United States v. Black ( 2022 )


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  •        This opinion is subject to revision before publication
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE    ARMED FORCES
    _______________
    UNITED STATES
    Appellee
    v.
    Ethen D. BLACK, Private First Class
    United States Army, Appellant
    No. 22-0066
    Crim. App. No. 20210310
    Argued March 29, 2022—Decided August 25, 2022
    Military Judge: Mark A. Bridges
    For Appellant: Captain Joseph A. Seaton Jr. (argued); Colo-
    nel Michael C. Friess, Major Joyce C. Liu, Captain Andrew
    R. Britt, and Jonathan F. Potter, Esq.
    For Appellee: Captain Karey B. Marren (argued); Colonel
    Christopher B. Burgess, Lieutenant Colonel Craig J.
    Schapira, and Captain Dustin L. Morgan.
    Judge HARDY delivered the opinion of the Court, in
    which Chief Judge OHLSON, Judge MAGGS, and Senior
    Judge STUCKY joined. Judge SPARKS filed a separate
    dissenting opinion.
    _______________
    Judge HARDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
    Appellant loaned his cell phone to another soldier, Private
    First Class (PFC) Avery, so that he could make calls, send
    texts, play games, and watch YouTube while he served
    overnight guard duty. While using the phone, PFC Avery
    accidentally discovered potentially inappropriate images of
    fellow female soldiers. PFC Avery reported the images to the
    acting first sergeant, who conducted a more in-depth search
    of the phone and discovered child pornography. After an
    investigation by the Criminal Investigation Division (CID),
    the Government charged Appellant with possession of child
    pornography.
    Prior to his court-martial, Appellant moved to suppress
    the evidence obtained from his cell phone, arguing that the
    acting first sergeant’s actions were an unlawful government
    search conducted without a warrant or Appellant’s consent.
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    The military judge granted Appellant’s motion, and the Gov-
    ernment filed an interlocutory appeal with the United States
    Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) which reversed. Ap-
    pellant appealed the ACCA’s decision to this Court, and we
    reverse again. The military judge did not abuse his discretion
    in holding: (1) PFC Avery lacked common authority to con-
    sent to the search of Appellant’s phone; (2) the Government
    failed to prove that the evidence was subject to the inevitable
    discovery doctrine; and (3) Appellant’s later voluntary con-
    sent to search the phone was not sufficiently attenuated from
    the unlawful search to cure that error.
    I. Background
    At the time of his alleged offense, Appellant’s unit was
    training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in
    Fort Polk, Louisiana. As part of his duties while at the JRTC,
    Appellant served a twelve-hour guard duty shift, after which
    he was relieved by a group of soldiers including PFC Avery,
    who were preparing to serve the twelve-hour overnight shift.
    Because PFC Avery’s cell phone was broken, he asked to bor-
    row Appellant’s cell phone for the duration of the night shift.
    Appellant loaned PFC Avery his cell phone, telling PFC Avery
    that he could use the phone to send text messages and make
    phone calls, play games, and watch YouTube, but making no
    other express statements about the scope of PFC Avery’s per-
    mission to use the phone. Before leaving the phone in PFC
    Avery’s possession, Appellant wrote down his phone’s
    passcode on the table. The passcode was sufficient to unlock
    the phone’s home screen and to access all features of the
    phone relevant to this case.
    Later during PFC Avery’s night shift, a photo gallery no-
    tification appeared on the screen of Appellant’s phone. While
    attempting to swipe the notification off the screen, PFC Avery
    inadvertently opened the photo gallery revealing multiple pic-
    tures of clothed female soldiers. The pictures appeared to PFC
    Avery and the other soldiers on guard duty to be focused on
    the women’s buttocks and to have been taken without the
    women’s knowledge or consent.
    After the discovery of the potentially inappropriate pho-
    tos, one of the soldiers called the acting first sergeant, Ser-
    2
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    geant First Class (SFC) Manglicmot, to report a possible sex-
    ual harassment incident. SFC Manglicmot came to the guard
    station to assess the situation and asked to look at Appellant’s
    phone so that he could verify what the soldiers had reported.
    PFC Avery unlocked the phone and handed it to
    SFC Manglicmot with the photo gallery open revealing the
    images of the clothed women. Suspecting that there might be
    further incriminating images on the phone, SFC Manglicmot
    exited the photo gallery and opened other photo galleries on
    Appellant’s phone, eventually discovering child pornography.
    At that point, SFC Manglicmot closed the phone, returned it
    to PFC Avery, and instructed the soldiers to stop using it.
    SFC Manglicmot attempted to report the child pornography
    to his command but was unable to reach anyone until the next
    morning.
    After SFC Manglicmot spoke to his command, he and CID
    agents detained Appellant, seized Appellant’s phone, and
    transported Appellant to the CID office for questioning. Once
    there, a CID agent informed Appellant of his rights and that
    he was suspected of possessing, viewing, distributing, and
    manufacturing child pornography. Appellant declined to
    make a statement and invoked his right to an attorney, but
    nonetheless provided written consent for CID to seize and
    search his phone. After CID’s search of Appellant’s phone
    (and later his laptop) revealed suspected child pornography,
    the Government charged Appellant with one specification of
    possession of child pornography in violation of Article 134,
    Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
    10 U.S.C. § 934
    (2018).
    Prior to his court-martial, Appellant moved to suppress all
    evidence and derivative evidence obtained from the search of
    his cell phone. The military judge granted the motion, con-
    cluding that SFC Manglicmot conducted an unlawful search
    of Appellant’s phone and that the evidence must be sup-
    pressed. As most relevant here, the military judge based his
    decision on three conclusions of law. First, that PFC Avery
    did not have common authority over Appellant’s entire phone
    because Appellant loaned PFC Avery his phone for a limited
    period of time and for limited purposes. Second, that even if
    PFC Avery had common authority over the phone, he only
    provided limited consent for SFC Manglicmot to search the
    3
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    one photo gallery PFC Avery had already seen and not to
    search the entire phone. Thus, when SFC Manglicmot exited
    that photo gallery and searched additional photo galleries, he
    exceeded the scope of PFC Avery’s consent. And third, that
    Appellant’s written consent to search the phone failed to cure
    the taint of SFC Manglicmot’s initial, unlawful search.
    After the Government moved for reconsideration based on
    the doctrine of inevitable discovery, the military judge further
    held that the Government failed to demonstrate the evidence
    from the phone would have been inevitably discovered absent
    SFC Manglicmot’s illegal search. The military judge declined
    to vacate his order suppressing the evidence obtained from
    Appellant’s cell phone, and the Government filed an interloc-
    utory appeal pursuant to Article 62, UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 862
    .
