United States v. Palmer ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
V.
Carlos O. PALMER, Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 01-0034
Crim. App. No. 9801039
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 24, 2001
Decided June 29, 2001
GIERKE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Maanvi M. Patoir (argued); Colonel Adele
H. Odegard, Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mayfield, and Major
Mary M. McCord (on brief); Captain Stephanie L. Haines.
For Appellee: Captain Paul T. Cygnarowicz (argued); Colonel
David L. Hayden, Lieutenant Colonel Edith M. Rob, and Major
Anthony P. Nicastro (on brief).
Military Judge: Paul L. Johnston
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before publication.
United States v. Palmer, No. 01-0034/AR
Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A special court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted appellant of unlawful possession, distribution,
and use of marijuana, in violation of Article 112a, Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 USC § 912a. The court-martial sentenced
appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 6 months,
forfeiture of $617 pay per month for 6 months, and reduction to
the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority reduced the
period of confinement to 4 months and 3 days but approved the
remainder of the sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the findings and sentence.
This Court granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT HAD FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT THE MILITARY JUDGE COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR
BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT
WHEN A VALID BASIS OF ADMISSIBILITY HAD BEEN MADE AND
THE MILITARY JUDGE KNEW THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS CRUCIAL
TO THE DEFENSE CASE.
For the reasons set out below, we affirm.
Factual Background
At about 3:00 a.m. on January 26, 1998, a civilian police
officer stopped to render assistance to appellant, whose
automobile was in a ditch. When appellant rolled down the
window, the officer noticed a strong odor of alcohol. Appellant
failed several field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. During an inventory of
appellant’s car in preparation for towing it, three cellophane
bags of marijuana were seized.
At trial, three witnesses testified about appellant’s
possession, distribution, and use of marijuana. One witness,
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Private First Class (PFC) Sean Boggs, testified that he purchased
marijuana from appellant and smoked marijuana with him after each
purchase on “about seven or eight” occasions. Defense counsel
cross-examined PFC Boggs but did not ask him about any
inconsistent, out-of-court statements. PFC Boggs was permanently
excused as a witness with no objection from the defense.
During the defense case, Specialist (SPC) Timothy Sauls was
asked to relate a conversation he overheard between PFC Boggs and
appellant. The prosecution objected on hearsay grounds. During
a hearing outside the presence of the members, the military judge
asked, “[W]hat is it you want this witness to testify to?” The
following colloquoy ensued:
DC: Well, Your Honor, PFC Boggs—this soldier is privy to a
conversation that Boggs had with Specialist Palmer when
Boggs told Palmer that Palmer didn't do anything with
regards to what he is being charged with. And that
statement was made by Boggs and it goes to his state of mind
at the time the statement was made, and it's not going—it's
not hearsay.
MJ: So, what you want to do is have this witness testify
that on some occasion after the accused was charged, Boggs
said to the accused, you didn't do what you are charged
with?
DC: Something to that effect, Your Honor. Boggs made a
statement after Boggs made his 24 February statement with
regards to what's true and what's not true in his statement,
and I believe this witness has some information that goes to
the actual credibility of Boggs' statements.
MJ: Yes, Captain King? You are standing?
ATC: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. First of all, Your Honor,
if the defense wants to attack Boggs' credibility, he
certainly could have asked this question of Boggs while he
was on the stand. To offer hearsay under this —- under this
premise that it goes to some mental state or emotional
condition of Boggs while having Sauls testify about it, the
– the government submits it’s not authorized, and that is
clearly a hearsay case.
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MJ: Well, I am going to sustain the government's objection
to that one question. I do believe it is hearsay. I have
reviewed Military Rule of Evidence 803(3), an exception to
the hearsay rule cited by defense counsel about then
existing mental state, and I don't believe that this is the
type of statement that would fall within that exception to
the hearsay rule in that it’s not talking about a mental
state of Boggs as to what he is going to be doing at some
point in the future. It appears to me that what you are
trying to do is get in through hearsay Boggs' opinion about
something, so I am not—I just don't see that this fits
within the exception that you cited. I am going to sustain
the objection.
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel did not proffer any other
basis for admitting SPC Sauls’ testimony. After a short recess,
the defense rested.
