United States v. Hibbard , 2003 CAAF LEXIS 132 ( 2003 )

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Bobby HIBBARD, Chief Master Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 02-0231
Crim. App. No. 34371
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 5, 2002
Decided February 6, 2003
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., GIERKE, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Robin S. Wink (argued); Lieutenant Colonel
Beverly B. Knott, Major Patricia A. McHugh, and Major Jeffrey A. Vires
(on brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel LeEllen Coacher (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Lance B. Sigmon and Major Jennifer R. Rider (on brief).
Military Judge: Michael J. Rollinger
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Hibbard, No. 02-0231/AF
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer members
convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification
each of maltreatment, rape, indecent assault, and making a false
official statement, and two specifications alleging dereliction
of duty, in violation of Articles 93, 120, 134, 107 and 92,
Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ] 10 USC §§
893, 920, 934, 907, and 892 (2002), respectively. He was
sentenced to confinement for four years and reduction to pay
grade E-4. The convening authority approved the findings and
approved a sentence of confinement for two years and reduction
to pay grade E-4. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an
unpublished opinion.
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING
TO INSTRUCT THE MEMBERS ON THE DEFENSE OF
MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO THE COMPLAINANT'S
CONSENT AS RELATED TO THE OFFENSE OF RAPE IN
THE SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II.
For the reasons stated below, we hold that the military judge
did not err when he declined to instruct the panel of members on
the defense of mistake of fact.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Mistake of Fact Defense
When an accused is charged with a crime in which knowledge
or intent is material as to an element, “it is a defense to an
offense that the accused held, as a result of ignorance or
mistake, an incorrect belief of the true circumstances such
that, if the circumstances were as the accused believed them,
the accused would be not guilty of the offense.” Rule for
Courts-Martial 916(j) [hereinafter R.C.M.]. If the accused is
charged with a general intent offense such as rape, “the
ignorance or mistake must have existed in the mind of the
accused and must have been reasonable under all the
circumstances.” Id.
Rape is a general intent offense requiring proof that an
accused deliberately or purposefully committed an act of sexual
intercourse by force and without the victim’s consent. See
Article 120(a); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002
ed.) Part IV, para. 45.b.(1) [hereinafter MCM]; United States v.
Willis, 41 M.J. 435, 437 (C.A.A.F. 1995). “[A]n honest and
reasonable mistake of fact as to the victim’s lack of consent”
is an affirmative defense to a charge of rape. United States v.
True, 41 M.J. 424, 426 (C.A.A.F. 1995)(quoting United States v.
Taylor, 26 M.J. 127, 128 (C.M.A. 1988)).
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The military judge is required to instruct the court-
martial panel on the availability and legal requirements of an
affirmative defense, if “the record contains some evidence to
which the military jury may attach credit if it so desires.”
United States v. Brown, 43 M.J. 187, 189 (C.A.A.F. 1995)
(quoting United States v. Simmelkjaer, 18 C.M.A. 406, 410, 40
C.M.R. 118, 122 (1969)). See R.C.M. 920(e)(3); United States v.
Davis, 53 M.J. 202, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2000). An affirmative defense
“may be raised by evidence presented by the defense, the
prosecution, or the court-martial.” R.C.M. 916(b) discussion.
The defense theory at trial and the nature of the evidence
presented by the defense are factors that may be considered in
determining whether the accused is entitled to a mistake of fact
instruction, but neither factor is dispositive. See United
States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85, 91 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Taylor, 26 M.J.
at 131. “Any doubt whether an instruction ``should be given
should be resolved in favor of the accused.´” Brown, 43 M.J. at
189 (quoting United States v. Steinruck, 11 M.J. 322, 324
(C.M.A. 1981)).
B. Appellant's Trial
Appellant was prosecuted for a number of offenses,
including a charge that he raped Technical Sergeant (TSgt) W
while both were stationed in Saudi Arabia at Eskan Village.
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Appellant’s defense at trial was that he did not engage in
sexual intercourse with TSgt W.