    On appeal, the ACCA reversed, concluding that the
    military judge abused his discretion by suppressing evidence
    obtained from Appellant’s cell phone. United States v. Black,
    No. ARMY Misc. 20210310, 
    2021 CCA LEXIS 559
    , at *2, 
    2021 WL 4953849
    , at *1 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 22, 2021)
    (unpublished). Because this Court reviews the military
    judge’s ruling directly in Article 62, UCMJ, appeals, United
    States v. Pugh, 
    77 M.J. 1
    , 3 (C.A.A.F. 2017), we need not
    linger on the details of the ACCA’s reasoning. In short, the
    ACCA held that PFC Avery had common authority over
    Appellant’s cell phone—and Appellant therefore assumed the
    risk that PFC Avery would allow the Government to search
    it—because Appellant provided PFC Avery with access to the
    phone without placing any express restrictions or limitations
    on the phone’s use. Black, 
    2021 CCA LEXIS 559
    , at *1, 
    2021 WL 4953849
    , at *1.
    This Court granted review to answer the following
    question:
    Whether the Army Court erred in its abuse of discre-
    tion analysis by (1) creating a novel test for common
    authority, (2) failing to give deference to the military
    judge’s findings, (3) comparing a modern cell phone
    to a traditional “container,” and (4) finding error
    based on a difference of opinion.
    United States v. Black, 
    82 M.J. 229
     (C.A.A.F. 2022) (order
    granting review).
    4
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    II. Standard of Review
    Although the granted issue focuses on the ACCA’s analy-
    sis, this Court directly reviews the military judge’s decision
    when presented with an interlocutory appeal. Pugh, 77 M.J.
    at 3. In such appeals, we review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party and are bound by the mili-
    tary judge’s factual determinations unless they are unsup-
    ported by the record or clearly erroneous. Id.
    This Court reviews a military judge’s decision to suppress
    evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bowen,
    
    76 M.J. 83
    , 87 (C.A.A.F. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs
    when the military judge either applied the law erroneously or
    clearly erred in making findings of fact. United States v. Don-
    aldson, 
    58 M.J. 477
    , 482 (C.A.A.F. 2003). An abuse of discre-
    tion must be “ ‘more than a mere difference of opinion. The
    challenged action must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unrea-
    sonable, or clearly erroneous.’ ” United States v. Solomon, 
    72 M.J. 176
    , 179 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (quoting United States v. White,
    
    69 M.J. 236
    , 239 (C.A.A.F. 2010)).
    III. Discussion
    Properly stated, the question before this Court is whether
    the military judge abused his discretion when he granted Ap-
    pellant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the
    search of Appellant’s cell phone. For the reasons explained
    below, we hold that he did not.
    A. Common Authority
    The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
    searches and seizures such that ordinarily searches are pro-
    hibited absent a search warrant except for a “ ‘few specifically
    established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Schneckloth v.
    Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 219 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United
    States, 
    389 U.S. 347
    , 357 (1967)). One of those exceptions is
    when the Government obtains voluntary consent, which can
    be provided “either from the individual whose property is
    searched, or from a third party who possesses common au-
    thority” over that property. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. 177
    , 181 (1990) (citations omitted); United States v. Rader, 
    65 M.J. 30
    , 32 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
    5
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    “The validity of the third party consent does not hinge on
    niceties of property law or on legal technicalities,” Rader, 65
    M.J. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omit-
    ted), but is instead determined by whether the third party has
    joint access or control of the property for most purposes.1 Id.;
    see also Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 314(e)(2) (“A per-
    son may grant consent to search property when the person
    exercises control over that property.”). The burden lies with
    the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that a third party has joint access and control to the degree
    that such control confers a right to consent to search. M.R.E.
    314(e)(5). The degree of control a third party possesses over
    property is a question of fact. Rader, 65 M.J. at 33. Whether
    that control is sufficient to establish common authority is a
    question of law. Id.
    The military judge concluded that the Government failed
    to establish by clear and convincing evidence that PFC Avery
    possessed common authority over Appellant’s entire phone,
    such that he could consent to SFC Manglicmot’s search of the
    additional photo galleries. He based this conclusion on his fac-
    tual findings that Appellant only loaned his phone to
    PFC Avery for one night; that Appellant told PFC Avery that
    he could use the phone to send text messages and make phone
    calls, play games, and watch YouTube and that Appellant had
    no expectation that he would do anything else with the phone;
    and that Appellant never gave PFC Avery permission to look
    at his photographs.
    The Government argues that the military judge abused
    his discretion when he concluded that PFC Avery did not
    have common authority over the entire phone based on the
    existence of implied—rather than express or actual—
    1  In Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 187
    , the Supreme Court also held
    that apparent common authority can establish the proper basis for
    a consent search. A person has apparent common authority to con-
    sent to a search if investigators reasonably believe that the person
    has authority to consent to a search, even if the person does not
    actually have such authority. 
    Id.
     at 188–89. This doctrine does not
    apply here because SFC Manglicmot knew before he accessed Ap-
    pellant’s phone that it did not belong to PFC Avery and had no rea-
    son to believe that PFC Avery had any relationship to the phone
    other than his possession of it at the time.
    6
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    limitations on PFC Avery’s use of the phone. The Government
    contends that that PFC Avery possessed common authority
    over Appellant’s phone because “Appellant provided
    unlimited physical access to it, and placed no restrictions—
    verbal or electronic—over the folders inside.” Because we are
    aware of no binding precedent that equates physical access
    with common authority or that requires express or actual
    restrictions on use, we disagree that the military judge
    misapplied the law.
    Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever held
    that the scope of a person’s common authority over property
    is coextensive with that person’s access to the property. If that
    were true, determining whether common authority existed
    would be trivial. The only question would be whether the per-
    son who consented to the search had access to the searched
    property. Under the Government’s theory, a property owner
    would “assume the risk” that another person might provide
    consent to an unlimited search by law enforcement simply by
    giving that person limited, temporary possession over their
    property. Yet that is not how the analysis in common author-
    ity cases proceeds.
