United States v. Davis , 2007 CAAF LEXIS 535 ( 2007 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Jess M. DAVIS, Airman First Class
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 06-0439
Crim. App. No. 35932
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued January 17, 2007
Decided April 23, 2007
EFFRON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BAKER, ERDMANN, and STUCKY, JJ., joined. RYAN, J., filed a
separate concurring opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major John N. Page III (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Mark R. Strickland (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Donna S. Rueppell (argued); Colonel
Gerald R. Bruce and Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs (on
brief).
Military Judge: James L. Flanary
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Davis, No. 06-0439/AF
Chief Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer members
convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of assault
consummated by a battery (three specifications) in violation of
Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 928 (2000). The court-martial returned findings of not guilty
with respect to rape (two specifications) and indecent assault
(one specification). See Articles 120 and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 920, 934 (2000). The sentence adjudged by the court-martial
and approved by the convening authority included a bad-conduct
discharge, confinement for six months, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted grade. The United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed. United States v. Davis, 62 M.J. 645(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT REQUIRED APPELLANT TO DEMONSTRATE
PREJUDICE FROM THE DENIAL OF HIS SUBSTANTIAL
PRETRIAL RIGHT TO AN OPEN ARTICLE 32 HEARING,
CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OPINION IN UNITED STATES
V. CHUCULATE, 5 M.J. 143 (C.M.A. 1978) THAT
STATES THE COURT WILL NOT TEST FOR PREJUDICE.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. PUBLIC ACCESS TO PRETRIAL HEARINGS UNDER ARTICLE 32, UCMJ
A formal pretrial investigation is a predicate to the
referral of charges to a general court-martial unless the
accused waives the pretrial proceeding. Article 32, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 832 (2000); Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(a).
The procedures for an Article 32 hearing include representation
of the accused by counsel, the right to present evidence, and
the right to call and cross-examine witnesses. Article 32(b);
R.C.M. 405(b)-(i).
A military accused is entitled to a public Article 32
hearing “absent cause shown that outweighs the value of
openness.” ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F.
1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted). R.C.M. 405(h)(3)
vests the authority to close an Article 32 hearing in the
commander who ordered the investigation. A command decision to
close an Article 32 hearing must be made on a “case-by-case,
witness-by-witness, and circumstance-by-circumstance basis.”
Powell, 47 M.J. at 365. The present appeal concerns the
applicable standards at both the trial and appellate level for
reviewing a decision to close all or part of an Article 32
hearing.
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B. PARTIAL CLOSURE OF APPELLANT’S ARTICLE 32 HEARING
The charges in the present case alleged sexual offenses
against three women, AC, LG, and MM. All three appeared
voluntarily at the Article 32 hearing. Immediately prior to the
hearing, defense counsel learned that the investigating officer
planned to close the proceeding during the testimony of AC and
LG. Defense counsel objected on the ground that “[n]either
evinced any embarrassment or timidity regarding the alleged
events” during defense counsel’s interviews prior to the
hearing. The investigating officer overruled the objection and
excluded the public during AC and LG’s testimony “due to the
sensitive and potentially embarrassing nature of the testimony
and in order to encourage complete testimony about the alleged
offenses . . . .”
At trial, Appellant moved to dismiss the charges,
contending that the investigating officer improperly closed a
portion of the Article 32 hearing. The military judge ruled
that the investigating officer had violated Appellant’s right to
an open Article 32 hearing, but declined to order relief on the
ground that improper closure resulted in no “articulable harm”
to Appellant.
C. CONSIDERATION OF CLOSURE BY THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the
military judge that the investigating officer violated
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Appellant’s right to a public Article 32 hearing. Davis, 62
M.J. at 647. The court further determined that the military
judge erred in failing to provide a remedy. Id. at 647-48.
Taking note of Appellant’s timely objection at trial, the court
observed: “Having established a violation of his substantial
pretrial rights, the appellant should have had his right to a
public pretrial investigative hearing enforced by the military
judge -- without a showing of prejudice or articulable harm.”
