S Pretrial Statements
At the time of the charged offenses, Ms. AL and Appellant
were stationed in Germany and assigned to the same unit. The
pertinent charges against Appellant were generated as a result
of a sworn statement Ms. AL provided to Army investigators on
June 19, 1995, in which she wrote: "About 0300 sometime in
February or March I was raped in my room by PARKER." She did
not expressly identify the year in which the alleged rape
occurred. The charges against Appellant alleged that he raped
Ms. AL “between 1 February 1995 and 31 March 1995,” and that he
engaged in adultery with Ms. AL “on or about February or March
1995.”
Between the time that charges were filed and trial on the
merits in Germany, Ms. AL left active duty and returned to the
United States. The prosecution, anticipating that Ms. AL might
not be willing to return to Germany for the court-martial,
received permission from the military judge on April 18, 1996 --
11 days before trial -- to depose her on videotape in the United
States. The deposition was taken on April 22, 1996.
Ms. AL's testimony during the deposition about the timing
of the alleged rape was inconsistent with the 1995 dates on the
charge sheet. During the deposition, she reiterated the
allegation in her sworn statement that Appellant had raped her
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while she was "passed out" at a party in her barracks room at
some point during February or March. When asked whether this
was a reference to 1993, she responded, "I believe so." She
also indicated that, prior to this incident, she and Appellant
had dated "about a month, maybe two," and that, she and
Appellant had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse "about
six or seven times" during their dating relationship. She also
indicated that their consensual sexual activity had ended at
some point prior to the rape, and that they did not have sexual
relations at any time after the alleged rape.
B. The Prosecution's Motion to Amend the Charges
On April 29, 1996, shortly after the deposition was taken,
the prosecution moved to amend the rape specification to correct
"an incorrect date." According to trial counsel, the
specification erroneously referred to "February 1995 to March
1995," when it should have referred to "February 1993 to March
1993" as the time period of the alleged rape. Defense counsel
objected on the grounds that the proposed modification exceeded
the scope of permissible minor changes. See R.C.M. 603(a), (d).
In the course of opposing trial counsel’s motion, defense
counsel emphasized that the dates were particularly important in
this case, where the prosecution intended to present testimony
that the interaction between Appellant and Ms. AL involved both
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consensual and non-consensual sexual intercourse. Defense
counsel argued that in the context of a relationship involving
consensual sexual activity, establishing the date of any alleged
non-consensual incident was critical to proper trial preparation
by the defense.
At the conclusion of argument by both parties, the military
judge sustained the defense objection, ruling that the
"Government . . . can't change the date." The military judge
later noted that his ruling was based on the position that the
defense, which was prepared to defend against a charge of
misconduct in 1995, did not have adequate notice that it would
be required to defend against a charge of misconduct in 1993.
C. Trial counsel's Motion to Admit Ms. AL's Statement Under
Military Rules of Evidence 413
Immediately after losing the motion to change the dates in
the rape specification concerning Ms. AL, the prosecution moved
to admit Ms. AL's videotaped deposition on the ground that the
sexual misconduct described therein was relevant to the separate
charges involving Ms. KD and Ms. USG. In support of the motion,
trial counsel cited Military Rule of Evidence [hereinafter
M.R.E.] 413, "Evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault
cases." M.R.E. 413(a) provides as follows:
In a court-martial in which the accused is
charged with an offense of sexual assault,
evidence of the accused’s commission of one
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United States v. Parker, No. 02-0937/AR
or more offenses of sexual assault is
admissible and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.
M.R.E. 413 is patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence 413,
which was enacted by Congress in 1994 to facilitate the
introduction of evidence that might otherwise be subject to
restrictions on the use of propensity evidence. See Drafter’s
Analysis at A22-37; Steven A. Saltzburg et al., Military Rule of
Evidence Manual 615-16 (4th ed. 1997). The rule permits the
prosecution “to use evidence of the accused’s uncharged past
sexual assaults for the purpose of demonstrating his propensity
to commit the charged offenses.” Id. at 616. See United States
v. Bailey, 55 M.J. 38 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
In the present case, trial counsel argued that Ms. AL’s
testimony was admissible because it concerned “sexual misconduct
of the exact same nature for which the accused is currently
facing trial of the other five specifications of rape, and as
such, it is admissible for that particular issue." Defense
counsel objected on various grounds, focusing primarily on the
contention that the probative value of such evidence was
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. See M.R.E. 403;
Bailey, 55 M.J. at 40-41.