    In Rader, this Court expressly rejected the idea that the
    owner of a computer that was also used by a third party could
    not limit the scope of the third party’s access to certain appli-
    cations or files. 65 M.J. at 34. And although the Court recog-
    nized that one way of restricting access was through the use
    of technological restraints such as passwords or encryption,
    we also acknowledged that courts should consider “whether
    the defendant otherwise manifested an intention to restrict
    third-party access.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
    (citation omitted). Accordingly, even though Appellant had
    not password protected or encrypted the photo galleries con-
    taining the child pornography, that does not mean that Ap-
    pellant could not have excluded those galleries from the scope
    of PFC Avery’s common authority.
    We also disagree with the Government that it was a mis-
    application of the law for the military judge to conclude that
    Appellant had restricted PFC Avery’s access to the phone
    without Appellant expressly telling PFC Avery what he was
    not allowed to do on the cell phone. In United States v. Reister,
    7
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    this Court faced a similar question in a case where the de-
    fendant had invited a third party to stay in his apartment
    while he was away. 
    44 M.J. 409
    , 411 (C.A.A.F. 1996). A criti-
    cal issue in the case was whether the third party’s common
    authority over the apartment extended to the contents of a
    closed logbook that was located on a shelf in the apartment.
    
    Id. at 414
    . The Court noted that the evidence showed that the
    defendant placed “no express restrictions” on the third party’s
    access to the apartment, yet—contrary to the Government’s
    theory—that did not end the Court’s analysis. 
    Id.
     Instead, the
    Court observed that the “question remains . . . whether the
    logbook was in a place that was impliedly off-limits to [the
    third party].” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). If implied limitations
    could not define the scope of a third party’s common author-
    ity, that question—and the Court’s ensuing analysis—would
    have been irrelevant.
    It is true that this Court has never been presented with a
    case where a military judge held that an implied restriction
    was sufficient to cabin a third party’s authority over shared
    property, but we reject the Government’s assertion that an
    implied restriction could never do so as a matter of law. Our
    common authority consent cases do not support such a con-
    clusion, and that view would be inconsistent with the Su-
    preme Court’s guidance that the key consideration in as-
    sessing Fourth Amendment consent cases is reasonableness,
    rather than technical property interests. Thus the appropri-
    ate question is “what would the typical reasonable person
    have understood by the exchange” between Appellant and
    PFC Avery. Florida v. Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. 248
    , 251 (1991); Geor-
    gia v. Randolph, 
    547 U.S. 103
    , 110 (2006) (citing Katz, 
    389 U.S. at
    352–53).2
    2 Although not a factor in this case, in Randolph, the Supreme
    Court further noted that widely shared social expectations carry
    “great significance” in determining reasonableness in Fourth
    Amendment consent cases. 
    547 U.S. at 111
    . We expect that social
    expectations with respect to cell phones may be an important and
    evolving consideration in future consent cases, given the unique na-
    ture of those devices. See Riley v. California, 
    573 U.S. 373
    , 393–95
    (2014) (discussing the various privacy considerations associated
    with cell phones).
    8
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    Here, the military judge weighed the sometimes conflict-
    ing testimony of Appellant and PFC Avery and specifically
    considered both what Appellant told PFC Avery and what he
    did not tell him. The military judge found that Appellant had
    manifested an intention to restrict PFC Avery’s use of his
    phone for a limited time and for the limited purposes of mak-
    ing phone calls, sending text messages, playing games, and
    watching YouTube. Based on these factual findings, the mili-
    tary judge held that Appellant’s manifested intention cabined
    PFC Avery’s common authority over the phone. In reaching
    this conclusion, the military judge correctly stated the Gov-
    ernment’s burden of proof and the test for common authority.
    This Court’s precedent has recognized the possibility that an
    implied restriction may limit the scope of common authority,
    and the military judge did not misapply or misunderstand the
    law when he found that the facts in this case limited
    PFC Avery’s control over Appellant’s phone such that it did
    not rise to a level of joint access and control sufficient to pro-
    vide PFC Avery authority to consent to a search of all the
    phone’s photo galleries.
    Although we might have reached a different conclusion
    than the military judge in the first instance, we are mindful
    that there must be more than a mere difference of opinion to
    establish an abuse of discretion. The military judge’s decision
    was not based on clearly erroneous facts, and it was not “ar-
    bitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.”
    Solomon, 72. M.J. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted)
    (citation omitted). The military judge did not exhibit an erro-
    neous view of the law, and he did not abuse his discretion in
    suppressing the evidence obtained from Appellant’s phone.
    B. Inevitable Discovery
    Because the military judge did not abuse his discretion in
    holding that PFC Avery did not have common authority to
    consent to the search, we must next consider whether the
    Government would have inevitably discovered the evidence
    obtained from Appellant’s cell phone absent the illegal search.
    When the Government unlawfully obtains evidence, that evi-
    dence may still be admissible if “the evidence would have been
    obtained even if such unlawful search or seizure had not been
    made.” M.R.E. 311(c)(2). To prevail under this doctrine, the
    Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
    9
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    that at the time of the unlawful search, government agents
    were already taking actions or pursuing leads such that their
    simultaneous actions and investigations would have inevita-
    bly led to the discovery of the evidence even absent the un-
    lawful conduct. United States v. Dease, 
    71 M.J. 116
    , 122
    (C.A.A.F. 2012). This Court reviews a military judge’s ruling
    on the application of the doctrine of inevitable discovery for
    an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at 121
    .
    Here, the Government argues that the discovery of the
    child pornography on Appellant’s phone was inevitable be-
    cause—even without the unlawful search of Appellant’s
    phone—the following events would have occurred: (1)
    SFC Manglicmot or Appellant’s command would have re-
    ported Appellant to CID based solely on the pictures of the
    clothed women; (2) CID would have opened an investigation
    into Appellant’s misconduct; and (3) that investigation would
    have resulted in a lawful search authorization for Appellant’s
    cell phone that would have revealed the child pornography.
    This theory is not illogical, but the military judge concluded
    there was not enough evidence in the record for the Govern-
    ment to carry its burden.
    Neither SFC Manglicmot nor Appellant’s company com-
    mander testified that they would have reported the poten-
    tially inappropriate pictures of clothed women to CID or
    sought a search authorization for Appellant’s phone absent
    the discovery of the child pornography. And later, when CID
    investigated Appellant and the contents of his cell phone after
    the unlawful search, CID made no effort to investigate the
    potentially improper clothed pictures, but instead exclusively
    focused on the child pornography. The Government offered no
    evidence suggesting that it is routine practice for CID to re-
    quest search authorizations when a suspect has taken pic-
    tures of fully clothed women like those PFC Avery initially
    found on Appellant’s phone. And although a CID agent testi-
    fied that she would have investigated Appellant for possible
    Article 117a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 917a, or Article 120c, UCMJ,
    10 U.S.C. § 920c, violations and sought a search authorization
    even without the discovery of the child pornography, the mil-
    itary judge found that her testimony was not credible based
    on her actual investigation and the fact that Appellant’s al-
    10
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    leged misconduct with respect to the nonconsensual photo-
    graphs of clothed women did not qualify as an offense under
    either Article 117a, UCMJ, or under Article 120c, UCMJ.