Id. at 648. The court concluded that “the military judge abused
his discretion by not dismissing the affected charges to allow
for reinvestigation under Article 32.” Id.
After concluding that the military judge erred, the Court
of Criminal Appeals tested that error for prejudice. Id. The
court concluded that the error in closing a portion of the
Article 32 proceeding did not result in prejudice to the
findings and sentence at trial. Id. at 648-49. In particular,
the court noted that: (1) the defense counsel had access to
written statements by the witnesses and had interviewed the
witnesses prior to trial; (2) defense counsel had cross-examined
the witnesses at the Article 32 hearing; (3) defense counsel
cross-examined the witnesses in the subsequent public trial; (4)
the witnesses recounted their allegations at various times
before and during the trial and their individual accounts
remained consistent throughout the process; (5) there was no
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evidence that the closure of the Article 32 hearing impeded
defense counsel’s trial preparation or that the testimony of the
witnesses would have changed had there been a second, open
Article 32 proceeding; and (6) defense counsel was able to
effectively cross-examine the witnesses, resulting in acquittal
of both alleged rapes and one indecent assault. Id.
The Government has not appealed the ruling of the military
judge, affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the
investigating officer erred in closing the Article 32
proceeding. Likewise, the Government has not appealed the
determination of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the military
judge erred by not requiring a new Article 32 proceeding in
light of the closure. The present appeal calls upon our Court
to determine whether: (1) the Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly determined that the military judge’s error should be
tested for prejudice, and (2) whether the court correctly
concluded that the error was not prejudicial.
D. DIVERGENT VIEWS IN PRIOR CASES REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF
PREJUDICE DURING APPELLATE REVIEW OF ARTICLE 32 ERRORS
Before our Court, parties in the present appeal have cited
cases that reflect two different approaches to the evaluation of
error in Article 32 proceedings. One line of cases holds that
appellate courts must test Article 32 errors for prejudice.
See, e.g., United States v. Mickel, 9 C.M.A. 324, 327, 26 C.M.R.
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104, 107 (1958) (testing for prejudice the denial of right to
counsel at Article 32 hearing); United States v. Holt, 52 M.J.
173, 184 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (testing for prejudice inappropriate
post-hearing conduct by the Article 32 investigating officer);
United States v. Johnson, 53 M.J. 459, 462 (C.A.A.F. 2000)
(testing for prejudice the improper production of witness at
Article 32 proceeding by illegal subpoena); United States v.
Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297, 302 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (testing for
prejudice when Article 32 investigating officer later served as
staff judge advocate on case returned for rehearing).
A second line of cases provides for reversal without a
showing of prejudice upon timely objection to an error at the
Article 32 hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Worden, 17
C.M.A. 486, 489, 38 C.M.R. 284, 287 (1968) (reversing conviction
based upon timely objection to denial of effective assistance of
counsel at Article 32 proceeding); United States v. Maness, 23
C.M.A. 41, 47, 48 C.M.R. 512, 518 (1974) (reversing conviction
based upon timely objection to denial of civilian counsel at
Article 32 proceeding); United States v. Donaldson, 23 C.M.A.
293, 294, 49 C.M.R. 542, 543 (1975) (reversing conviction upon
timely objection to Article 32 investigating officer’s legal
authority); United States v. Chestnut, 2 M.J. 84, 85 (C.M.A.
1976) (reversing conviction upon timely objection to failure to
produce rape victim at Article 32 hearing); see also United
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States v. Chuculate, 5 M.J. 143, 145-46 (C.M.A. 1978) (declining
to reverse conviction for failure to produce a civilian witness
at the Article 32 proceeding when the defense failed to request
a deposition in lieu of live testimony and there was no showing
of adverse effect at trial).
