United States v. Lewis ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Jamaal A. LEWIS, Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 10-0484
Crim. App. No. 20061070
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 15, 2010
Decided February 15, 2011
EFFRON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BAKER, ERDMANN, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: William E. Cassara, Esq. (argued); Captain
Michael E. Korte (on brief); Captain Kristin McGrory.
For Appellee: Captain Madeline F. Yanford (argued); Major
Christopher B. Burgess, Captain Stephen E. Latino, and Captain
Benjamin M. Owens-Filice (on brief).
Military Judge: Debra L. Boudreau
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Lewis, No. 10-0484/AR
Chief Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of two
specifications of attempted robbery with a firearm, two
specifications of murder while attempting to perpetrate a
robbery, and aggravated assault with a firearm, in violation of
Articles 80, 118, and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 918, 928 (2006). The sentence
adjudged by the court-martial and approved by the convening
authority included a dishonorable discharge, confinement for
life, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The United
States Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. United States
v. Lewis, No. ARMY 20061070, (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 5, 2010)
(unpublished).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED
WHEN THE TRIAL COUNSEL ASKED A DEFENSE EXPERT WHETHER
HE FOUND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, AND ARGUED TO THE
MEMBERS THAT THE DEFENSE EXPERT FAILED TO FIND
EVIDENCE SUGGESTING ANYONE OTHER THAN APPELLANT
COMMITTED THE OFFENSES.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the military
judge did not err in permitting the prosecution’s questioning
and argument, and we affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND
The granted issue concerns the prosecution’s cross-
examination of a defense expert witness and the prosecution’s
rebuttal during closing argument. Part A provides background
concerning the underlying charges and investigation. Part B
describes the central theories offered by the parties at the
outset of the trial. Part C describes the circumstances
involving the questioning of the defense expert. Part D
describes the pertinent aspects of the closing argument.
A. THE INCIDENTS AND THE INVESTIGATION
The charges against Appellant stemmed from two incidents
involving the use of a firearm in the course of attempted
robbery, assault, and murder. In the first incident, a drive-by
shooting, a civilian suffered a gunshot wound. The second
incident, an attempted robbery, resulted in the shooting deaths
of a servicemember and a civilian.
During the subsequent investigation, law enforcement
officials focused on four individuals: Appellant; the driver of
the car in the first incident involving the drive-by shooting;
the driver of the car in which Appellant fled the scene of the
second incident involving the double homicide; and the owner of
the car in which part of the murder weapon was found. Appellant
provided a statement to investigators denying culpability. The
three other individuals made statements implicating Appellant,
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and subsequently testified for the prosecution at trial under
grants of immunity.
The primary evidence against Appellant developed in the
investigation, later produced at trial, consisted of statements
by these three witnesses describing Appellant’s act of shooting
during the drive-by, Appellant’s expression of intent to rob the
victims of the murder, his efforts to dispose of the weapon in
Puget Sound, and his repeated confessions regarding both events.
Additional evidence included the testimony of eyewitnesses who
supported portions of the lead witnesses’ testimony, and
evidence concerning the DNA of a victim found on the recovered
weapon.
During the investigation, two of the witnesses led
authorities to the location where the rest of the weapon had
been thrown into Puget Sound. Special Forces divers recovered
parts of the weapon from that location. Ballistic evidence
linked the pistol to both shootings. The Government obtained
evidence showing that Appellant had purchased the weapon and
used it at a firing range at least once.
B. OPENING STATEMENTS
At the beginning of the trial, the military judge advised
the panel that the Government bore the burden of proving the
accused’s guilt by legal and competent evidence. The military
judge asked the members of the panel, “Does each member
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understand that the burden of proof to establish the accused’s
guilt rests solely upon the prosecution and the burden never
shifts to the defense to establish the accused’s innocence?”
The military judge then followed up by asking: “Does each
member understand, therefore, that the defense has absolutely no
obligation to present any evidence or to disprove the elements
of the offenses?” The panel members responded in the
affirmative to both questions.