    Under these facts, the military judge did not abuse his dis-
    cretion when he held the inevitable discovery doctrine did not
    apply. The military judge reasonably concluded that the Gov-
    ernment did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
    that the Government would have investigated Appellant
    based solely on images of the clothed women; or (2) that such
    an investigation would have resulted in a lawful search au-
    thorization for Appellant’s phone.3
    C. Attenuation
    After completing his twelve-hour guard duty shift and
    loaning PFC Avery his phone, Appellant returned to his tent
    to sleep. The following morning, SFC Manglicmot retrieved
    Appellant from his tent and escorted him to a waiting CID
    officer. The CID officer handcuffed Appellant, seized his cell
    phone, and transported Appellant to the CID office for ques-
    tioning. After being informed of his rights, Appellant elected
    to remain silent and requested a lawyer but gave CID his con-
    sent to search his cell phone. All parties agree that Appel-
    lant’s consent was voluntary.
    Before the military judge, the Government argued that
    even if SFC Manglicmot’s search of Appellant’s phone was un-
    lawful, the voluntary consent that Appellant gave to CID to
    search his phone the next day was sufficiently attenuated
    from SFC Manglicmot’s illegal search that it cured the taint
    3  After the military judge granted Appellant’s motion to sup-
    press the evidence obtained from his cell phone, the Government
    requested reconsideration due to the fact that—unbeknownst to the
    Government trial counsel—Appellant faced Article 15, UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 815
    , nonjudicial punishment for violating Article 134,
    UCMJ, based on the photos of clothed women discovered by
    PFC Avery on Appellant’s cell phone. Although this fact might have
    helped the Government establish that it was interested in investi-
    gating more than just the child pornography on Appellant’s phone,
    even with the evidence of the Article 15 proceeding, it was not an
    abuse of discretion to conclude that the child pornography would
    not have inevitably been discovered. The evidence in the record does
    not clearly establish that the Government would have pursued non-
    judicial punishment absent the child pornography investigation.
    11
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    of that search. The military judge disagreed, concluding that
    all three factors from the test set forth in Brown v. Illinois,
    
    422 U.S. 590
     (1975), weighed in Appellant’s favor. Before this
    Court, the Government now argues that the military judge
    abused his discretion by misapplying at least two of the
    Brown factors. Again, we disagree.
    As correctly stated by the military judge, to determine
    whether a defendant’s voluntary consent to a search is suffi-
    ciently attenuated from an earlier unlawful search, this Court
    assesses three factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the un-
    lawful police activity and the subsequent consent; (2) the
    presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose
    and flagrancy of the official misconduct. United States v.
    Conklin, 
    63 M.J. 333
    , 338–39 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (adopting the
    three-factor test from Brown, 
    422 U.S. at
    603–04). In applying
    the third factor, this Court has held that the misconduct need
    not be “outrageous” or demonstrate bad motive or intent by
    the government official. United States v. Darnall, 
    76 M.J. 326
    ,
    331 (C.A.A.F. 2017). It is sufficient that the misconduct be
    “unnecessary and unwise.” Conklin, 63 M.J. at 339.
    In his ruling on attenuation, the military judge drew par-
    allels between the facts in this case and to those in this
    Court’s decision in Conklin, 
    63 M.J. 333
    . In Conklin, this
    Court held that the accused’s consent to search his computer
    was not sufficiently attenuated from an earlier unlawful
    search of that computer to cure the error. 
    Id. at 340
    . In that
    case, the Court analyzed the three Brown factors as follows:
    (1) less than three hours elapsed between the illegal search
    and the consent; (2) there were no intervening circumstances
    despite the involvement of new agents because absent the il-
    legal search there would have been no interest in the accused;
    and (3) although the government agents did not harbor bad
    motives, the Court held the agents’ actions were “unnecessary
    and unwise” as well as “avoidable . . . and unlawful.” 
    Id. at 339
    . This Court concluded that each factor weighed in the ac-
    cused’s favor, and ultimately held that the causal connection
    between the illegal search and the accused’s consent had not
    been broken. 
    Id. at 340
    .
    Given the similarities between the facts in this case and
    those in Conklin, we find no support for the Government’s ar-
    12
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    gument that the military judge abused his discretion by mis-
    applying the Brown factors. First, with respect to the tem-
    poral proximity of the illegal search and the consent, in this
    case the delay was about twelve hours compared to less than
    three hours in Conklin. But even that minor difference is de-
    ceiving because SFC Manglicmot conducted the illegal search
    during the night shift and Appellant was arrested the follow-
    ing morning. Although more time passed between the illegal
    search and Appellant’s consent in this case compared to
    Conklin, the relevant parties were asleep for much of that
    time.
    Second, with respect to the presence of intervening cir-
    cumstances, the Government admitted before the military
    judge that there were none, see Government Response to De-
    fense Motion to Suppress Evidence at 13, United States v.
    Black, (U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, 4th Jud. Circ. Mar. 30,
    2021) (“there were admittedly no intervening circum-
    stances”), and the military judge agreed. Nevertheless, the
    Government now argues that the military judge misapplied
    the second Brown factor by applying the wrong legal stand-
    ard. It would be passing strange for this Court to now hold
    that the military judge abused his discretion by accepting the
    Government’s concession on this point.
    But even without the Government’s admission, we could
    not fault the military judge for applying the same reasoning
    that this Court applied in Conklin. In that case, this Court
    found that the second factor weighed in favor of the accused
    because the government agents “would not have been
    interested in talking to [the accused] but for the information
    relayed to them as a direct result of the unlawful search that
    had just taken place.” Conklin, 63 M.J. at 339. Similarly, in
    this case, the military judge noted, “[t]he CID agents relied
    exclusively on the results of SFC Manglicmot’s unlawful
    search and discovery of child pornography in conducting their
    investigation and asking for the accused’s consent to search.”
    Considering that this Court concluded that “[t]here were no
    intervening events or circumstances that would sever the
    causal connection” between the unlawful search and the
    accused’s consent in Conklin, 63 M.J. at 339, the military
    judge did not abuse his discretion by coming to the same
    conclusion here.