II. ANALYSIS
A. CONSIDERATION OF ARTICLE 32 ERRORS DURING DIRECT REVIEW
OF THE FINDINGS AND SENTENCE
The parties have not articulated, and we have not
identified, a persuasive theory that would justify two separate
lines of authority for evaluating the effects of an erroneous
ruling at trial with respect to the rights of an accused under
Article 32. In that light, we identify here a set of principles
for evaluating the effect of a ruling in which a military judge
erroneously failed to provide an adequate remedy at trial for a
violation of the rights of the accused in an Article 32
proceeding.
We begin our analysis with the applicable statutory
requirement for evaluation of an error: “A finding or sentence
of court-martial may not be held incorrect on the ground of an
error of law unless the error materially prejudices the
substantial rights of the accused.” Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C § 859(a) (2000). Article 59(a) establishes an appellate
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standard for review of the findings and sentence, not a trial-
level standard for ruling on motions. In that regard, we note
that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that the
military judge erred by requiring a showing of prejudice as a
precondition to providing a remedy for violation of Appellant’s
rights at an Article 32 proceeding. Davis, 62 M.J. at 647-48.
The UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial provide an
accused with a substantial set of rights at an Article 32
proceeding. See, e.g., R.C.M. 405. As a general matter, an
accused is required to identify and object to any errors in the
Article 32 proceeding at the outset of the court-martial, prior
to trial on the merits. See R.C.M. 905(b)(1). When an accused
makes an objection at that stage, the impact of an Article 32
violation on the trial is likely to be speculative at best. The
time for correction of such an error is when the military judge
can fashion an appropriate remedy under R.C.M. 906(b)(3) before
it infects the trial, not after the members, witnesses, and
parties have borne the burden of trial proceedings. See Mickel,
9 C.M.A. at 327, 26 C.M.R. at 107; R.C.M. 906(b)(3). In the
event that an accused disagrees with the military judge’s
ruling, the accused may file a petition for extraordinary relief
to address immediately the Article 32 error. See ABC, Inc. v.
Powell, 47 M.J. 80 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (granting petition for
extraordinary relief and issuing a writ of mandamus).
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When the case reaches the appellate courts on direct
review, however, the situation is quite different. Article
59(a), like its federal civilian counterpart, Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(a), recognizes that errors are likely to occur in the dynamic
atmosphere of a trial, and that prejudice must be shown before
reversing the findings or sentence. Article 59(a) is applied
through standards of review and appellate burdens tailored to
the issue on appeal. As a general matter, for example, if an
appellant demonstrates that a ruling by the military judge was
in error, the burden then shifts to the government to
demonstrate that the error was harmless. United States v.
Pollard, 38 M.J. 41, 52 (C.M.A. 1993). If the error is of
constitutional dimension or involves unlawful command influence,
the government must show that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Bins, 43 M.J. 79, 86
(C.A.A.F. 1995) (constitutional error); United States v.
Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 151 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (unlawful command
influence). An error is treated as inherently prejudicial,
without the need for a further showing of prejudice, only if it
amounts to a “structural defect[] in the constitution of the
trial.” See United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 6 (C.A.A.F.
1996).
In summary, on appeal we evaluate an error in an Article 32
proceeding under Article 59(a). The standard of review and
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allocation of burdens in such cases depends on whether the
defect amounts to a structural constitutional error or other
constitutional error, unlawful command influence, or other
nonconstitutional error. To the extent that our prior case law
reflects inconsistent treatment of Article 59(a) in the context
of Article 32 errors, we take this opportunity to reiterate that
Article 59(a) applies to all Article 32 errors considered on
direct review of the findings and sentence of a court-martial.