Appellant now argues that SPC Sauls’ testimony was obviously
admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 613, Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States (2000 ed.),∗ to prove that Boggs made a statement
prior to trial that was inconsistent with his testimony at trial,
and that the military judge should have recognized it as such
based on the context. The Government asserts that defense
counsel did not proffer the evidence with sufficient specificity
to put the military judge on notice of the grounds for
admissibility now asserted on appeal. The Government argues
that, because of the inadequate proffer, appellant failed to
preserve the issue for appeal.
Mil. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless the ruling materially
prejudices a substantial right of a party, and
* * *
∗
All Manual provisions are identical to the ones in effect at the
time of appellant’s court-martial.
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In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the
military judge by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.
Mil. R. Evid. 613(b) provides:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by
a witness is not admissible unless the witness is
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and
the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to
interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of
justice otherwise require.
Although the usual practice is to confront the witness with
the inconsistent statement during cross-examination, it is
permissible to delay any mention of the inconsistent statement
until other witnesses are called. See United States v. Callara,
21 M.J. 259, 264-65 (CMA 1986); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lee D.
Schinasi, and David A Schlueter, Military Rules of Evidence
Manual 809 (4th ed. 1997); Drafters’ Analysis of Mil. R. Evid.
613(b), Manual, supra at A22-49.
Mil. R. Evid. 803(3), relied on by the defense at trial,
provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is--
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such
as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain,
and bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of [the]
declarant’s will.
(Emphasis added.) In United States v. Means, 24 M.J. 160, 162 (CMA
1987), this Court held, “When a ruling excludes evidence,
appellate review of the correctness of the ruling is not
preserved unless ‘the substance of the evidence was made known to
the military judge by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked.’” Military judges are not
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United States v. Palmer, No. 01-0034/AR
expected to be clairvoyant. When the basis for admissibility is
not obvious, “an offer of proof is required to clearly and
specifically identify the evidence sought to be admitted and its
significance.” Id. at 162-63.
United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 957 (1st Cir. 1992),
cited by appellant, set out the general rule: If evidence is
excluded at trial because it is inadmissible for the purpose
articulated by its proponent, the proponent cannot challenge the
ruling on appeal on the ground that the evidence could have been
admitted for another purpose. A purpose not identified at trial
does not provide a basis for reversal on appeal.
We review a military judge’s ruling excluding evidence for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Sullivan, 42 M.J. 360, 363
(1995). The proponent of evidence has the burden of showing that
it is admissible. United States v. Shover, 45 M.J. 119, 122
(1996). Because of defense counsel’s vague and misdirected
proffer, we hold that the military judge did not abuse his
discretion by sustaining the Government’s objection to the
evidence. Means, 24 M.J. at 163.
Defense counsel offered the evidence under Mil. R. Evid.
803(3) as evidence of PFC Boggs’ state of mind. He did not
sufficiently link Boggs’ state of mind to the credibility of his
testimony. He made no effort to reconcile his theory of
admissibility with the limitation in Mil. R. Evid. 803(3) that
makes it inapplicable to “a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed.”
Unlike the situation in Hudson, supra, defense counsel never
asserted that SPC Sauls’ testimony was admissible to impeach PFC
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Boggs. Defense counsel did not mention Mil. R. Evid. 613, utter
the word “inconsistent” or anything equivalent to it, or alert
the military judge to the theory of admissibility now urged on
appeal. Although Mil. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) does not require
counsel to cite the rule by number or to quote specific words
from the rule, counsel is required to alert the military judge to
the significance of the proffered evidence. In this case,
defense counsel did not allude to the inconsistency between
Boggs’ pretrial statement and his trial testimony as the basis
for admission. Instead, he focused the military judge on the
hearsay exception based on Boggs’ state of mind. If defense
counsel had two theories of admissibility, it was incumbent on
him to alert the military judge to both theories, especially when
it became apparent that the military judge was ruling only on the
basis of Mil. R. Evid. 803(3).
It is clear that the military judge was not alerted to the
possibility of a prior inconsistent statement. He observed,
without contradiction, that defense counsel was trying to “get in
through hearsay Boggs’ opinion about something.” Defense counsel
made no effort at that point to focus the military judge on any
inconsistency between Boggs’ testimony in court and the
conversation allegedly overheard by SPC Sauls.
Decision
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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