    13
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    Finally, with respect to the purpose and flagrancy of the
    official misconduct, the military judge’s reasoning again
    tracked this Court’s decision in Conklin. In Conklin, this
    Court noted that the illegal search of the accused’s computer
    was the only factor that led directly to the government’s re-
    quest for the accused’s consent and its subsequent search of
    his computer. Id. at 340. The Court held that although the
    unlawful search itself was not flagrant (even if it was avoida-
    ble and unwise), the Government’s exploitation of the infor-
    mation obtained through that search was. Id. Similarly, the
    military judge in this case noted that SFC Manglicmot’s un-
    lawful discovery of child pornography on Appellant’s phone
    provided the only basis for CID’s investigation and its request
    for consent to search Appellant’s phone. Although the mili-
    tary judge stated that the Government’s actions were not ma-
    licious, he did conclude that they were “unwise, avoidable,
    and unlawful” like the Government’s actions in Conklin.
    Reviewing the military judge’s analysis of the Brown fac-
    tors, we cannot say that the military judge abused his discre-
    tion. The military judge’s reasoning was not arbitrary, fanci-
    ful, or unreasonable. To the contrary, the military judge cited
    Conklin, 
    63 M.J. 333
    , our leading precedent with respect to
    attenuation, and faithfully applied the guidance provided by
    that case and other precedent. While we recognize that the
    Government argues that the facts in Conklin can be distin-
    guished and that the reasoning in Conklin should have led
    the military judge to a different result, we view that as more
    of a difference of opinion than an abuse of discretion.
    IV. Conclusion
    We hold that the military judge did not abuse his discre-
    tion when he held: (1) that PFC Avery lacked common author-
    ity to consent to a search of Appellant’s phone; or (2) that nei-
    ther the inevitable discovery doctrine nor the doctrine of
    attenuation could transform the contents of the unlawful
    search into admissible evidence. The decision of the United
    States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The mil-
    itary judge’s rulings with respect to Appellant’s motion to
    suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone (Appellate
    Exhibit VIII) and to the Government’s motion for reconsider-
    ation of that motion (Appellate Exhibit XII) are affirmed. The
    record is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army
    14
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Opinion of the Court
    for remand to the military judge for further proceedings con-
    sistent with this opinion.
    15
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting.
    I disagree with the majority’s conclusions regarding both
    common authority to search and the question of attenuation
    and therefore dissent in their decision to uphold the military
    judge’s ruling.
    Common Authority to Search
    Searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively
    unreasonable unless they fall within “a few specifically estab-
    lished and well-delineated exceptions.” United States v.
    Wicks, 
    73 M.J. 93
    , 99 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
    389 U.S. 347
    ,
    357 (1967)). Individuals have a reasonable expectation of pri-
    vacy in the contents of their cell phones and therefore cell
    phones may not be searched without probable cause and a
    warrant unless the search falls within one of these exceptions.
    
    Id.
     Voluntary consent from an individual possessing author-
    ity is one such exception to the Fourth Amendment protec-
    tions against warrantless search. United States v. Weston, 
    67 M.J. 390
    , 392 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
    Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 314(e)(1), states that
    “[e]vidence of a search conducted without probable cause is
    admissible if conducted with lawful consent.” An individual
    can grant consent to search when that person “exercises con-
    trol over” the property in question. M.R.E. 314(e)(2). In other
    words, consent to search can come from “a fellow occupant
    who shares common authority over the property.” Weston, 67
    M.J. at 392 (citing United States v. Matlock, 
    415 U.S. 164
    , 171
    (1974); United States v. Gallagher, 
    66 M.J. 250
    , 253 (C.A.A.F.
    2008)). The government only needs to show proof that “per-
    mission to search was obtained from a third party who pos-
    sessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship
    to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Matlock,
    
    415 U.S. at 171
    . Common authority consists of:
    [M]utual use of the property by persons generally
    having joint access or control for most purposes, so
    that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
    inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in
    his own right and that the others have assumed the
    risk that one of their number might permit the
    search.
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    United States v. Rader, 
    65 M.J. 30
    , 33 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matlock, 
    415 U.S. at
    171 n.7).
    Whether a third party exercises control over a given prop-
    erty is a question of fact. 
    Id.
     The military judge’s findings of
    fact are not disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous or un-
    supported by the record. 
    Id.
     (citing United States v. Reister,
    
    44 M.J. 409
    , 413 (C.A.A.F. 1996)). “Whether these facts rise
    to the level of joint access or control for most purposes is a
    question of law.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted) (cit-
    ing Reister, 
    44 M.J. at 415
    ).
    In Rader, this Court determined that the appellant’s
    roommate, who used the appellant’s computer to play com-
    puter games and perform routine maintenance and whose
    own computer was joined to the appellant’s by a local access
    network, possessed sufficient access and control to consent to
    a search of the computer. 65 M.J. at 31. Our evaluation in-
    cluded recognizing that the appellant did not communicate
    any restriction regarding access to his computer files to any
    of his roommates, that any understanding regarding re-
    stricted access to the appellant’s computer was tacit and un-
    clear, and that neither the computer nor any of its files were
    password protected. Id. at 34. We rejected the argument that
    the roommate did not have control over or authority to con-
    sent to a search of certain files within the computer simply
    because he only had permission to use the computer for a cer-
    tain purpose. Id.
    In the current case, the military judge determined that
    PFC (Private First Class) Avery did not possess common au-
    thority because there was no expectation by Appellant that
    PFC Avery would view anything other than the agreed upon
    materials. Appellant loaned his cell phone for one night with
    the understanding that PFC Avery would use the phone for
    texting, calling, viewing YouTube, and playing games. The
    military judge concluded that, under such circumstances, it
    would be unreasonable to conclude that PFC Avery had un-
    fettered authority to use the phone and that Appellant lend-
    ing his phone for the duration of the guard shift was “not the
    type of mutual use of property that establishes joint access or
    control for most purposes.” At no point did the military judge
    discuss the factors this Court considered in Rader.
    2
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    The Government argues, in line with the lower court deci-
    sion, that the military judge abused his discretion because the
    facts supported the legal conclusion that PFC Avery did have
    unfettered access to and control of Appellant’s phone. Appel-
    lant allowed PFC Avery to use his cell phone without any ex-
    press restrictions and gave him a passcode which allowed for
    unlimited access to the contents. United States v. Black, No.