1. Defense Counsel's Opening Statement
The central theme of defense counsel’s opening statement
was that Appellant did not engage in an act of sexual
intercourse with TSgt W. In support of this approach, defense
counsel suggested the evidence would show that TSgt W had
fabricated the rape charge. According to defense counsel, TSgt
W wanted a transfer from Saudi Arabia to the United States. The
apparent implication was that she would receive more sympathetic
consideration as a rape victim. Defense counsel indicated the
evidence would show that TSgt W had not wanted to leave her
family in Little Rock, Arkansas, where she had been stationed
for sixteen years, and that she decided to accuse Appellant of
rape after Staff Sergeant (SSgt) S told her about inappropriate
sexual advances by Appellant. Defense counsel suggested the
evidence would show that TSgt W's motive to fabricate and the
lack of medical evidence would prove that no sexual intercourse
occurred.
2. The Victim's Testimony
TSGT W was the prosecution's primary witness. She provided
the following testimony about her interaction with Appellant –
who was her first sergeant – in the brief period between her
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arrival at Eskan Village and the incident leading to the rape
charge.
During the two days following her arrival, Appellant
provided TSGT W with an orientation – showing her around the
base, including her in social functions, and introducing her to
other Air Force personnel. In the course of these activities,
Appellant pointed out a private swimming pool, indicating that
he was allowed to bring one guest to the pool. He told her not
to tell anyone else about it.
In the afternoon of her third day at the base, Appellant
called TSgt W into his office on four different occasions,
asking her each time to accompany him to the private pool that
night. Although TSgt W repeatedly attempted to avoid giving a
direct answer, Appellant pressed her to join him, and she
eventually agreed to do so. That evening, Appellant met TSgt W
at her room, telling her that they would first go to his
apartment so that he could change into his swimsuit. At the
apartment, Appellant asked TSgt W to enter his room. Because
she was reluctant to be alone with him, she declined to do so,
and remained in the hallway while he changed.
When they arrived at the private pool, no one else was
present. TSgt W hesitated because she did not want to be alone
with Appellant, but she was also concerned about acting in a
manner that would be perceived as insulting to her first
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sergeant. After Appellant prodded her, she eventually went into
the pool area, and they both entered the pool. At the time she
entered the pool, she was wearing shorts over her swimsuit.
After the pockets filled with water, causing discomfort, she
removed the shorts that covered her swimsuit. Over the period
of about an hour, Appellant and TSgt W swam and talked, spending
time in both the pool and a nearby hot tub.
While in the hot tub, Appellant asked TSgt W if she trusted
him. She replied that she did. He began to rub her feet. A
few seconds later, Appellant let go of her feet, stood up, and
“came at” her -- touching her breasts, buttocks, thighs, and
back. After trying to kiss her, he pulled aside her swimsuit
and inserted his finger into her vagina. According to TSgt W,
this initial contact lasted “a couple of seconds,” leaving her
in shock, unable to move or speak.
Appellant then left the hot tub and spread out a towel on
the deck. TSgt W told Appellant, “I can’t do this.” She next
found herself on her back on the towel, but could not recall the
details of moving from the hot tub to the towel. Appellant
pulled down his swim trunks and “came down on [her] really
fast,” leaving her able to move only her upper chest area and
head. She struggled to turn her head back and forth to avoid
Appellant’s attempts to kiss her, which led him to say, “come
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on, kiss me.” Appellant then inserted his penis into TSgt W’s
vagina.
TSgt W, who began to cry “really hard,” had difficulty
breathing. Appellant asked TSgt W if she wanted him to stop,
and she nodded an affirmative response. It is unclear whether
he saw her response, but he did not stop. When she realized
that he was not stopping, she began to cry “even harder.” He
again asked if she wanted him to stop, and TSgt W was able to
say that she wanted him to stop. Appellant then ended the act
of sexual intercourse.
After terminating the sexual activity, Appellant said: “You
are a beautiful woman and we are both adults.” He asked her to
come back to his room with him. She refused. He said that he
wanted to get to know her better, and that she should “just let
what comes natural happen” next time. He also said that she
need not worry because he had undergone a vasectomy. As they
were preparing to leave, he added: “Well, at least this was
consensual.”
3. Defense Counsel’s Cross-Examination of the Victim
The cross-examination of TSgt W by defense counsel
emphasized the defense contention that Appellant did not engage
in sexual intercourse with TSgt W. Defense counsel highlighted
inconsistencies between TSgt W’s testimony at trial and prior
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statements she made to investigating authorities. In addition,
defense counsel explored TSgt W’s unhappiness with having to
leave her family. Defense counsel did not ask any questions on
cross-examination to explore or highlight a mistake of fact
defense.
