United States v. Whitten , 2002 CAAF LEXIS 36 ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
V.
John A. WHITTEN, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 01-0243
Crim. App. No. 9900373
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 24, 2001
Decided January 14, 2002
GIERKE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., EFFRON and BAKER, JJ., and
SULLIVAN, S.J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Stephanie D. Sanderson (argued); Colonel
Adele H. Odegard, Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mayfield, Major
Jonathan F. Potter, and Captain Katherine A. Lehmann (on
brief); Major Imogene M. Jamison.
For Appellee: Captain Susana E. Watkins (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Edith M. Rob and Major Daniel G. Brookhart (on
brief); Colonel Steven T. Salata.
Amicus Curiae: Samantha Schoell (law student)(argued); Karen L.
Hecker (supervising attorney)(on brief)--For the Columbus
School of Law, Catholic University of America.
Military Judge: Robert F. Holland
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before publication.
United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A military judge sitting as a general court-martial
convicted appellant, on mixed pleas, of conspiracy to commit
larceny, wrongful disposition of military property, larceny, and
wrongful appropriation of military property, in violation of
Articles 81, 108, and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
USC §§ 881, 908, and 921, respectively. The adjudged and
approved sentence provides for a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for four months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted
grade. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and
sentence in an unpublished opinion. This Court granted review of
the following issue:
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDINGS OF GUILTY TO THE OFFENSES OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
LARCENY (THE SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE I) AND LARCENY
(SPECIFICATION 1 OF CHARGE III) BECAUSE THE CONSPIRACY AND
LARCENY WERE COMPLETED BEFORE APPELLANT BECAME INVOLVED IN
THE SITUATION.
For the reasons set out below, we affirm.1
Facts
Specialist (SPC) Mark Rodbourn and Private First Class (PFC)
Joshua McCarus agreed to help appellant move from his off-post
trailer park to on-post military housing. As they drove through
appellant’s trailer park in McCarus’s car, they noticed a
military duffel bag lying unattended behind a vehicle in a
parking area. They “drove back around” a second time, took the
duffel bag, and put it in the car.
1
This case was argued at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America, Washington, D.C., as part of the Court’s Project Outreach. See
United States v. Allen, 34 M.J. 228, 229 n. 1 (CMA 1992).
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
Rodbourn testified that they parked “past [appellant’s]
house a little bit,” in case someone had seen McCarus’s car.
McCarus testified that they parked “[a] little bit away from his
house,” because he thought appellant would be moving with a truck
and trailer and he “didn’t want to get it scratched, or
anything.”
The owner of the duffel bag, PFC Timothy Campbell, testified
that his neighbor ran up to him and said, “Somebody just took off
with your stuff.” When the neighbor said that she could
recognize the car and its occupants, they drove around and found
it within “45 seconds to a minute.” The car was “about six
houses away.” He knocked on the door of the nearest trailer, but
no one answered. He knocked on the doors of the neighbors, but
no one recognized the car. At that point, PFC Campbell called
the police, who arrived in fifteen to twenty minutes.
Rodbourn and McCarus both testified that they told appellant
about the duffel bag while they were at his trailer, but they did
not recall appellant saying anything in response. Rodbourn
testified that while they were waiting for another person to
arrive to assist in the move, they noticed that the owner of the
duffel bag had parked his car behind McCarus’s car, blocking it
in, and the police were in the area.
When the police left, Rodbourn and McCarus “got in McCarus’s
car real quick” and followed appellant to Sergeant First Class
(SFC) Lund’s house to pick up a trailer. At Lund’s house,
Rodbourn, McCarus, and appellant opened the duffel bag, dumped
the contents on the lawn, “inventoried” them, and decided what
items each would keep. The duffel bag contained military
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
equipment, uniforms, and personal items. They threw away the
personal items. Appellant ripped the name tapes off the uniforms
and spray-painted over Campbell’s name on the duffel bag. They
put the items to be distributed among themselves back into the
duffel bag and put the bag in McCarus’s car. Rodbourn and
McCarus then followed appellant to his new on-post quarters,
where they left it. Rodbourn testified that they left the duffel
bag at appellant’s quarters because McCarus’s car had already
been identified and “they’[d] find it in the barracks.”
McCarus and appellant had also been involved in a theft of
ammunition left over from a gunnery training exercise. As the
investigations into the stolen ammunition and stolen duffel bag
intensified, appellant took the stolen duffel bag and the stolen
ammunition to a wooded area and attempted to conceal them.
McCarus, Rodbourn, and appellant agreed that McCarus and Rodbourn
would take the blame for the theft of the duffel bag, and
appellant would take the blame for the ammunition.
At the conclusion of the prosecution case, the defense made
a motion for a finding of not guilty, arguing, “The larceny was
completed before [appellant] ever even laid eyes on [the duffel
bag].” Defense counsel conceded that, if appellant was guilty of
anything, he was guilty of being an accessory after the fact or
receiving stolen property. Trial counsel argued that the larceny
was not completed until they divided the contents of the duffel
bag among themselves. Neither side presented any legal authority
to support their arguments. The military judge denied the motion
without explanation.
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
Discussion
Appellant now asserts that the conspiracy, as well as the
larceny, were completed before appellant became involved. He
argues that larceny continues only “until such time as its fruits
are secured in a place where they may be appropriated to the use
of the perpetrator of the scheme.” United States v. Seivers, 8
M.J. 63, 65 (CMA 1979), citing United States v. Escobar, 7 M.J. 197
(CMA 1979). The Government argues that asportation of the stolen
property continued until the property reached its final hiding
place in appellant’s on-post quarters. Amicus curiae argues
there was no evidence that Rodbourn and McCarus formed a
conspiracy to steal the property; and that appellant could not
have conspired with Rodbourn and McCarus to steal the property
because the larceny was complete before appellant became involved
with the stolen property. The question before us is “whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of [conspiracy and larceny] beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979).
