United States v. Quick , 2004 CAAF LEXIS 363 ( 2004 )

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Spencer W. QUICK, Private
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 03-0566
Crim. App. No. 200001657
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 11, 2004
Decided April 19, 2004
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined. CRAWFORD, C.J., filed
an opinion concurring in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Commander Michael J. Wentworth, JAGC, USNR
(argued); Lieutenant Commander Eric J. McDonald, JAGC, USN (on
brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Christopher J. Hajec, JAGC, USNR
(argued); Commander Robert P. Taishoff, JAGC, USN (on brief);
Lieutenant Frank L. Gatto, JAGC, USN.
Military Judge: R. H. Kohlmann
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication.
United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, Private (E-1) Spencer W. Quick, was tried by a
military judge sitting as a general court-martial. He entered
guilty pleas to rape, wrongful appropriation, robbery, assault
with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and kidnapping
in violation of Articles 120, 121, 122, 128 and 134, Uniform
Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 921, 922, 928
and 934 (2000), respectively. Following an inquiry into the
providence of his pleas, he was convicted of all charges. Quick
was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 65
years and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Pursuant to a
pretrial agreement, the convening authority approved the
sentence but suspended all confinement in excess of 30 years.1
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed
the conviction pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) (2000). That court consolidated the robbery and
aggravated assault specifications into a single specification
under Article 122, affirmed the consolidated specification and
remaining charges, reassessed the sentence, and affirmed the
adjudged sentence as approved by the convening authority.
United States v. Quick, NMCM 200001657 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
April 18, 2003).
1
The suspended portion of Quick’s sentence terminates 12 months
after he is released from confinement.
2
United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
Quick petitioned this Court and we granted review of the
following issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY HIS
TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL’S CONCESSION DURING
HIS SENTENCING ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT
DESERVED A DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE, AND THAT
CONFINEMENT FOR 40 YEARS OR LESS WAS NOT
EXCESSIVE, BECAUSE “THE REASONABLE
LIKELIHOOD THAT THE APPELLANT WOULD HAVE
RECEIVE[D] AT LEAST A DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE
AND CONFINEMENT WELL IN EXCESS OF 40 YEARS
CANNOT BE DOUBTED.”
We find that Quick has failed to meet his burden of showing
prejudice under the ineffective assistance of counsel test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
FACTS
Quick’s guilty pleas arose out of a number of offenses he
committed in the early morning hours of June 2, 1999. After
spending the previous night drinking at an “adult” nightclub,
Quick hired a taxi driven by a young woman. He initially
directed her to drive to various places in an unsuccessful
search for a friend. He then had her drive to his barracks at
Camp LeJeune and as he was getting out of the taxi, he noticed a
rock on the floor. He grabbed the driver by the neck and pulled
her into the back seat where he struck her several times on the
head with the rock.
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
Following the assault, Quick drove the taxi from Camp
LeJeune to a rural area where he raped the semi-conscious
driver. He then drove the cab around with the driver in the
back seat until it ran out of gas. Quick took $110.00 that he
found in the cab and fled the scene, leaving the driver alone
and injured.
Based on his pleas, his admissions during the providence
inquiry and the stipulation of fact, the military judge found
Quick guilty of rape, wrongful appropriation of a vehicle,
robbery, aggravated assault and kidnapping. Quick was advised
by the military judge that based on his pleas alone he faced a
maximum sentence that included, inter alia, a dishonorable
discharge and confinement for life without parole.
During his sentencing case, Quick made a brief unsworn
statement in which he apologized to his victim, his mother, and
the Marine Corps. He asked for forgiveness but made no mention
of any specific type of punishment. Defense counsel, in
concluding his sentencing argument, stated:
[Quick] is not the animal that the
[G]overnment presents to you and says,
[“]Lock him up and throw away the key and
let him die behind bars.[”] The defense has
no reason to argue a lesser type of
discharge other than a dishonorable is
proper in this case. The defense concedes
that [it] is. This type of conduct truly
deserves to be labeled as dishonorable. The
other punishments are collateral. They have
no real consequences in the outcome of this
case. But the real issue is: How much time
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
is enough? How long does he deserve to be
locked up[?]