The prosecution’s opening statement summarized the
evidence, noting that the panel would hear testimony evidence
from the investigators, forensic experts, and eyewitnesses. The
Government emphasized it would rely upon the recovered murder
weapon and incriminating statements made by Appellant to other
witnesses.
Defense counsel emphasized in his opening sentence that the
defense would not only challenge the sufficiency of the
Government’s proof, but also that “we are going to prove to you
that Specialist Lewis is not guilty of these offenses.” Defense
counsel added: “As the judge explained to you, we don’t have a
burden, but we are going to bring forward evidence and we are
going to prove to you that he is not guilty.”
After stating that the defense would demonstrate the bias
and unreliability of the prosecution’s witnesses, defense
counsel stated: “We’re then going to talk about the police
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investigation that was done in this case.” After noting that
“the police did some good police work,” he added: “But the
evidence is going to make very clear that they did some very,
very poor work as well.” At that point, he summarized the
defense view of deficiencies in the investigation, asserting
that the police focused unduly on Appellant without examining
other possibilities, that they performed an incomplete
examination of the alleged “getaway car,” and that they
performed forensic tests only on Appellant and his clothes but
not on any of the other participants, and that fingerprints were
checked only against Appellant and not against the others.
Defense counsel again emphasized: “So we’re going to show you,
through evidence, the holes and mistakes and faulty pointing --
faulty direction of the police investigation.”
In the balance of the opening statement, defense counsel
promised to provide “some affirmative evidence of [their] own.”
Among other matters, counsel discussed the lack of blood, gun
residue, or DNA tied to Appellant.
C. EXAMINATION OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
The prosecution’s case proceeded as outlined in trial
counsel’s opening statement. Defense counsel subjected the
prosecution’s law enforcement witnesses to vigorous cross-
examination about conduct and results of their investigative
activities. Throughout the trial, defense counsel attacked the
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credibility of the chief Government witnesses and seized on the
lack of direct physical evidence, arguing that the Government’s
investigation had focused on Appellant to the exclusion of other
potential suspects and was therefore unreliable.
After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its
case, including testimony in furtherance of the promise in
defense counsel’s opening statement to provide affirmative
evidence of Appellant’s innocence. The defense presentation
included testimony from James Pex, offered by the defense as a
qualified expert on crime scene investigation, blood spatter
analysis, and various forensic laboratory procedures.
The testimony from Mr. Pex focused primarily on the
components of proper investigative procedures. He also
testified concerning the results of his own examination of the
evidence, including the vehicles in the case and the victim’s
clothing. He provided detailed testimony regarding his
evaluation of the blood spatter in the murder victims’ vehicle.
His testimony included numerous slides containing his views on
the appropriate steps in an investigation and his independent
findings with respect to the evidence in the case.
The prosecution’s cross-examination of Mr. Pex included the
following question: “During the course of your investigation,
you didn’t find anything that you would consider exculpatory of
Specialist Lewis, did you?” After Mr. Pex answered in the
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negative, the prosecution then asked: “Conversely, you didn’t
find anything that would make you think that somebody else was
the actual shooter?” Mr. Pex responded: “I couldn’t say one
way or another.”
Following examination by the parties, the military judge
presented a panel member’s question to Mr. Pex concerning his
examination of the vehicles involved in the incident. After Mr.
Pex described the vehicles that he had examined, the military
judge narrowed the scope of vehicles at issue and asked whether
Mr. Pex had found anything of “evidentiary significance” in the
vehicles. Mr. Pex described his investigation of the vehicles
and answered the question in the negative. The military judge
then asked the panel member whether the interchange had answered
the member’s question, and the member replied in the
affirmative. The defense counsel did not object to the
questions from the prosecution, the panel member, or the
military judge.
D. CLOSING ARGUMENTS
The prosecution’s closing statement focused on the evidence
presented during the Government’s case. The prosecution did not
offer any pertinent comments regarding the granted issue.
Defense counsel, during closing argument, reminded the
panel that his opening statement had promised that the defense
would make an affirmative showing of Appellant’s innocence. He
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further assured the panel that the defense had delivered on that
promise during its presentation of the evidence. Early in the
closing argument, defense counsel told the panel, “Listen, we
set out to prove to you that Specialist Lewis is not guilty. I
believe we did that and I’m going to explain to you how . . . .”