4. The Defense Case
The defense case on the merits sought to bolster the
proposition that Appellant did not engage in sexual intercourse
with TSgt W. Appellant did not seek to establish a mistake of
fact defense. Defense counsel submitted twenty-three affidavits
and multiple witnesses attesting to Appellant’s good military
character, his law-abiding nature, and his character for
truthfulness. A fellow first sergeant testified that
Appellant’s public interaction with TSgt W was neither
inappropriate or unusual. Defense counsel attempted to
discredit SSgt S’s allegations of inappropriate sexual advances
by Appellant. Defense counsel also introduced evidence that a
guard walked past Appellant and TSgt W while they were in the
hot tub, and that they had exchanged greetings. Appellant did
not testify, and the defense did not present any other evidence
of a mistake of fact defense during its case-in-chief.
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5. The Request for Instructions and
Defense Counsel’s Closing Argument
Prior to closing arguments, defense counsel moved for a
mistake of fact instruction. Defense counsel’s argument in
favor of the instruction addressed TSgt W’s remarks and actions
towards Appellant, suggesting that the record was unclear as to
whether TSgt W “communicated her non-desire” to Appellant.
Defense counsel did not cite or rely upon that aspect of TSgt
W's testimony stating that after the act was completed,
Appellant said: “Well, at least this was consensual.” Likewise,
defense counsel did not contend that TSgt W affirmatively had
indicated a desire to engage in sexual intercourse. The
military judge denied the motion, taking note of TSgt W's
testimony that Appellant had rushed toward her, pinned her down,
left her in a state of shock, and did not ask if she wanted him
to desist until after the act of penetration. The military
judge, observing that the mistake of fact defense requires both
an honest and a reasonable belief, held that there was not
enough evidence to warrant an instruction. He specifically
relied upon TSgt W’s description of the incident and the defense
theory of the case, which he described as “blanket denials of
any kind of contact whatsoever[.]”
Defense counsel’s closing argument concentrated on the
defense theory that Appellant had not engaged in sexual
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intercourse with TSgt W. Counsel did not ask the members to
consider that Appellant might have mistakenly believed that TSgt
W consented to sexual intercourse, but simply took note of the
Government’s burden to prove “lack of consent” and contended
that the Government could not do so beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Discussion
The issue of whether a jury was properly instructed is a
question of law, which we review de novo. United States v.
McDonald, 57 M.J. 18, 20 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Even if not requested
by the defense, a military judge has a sua sponte duty to give
certain instructions when reasonably raised by the evidence,
including a defense instruction as to the affirmative mistake of
fact defense. See id.; R.C.M. 920(e).
In the present case, the military judge concluded, as a
matter of law, that there was insufficient evidence of a
reasonable and honest belief to require a mistake of fact
instruction. The Court of Criminal Appeals suggested there was
some evidence that Appellant had an honest belief as to consent.
The court observed, however, that it was “difficult . . . to
imagine any court members attaching any credit” to the evidence.
United States v. Hibbard, No. ACM 34371, slip Op. at 5 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2001). The court concluded, as a matter of
law, that there was insufficient evidence of a reasonable belief
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to require an instruction. Id. For the reasons set forth
below, it is appropriate to focus on the point of agreement
between the military judge and the Court of Criminal Appeals –
that the evidence did not reasonably raise the issue of whether
Appellant had a reasonable but mistaken belief as to consent.
Because we conclude that the military judge did not err in this
regard, we need not address aspects of the ruling by the
military judge or the opinion by the court below citing other
reasons for declining to give the instruction.
On appeal, Appellant suggests that the following factors
support a mistake of fact instruction: (1) TSgt W willingly
accepted Appellant’s invitation to join him at night in a
private swimming pool; (2) she accepted a foot rub from
Appellant; (3) when Appellant engaged in sexual touching, she
did not tell him that she wanted him to stop; (4) they both got
out of the tub and laid down on a towel and had sexual
intercourse; (5) during intercourse, Appellant received “mixed
signals” in the form of heavy breathing and crying; and (6) when
he asked her after penetration if she wanted him to stop, he may
not have perceived her first response, but when he asked again
and she said “Yes” he stopped. In addition, as noted by the
Court of Criminal Appeals, at the end of the incident appellant
said, “Well, at least this was consensual.” Id.