He won’t go . . . prey on people again.
He does not have that tendency in his life.
There’s no indication that he’s ever been
violent. He’s never abused other women.
And that’s a predicament that he won[’]t
give us in the future, especially when he
gets an opportunity to receive the type of
treatment that he does. A period of
confinement in a term of years is adequate,
Your Honor, to punish him, to let society
know he has been punished, to allow him to
accomplish one of the goals of punishment in
a sentence of rehabilitation, and to give
him light at the end of the tunnel that may
allow him, one day, to get out and adjust
and live life again.
The defense will argue that any period
of confinement in excess of 40 years is
excessive. It is not necessary. Not for
the military judge, who has a horribly
difficult task here, to work through all of
this stuff and try to understand this
particular individual. And to try to scope
and mold a punishment that will adequately
punish him and serve the needs of justice in
the military in that particular accused,
Your Honor.
(Emphasis added.) The military judge sentenced Quick to a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for 65 years and
forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Pursuant to Quick’s
pretrial agreement, the convening authority suspended all
confinement in excess of 30 years for a period of 12 months
following Quick’s release from confinement and approved the
remainder of the sentence as adjudged.
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Quick claimed that
his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he “conceded
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
the appropriateness of a dishonorable discharge and confinement
of up to 40 years.” The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
that defense counsel’s sentencing argument constituted deficient
performance when he conceded the appropriateness of the
dishonorable discharge where the record did not reflect Quick’s
agreement. The lower court concluded, however, that Quick had
not demonstrated prejudice and therefore failed to carry his
burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel.
On appeal to this Court, Quick again raises the argument
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in conceding
the appropriateness of a dishonorable discharge and confinement
of up to 40 years. In addition, Quick asserts that the Court of
Criminal Appeals applied the wrong standard in determining that
there was no prejudice. We review this decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals de novo as a question of law. See United
States v. Key, 57 M.J. 246, 249 (C.A.A.F. 2002); United States
v. Sales, 56 M.J. 255 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
DISCUSSION
Quick’s claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance is reviewed under the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
In Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that the “benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a
just result.” Id. at 686. To determine whether the result in
any particular case was unreliable, the Supreme Court went on to
establish a two-prong test:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s
assistance was so defective as to require
reversal of a conviction . . . has two
components. First, the defendant must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable. Unless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown
in the adversarial process that renders the
result unreliable.
Id. at 687. Key, 57 M.J. at 249.
The burden on an appellant is heavy because counsel is
presumed to have performed in a competent, professional manner.
To overcome this presumption, an appellant must show specific
defects in counsel’s performance that were “unreasonable under
prevailing professional norms.” United States v. Anderson, 55
M.J. 198, 201 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
There is, however, no particular order that must be
followed in analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should
be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also United
States v. Adams, __ M.J. __, __ (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States
v. McConnell, 55 M.J. 479, 481 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly concluded
that the trial defense counsel improperly conceded the
appropriateness of a dishonorable discharge where the record was
silent as to the wishes of his client, see, e.g., United States
v. Dresen, 40 M.J. 462, 465 (C.M.A. 1994), that court did not
address trial defense counsel’s concession regarding the
appropriate amount of confinement. Because we can resolve this
case by addressing the prejudice prong of Strickland, we need
not decide whether the trial defense counsel’s concession as to
confinement met the first prong of Strickland. In addressing
the prejudice prong, it is first necessary to examine Quick’s
claim that the Court of Criminal Appeals used the wrong standard
in analyzing prejudice.
The Court of Criminal Appeals properly cited Strickland and
the appropriate standard for evaluating ineffective assistance
of counsel. That court went on, however, to cite our decision
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
in United States v. Pineda, 54 M.J. 298 (C.A.A.F. 2001), a case
that also involved a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel based
on the concession of a punitive discharge by the defense counsel
where the record did not reflect the appellant’s agreement.