B. IMPACT OF THE ERROR IN APPELLANT’S ARTICLE 32 HEARING
Although the Article 32 investigation is an important
element of the military justice process, it is not part of the
court-martial. An Article 32 investigation takes place before
the convening authority’s decision to refer a case for trial by
general court-martial. See R.C.M. 405(a); R.C.M. 407(a)(5);
R.C.M. 601(d)(2)(A). A case may be referred to trial by special
court-martial without conducting an Article 32 investigation,
even though a special court-martial can result in the stigma of
a punitive discharge and confinement for up to one year. See
R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(B); R.C.M. 404; R.C.M. 405(a). In light of
those considerations, the Article 32 investigation is not so
integral to a fair trial that an error in the proceeding
necessarily falls within the narrow class of defects treated by
the Supreme Court as structural error subject to reversal
without testing for prejudice. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
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United States v. Davis, No. 06-0439/AF
U.S. 279, 307-10 (1991) (distinguishing between “trial errors”
and “structural defects” when applying harmless error analysis);
2 Steven A. Childress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of
Review § 7.03 (3d ed. 1999).
The court below treated the error as a nonstructural error
of constitutional dimension that could be tested for prejudice.
Davis, 62 M.J. at 648. The lower court concluded that the error
in closing the proceeding was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 649.
We need not determine in this case whether the improper
closure of the Article 32 proceeding was an error of
constitutional or nonconstitutional dimension. As summarized
above in Section I.C., the Court of Criminal Appeals conducted a
detailed prejudice evaluation of the erroneous partial closure
of the Article 32 hearing, concluding that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis, 62 M.J. at 648-49.
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals for the reasons set
forth in that court’s opinion. Id. In short, irrespective of
whether the error was of constitutional or nonconstitutional
dimension, the court below did not err in affirming Appellant’s
conviction.
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III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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Ryan, Judge (concurring):
I agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the
erroneous partial closure of this Article 32, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2000), investigation
was harmless, irrespective of the characterization of the nature
of this error. I write separately because the lower court’s
citation to and reliance on ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363(C.A.A.F. 1997), to support the position that the Sixth Amendment
right to an “open trial” applies at an Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation is misplaced, and there is no reason for this Court
not to say so.
Powell does not hold that the Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial applies to an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation.
Indeed, while Powell recognizes that this Court has “never
addressed the direct question whether the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution affords a military accused the right to a public
Article 32 hearing[,]” 47 M.J. at 365, Powell does not itself
answer that direct question. I respectfully disagree that we
should avoid correcting an obvious misapprehension of Powell’s
holding by at least one of the Courts of Criminal Appeals.
Regarding the answer to the question whether there is a
right to an open Article 32, UCMJ, investigation under the
Sixth Amendment, I agree with the majority opinion that the
issue was neither raised by the Government nor briefed by the
parties. This case is thus not the proper vehicle to address
United States v. Davis, No. 06-0439/AF
the question, even though, in response to questions from the
Court, both parties appeared to concede at argument that the
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is not applicable to
a pretrial proceeding under Article 32, UCMJ.
Of course, but for the lower court’s opinion and rationale
for its holding, I would not have thought that this was either an
open or close question. The pertinent language of the Sixth
Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial . . . .” U.S.
Const. amend. VI (emphasis added). As the majority recognizes,
the Article 32, UCMJ, investigation is not itself part of the
court-martial -– the trial. __ M.J. __ (11) (stating that the
Article 32, UCMJ, investigation “is not part of the court-
martial”). Rather, it precedes the trial.
Pursuant to Article 32(a), UCMJ, no charge may even be
referred to a trial by general court-martial until the Article
32, UCMJ, pretrial investigation has been completed. See Rule
for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(a); R.C.M. 407(a)(5); R.C.M.
601(d)(2). The Article 32, UCMJ, investigation precedes all of
the following: the determination whether there will be a trial;
the decision whether the charge will be referred to general
court-martial; and the decision as to what charges, if any, may
be referred to a general court-martial. See Article 32, UCMJ.
Given the language of the Sixth Amendment and the logical and
temporal divide between “trial” and “pretrial,” I await with
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interest arguments in the appropriate case that address whether
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applies to a pretrial
Article 32, UCMJ, investigation.
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