Defense counsel then provided a detailed critique of the
prosecution’s case, focusing on witness credibility,
inconsistencies, and the lack of direct physical evidence.
After stating that “the government has failed,” defense counsel
then said, “So what ought to happen is I ought to just be done,
just shut up now, it’s been long enough and you probably all
would appreciate that.” He decided, however, to not rest on his
critique of the prosecution’s case, adding, “But I can’t help
myself. I’m going to go on. So brace yourselves.”
He followed this by stating that it would be sufficient for
the panel to conclude that the prosecution had not met its
burden, and that it was the panel’s duty to do so. Then he
said:
But listen, I want to give you more. Some
affirmative evidence of innocence. Some
affirmative evidence of innocence. [Sic] Because
you see, I could just -- like I said before, I
could just keep my mouth shut. The government’s
case has already failed, but here’s -- we’re
going to go on the offense now and try to give
you something to hang you hats on. We’re going
to try. . . . I mean, we’re trying to give you
some affirmative evidence of innocence.
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Counsel proceeded to discuss evidence that the defense
highlighted as demonstrating deficiencies in the investigation.
He also pointed to the lack of DNA, fingerprints, or other
physical evidence linking Appellant to the crimes, stating,
“[t]he absence of any link is significant evidence in and of
itself.” He added that the Government had used numerous
forensic methods to examine the accused, but had failed to
examine other potential suspects with the same rigor. He then
stated:
They looked at Lewis in every discipline that
they understand and they found nothing. They did
not look at these other folks. They didn’t even
make pictures of them. That is affirmative
evidence of innocence, the evidence that was
transferred from the crime scene to the killer
was never found because it was never looked for
in the right place.
On rebuttal, the prosecution offered an observation
regarding the testimony from Mr. Pex, the defense’s expert
witness. Trial counsel stated, “The defense’s own witness,
their expert witness, Mr. Pex went through every single piece of
evidence that [law enforcement officials] had processed looking
to find anything that would be exculpatory.” Counsel then
argued, “After his long process, he did not find anything that
would exclude [Appellant] as the shooter.” Defense counsel
offered no objection.
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After closing arguments, the military judge gave the
following instruction: “The burden is on the prosecution to
prove each and every element of each offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” The military judge further instructed the jury that
“the burden of proof to establish guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt is on the government. The burden never shifts
to the accused to establish innocence or to disprove the facts
necessary to establish each element of each offense.” Appellant
did not request any other instructions regarding the burden of
proof or prosecutorial comment.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellant contends that trial counsel’s cross-
examination of Mr. Pex and his closing statement both suggested
that the defense bore the burden of proof to demonstrate that he
was not guilty, thereby violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. In support of this argument, Appellant
contends that the questions posed by the military judge to Mr.
Pex compounded the problem.
The issue of whether such questioning and comment would
constitute a due process violation involves a question of law
that we review de novo. See United States v. Moran, 65 M.J.
178, 181 (C.A.A.F. 2007). In the absence of defense objection,
we review for plain error. United States v. Maynard, 66 M.J.
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242, 244 (C.A.A.F. 2008). Under the plain error standard an
appellant must show, “(1) an error was committed; (2) the error
was plain, or clear, or obvious; and (3) the error resulted in
material prejudice to substantial rights.” Id. “An error is
not ‘plain and obvious’ if, in the context of the entire trial,
the accused fails to show the military judge should be faulted
for taking no action even without an objection.” United States
v. Burton, 67 M.J. 150, 153 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting Maynard, 66
M.J. at 245) (quotation marks omitted).
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
government must prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Czekala, 42 M.J. 168, 170 (C.A.A.F.
1995); see also Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 920(e)(5)(A)
(providing that the “accused must be presumed to be innocent
until the accused’s guilt is established by legal and competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt”).
An improper implication that the defendant carries the
burden of proof on the issue of guilt constitutes a due process
violation. United States v. Mason, 59 M.J. 416, 424 (C.A.A.F.