Although this Court relied on the Strickland prejudice standard
in Pineda, the opinion did include the following language:
“[W]here the facts of a given case compel a conclusion that a
bad-conduct discharge was reasonably likely, we do not normally
order a new sentence hearing.” Id. at 301.
Quick argues that whether a particular result was
“reasonably likely” is not the proper standard and goes on to
argue that the “Court of Criminal Appeals must be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that its reassessment has rendered
that constitutional deprivation harmless.” At oral argument the
Government asserted that while the Strickland test is generally
the appropriate test for assessing prejudice, Pineda established
a different test for ineffective assistance of counsel cases
that involve an improper concession of a punitive discharge by
defense counsel.
We agree with Quick that the Court of Criminal Appeals
utilized the wrong standard in analyzing the prejudice prong of
Strickland, but disagree with his assertion that “beyond a
reasonable doubt” is the correct standard. Quick appears to
argue that once he meets the first prong (deficient performance)
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
under Strickland, he has shown a constitutional violation which
shifts the burden to the Government to demonstrate that the
deficient performance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Quick misperceives the test. The Supreme Court in Strickland
established a two-prong test which must be met before there is a
finding of constitutional violation. Absent a showing of both
deficient performance and prejudice, there is no constitutional
violation under Strickland.
The second prong of the Strickland test does not include
the “reasonably likely” language relied on by the Court of
Criminal Appeals. Rather, the appropriate test for prejudice
under Strickland is whether there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error, there would have been a different
result. 466 U.S. at 694. The Court of Criminal Appeals
properly cited Strickland as controlling authority and that is
the standard it should have applied, not a standard measuring
whether the sentence adjudged was “reasonably likely.”
In Pineda, this Court assessed prejudice “under the second
prong of the test in Strickland.” 54 M.J. at 301. To the
extent that the language in Pineda referenced by the Court of
Criminal Appeals has caused uncertainty in regard to the proper
standard for prejudice in cases involving concessions of
punitive discharges, we take this opportunity to clarify that
the Strickland test is the proper vehicle for reviewing a claim
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
that a defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by conceding the appropriateness of a punitive
discharge.
We now turn to the prejudice prong of Strickland – is there
a reasonable probability that, absent the error, there would
have been a different result?
Quick’s pleas, his admissions during the providence inquiry
and the stipulation of fact reveal a brutally senseless crime.
For no explained reason, and certainly with no provocation,
Quick struck the taxi driver with a rock several times
inflicting, among other injuries, a “severe concussion . . .
deep cuts to the head . . . swelling and discoloration of the
tongue, and a brain contusion.” This assault was but a first
step in a course of conduct marked by a total disregard for the
physical well-being and human dignity of the victim. After
having beaten, kidnapped and raped her, Quick ultimately
abandoned her in a rural area.
Given the nature of the crime there is no reasonable
probability that, even if defense counsel had not conceded a
dishonorable discharge and argued for 40 years confinement,
there would have been a different result. This is underscored
by the fact that this was a trial by military judge alone. The
record does not reveal that the military judge was perceptibly
swayed by defense counsel’s concessions. To the contrary, in
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
the face of trial counsel’s argument that Quick be confined for
life, the military judge appears to have exercised independent
judgment in determining an appropriate sentence.
While the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the wrong
standard in their prejudice analysis, the result does not
change. Under the facts of this case, there is no reasonable
probability that, absent the error, the result would have been
different. Quick has failed to meet his burden to establish
prejudice under the Strickland test.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (concurring in the result):
I agree with the majority that Appellant suffered no
prejudice from defense counsel’s allegedly deficient
performance. I disagree, however, that “trial defense counsel
improperly conceded [during the sentencing argument] the
appropriateness of a dishonorable discharge” and that any period
of confinement in excess of forty years is excessive. ___ M.J.
(8). In my view, counsel’s concession was an appropriate
tactical decision aimed to ensure his credibility with the
court-martial and assess reasonable sentencing probabilities.