The military judge ruled that the prosecution would be
permitted “to put on this evidence under M.R.E. 413." With
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respect to defense counsel’s objection under M.R.E. 403, the
military judge said:
The drafters took that into consideration
when they gave us M.R.E. 413. It almost
seems to be an exception to 403. But even
with a 403 balancing, [an] allegation of a
prior rape is very relevant to charged
offenses of a similar nature, even if the
modus operandi is a little bit different.
And that's what the drafters said [] is the
reason they put in 413.
D. Contents of the Flyer
Prior to the introduction of evidence on the merits, the
prosecution sought to clarify the status of the rape charge
involving Ms. AL in light of the military judge's rejection of
the Government’s motion to amend the specification. Trial
counsel noted that the “flyer” – the document that would be
presented to the members summarizing the charges and
specifications -- contained the specification alleging rape of
Ms. AL in 1995, and he argued that the Government should be
permitted to retain the specification alleging 1995 as the year
of the offense. Trial counsel added: "Then through instructions
to the panel, the panel can address whether or not they feel
that the government has met its burden of proof on that
allegation." According to trial counsel, if the prosecution
would not be allowed to proceed with the specification as
alleged, the flyer would have to be modified to delete the
specification before the flyer was given to the panel.
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Defense counsel countered that the specification should be
deleted from the flyer because there was no evidence that
Appellant raped Ms. AL in 1995. According to defense counsel,
the only evidence of any misconduct with AL was the deposition.
Defense counsel noted that the military judge had admitted the
deposition only for a limited purpose under M.R.E. 413, and that
the deposition addressed an incident in 1993, not a rape in
1995.
The military judge declined to order deletion of the
specification, observing: "I'll expect [the Government to] put
on some evidence and it may not be enough." Trial counsel
added, "And we can address that at the appropriate time with the
close of the government's case, Your Honor."
E. The Prosecution's Evidence on the Charged Offenses
After opening statements, the prosecution presented its
evidence on the charges against Appellant concerning Ms. KD and
Ms. USG. The prosecution also presented evidence on an
unrelated charge of maltreatment of a subordinate under Article
93, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000). The evidence as to these
offenses consisted primarily of in-court testimony by the
alleged victims and other witnesses. The prosecution then
offered the videotaped deposition of Ms. AL, which the military
judge admitted into evidence, consistent with his pretrial
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United States v. Parker, No. 02-0937/AR
rulings. The deposition was shown to the members without
comment by either counsel or the military judge. During
rebuttal, the Government offered brief testimony by a
noncommissioned officer in Ms. AL's unit that primarily
concerned AL's character for truthfulness and her credibility.
At the end of his testimony, a member of the panel asked this
witness whether he was aware of any relationship between Ms. AL
and Appellant, and he answered, "No, sir."
F. The Defense Motion for Findings of Not Guilty
After the prosecution completed its case on the merits,
defense counsel moved for findings of not guilty on the rape and
adultery specifications that alleged misconduct with Ms. AL in
1995. See R.C.M. 917.
Under R.C.M. 917(a), the military judge “shall enter a
finding of not guilty . . . if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction of the offense affected.” R.C.M. 917(d)
states that a motion for a finding of not guilty “shall be
granted only in the absence of some evidence which, together
with all reasonable inferences and applicable presumptions,
could reasonably tend to establish every essential element of an
offense charged. The evidence shall be viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution without an evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses.”
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In support of the motion for findings of not guilty,
defense counsel argued that during the prosecution's case-in-
chief "no evidence whatsoever [had been] presented on those
issues of guilt or innocence on these charges or
specifications." Trial counsel contended that the
specifications should be submitted to the court-martial panel,
and that the members should be permitted to find Appellant
guilty of the two specifications by using exceptions and
substitutions to modify the date. Defense counsel offered two
responses: first, that the only evidence relating to Ms. AL was
in her deposition, which alleged a rape occurring in 1993,
significantly outside the charged time period; second, that the
deposition had been admitted only as propensity evidence
relevant to the charges involving Ms. KD and Ms. USG, and that
the deposition did not state that Appellant engaged in sexual
misconduct with Ms. AL in 1995.
Following the presentations by both parties, the military
judge denied the defense motion to dismiss the charges. He
added that he was going to "do research the next time we have a
break as to how much of a variance [in the dates] this is, and
whether I'll allow it to go to the members later." Defense
counsel asked the military judge to enter special findings
regarding the motion to dismiss when the military judge
completed his review of the variance matter, and the military
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United States v. Parker, No. 02-0937/AR
judge agreed. Defense counsel raised the issue later in the
trial by asking the military judge to rule on the motion to
dismiss, noting that the defense awaited a definitive ruling
before deciding how to proceed. A brief colloquy ensued:
MJ: The decision is that the motion is
denied.