2004). The limitation on comments regarding the burden of proof
does not apply, however, in circumstances where the defense has
the burden of proof on a particular matter, such as an alibi
defense. See United States v. Webb, 38 M.J. 62, 66 (C.A.A.F.
1993). Likewise, the limitation on comments cannot be used by
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the defense as both a shield and a sword. See United States v.
Carter, 61 M.J. 30, 33 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (noting that “[u]nder the
‘invited response’ or ‘invited reply’ doctrine, the prosecution
is not prohibited from offering a comment that provides a fair
response to claims made by the defense”) (citing United States
v. Gilley, 56 M.J. 113, 120-21 (C.A.A.F. 2001)).
When determining whether prosecutorial comment was
improper, the statement “must be examined in light of its
context within the entire court-martial.” Id. In the course of
reviewing “whether an appellant was deprived of a fair trial by
such comments, the question an appellate court must resolve is
whether, viewed within the context of the entire trial . . .
defense counsel’s comments clearly invited the reply.” Gilley,
56 M.J. at 121 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, from the outset of defense counsel’s
opening statement, the defense articulated a strategy expressly
promising an affirmative showing of innocence. In that regard,
defense counsel assured the panel that the defense would go
beyond demonstrating that the Government had failed to meet its
burden of proof, and that the defense would make an affirmative
showing of Appellant’s innocence. See supra Part I.B.
As part of that strategy, the defense presented the
testimony of an expert witness who criticized the Government’s
investigation. In addition, the defense’s expert testified as
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United States v. Lewis, No. 10-0484/AR
to the results of his own investigation and analysis of
important items of evidence. See supra Part I.C. The defense
posture and the evidence opened the door to exploration of these
matters. In the context of the defense presentation of evidence
from the Pex investigation, the prosecution’s questions to Mr.
Pex about the results of his investigation fell well within the
range of permissible cross-examination. The question from the
panel member, and the ensuing question posed by the military
judge both reflected reasonable inquiries based upon the
testimony from Mr. Pex about his investigation of the vehicles.
During closing arguments, defense counsel presented a
closing statement consistent with the strategy outlined in the
opening argument and addressed in the defense evidence. The
closing argument from defense counsel expressly stated that the
defense not only had demonstrated the Government’s failure to
meet its burden, but also that the defense had provided the
panel with “affirmative evidence of innocence.” See supra Part
I.D.
On appeal, the defense asks us to view the defense
statements at trial as nothing more than inartful commentary on
the Government’s failure to meet its burden of proof which, in
that posture, did not open the door to the prosecution’s
questions and comments. In this case, however, we are not
dealing with a stray comment by the defense. Here, the defense
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counsel chose to open the case with a promise of affirmative
evidence. After the prosecution completed its case, the defense
sought to fulfill that promise by presenting evidence that
included testimony from an expert regarding his own
investigation.
Defense counsel expressly reminded the members in the
closing statement that the defense had presented more than a
critique of the Government’s case by providing “affirmative
evidence of innocence.”
In summary, the prosecution could rely on the defense
posture and the evidence presented during the defense case as
providing the basis for the questions posed to the expert
witness. The military judge also could rely on those matters as
the basis for posing questions on his own and from the panel.
Likewise, during rebuttal of closing argument, the prosecution
could rely on the defense counsel’s closing argument, which
highlighted the earlier defense presentation, as providing the
basis for the comments offered by the prosecution in rebuttal.
In evaluating these matters with respect to the granted
issue, which involves the burden of proof, we also take into
account the instructions provided by the military judge. Here,
the military judge provided the members with appropriate
guidance and instructions at two important points in the trial.
He advised the members at the outset of trial that the
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Government bore the burden of proving the accused’s guilt by
legal and competent evidence, and that the burden would never
shift to the accused. He later provided a similar instruction
after closing arguments. See supra Parts I.A., I.D.
Under the circumstances of this case, the military judge
was not obligated to treat the prosecution’s actions as
objectionable and intervene on his own motion. Accordingly,
Appellant has not met his burden of establishing error, much
less plain error.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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