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The test for determining whether an affirmative defense of
mistake of fact has been raised is whether the record
contains some evidence of an honest and reasonable mistake to
which the members could have attached credit if they had so
desired. R.C.M. 916(j); Davis, 53 M.J. at 205. In the present
case, as noted above, our focus is limited to the “reasonable
mistake” prong of the test. Therefore, in determining whether
the factors cited by Appellant reasonably raised the defense of
mistake of fact, we consider whether the record contains some
evidence of a reasonable mistake to which the members could have
attached credit if they had so desired. In doing so, we
consider the totality of the circumstances at the time of the
offense. Key circumstances in this case include: (1) the fact
that Appellant had a supervisory relationship with TSGT W, and a
responsibility to orient her to her new duty station; (2) his
use of the official duty environment to press her to join him at
the swimming pool that evening; (3) her manifest discomfort, as
reflected in her repeated efforts to avoid his invitation to
join him in the swimming pool, her unwillingness to enter his
apartment, and her hesitancy to enter the pool until prodded by
him; (4) his insistence that she respond to a question about
trust as a predicate for giving her a foot rub; (5) his sudden
rush at her, followed by aggressive sexual touching; (6) her
statement that this put her in a state of shock; (7) the absence
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of any evidence that she responded positively to his aggressive
sexual touching; (8) her repeated attempts to avoid his kisses;
and (9) his use of his body weight to restrict her upper body
movements.
In our consideration of whether a mistake of fact
instruction is required, we take into account the manner in
which the issue was litigated as well as the material introduced
into evidence at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Peel, 29
M.J. 235 (C.M.A. 1989).
As noted by the military judge in the present case, defense
counsel concentrated throughout the trial on the theory that
Appellant had not engaged in sexual intercourse with TSgt W.
Defense counsel steadfastly adhered to the theory of no sexual
intercourse in his opening statement, during his cross-
examination of TSgt W, in the presentation of defense evidence,
and in his closing argument.
With respect to cross-examination, defense counsel’s
approach to the prosecution’s key witness, TSgt W, is
informative – particularly because Appellant, at trial and on
appeal, has relied on her testimony as the basis for the
instruction. At best, TSGT W’s testimony described a situation
that the defense might have explored in greater detail to
reasonably raise a mistake of fact. Such an approach, however,
would have entailed an element of risk, because the cross-
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examination might have produced testimony that more firmly
demonstrated an absence of consent. The fact that such an
approach would have been risky, however, does not mean that the
defense could leave the details unexplored and then expect to
receive a mistake of fact instruction. Without such
exploration, TSGT W’s testimony did not describe a situation
that reasonably raised a mistake of fact as to her willingness
to engage in sexual intercourse.
In the present case, defense counsel made no attempt on
cross-examination of TSgt W to explore and develop grounds for a
mistake of fact. Instead, counsel used cross-examination to
highlight inconsistencies and establish motive in an attempt to
bolster his own theory that no sexual intercourse occurred. See
Jones, 49 M.J. at 90.
Although it is not necessary to present evidence of a
mistake of fact in the defense case on the merits or to discuss
such evidence in closing argument in order to obtain an
instruction in a proper case, see, e.g., United States v.
Sellers, 33 M.J. 364, 368 (C.M.A. 1991), it is appropriate for
an appellate court to take into account the absence of such a
presentation in assessing the significance of the evidence. We
note that TSgt W’s testimony regarding Appellant’s remark --
“Well, at least this was consensual” – was treated at trial as
an isolated remark unconnected to specific evidence of
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Appellant’s understanding or intent. Defense counsel did not
seek to connect it to any other evidence at trial, nor did
defense counsel seek through argument to suggest that the case
involved sexual intercourse which Appellant believed to be
consensual. Although the defense presentation at trial is not
dispositive in determining what affirmative defenses have been
reasonably raised by the evidence, we may take into account the
absence of a mistake of fact approach from the defense case when
considering evidence such as TSGT W’s testimony about
Appellant’s parting remark. See Taylor, 26 M.J. at 131. In
that context, Appellant’s cursory parting remark -- that “at
least” the act was consensual –- need not be viewed as anything
more than an after-the-fact attempt to recast unpleasant
circumstances in a favorable light. Cf. United States v.
Buckley, 35 M.J. 262 (C.M.A. 1992)(appellant's remark to victim
that he thought she was awake did not raise mistake of fact as
to consent).
In summary, the evidence cited by the defense in light of
the totality of the circumstances, including the manner that the
issue was litigated at trial, was insufficient to reasonably
raise the issue of whether Appellant had a reasonable belief
that TSgt W consented to sexual intercourse.
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III. Conclusion
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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