    ARMY Misc. 20210310, 
    2021 CCA LEXIS 559
    , at *17–18,
    
    2021 WL 4953849
    , at *5 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 22, 2021) (un-
    published). The Government also adopts the lower court’s
    conclusion that the military judge erred in his interpretation
    of the law by focusing on the areas of the phone Appellant told
    PFC Avery he could use rather than on the lack of express
    restrictions on use. The lower court looked to Rader and its
    assertion that “in the personal computer context, courts ex-
    amine whether the relevant files were password-protected or
    whether the defendant otherwise manifested an intention to
    restrict third-party access.” 65 M.J. at 34 (quoting United
    States v. Aaron, 33 F. App’x 180, 184 (6th Cir. 2002)).
    Both the Government and the lower court echoed the
    premise in Rader and Matlock that mutual use of property
    carries with it the understanding that one has “assumed the
    risk” that anyone with joint access might authorize a search.
    Rader, 65 M.J at 33; Matlock 
    415 U.S. at
    171 n.7; see also
    United States v. Basinski, 
    226 F.3d 829
    , 834 (7th Cir. 2000)
    (stating that “where a defendant allows a third party to exer-
    cise actual or apparent authority over the defendant’s prop-
    erty, he is considered to have assumed the risk that the third
    party might permit access to others, including government
    agents”); United States v. Jackson, 
    598 F.3d 340
    , 347 (7th Cir.
    2010) (stating that “the third-party consent exception to the
    warrant requirement is premised on the assumption of risk
    concept”). Appellant would therefore have assumed the risks
    involved in lending out a cell phone on which he has stored
    illegal pornographic images.
    I agree with the Government that the military judge’s con-
    clusion regarding common authority was an abuse of discre-
    tion. He erred in failing to weigh the factors this Court ap-
    plied in Rader and in relying solely upon what Appellant told
    PFC Avery he could do with the phone. The military judge’s
    3
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    conclusion that the non-password-protected folders on Appel-
    lant’s phone were off-limits because Appellant did not expect
    PFC Avery to use them hinges upon the argument we rejected
    in Rader, which involved a personal computer and therefore
    implicated similar extensive access to personal material. Ap-
    pellant gave his cell phone to PFC Avery for a twelve-hour
    period and did not communicate any express restrictions.
    Given that, in their Article 39(a) Uniform Code of Military
    Justice (UCMJ), 
    10 U.S.C. § 839
    (a) (2018), hearing testimony,
    Appellant said that he thought that PFC Avery promised he
    would only use the phone for the purposes discussed but PFC
    Avery was under the impression that he had full access to the
    phone, we can conclude that any understanding regarding re-
    stricted access was tacit and unclear. And, to the extent any-
    thing was password protected, Appellant provided PFC Avery
    with the passcode by writing it down on the table. When those
    Rader factors are incorporated into the analysis, I cannot help
    but conclude that Appellant allowed PFC Avery joint access
    and control and therefore assumed the risks involved with
    lending his cell phone and its illegal contents.
    I do recognize two factors, the informal relationship be-
    tween Appellant and PFC Avery and the limited time period
    during which PFC Avery shared use of the phone, which dis-
    tinguish this case from the key cases establishing common
    authority cited by both the military judge and the lower court.
    Those cases involved a longer time period (three weeks of
    house-sitting in Reister, 
    44 M.J. at 411
    ); a more intimate re-
    lationship between the players (such as mother and son in
    Jackson, 
    598 F.3d at
    342–43, or husband and wife in Weston,
    67 M.J. at 391); or ongoing shared use (such as the roommates
    in Rader, 65 M.J. at 31, and Matlock, 
    415 U.S. at 166
    ). How-
    ever, in United States v. Crain, the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that a defendant had
    authority to consent to the search of a car because he was a
    co-occupant of the borrowed vehicle at the time and had per-
    mission to drive it for a single night. 
    33 F.3d 480
    , 484 (5th
    Cir. 1994). The military judge did not explore this line of rea-
    soning beyond stating that it was “not the type of mutual use
    property that establishes joint access or control for most pur-
    poses.” I find nothing in our case law to indicate that handing
    over property to another person, giving him “full access and
    4
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    control,” and departing for a full twelve hours is not sufficient
    to establish common authority and the accompanying as-
    sumption of risk.
    Scope of Consent
    Though I am convinced that PFC Avery was able to con-
    sent to a search of Appellant’s cell phone, I believe that the
    search performed by Sergeant First Class (SFC) Manglicmot
    was illegal because he exceeded the scope of PFC Avery’s con-
    sent. “A consensual search is reasonable under the Fourth
    Amendment so long as it remains within the scope of con-
    sent.” Jackson, 
    598 F.3d at
    348 (citing Michael C. v. Gresbach,
    
    526 F.3d 1008
    , 1015 (7th Cir. 2008)). “The standard for meas-
    uring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
    Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would
    the typical reasonable person have understood by the ex-
    change between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v.
    Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. 248
    , 251 (1991).
    The military judge concluded that, when PFC Avery
    handed over the phone with the photo gallery already opened
    and explained that he had viewed those photos, he was grant-
    ing consent to search only that portion of the phone. SFC
    Manglicmot exceeded the scope of that consent when he chose
    to back out of the photo gallery and search other sections of
    the phone for child pornography due to his own suspicions of
    what might be on the phone. The military judge viewed the
    scope of consent as limited to viewing the photos of the female
    soldiers in the open gallery.
    The Government argues that PFC Avery placed no limita-
    tions on his consent and therefore SFC Manglicmot was enti-
    tled to search other folders in the phone. In essence, PFC
    Avery gave him the phone to look at pictures and that made
    all pictures fair game. The federal cases cited by the Govern-
    ment in support of this argument involve physical closed con-
    tainers, not electronic devices. For example, in Jimeno the
    container searched was a brown paper bag on the floor of a
    car. 
    500 U.S. at 250
    . In Jackson, the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that, given consent by
    proper authority, “law enforcement may search anywhere
    within the general area where the sought-after item could be
    concealed.” 
    598 F.3d at
    348–49. But the container in question
    5
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    was the side pocket of a computer case in which the police
    found a gun. 
    Id.
     However, this Court has established that
    “[b]ecause of the vast amount of data that can be stored and
    accessed, as well as the myriad ways they can be sorted, filed,
    and protected, it is not good enough to simply analogize a cell
    phone to a container.” Wicks, 73 M.J. at 102. In Wicks, we de-
    termined that the lower court erred in relying upon a con-
    tainer analysis when assessing whether the government’s
    search of the appellant’s cell phone exceeded a private search.