To this end, counsel would have been remiss not to concede the
appropriateness of a dishonorable discharge and a lengthy period
of confinement. Accordingly, I concur only in the result of the
lead opinion.
Both the Sixth Amendment and Article 27, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (2000), guarantee an accused
the significant right to effective assistance of counsel.
United States v. Fluellen, 40 M.J. 96, 98 (C.M.A. 1994).
Importantly, there are “countless ways to provide effective
assistance in any given case.” Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984). As to effective assistance during the
closing and sentencing argument, “deference to counsel's
tactical decisions in his closing presentation is particularly
important because of the broad range of legitimate defense
United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
strategy at that stage.” Yarborough v. Gentry, ___ U.S. ___,
___, 124 S.Ct. 1, 4 (2003)(per curiam). Such arguments should
“sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of
fact, but which issues to sharpen and how best to clarify them
are questions with many reasonable answers.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Defense counsel’s concession in the instant case was, in my
view, a legitimate tactical decision to which this Court should
afford great deference. “[C]onfessing a client’s shortcomings
. . . is precisely the sort of calculated risk that lies at the
heart of an advocate’s discretion. By candidly acknowledging
his client’s shortcomings, counsel might have built credibility
with the jury and persuaded it to focus on the relevant issues
in the case.” Id. at 6. The same tactic was famously employed
by Clarence Darrow in the Leopold and Loeb case:
I do not know how much salvage there is in these two
boys . . . . [Y]our Honor would be merciful if you
tied a rope around their necks and let them die;
merciful to them, but not merciful to civilization,
and not merciful to those who would be left behind.
Id. at 6-7 (quoting Famous American Jury Speeches 1086 (Hicks
ed. 1925)(reprint 1990)). In this vein, counsel’s concession
that Appellant’s conduct “deserves to be labeled as
dishonorable” and “that any period of confinement in excess of
forty years is excessive” was a calculated attempt to build
credibility with the judge.
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
Moreover, defense counsel appropriately realized that given
the severity of Appellant’s offenses and the resultant injuries
to the victim, counsel’s best argument was to limit the
difference between the sentence cap on the pretrial agreement
and any sentence announced and approved by the convening
authority. Appellant’s pretrial agreement permitted the
convening authority to suspend any confinement in excess of 30
years. Suspension of confinement, unlike disproval of
confinement, can be revoked upon further misconduct by the
accused. Given Appellant’s established history of criminal
offense and alcohol abuse, defense counsel astutely acknowledged
the likelihood of future misconduct, and therefore the
likelihood of the suspension’s revocation. In short, by
conceding that confinement over 40 years would be excessive,
counsel in effect limited to ten years the additional
confinement Appellant would serve were his suspension revoked.
Finally, counsel’s concession as to excessive confinement
was also a legitimate attempt to avoid an unfavorable life
sentence for Appellant. Appellant would earn 10 days of “good
time” credit each month for his 30 year sentence, but no “good
time” credit for a life sentence. U.S. Dep’t of Defense,
Instruction 1325.7, Administration of Military Correctional
Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority, Enclosure 26.1.1-
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United States v. Quick, No. 03-0566/MC
.5 (July 17, 2001).∗ In this light, defense counsel not only
negotiated a favorable deal for Appellant, but by making a
credible sentencing argument, may well have avoided a sentence
of life or life without parole.
Given the reasonable tactical motives behind defense
counsel’s concession, as well as the substantial deference this
Court should afford counsel when analyzing ineffective
assistance claims, I cannot find the concession improper. On
the contrary, defense counsel’s actions on Appellant’s behalf
were entirely consistent with the “wide range of reasonable
professional assistance” considered to be effective.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Concluding otherwise, as the
majority does, will result in a disservice to accuseds by
encouraging counsel to be timid in employing pro forma
sentencing arguments simply to avoid ineffectiveness claims.
Accordingly, I concur only in the lead opinion’s ultimate
result.
∗
The current instruction is materially identical to the one in effect at the
time of trial.
4