DC: The grounds, sir?
MJ: Prima facia case has been made.
DC: Thank you, sir. Has the military judge
done any research that he had indicated that
he was going to do earlier?
MJ: I did as much research as I felt was
necessary.
DC: Thank you, sir.
The military judge did not enter special findings in support of
the ruling, despite his earlier statement that he would do so.
G. Entry of Findings by Exceptions and Substitutions
Following presentation of evidence on the merits by both
parties, the military judge instructed the panel on findings,
including an instruction on the general subject of variance.
The instruction advised the members that if they were satisfied
from the evidence that the charged offenses occurred but that
the time, place, or manner "differs slightly" from the exact
allegations in the specifications, they could make "minor
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modifications" in reaching their findings, provided that they
did not change the nature or identity of the offenses.
The members found Appellant guilty by exceptions and
substitutions of both specifications alleging misconduct with
Ms. AL. They found that the rape had occurred between "1 August
1993" and 31 March 1995, and that the adultery had occurred on
or about "August [19]93 through March [19]95."
IV. DISCUSSION
The present appeal involves a closely contested trial, in
which the members were required to make careful judgments about
whether Appellant crossed the line between permissible and
impermissible social and professional interactions in a variety
of different circumstances. In the context of this case,
evidence concerning the time, place, and nature of the
interactions between Appellant and others was a major focus of
the litigation. The importance of these factors is reflected in
the findings at both the trial and appellate levels. At trial,
the members found Appellant not guilty of four of the six rape
allegations, one of the two assault charges, and a separate
maltreatment charge. They also modified one of the forcible
sodomy charges to simple sodomy. The Court of Criminal Appeals
further modified the findings, concluding that the evidence was
factually insufficient as to three findings: one of the
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remaining rape charges, the remaining forcible sodomy charge,
and the remaining assault charge. Parker, 54 M.J. at 708.
With respect to the charges concerning Appellant’s
interaction with Ms. AL, the military judge’s pretrial rulings
established the parameters of the Government’s case. First, the
military judge rejected the prosecution’s motion to modify the
charged dates from 1995 to 1993. That decision, based upon the
prohibition against major changes in R.C.M. 603, made it clear
that the Government was obligated to prove that the offenses
took place in 1995, the charged timeframe. Second, the military
judge thereafter permitted the prosecution to introduce Ms. AL’s
deposition, following the prosecution’s representation that the
evidence was admissible under M.R.E. 413 because it contained
evidence relevant to the separate charges involving Ms. KD and
Ms. USG. Third, the decision by the military judge to not alter
the 1995 dates on the flyer further underscored the Government’s
obligation to produce evidence that Appellant engaged in
improper sexual activity with Ms. AL in 1995. The prosecution
produced no such evidence.
Following the military judge’s rejection of the motion to
change the charged dates, the Government could have addressed
the disconnect between pleading and proof through withdrawal of
these charges and preferral of new charges for consideration in
the present trial or in a separate trial. See R.C.M. 603(d).
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Having chosen not to do so, the Government was required to prove
in its case-in-chief that there was improper sexual activity
between Appellant and Ms. AL during the charged period in 1995.
The Government introduced no evidence of sexual interaction
between Appellant and Ms. AL during the charged time period.
Had the Government introduced evidence from which the
factfinders could reasonably infer sexual action during the
charged period in 1995, the evidence in Ms. AL’s deposition
concerning sexual activity in 1993 might have been relevant
under M.R.E. 413 to proving the nature of subsequent sexual
activity. The prosecution, however, could use the 1993 evidence
only by connecting it to otherwise admissible evidence of sexual
activity between Appellant and Ms. AL in 1995. Proof of
improper sexual activity in 1993, without more, did not
demonstrate directly or by reasonable inference that Appellant
engaged in sexual activity with Ms. AL in 1995.
Accordingly, the evidence introduced by the prosecution at
the close of the Government’s case was legally insufficient
under R.C.M. 917 to prove that Appellant raped Ms. AL in the
period between February and March 1995 or that he engaged in
adultery with her during that period. The military judge erred
by not granting the motion to dismiss those specifications.
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V. DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is reversed as to specification 4 of Charge II and
specification 2 of Charge V, and as to the sentence. The
findings of those specifications are set aside, and those
specifications are dismissed. The sentence is set aside, and
the case is returned to the Judge Advocate General for remand to
the Court of Criminal Appeals, which may order a rehearing.
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