    Id. at 103. We noted that a cell phone that “can be linked to a
    vast amount of personal data, some readily accessible and
    some not” does not function like a static storage container,
    and that the contents of the appellant’s cell phone were not
    readily exposed or subject to examination but required that
    the government sort through private information during its
    search.1 Id. at 102–03. Given Wicks, the question of whether
    consent to search an open folder of a cell phone means consent
    to search other folders on that phone cannot be resolved by
    relying upon single closed container cases.
    “The exclusionary rules for unlawful searches apply only
    to searches made by someone acting in a governmental capac-
    ity. Hence, the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rules
    are not implicated by a private search.” Reister, 
    44 M.J. at 415
    (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). SFC
    Manglicmot’s search was performed on behalf of the Govern-
    ment. He was summoned by the soldiers because of his au-
    thority over them and he was clear prior to the search that he
    was concerned about a potential sexual harassment or Crim-
    inal Investigation Division (CID) situation. However, PFC
    Avery’s search was premised upon the accidental opening of
    the photo gallery and his own personal curiosity. It was in no
    way conducted on behalf of the Government. See Reister, 
    44 M.J. at 415
    . Once any original expectation of privacy was
    overcome by PFC Avery’s private search, the Government
    could use the now nonprivate information without violating
    the Fourth Amendment. 
    Id.
     at 416 (citing United States v. Ja-
    cobsen, 
    466 U.S. 109
    , 117 (1984)). However, the Government
    1 Wicks involved  three increasingly broad government searches,
    all of which this Court determined had exceeded their scope, culmi-
    nating in the review of over 45,000 text messages. 73 M.J. at 101.
    6
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    may not exceed the scope of the private search, including ex-
    panding it into a general search. Wicks, 73 M.J. at 100 (citing
    Jacobsen, 
    466 U.S. at
    117–18). “Applying this to . . . cell
    phones, the scope of the private search can be measured by
    what the private actor actually viewed as opposed to what the
    private actor had access to view.” 
    Id.
    The Government must prove lawful consent to search by
    clear and convincing evidence. M.R.E. 314(e)(5). Determining
    the scope of a consent to search requires an evaluation of the
    totality of the circumstances “including the interaction be-
    tween the parties, the purpose of the search, and the circum-
    stantial evidence surrounding the search.” United States v.
    Beckmann, 
    786 F.3d 672
    , 679 (8th Cir. 2015).
    Here, one of the soldiers with PFC Avery contacted SFC
    Manglicmot about a possible incident implicating the Army’s
    Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention
    (SHARP) program and involving soldiers in their unit. Black,
    
    2021 CCA LEXIS 559
    , at *3–4 
    2021 WL 4953849
    , at *1. SFC
    Manglicmot was concerned that the photos might involve a
    sexual harassment issue. When SFC Manglicmot arrived,
    PFC Avery told him about the four photos of members of the
    unit he had viewed. PFC Avery testified at the Article 39(a),
    UCMJ, hearing that he gave SFC Manglicmot the cell phone
    “to show him the pictures, so he would know [what] the whole
    situation was, so he could possibly take action, like actions
    that I couldn’t take myself.”
    SFC Manglicmot looked at the photos and noted that they
    could be deemed sexual in nature. He then backed out of the
    open photo gallery containing the photos PFC Avery had
    viewed and began scrolling through other images. Upon see-
    ing the other photos, particularly one that “zoomed in” on the
    buttocks of a child, SFC Manglicmot had an “inkling” that
    “maybe there was something else that was deeper, that we
    should know about” and “maybe there’s more things here.” So
    he exited that photo gallery folder entirely, began scrolling
    around, and noticed icons for other folders that seemed they
    could contain sexually inappropriate materials. SFC Man-
    glicmot then opened them and discovered what he thought
    was child pornography. Only at that point did he give the
    phone back to PFC Avery and tell the soldiers to leave the
    phone there and not tell Appellant what they had seen.
    7
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    The circumstances here indicate that PFC Avery never
    asked, told, or encouraged SFC Manglicmot to search the
    phone outside of the photo gallery containing the photos of the
    clothed female soldiers. He never mentioned child pornogra-
    phy or did anything to imply he thought Appellant might have
    child pornography on his phone. His only concern was a pos-
    sible SHARP incident involving soldiers in their unit. SFC
    Manglicmot expanded the search to other folders because of
    his own “inkling.” These facts do not establish by clear and
    convincing evidence that a reasonable person would assume
    PFC Avery consented to the expansive search performed by
    SFC Manglicmot. In addition, we must reconcile the assertion
    in Wicks that a government search cannot exceed what the
    private actor actually viewed. Here, PFC Avery, during his
    private search, actually viewed photos of clothed female sol-
    diers. I therefore conclude that SFC Manglicmot exceeded the
    scope of PFC Avery’s consent to search.
    Attenuation and the Exclusionary Rule
    “Evidence derivative of an unlawful search, seizure, or in-
    terrogation is commonly referred to as ‘fruit of the poisonous
    tree’ and is generally not admissible at trial.” United States v.
    Conklin, 
    63 M.J. 333
    , 334 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (quoting Nardone
    v. United States, 
    308 U.S. 338
    , 341 (1939)). However, “[t]he
    granting of consent to search may sufficiently attenuate the
    taint of a prior violation.” 
    Id. at 338
    . Sometimes the link be-
    tween the illegal search and the discovery of the evidence is
    “too attenuated to justify suppression.” Utah v. Strieff, 
    579 U.S. 232
    , 235 (2016). Under the attenuation doctrine, “evi-
    dence is admissible when the connection between unconstitu-
    tional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been
    interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that the in-
    terest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been
    violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
    obtained.” 
    Id. at 238
     (internal quotation marks omitted)
    (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 
    547 U.S. 586
    , 593 (2006)).
    To evaluate whether consent to search is sufficiently at-
    tenuated from a Fourth Amendment violation, this Court has
    adopted the framework established by the Supreme Court in
    Brown v. Illinois, 
    422 U.S. 590
    , 603–04 (1975). Conklin, 63
    M.J. at 338.
    8
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    To determine whether the defendant’s consent was an in-
    dependent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between
    the consent and the constitutional violation, we must consider
    three factors: “(1) the temporal proximity of the illegal con-
    duct and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circum-
    stances; and (3) the purpose and the flagrancy of the initial
    misconduct.” Conklin, 63 M.J. at 338–39 (citing United States
    v. Hernandez, 
    279 F.3d 302
    , 307 (2002)). “None of these three
    factors is dispositive of attenuating the taint of the original
    wrongdoing, but rather they are examined in aggregate to de-
    termine the effect of an appellant’s consent.” United States v.