The elements of conspiracy are:
(1) That the accused entered into an agreement with one
or more persons to commit an offense under the code;
and
(2) That, while the agreement continued to exist, and
while the accused remained a party to the agreement,
the accused or at least one of the co-conspirators
performed an overt act for the purpose of bringing
about the object of the conspiracy.
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
Para. 5b, Part IV, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2000
ed.).2 “Each conspirator is liable for all offenses committed by
any of the co-conspirators while the conspiracy continues and the
person remains a party to it.” Id. at para. 5c(5).
The formation of a conspiracy “need not take any ‘particular
form or be manifested in any formal words.’” The agreement can
be “silent, . . . ‘tacit[,] or [only a] mutual understanding
between the parties.’” It “is usually manifested by the conduct
of the parties themselves.” United States v. Barnes, 38 M.J. 72,
75 (CMA 1993) (internal citations omitted.) A conspirator who
joins an existing conspiracy “can be convicted of this offense
only if, at or after the time of joining the conspiracy, an overt
act in furtherance of the object of the agreement is committed.”
Para. 5c(1), Part IV, Manual, supra. Thus, the prosecution was
required to prove that appellant joined an ongoing conspiracy
between Rodbourn and McCarus, and that after he joined the
conspiracy, an overt act in furtherance of the larceny of the
duffel bag was committed.
The elements of larceny are:
(1) That the accused wrongfully took, obtained, or
withheld certain property from the possession of the
owner or of any other person;
(2) That the property belonged to a certain person;
(3) That the property was of a certain value, or of
some value; and
(4) That the taking, obtaining, or withholding by the
accused was with the intent permanently to deprive or
defraud another person of the use and benefit of the
property or permanently to appropriate the property for
2
All provisions of the Manual are the same as those in effect at the time of
appellant’s court-martial.
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
the use of the accused or for any person other than the
owner.
Id. at para. 46b.
To prove larceny, the prosecution was required to prove that
appellant joined an ongoing conspiracy to commit larceny, as
discussed above, or that he aided and abetted an ongoing larceny
being committed by Rodbourn and McCarus. See Art. 77, UCMJ, 10
USC § 877 (person who aids and abets the commission of an offense
is criminally liable as a principal).
The pivotal factual issue at trial involved asportation of
the property. The crime of larceny by taking continues as long
as asportation of the property continues. Escobar, 7 M.J. at 199,
citing United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d 1245, 1253 (DC Cir.
1972). “[F]actually the original asportation continues as long
as the perpetrator is not satisfied with the location of the
goods and causes the flow of their movement to continue
relatively uninterrupted.” Id. at n. 4.
The prosecution theory was that appellant joined the
conspiracy while asportation was continuing. The defense theory
was that asportation was completed when Rodbourn and McCarus put
the duffel bag in the car and parked the car.
With respect to the conspiracy, the specific issue before
this Court is whether any rational factfinder could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That Rodbourn and McCarus formed a conspiracy to steal
Campbell’s duffel bag and its contents;
(2) That they took the duffel bag;
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
(3) That appellant joined the conspiracy before Rodbourn and
McCarus were “satisfied with the location of the goods” and while
the movement of the goods continued “relatively uninterrupted”;
and
(4) That an overt act in furtherance of the agreement to
steal the duffel bag was committed after appellant joined the
conspiracy.
With respect to the larceny, the specific issue is whether
any rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant joined an ongoing conspiracy to commit
larceny or aided and abetted the larceny before Rodbourn and
McCarus were “satisfied with the location of the goods” and while
the movement of the goods continued “relatively uninterrupted.”
The evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, reflects the following:
(1) That Rodbourn and McCarus decided to steal the
duffel bag after they saw it unattended and circled the area
a second time;
(2) That almost immediately after they took the duffel
bag, Rodbourn and McCarus became concerned that McCarus’s
car had been identified;
(3) That within minutes, they knew that McCarus’s car
had been identified and the police notified of the theft;
(4) That within minutes, they decided that the stolen
property could not be kept in the car or the barracks;
(5) That, at the first opportunity, they moved the car
and the duffel bag to SFC Lund’s house;
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
(6) That, at SFC Lund’s house, appellant participated
in the division of property, removed Campbell’s
identification from some of the items, and identified which
items he wanted to keep for himself;
(7) That appellant, Rodbourn, and McCarus did not know
the exact contents of the duffel bag and did not decide what
items they wanted to keep until they “inventoried” it at SFC
Lund’s house; and
(8) That after appellant, Rodbourn, and McCarus divided
the property and threw away the items they did not want,
appellant agreed to hide the stolen property in his new on-
post quarters.
Based on this evidence, we hold that a rational factfinder
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodbourn and
McCarus formed an agreement, manifested by their conduct, to
steal the duffel bag after initially seeing it and then circling
back around to take it; that appellant joined the ongoing
conspiracy to steal Campbell’s duffel bag and its contents; and
that several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were
committed after he joined it: inventory and division of property,
removal of identifying markings and name tapes, and further
transportation to appellant’s quarters for safekeeping. We
further hold that a rational factfinder could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant aided and abetted in the larceny
before asportation of the stolen property was complete.
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to
support appellant’s convictions of conspiracy and larceny.
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United States v. Whitten, No. 01-0243/AR
Decision
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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