    Dease, 
    71 M.J. 116
    , 122 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing Brown, 
    422 U.S. at
    603–04).
    I largely agree with the majority’s application of the first
    two Brown factors and acknowledge that, arguably, they
    slightly favor Appellant. However, in this case, I do not find
    these first two factors to be determinative.
    I part from the majority when it comes to the third Brown
    factor, which examines the Government’s conduct. “The
    Supreme Court has identified this third factor as particularly
    important, presumably because it comes closest to satisfying
    the deterrence rationale for applying the exclusionary rule.”
    United States v. Khamsouk, 
    57 M.J. 282
    , 291 (C.A.A.F. 2002)
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing New York v.
    Harris, 
    495 U.S. 14
    , 23 (1990)). Our case law has fleshed out
    our interpretation of “purpose and flagrancy.” In Conklin,
    although we concluded that the government harbored no
    questionable motive or intent and were hesitant to call their
    actions flagrant, we decided that their “unwise, avoidable,
    and unlawful” conduct satisfied the third Brown factor. 63
    M.J. at 339. In United States v. Darnall, we determined that
    it is not “necessary that the agent’s conduct be outrageous for
    the third factor in Brown to apply” nor do we require evidence
    of “bad motive or intent” on the investigator’s behalf. 
    76 M.J. 326
    , 331 (C.A.A.F. 2017).2 Meanwhile, in deciding Strieff, the
    Supreme Court clarified that the third Brown factor was not
    2  In Darnall, we determined that law enforcement’s overall in-
    vestigation was hasty, flimsy, sloppy, and apathetic to such a de-
    gree that it “infringed inexcusably upon Appellant’s Fourth Amend-
    ment rights.” 76 M.J. at 332.
    9
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    triggered by minor misconduct such as “an isolated instance
    of negligence that occurred in connection with a bona fide
    investigation” with no evidence of systemic or recurrent police
    misconduct. 579 U.S. at 242.
    The degree of law enforcement misconduct factors heavily
    into any assessment of the application of the exclusionary
    rule. The exclusionary rule operates as a “judicially created
    remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gen-
    erally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal con-
    stitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v.
    Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 906 (1984) (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 
    414 U.S. 338
    ,
    348 (1974)).
    [T]he dissipation of the taint concept that the Court
    has applied in deciding whether exclusion is appro-
    priate in a particular case attempts to mark the
    point at which the detrimental consequences of ille-
    gal police action become so attenuated that the de-
    terrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer jus-
    tifies its cost.
    Id. at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown,
    
    422 U.S. at 609
     (Powell, J., concurring in part)). In determin-
    ing whether the exclusionary rule is warranted, a balance
    must be struck between “the public interest in determination
    of truth at trial and the incremental contribution that might
    [be] made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values.”
    Khamsouk, 57 M.J. at 292 (alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 
    428 U.S. 465
    , 488 (1976)). “[W]hen there is a Fourth Amendment vio-
    lation, the exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of
    exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits.” Strieff, 579 U.S. at
    235. “The exclusionary rule applies only where it result[s] in
    appreciable deterrence for future Fourth Amendment viola-
    tions and where the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the
    costs.” Wicks, 73 M.J. at 104 (alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States,
    
    555 U.S. 135
    , 141 (2009)).
    The military judge determined that SFC Manglicmot’s un-
    lawful search and CID’s failure to follow up on the circum-
    stances of that initial search were “the type of law enforce-
    ment and official conduct that the exclusionary rule was
    10
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    designed to deter.” The Government, in contrast, argues that,
    because SFC Manglicmot was not a law enforcement officer,
    he understandably did not know his search of the phone
    might be illegal. He had the well-intentioned goal of seeing
    whether the photos might pose a problem suitable for CID in-
    vestigation. The Government also emphasizes that the behav-
    ior of the investigators was not questionable in any other way.
    The military judge’s findings and conclusions regarding
    attenuation focus primarily on SFC Manglicmot’s actions, in-
    cluding a lengthy footnote describing what SFC Manglicmot
    could have done instead of the search he did perform. How-
    ever, I disagree that SFC Manglicmot’s search rose to the
    level of purposeful or flagrant and believe the military judge
    abused his discretion in reaching this conclusion. SFC Man-
    glicmot quite simply lacked the law enforcement training to
    understand the legal nuances of a permissible phone search.
    It is unrealistic to expect every acting SFC to have this
    knowledge. His actions appear to have been a good faith mis-
    understanding of the confines of the Fourth Amendment.
    Nor am I convinced that CID’s failure to inquire about the
    lawfulness of SFC Manglicmot’s search was unwise, avoida-
    ble, or unlawful to such a degree that it merits application of
    the exclusionary rule. Even if the CID agents should have
    suspected that SFC Manglicmot’s search might have been
    problematic, they were at worst negligent in failing to follow
    up on his mistake. The behavior of the investigators was not
    questionable in any other way. Appellant was read his rights,
    properly informed of the nature of the request for consent
    (that he was suspected of possessing child pornography), and
    properly informed that he was not required to give consent.
    Because Appellant did not know about the initial phone
    search, there is no concern that the CID agents tried to lever-
    age that to obtain his consent. In addition, law enforcement
    simultaneously approached a magistrate to obtain a search
    authorization. See Wicks, 73 M.J. at 104 (considering both
    lack of evidence that a search authorization was pursued and
    the investigating officer’s testimony that it was not her inten-
    tion or practice to seek search authorization under the cir-
    cumstances in determining that the exclusionary rule should
    apply). There is no indication of an attempt to intentionally
    circumvent Appellant’s constitutional rights, nor do we have
    11
    United States v. Black, No. 22-0066/AR
    Judge SPARKS, dissenting
    the kind of sloppy and apathetic law enforcement process we
    encountered in Darnall. As such, I cannot conclude that what
    happened here was the “type of law enforcement activity we
    would certainly hope to deter” or that we “might well be en-
    couraging rather than deterring it” by allowing admission of
    the evidence derived from this particular search. Darnall, 76
    M.J. at 332 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted). This Court’s duty to protect the Fourth Amendment val-
    ues is not further served by application of the exclusionary
    rule in a case like this.
    I therefore respectfully dissent.
    12